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Apologetic lectures on the
moral truths of

APOLOGETIC LECTURES

ON THE

MORAL TRUTHS OF CHRISTIANITY.

PRINTED BY MURRAY AND GIBB,

FOR

T. & T. CLARK, EDINBURGH.

LONDON, HAMILTON, ADAMS, AND CO.

DUBLIN, ROBERTSON AND CO.

NEW YORK, SCRIBNER, WELFORD, AND ARMSTRONG.

APOLOGETIC LECTURES
ON THE
MORAL TRUTHS OF CHRISTIANITY.

BY
✓
CHR. ERNST LUTHARDT,
DOCTOR AND PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY.

Translated from the German by
SOPHIA TAYLOR.

SECOND EDITION.

EDINBURGH:
T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET.
1876.

P R E F A C E.

IN now sending forth to the public my Lectures on the 'Morality of Christianity,' I can but accompany them with the wish, that they may share like favour with that bestowed, from the very first, upon my 'Apologetic Lectures on the Fundamental, and upon the Saving Truths of Christianity.' The present course is indeed no transient effort, but the fruit of the occupation of years with the subjects and questions therein discussed. I am, however, but too well aware that success and results are not dependent upon our labour, or upon the time we may devote to a matter. It is indeed a duty to do all we can; but that which is best is a gift from on high. May it have been given to me to have spoken of the moral truths of Christianity in a manner consistent with the importance and magnitude of the subject, and conducive to the benefit of my readers.

It has been my long-cherished purpose to deliver and publish public lectures on Christian morals. The execution of my design has been delayed by circumstances, and particularly by the warlike events of the last few years. But the discussion of such questions can never be too late. If ever there was an age when this was needed, it is our own. Looking coldly—to use a mild term—on the dogmas of Christianity, it requires the moral evidence furnished by life and deed. And this is in all cases the evidence which will carry all before it. Unless Christianity can prove itself to be the moral power of public and private life, all other proofs will be in vain. Besides, this kind of evidence gives fresh weight to, and completes every other. If, however, anything is certain, it is this, and if any evidence in favour of Christianity can be brought forward it is this, that it has been, both historically and actually, the power and the blessing of our entire national existence, and that it is an inexhaustible source of moral renovation for all nations. Such has hitherto been its mission, and that mission is not yet ended. If this is sometimes forgotten, still it cannot be denied, for it is fulfilled in our sight. May these Lectures help to bring it to remembrance.

In thus speaking, I am also justifying the title I have given to these Lectures in calling them the Third Part of the 'Apology for Christianity.' For if their form is not apologetic, their matter is itself so.

The notes to this series occupy more space than those of the two former volumes. The greater the number and importance of the questions and subjects to be discussed, and the narrower the limits to which the form of lectures obliged me to restrict myself, the more was it incumbent on me to furnish in the notes not merely matter corroborative of the text, but also opinions on kindred topics which might carry out what is said in other aspects, and so contribute to its further consideration. I trust this may not be unacceptable to my readers, and the more so, because I have not been satisfied with mere references, but have quoted verbally the more important passages.

With these remarks I send forth this book to effect what God has appointed it.

C. E. LUTHARDT.

LEIPSIK, *July* 25, 1872.

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APOLOGETIC LECTURES

ON THE

MORALITY OF CHRISTIANITY.

LECTURE I.

THE NATURE OF CHRISTIAN MORALITY.

OR the third time, my respected hearers, am I about to deliver a course of consecutive lectures in this place. When, eight years since, I ventured for the first time to appear before you, our attention was occupied with the general *Fundamental Truths* of Christianity. The interest excited by those lectures, and, I may perhaps add, the blessing with which God accompanied them, emboldened me to discuss, in a second series, those special *Saving Truths* of Christianity which may be said to lead us into the inner sanctuary of the Christian faith. And this attempt, too, you received with kind indulgence. In now venturing to make the *Morality of Christianity* the subject of a third course, I am but carrying out, though at a later period than I could have wished,

2 *Lecture I.—The Nature of Christian Morality.*

a long-cherished purpose. Without this, the former lectures bear a fragmentary character; for the moral truths of Christianity are most intimately connected with those which are the matter of its faith, and the union between religion and morality is an indissoluble one (1).

My two former courses were apologetic lectures, and the present one is of a similar character. For the evidence of the life and practice is an evidence that carries all before it. The age has a feeling for facts; it demands realities, and not merely fair words or plausible theories. And the demand which it makes of Christians is, that they should prove their faith to be a reality (2). Christian faith has been reproached as being a matter of mere feeling, and not of actual practice, or thought to be honoured when designated as a noble feeling of noble minds. Certainly feeling has its claims, and we all need to intermit that tension of mind and will which life and work demand, by moments or hours devoted to sentiment. But Christianity is not designed for such single hours of mental repose alone, but for life and life's work; and its office is a higher one than that which may be fulfilled by music or poetry. It is not, so to speak, a charming romance, whose scene lies in the far distance beyond the bounds of reality, but it is a matter of the will, a fact, and, indeed, a moral fact. As truly as sin and guilt, and the troubles, wants, and duties of life are facts, and not mere fictions of the imagination, so truly is Christianity also a fact, for it is deliverance from life's troubles, and strength for life's duties.

But perhaps it is replied: Well, granting that Christianity is more than sentiment, and more than poetry, it is, after all, only theory, a summary of views and notions, concerning which we may hold different opinions, without such opinion being decisive of a man's real value, or affecting the essence of his moral nature. The most opposite religious views may be held, and yet the very same moral principles and dispositions embraced and possessed. If this were indeed the case, Christianity would have to be reckoned among the systems of philosophy, and to share their lot. History teaches us that one system of philosophy has abolished another, and that none can lay claim to lasting authority. The office of philosophy is to enlighten the world if it can, but not to renovate it. Christianity, on the contrary, lays claim to imperishableness, and has shown itself to be the power of renovation to the world.

Thirty or forty years ago, in the days when philosophy had the upper hand, Christianity was regarded as a preliminary stage thereto. It was said that profound thoughts were here enclosed in the shell of a popular faith, and that it was the mission of philosophy to burst the shell, and free the true ideas from their covering. To give an example, the central point of Christianity was said to be the doctrine of the God-man. But to regard Jesus of Nazareth as alone the God-man was the popular conception, whichever delights to clothe ideas in individual and palpable forms. The general idea underlying this conception was the truth that God and man are in reality one; that God does not exist

independently, but has His reality and comes to consciousness in man. This profoundest of philosophical thoughts was expressed by Christianity in the conception of the God-man Jesus Christ. Thus Christianity was, in the garb of religious faith, a preliminary stage to philosophy. Such was the opinion held concerning Christianity in the period of philosophy; but the age of philosophical systems has been succeeded by that of realities, and Christianity is now still regarded as a theory, but as an extravagant or unmeaning one. Life, it is said, has nothing to do with it, and takes its own paths independently thereof. The practical consequence is, that the attempt is made to thrust Christianity out of connection with general and public life, and to make it the private matter of those who happen to feel the singular craving for such a religious belief. We meet with this attempt in the most opposite spheres, and this fact makes it the Christian's duty to prove that Christianity fills the central position in all life, and that hence it is in its proper place when in connection with general and public life. Christianity is no mere private affair; it is a public, a national affair. The future of our nation depends upon the position it takes up with respect to Christianity. Many as are the differences that prevail among Christians, this is a conviction in which we all unite.

It is an unmistakeable fact that God is leading our nation to a new era. After the supremacy of Spain in the sixteenth century, and that of France in the succeeding centuries, the German era seems to be dawning upon

the European world. But great as may be the political greatness and importance of the nation, its future will only be happy and blessed if it makes Christianity the firm foundation-stone of its new imperial edifice. We rejoice, and we have a right to rejoice, that the German name has so speedily become honourable among all nations. Hitherto we had been esteemed only as diligent labourers, as good material for the life-culture of other nations, when one morning the world awoke, and found to its surprise that Germany was the first among the nations. There is a national pride which is justifiable, and for this we have ample reason. There is, moreover, a national Pharisaism, and we are not without temptation thereto. When we look back, we cannot but acknowledge that it was God's mercy and not our own wisdom and soldiership which so led our armies from victory to victory, that we were like unto them that dream; that it was God's mercy which gave us that German empire which we had so long vainly dreamt of and longed for. Let us, then, as we look forward, acknowledge also, that nothing but faith in God and in His revelation in Christ can lay a firm foundation for the edifice of our national future. The wisest policy, the truest patriotism, is to prepare a place for Christianity in our nation and in our national life. The natural sources of a nation's life, even of the most highly-gifted nation, dry up at last, as we are taught by the history of the ancient world. Christianity, however, is the perennial fountain of a moral life, in which even the most debased of nations may ever be refreshed

6 *Lecture I.—The Nature of Christian Morality.*

and renovated. This is a fact which our nation has repeatedly experienced, and the experience of the past is the best instruction for the future (3).

It is then with a desire to render a service to my fellow-countrymen, and at the same time to fulfil a national duty, that I would endeavour in these lectures to explain the morality of Christianity.

The subject of the present lecture is *the nature of Christian morality*. In its treatment you will perhaps miss the concrete features and lively colouring which you have a right to expect in lectures on morality, but will kindly excuse this when you remember the generality of the question which must occupy us at the commencement of this course.

Our subject naturally divides itself into three heads :
(1) *There is a moral world in general* ; (2) *There is an internal connection between morality and religion* ;
(3) *In Christianity, the progress made by religion denotes a similar progress of morality*.

(1) In all cases the *moral* view is the highest and most advanced that can be taken, and to occupy, with respect both to things and men, a moral position, is most in accordance with the moral dignity of man. In the intercourse of man with man, in the influence of one upon another, we do our best and our utmost when we address ourselves to his moral nature. I appeal to the experience of all instructors. What is the highest duty of a teacher, and what his best reward ? To teach certain branches of knowledge, to impart a certain amount of skill, is well, but this is

not his highest aim. What is known may be forgotten, skill once acquired may be lost, but the moral effect produced by instruction, the development of moral character attained by the pupil, is a far more deeply rooted and enduring possession. To affect and to lay hold on the man in the pupil is the highest duty of the teacher. And when we succeed in kindling and fanning the moral spark in a boy or a young man, the joy is unequalled by any of the other joys of our vocation, and one which, so long as there are teachers possessed of moral enthusiasm, and pupils possessed of moral susceptibility, will form its imperishable charm. Moral influence is the highest of all influences.

Again, when we have exhausted all other means, it is to a man's conscience that we make the last appeal. In so doing, we try to get a hold upon him by his highest dignity, and remind him of the inmost sanctuary of his being. It is true that they are to be blamed who are always ready to leave anything to another's conscience, for this may certainly be abused, whether from convenience, or from rigorous legality, or from fanaticism. But this is only blameable because it is not right to use as an ordinary thing that which is the highest and the utmost. And in saying this, we acknowledge that no higher judgment can be passed on things and men than a moral one, and no holier obligation imposed than that of conscience.

The worst we can say of a man is, that he has no conscience. We may pardon, or at least excuse many weaknesses and faults, and even grave offences; but

lack of conscience will never meet with excuse. On the other hand, when we would express the highest confidence in the moral character of another, we say that he is conscientious. This quality is of more value in our eyes than the highest endowments, or the most winning amiability. And what else do such definitions say, but that there is a moral world, and that its decisions concerning the worth or worthlessness of a man are final? Is this mere phraseology, or the expression of a truth?

We live in a world of sensible facts and experiences, and are furnished with organs of sense for the perception of the facts of this sensible world by which we are surrounded. And we all know from experience that in proportion as we use and exercise these organs, their powers are heightened and developed. What then? Is this world of sensible manifestations all, or is there not besides this the world of moral facts and truths? And does not the latter concern us quite as much as the former? If this is the case, we shall be furnished with an organ for its perception also. And in proportion as we use and exercise this organ, shall we develope its power and enhance its vigour and susceptibility. The organ for the facts and truths of the moral world is conscience. We all bow before its claims, and acknowledge its decisions as supreme. We speak of a good conscience, and when we do so, we name the highest good and the surest pledge of happiness. We speak of an evil conscience, and regard it as the greatest torture in existence. The imagination of poets has painted the most touching pictures of its agony. The

colours they used were poetry, but the portraits were faithful. When they speak of the Furies they use figurative language, but what they represent by such figures is a fact. We may perhaps doubt whether the characters of Shakespeare are historical personages, but we cannot doubt the moral events of which these characters are the vehicles. When we would sum up in one word the greatness and significance of Shakespeare, we call him the dramatist of the conscience (4).

Certain as are the truths of mathematics, indubitable as are the propositions of logic, so certain and indubitable are the facts of the moral consciousness. And if we are determined to doubt, we can more easily resolve to doubt the former than the latter. The scepticism of Kant stopped short at the fact of conscience, and the idealism of Fichte admitted this reality. The categorical imperative, 'thou shalt,' was to Kant the most certain fact he knew of, and the moral system of the world was exalted by Fichte to the dignity of Deity.

The facts of the moral world determine the character of the man. Whether I acknowledge the principles of physics or the facts of history may perhaps influence the judgment formed of my understanding, but is a matter of indifference with respect to the estimate formed of my character. Whether I embrace or reject the atomistic theory may be of consequence to my scientific opinions, but does not affect my individual nature. For to this I do not occupy a moral position, as I do to the former class of facts. Hence, too, the certainty which I have of mathematical proofs and logical proposi-

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tions is of quite a different kind from that which I have of moral truths. I am obliged, whether I will or not, to admit the truth of the Pythagorean theorem of the squares of a right-angled triangle, or the logical axiom that if two quantities are equal to a third, they are also equal to each other. But I cannot be thus constrained to admit moral truths. In their case, if I will not I need not, for these truths appeal not merely to the understanding but to the will, and the will is free and cannot be constrained. It is this very fact that constitutes the superior dignity of these truths; for in proportion as truths and facts belong to the sphere of necessity are they of a lower, and in proportion as they belong to the sphere of liberty are they of a higher order (5).

There is a view—and it seems to be gaining ground—which strives to raise the method applied to the world of sensible phenomena to a universal one. This may be called the *physical* view. Nature is governed by the law of necessity, and the connection between cause and effect is inevitable. Here laws and forces which can be expressed by mathematical formulæ, and whose effects may be made subjects of calculation, prevail. It is proposed to transfer this view to the sphere of morals. But is it, we ask, possible to calculate the emotions of the heart, and the determinations of the will, with that mathematical certainty with which we reduce to numbers the effects of gravitation or the electric currents? Do we not know that to all the known factors which co-operate in an action must be added the unknown and incalculable factor of free

determination? Here we cannot get beyond a computation of probability.

This view has been applied to history, and the right of a moral judgment concerning historical phenomena denied. We are told that we are not justified in judging, but only in explaining. Children, it is said, are accustomed thus to divide men into good and bad, and when they happen to hear of some past celebrity, their first question is: Was he a good or a bad man? According to the answer, they forthwith hate or love. I must confess that this fact has ever appeared to me exceedingly touching and significant. It is an involuntary testimony to the moral nature of human existence. It is said, This is a childish method. Well! we know that not only are we told in the 8th Psalm, that 'out of the mouths of babes and sucklings God has perfected praise,' but that it is a common saying among us that children speak the truth, and Ruckert sings, '*O du Kindermund, o du Kindermund, unbewusster Weisheit froh*' (O mouth of childhood, happy in unconscious wisdom). But it is objected: Our business is only to ascertain the circumstances and efficient causes whence an action proceeded or a character was formed. We have to understand, not to judge. It is no concern of ours whether Nero the matricide or the Christians whom he caused to be burned at Rome were morally the greater; we have to understand both the one and the other according to their age and surroundings, and that is sufficient. In other words, we are to contemplate history without moral interest,

without heart or conscience; we are to examine characters much in the same way as a botanist examines a plant. Its conformation may interest his mind, but it would be ludicrous to attempt to pass a moral judgment upon it, for it belongs to the sphere of necessity, not to that of freedom and will. Man, however, is more than a plant, and the character of man is not a mere growth of the soil from which he sprang, but his own free determinations co-operate in its production, and invite a moral judgment. If we are not utterly *blasés*, we do violence to ourselves, and deny our own moral nature, when we cease to regard historical facts and historical men according to the dictates of the moral sense. If enthusiasm and indignation are—as I think they are—anywhere justifiable, it is in the sphere of moral facts and judgments. We may be cool when we study geometry, and enthusiasm may be quite out of place when we compute the surfaces and angles of a crystal; but they who can thus deal with history have never perceived its inmost pulsations, but are standing soulless themselves before the soulless corpse of humanity (6).

This view, which we may call the physical, is opposed by the *ethical*, which is based upon the recognition of freedom. This does not deny that moral, like physical, life has its laws and is subject to the connection between cause and effect; but it asserts that the self-determination of man, with its free resolves, must be taken into account as an essential factor. It admits that every action demands its motive, and must be referred to causes; but it maintains that these causes are

not compulsory. It knows right well how to estimate the great power which natural temperament or external circumstances exercise upon every one. But it denies that this power is absolute. For the ultimate decision is still in a man's own hands. In proof whereof it appeals to the undeniable facts of inward accountability, the feeling of responsibility, consciousness of guilt, and repentance. Spinoza, the pantheist, indeed says that repentance is folly, for what is done is done, and moreover could not but have been done (7). But repentance has at all times been regarded—and that by the best of men—as the beginning of good, and conscience as the characteristic and special dignity of man. Christianity began, as is well known, with the preaching of repentance, and the Reformation began with those theses of Luther which treat of repentance.

The attempt has been made to refute the doctrine of moral freedom by the figures of statistics. It has been shown that in apparently voluntary actions, especially in suicide and other crimes, a certain self-consistent and recurring regularity prevails, and it has been thence inferred, that those actions which we call free only appear so, and are really the necessary results of natural laws, conditioned by time and space, by natural organization and external circumstances. It is true that tables of statistics have been drawn up concerning a series of actions, whose apparent regularity and conformity to law cannot but be regarded with surprise. But even if this conformity and regularity were still greater than they are, they are no proofs of necessity.

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To infer this is to make a logical leap. Besides, though external actions may be made matters of statistic enumeration, can the disposition be statistically vouched for? Perhaps it is replied: It can, so far as it is manifested. But who does not know what bad security the external manifestation and the internal disposition are for each other, and that similar actions may spring from the most opposite dispositions? But is not the disposition the real sphere of morality? And how comes it that moral statistics have been drawn up of sins and crimes, and of actions morally indifferent, while no account has been taken of virtues and good works? (8)

Such statistics at all events prove one thing, namely, the truth of the scriptural saying, that 'whosoever committeth sin is the slave of sin.' For he engages himself in the service of powers that get the mastery over him (9). But it was his will which engaged in this service, and which thus proves its freedom in the midst of its bondage. It is true that there are limits and restraints to both our will and our power, but within these necessary restraints our motions are free. Certainly freedom is not arbitrariness, for to be free is not to act without reason, but to have the power of choosing and of taking the initiative. We are not mere ciphers, but quantities having independent value in the world's great sum; and if such value is really determined by the harmony of our will with the moral law, this harmony is itself an act of our will, of our freedom. There is, besides the sphere of nature and its necessity, a sphere of morality. And great as may be the interest we feel in

the problems of nature, the questions of morality have far higher claims upon us, and demand our supreme interest, for they are decisive concerning ourselves and our whole life.

(2) *There is an internal connection between morality and religion.*—The tendency of the age sets itself against this maxim, and raises objections to it. manifold are the efforts of the present day ; but their common object is secular culture and its promotion, their common aim to release secular life from the influence of religion, and to place it upon its own foundations. Secular life is so enriched that it seems to need nothing beyond itself, and the desire is felt to comprise its fulness within itself, to the exclusion of all extraneous elements. Religion is regarded as that which is, properly speaking, the most extraneous, because its matter is supermundane, and because it gives to life a reference to a life beyond the world, and thus disturbs the finished self-contained harmony of the world. So far, indeed, as religion consists only in feeling and sentiment, and forms a kind of poetry of life, breathing over it a mild and gentle atmosphere, so far it may be put up with. For in this form it is itself but a product of natural life, it satisfies one of its wants, and well becomes those softer and milder characters to whom it lends a special charm. Hence this religion of sentiment is allowed to pass, and is even admired, especially in women. But as for those whose life is passed among the stern realities of arduous labour or public duties, they have neither room nor leisure for

it. In other words, it is useless in the fulfilment of the moral duties of life, and if it will insist upon being religion properly so called, *i.e.* upon maintaining its supermundane element, and its conformity with revelation, it is actually obstructive to them, for it is then a foreign element introduced into secular life. The reason why the present age often takes up a position adverse to religion, and seeks to exclude it from connection with its life, is that it may place the latter altogether upon its own foundation. What then does the age regard as the foundation of natural life? All its nobler spirits admit that all life rests upon moral foundations. To know of nothing beyond material life is esteemed as vulgar, and as casting an objectionable shade over the disposition, by the better minded, who seek to base modern life and its world upon moral foundations. Morality is declared to be the fundamental principle of all life; but this morality is to be based upon itself and not upon religion. Morality independent of religion is the latest maxim of the age, the maxim by which it seeks to justify its rejection of Christianity. This is the question which really involves the decision of the various questions that agitate our times (10).

But this maxim of an irreligious morality is by no means new. It is, on the contrary, an old maxim, on which history has already given its verdict, which history has already condemned. It was the maxim of that philosophic morality of antiquity which has proved its own impotence. Originally, indeed, morality was combined with religion even in the opinion of the ancient

world. Little as Greek imagination shunned to attribute human passions and human crimes to the gods, it yet regarded them as the patrons and guardians of the moral duties and tasks of earthly life. For the gods were worldly powers, and therefore also the guardians of worldly life. Domestic life, civil life, cannot exist unless by keeping within the bounds prescribed by nature or circumstances. To observe these bounds is morality; arrogantly to despise them is sin, and the gods are the avengers of this sin of arrogance. It was the Doric mind especially which represented the feeling for order, restraint, and law, and perceived the symbol of these qualities in Apollo, the god of harmony. This characteristic was also exhibited by that practical wisdom of which the seven wise men of Greece, the moral instructors and lawgivers of their race, were esteemed the representatives. From this practical morality of the better kind of popular opinion arose the moral philosophy of the philosophers. All morality was comprised in the so-called four cardinal virtues,—wisdom, justice, valour, and prudence. These virtues, however, refer only to the relations of one man to another in civil life. They do not necessarily involve a deeper religious element, but are merely placed under the patronage of the gods. Their connection with religion is this: morality is not made to grow out of religion; it does not thence derive its origin, but only its external support. The two occupied entirely different spheres. Morality did not necessarily involve religion, and whatever amount of morality religion might have,

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this was no essential element of her composition, but held in fief of morality. But even this bond was next dissolved. It was Aristotle, that great master of ancient philosophy, who completed its dissolution. With Plato morality still had a religious character. Life on earth was to be fashioned after the heavenly model of the divine ideas. Aristotle denied the reality of these ideas. Hence our conduct has no relation to the supermundane, but only to this world in which we live. Our conduct is not determined by the ideas of another world, but arises from the reasonable nature of man himself. Conduct towards Deity is out of the question ; for the Deity has no relation to us, but exists in continual self-contemplation beyond the world of action, and is of no importance with respect to the moral life. Thus morality is demanded not by religion, but by the reasonable nature of man. Hence this is also the sphere of morality. Beyond these limits it does not extend. Now the nature of man finds its most appropriate manifestation in the State, and accordingly morality is in very truth merged in the relation to the State. It necessarily exhibits a political character. All morality, all sin, is of a political nature ; virtue is civil justice. This fundamental thought of the Aristotelian morality was the prevailing view of the then Greek world in general. Aristotle does but give distinct expression to general opinion, and carry it out to its ultimate consequences. Thus religion and morality parted company. Religion was severed from morality, and morality from religion, and the outcome of the ancient

world was an immoral religion and an irreligious morality (11).

The consequences, however, of this separation actually lie before us. History shows that such religion is doomed, that such morality is impotent. This result of history proves that the two, religion and morality, are assigned to each other, that their truth is only found in their union. That alone is true religion which produces a vigorous morality, and that alone is a vigorous morality which arises from true religion.

The nobler spirits of the closing era of the ancient world felt that these two vital forces were intrinsically united. It was the later Stoical philosophy that sought to found its morality on religion. The strong point of the Stoics is morality. In this earnest school did all the better-minded of the latter ages of the ancient world take refuge. Stoicism had a wider range of vision than the earlier philosophies. It surpassed the idea of the State, which had formed the highest ideal of its predecessors, and even of a Plato, and enlarged this notion to the idea of human society in general. Its merit was to have struck out a path to the idea—so pregnant with the future—of universal manhood. The development of the Roman empire furthered and supported this idea. For the Roman empire was not merely a state, but apparently a union of the human race in general—apparently, for there was no real union, but only an extension of the restraints of the original state upon the ruins of the independence of other states and nations. Thus the Stoic idea of human society had no reality and

no truth. It was a shadow of the future, but not as yet a present reality, and consequently no vital force. A universal love of mankind was indeed spoken of, but this was mere phraseology, for it was not only unrealized but meaningless. How void of meaning this notion was may be seen even in Cicero, who transplanted the Stoic morality into Roman soil. Deeper sources were needed for the new ethic acquisitions, and these were sought in religion; the later Stoicism of Seneca, the contemporary of St. Paul, is characterized by its religious tinge, and tries to base morality upon religion. The severed streams now tend toward each other; and morality, having proved its own impotence, seeks to derive new strength from the spirit of religion. But for its attempt to succeed, Stoicism must have been in possession of true religion; and this it was without, for it was without the knowledge of the true, the Personal God. Its opinions were pantheistic. Nature and its laws were supreme. The absorption of God in the world and the deification of the world are fundamental ideas with heathenism; and it was this false view of religion which prevailed in Stoicism that frustrated its attempts in morality. They were but prophecies—yet still prophecies—whose fulfilment was as yet future (12).

I have dwelt upon this matter because I wished to show from history that this modern notion of irreligious morality is not new, but old; and that this supposed progress of modern culture is a retrogression to a standpoint upon which history has passed sentence of con-

demnation. For the moral ruin of the ancient world, which was succeeded by its political ruin, is the verdict of the God who rules in history.

And this was but natural. For the separation in question is one at variance with the nature of man. If we ask what it is that makes a man really such, the utmost that we could mention in reply would be: his consciousness of God and his conscience. We distinguish these qualities, but we all know that they are most intimately connected, nay, that they form part each of the other. The expression of consciousness of God is religion, the expression of conscience is morality. To sever religion and morality is to destroy the unity of human nature. Besides, what kind of religion would that be which was of no moral importance? And how should morality be permanent, unless its roots are found in the eternal world? For so soon as God ceases to be the supreme moral tribunal, we have no supreme tribunal of morality at all, none that is universal, before which all must bow, from which none can escape. And then there is an end of the idea of justice. And if justice is no longer absolute, the foundations of human society in general are destroyed. For all human affairs are based upon justice, and the idea of justice upon God. It is indeed possible to be inconsistent, and to embrace the idea of justice and morality while denying the idea of God, but the inconsistencies of individuals will not hinder the necessary consequences of their actions. 'There are men,' says Naville, 'whose beliefs have all been destroyed, while their conscience, like a solitary

pillar, stands upright among the ruins. The phenomenon presented by these virtuous persons fills us with reverence and wonder. They are, properly speaking, the miracles of that Divine Goodness whose name is never on their lips. If there is a man on earth who ought to fall on his knees and shed warm tears of gratitude, it is one of those who, while he means to deny God, has yet been endowed by Providence with so lively a feeling for the noble and the pure, with so strong an aversion for evil, that his sense of duty stands firm and upright without any other supports. An exception, however, is not the rule, and what falls to the lot of some does so to them but for a time, and never falls to the lot of others at all.' 'You know,' continues he, 'the crusts of snow over the fissures in the glaciers of our mountains. The hanging bridge bears one traveller safely over the abyss, but the thin crust breaks beneath the steps of many, and the rash throng are hurled into the depths. So does it fare with those schools of philosophy from which the idea of God is banished, and with that culture in which a lively feeling of the existence of God is lost; they sink into those sunless regions which the light of the feeling for the good no longer penetrates' (13).

What history proves, and the nature of man requires, *Christianity* teaches. The connection of religion and morality is a fundamental thought of Christianity. The Old Testament had already combined morality with religion in the Ten Commandments. There is not in the literature of any nation such a summary of

morality as we possess in the Decalogue, that briefest yet most comprehensive compendium of morals. But morality, as here required, is reduced to love to God and love to man; these are designated by our Lord as the two chief commandments, and we accordingly divide the law into two tables. In so doing we express the connection of religion and morality. But that which has its beginnings in the Old Testament is complete in Christ. Who doubts that Jesus was the perfect manifestation of morality? If ever love to man became impersonate, it was in Him. But His life in the service of man was a life in God. His life in God was the sacred source of His life in the world. He exhibited in His own person the union of religion and morality; and this union was reflected in His word. When we consider the Sermon on the Mount, we find this thought in all those sayings in which moral perfection and love are traced back to God, who is holy and perfect, that we also may be holy, and who maketh His sun to rise upon the evil and the good. God, who is the object of religious faith, is also the source of moral practice. Morality is based upon religion, and ethics upon dogma. Dogma treats of communion with God, ethics of likeness to God. Communion with God is the prerequisite of likeness to Him. Such is the moral stand-point of Christianity. We find it in all parts of Holy Scripture, but perhaps it is nowhere so definitely expressed, or so consistently carried out, as in the First Epistle of St. John. If you read through this epistle from this point of view, it will immedi-

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ately bring before you the fact that the fellowship with us into which God has entered in Christ, and into which faith in the Father and the Son has translated us, is the power of likeness to God in love and holiness.

Christianity, by thus founding morality on religion, confirmed and maintained it for future ages, and inaugurated a new era. For if any fact is certain, it is this, that the ancient world had, in a moral point of view, collapsed, and could find in itself no power to effect a moral renovation, and that it was Christianity that breathed into the fallen ancient world that new moral spirit which is still its life. What, then, we ask, was it that made ancient morality at last powerless, and Christian morality vigorous? What but that the former depended upon itself, while the latter derived its vitality from its connection with religion. To sever morality from religion is to annihilate the advantages introduced into the world by Christianity, and to cast a doubt upon the moral future of mankind. Certainly it is now easier to suppose that we could get on with morality alone, because our notions of morality are in these days far truer and deeper than those of the pre-Christian world. This, however, is the case only because they have been replenished with the vital elements of Christianity. Even its opponents owe their morality to the gospel, as Rousseau and Kant—two most unexceptionable witnesses in this case—have acknowledged (14). The very greatest minds of the ancient world had less knowledge of morals than a

child attending a Christian school has now. But everything wastes away which is not constantly receiving fresh life into itself, and the moral notions of the day will not escape this universal lot, if they cut themselves from those roots whence they are ever deriving fresh accessions of life, and by which the advantages they owe to Christianity are continued.

In what, then, do these advantages consist, and what is it that distinguishes *Christian morality* from the morality of the ancient world? You will all immediately answer, It is the principle of love,—a love that is a motive of conduct, and not a mere amiable, natural weakness,—a serious and a sacred thing, which the world was first taught to know as a union of holy anger against sin, and tender compassion towards sinners, by the revelations of God in Christ Jesus. This moral principle of love was unknown to the ancient world, for the revelation of God's love was also unknown. With Aristotle, justice is the supreme virtue; and though Cicero tries to infuse into it some warmth, by the ideas of moderation and philanthropy, it is but a cold and frosty thing, and very far removed from that 'enthusiastic philanthropy,' as it has well been called, which was kindled by Christ, and which conquered the world (15). The ancient world could lay down laws, institute rules, and set up requirements. But while law may restrain the outer life, it can neither conquer the heart nor change the inclination. Christianity entered into human society with a great fact, and conquered the world because it conquered the heart. This fact is

Jesus Christ, and the revelation of the love of God in Him. We learn what it is to love by the love where-with God has loved us. ‘We love Him because He first loved us.’ This one saying of St. John expresses the whole mystery of Christian morality. God first loved us is the summary of Christian doctrine. We love Him is the summary of Christian morality. To speak to the pre-Christian world of the love of God to us, or of our love to Him, was to speak in an unknown tongue, and Aristotle called it absurd (*ἄτοπον*). To speak thus now is to name the essence of all Christian teaching, and the secret of its power. The ancient world received man only in his relation to the world. Christianity views him in his relation to God. It shows us the sin which separates us from God, and the grace which unites us to Him; it inculcates the love of gratitude with which we should requite the love of grace. Christianity acknowledges the world; it confirms all its natural laws, possessions, and arrangements, and acquiesces in man’s position therein. But it gives him a new heart; and this new heart, this changed disposition, we are to take into the various relations of our life in the world. Christianity did not propose to alter the arrangements of natural and national life; but yet it transformed them all, for it changed men themselves. The sphere of its operations and its starting-point is the inner life of the individual. It was in the soul of man that Christ deposited the sacred sparks of love to God and man, and thus kindled the fire of love in the heart. From the heart, its warmth and light

have penetrated the whole man, and renovated his life in the world. This is Christian morality (16).

Christian morality, however, presupposes the Christian, and the Christian presupposes the man. Hence man must form the subject of our next lecture.

LECTURE II.

M A N.



THE theme of the present lecture is *Man, his physical and his moral nature*. For if Christian morality deals with the morality of the Christian, the Christian presupposes the man, who is called and designed to become a Christian. We shall not rightly understand the Christian till we have learnt to understand the man.

We are accustomed to say man consists of two parts, body and soul. But in thus speaking we do not designate his special nature. For have not the brutes a soul also? and is not the body of man organized for a wholly different kind of mental life from theirs? The peculiarity of man does not then consist in this fact. On the contrary, that which distinguishes us from all other beings on earth is, that we stand in a relation not only to the world, but to God, and that we are quite as much designed and organized for this relation as for that which we hold to the world. The specialty of our nature consists in our occupation of this twofold position.*

We are integrally connected *with the world and with God*. The world is comprised in man as its *aim and close*. God is reflected in man as His *image*. These are the two aspects combined in man as such. Let us pause a while to consider them.

Let us make man.—With these words of God does Scripture introduce the creation of man. The whole gradational series of earthly creatures preceded man; creation thus took its last step in him; with him it closed. The creatures who preceded him, the whole terrestrial world before him, is, so to speak, man-developing; and man himself is the summary of the world preceding him. The idea of man runs through the previous stages, which are mere approaches towards man; in man himself this idea is subsequently realized. We may say: The earthly creation is man analysed and man is creation synthetized. Such is the view of Scripture as laid down in those words which precede the creation of man and succeed that of all the other creatures: Let us make man. But the word of God continues: In our image. God designs to be imaged in man. The whole world is a mirror of God, of His power and wisdom; but His most special nature will give itself a creature image in man. In him will God Himself be reflected, and man's soul is to be His mirror. He is to bear His image and likeness: to Him shall man's countenance be uplifted; towards Him shall his soul be disclosed; with Him shall his heart be filled.

This, then, is the view of Holy Scripture, that we occupy a double position. We are integrally connected

with the world as its conclusion, and we are integrally connected with God as His image.

Nature around us is the sphere of necessity ; God, however, is freedom. In man, both spheres, that of freedom and that of necessity, meet together (1).

We behold in history the joint operation of freedom and necessity, and we designate this co-operation as a mystery. But freedom and necessity are both present in history, because they are united in man ; for history is nothing but the development of man.

In ourselves—in our constitution—there is an element of *necessity*.

Nature around us is repeated in us, in our human nature, and in each of us in a special manner. In no single individual is human nature completely exhibited ; we have each only our share. One has a nobler, one a meaner nature ; intellectual gifts and powers are differently distributed ; the material of human nature is mixed in varying proportions. Every one is a more or less partial manifestation of human nature. No one thoroughly represents it, not even the most gifted. Each has his limits. The very reason of the interest we feel in each other is that the rich abundance of human nature has its special manifestation in each ; that we all have a different kind of individuality. This individuality is our special possession, a gift which we have received, and which it is our duty to preserve and cultivate.

We did not bestow this our peculiarity upon ourselves ; it was given to us. We may develope and

cultivate it, or leave it uncultivated ; we may supply it with or deprive it of material ; we can assimilate all that we learn, all that we endure, all that we experience, and enrich our nature by making all this its mental possession ; but we cannot fundamentally change the nature which was given to us. He who is unimaginative will remain so all his life, and he who is not poetically gifted will never with all his efforts and practice be a poet, whatever number of verses he may compose. We may develop a talent, but no diligence can take the place of genius. Limits are prescribed to each, beyond which he cannot pass. We are not free, but bound.

And so we ought to be. For we are instruments in the hand of a Higher Power. ‘Has not a potter power,’ says St. Paul (Rom. ix. 21), ‘of the same clay to make one vessel to honour, and another to dishonour ?’ We are the clay and God is the potter ; He forms and uses us after His good pleasure, according as He needs us in the great household of the world and its history. Each of us has his place assigned him by God in the great whole of mankind, and He fashions and leads us in conformity therewith.

For not only is our natural peculiarity independent of ourselves, but our lot in life is also for the most part taken out of our own hands. There is, indeed, a saying that every man is the architect of his own fortune ; but we all too well know in how limited a sense this is true. Who is able to appoint the external circumstances amidst which he is born and bred ? Yet how infinitely

does our whole earthly lot depend on these! The influence of the individual himself upon it is confined within the very narrowest limits. And as for what we call chance or luck, we all know how great a part this plays in the matter. I need only appeal to those among you who are merchants. You know that however cautiously you may speculate, the issue is not in the hands of even 'the most cautious. How many accidents may baffle all calculations! And this is repeated in all classes and conditions of life.

In short, whether we regard our natural dispositions, or the circumstances in which we are placed, or our lot in life, we everywhere find ourselves restrained within certain limits, which we can neither pass nor extend; we everywhere see ourselves subjected to a law of necessity which we are unable to shake off. We are figures in the great sum of the world's history; instruments in the hand of One higher than ourselves, and must let ourselves be used for more general purposes; and it is on this very circumstance that the connection of history depends.

I believe I rightly understand your feelings when I say, that so far you follow me, but that you do so with a certain inward repugnance. You cannot but admit the truth of all I have advanced, and yet you feel that this is not the whole truth; and you are right. This is not the whole man. Whether our natural endowments are great or small; whether we rank with the poetical or the commonplace; whether we are favourably or unfavourably circumstanced—does not

after all decide upon what we really are, is not in truth our very self. All this constitutes, it may be, the possessions we *have*, the new material we are to fashion, the matter out of which we build up the edifice of our life—one house is composed of better, another of meaner materials; but it is *we* that use this material in our life-building. How we use it, whether ill or well, is entirely our own affair, and depends not on the material alone, but upon ourselves, upon the tendency of our own will, upon the moral constitution of our own nature. In the sphere of the will, in the province of moral resolves and self-determinations, we feel ourselves *free*. We are not obliged to act as we do, we are not absolutely constrained by the natural disposition bestowed upon us. It is true that limits are drawn around us, but within these limits we move freely. We are not mere natural beings, subject like the brutes to the force of instinct or impulse, or to the necessity of an unchangeable fate; we are also *personal*, *i.e. free* beings, for we were created in the likeness of God, the supreme and absolutely free Spirit.

If, indeed, there were no God, and we were consequently in no relation to God—if there were only nature, if this were God—then we too should be subject to the law of necessity; then liberty would be out of question, and we should not be personal beings properly so called, but only parts dependent upon, and not free of, the great whole of nature. This is the theory of Pantheism, and of its result, Materialism. We know, however, that there is a God, a free, personal God, and that we are

not made merely for the world, this world of necessity, but for God, the free Sovereign of all things, and made to fill a free relation to Him. For we are called to love and to obey Him. Love, however, cannot be commanded or forced, and the obedience of love is a free act. Herein lies the essence of morality. It is because we are personal beings that the higher sphere of morality is disclosed to us. We belong not only to the physical but to the ethical world ; for we are personal and not merely natural beings, called to freedom, and not subject merely to necessity (2).

We bear, then, within us two aspects ; we belong to two worlds, called nature and personality, necessity and freedom. Both aspects are most intimately connected, and are inextricably interwoven into the unity of our life. We all know from experience how various and how powerful are the influences exerted upon us by the circumstances in which we are placed, by the atmosphere in which we exist, and by the natural peculiarities with which we were born, and how all these set our wills in motion. But the decision which we come to lies not with these, but with ourselves. The temptation may be strong, the excited passion powerful, but the act itself is our own. And according to our decision, according to the direction taken by our will, are our moral worth, our true position towards God, and our eternal lot determined.

In the sphere of nature there is no morality, and consequently no immorality. For here, not freedom, but necessity prevails ; here it is not *will* or *ought*, but *must*.

The different amount of endowment, and the consequent difference of importance or value of individuals with respect to the external life and history of society, may be infinitely great. A great architect of the edifice of humanity is of very different importance to the humble carter in our streets. But when they are viewed with respect to their moral nature, the one stands neither higher nor lower than the other. Whether one is more or less gifted, called to great or humble duties, is here a matter of indifference. In a moral point of view, the sentence passed must be determined by one circumstance only, the relation in which we inwardly stand to God. It is this which determines the moral worth or worthlessness of men, and of all men equally. There is not one kind of morality for the man of genius, and another for the man of weak intellect. For the disposition of the heart, and not the endowments of the mind, decides the question (3).

For this knowledge we are indebted to Christianity. But our instinct for truth bears testimony thereto. When the Lord says in the gospel, that God looks at the heart and beholds that which is secret, and that the alms of the poor widow are of more value than the gifts of the rich; or when St. Paul says that there is no respect of persons with God, that with Him there is neither male nor female, bond nor free, we involuntarily acquiesce in these sayings. The error of the moral view of the ancient world consisted in regarding man not first of all in his relation to God, but in his position with regard to the external circumstances of life, and

especially to the civil commonwealth. In the external circumstances of life and in our civil position we are all unequal. Of these differences in natural life, the ancient world made differences of moral worth and endowment. The man, it was thought, was gifted with a better moral disposition than the woman, the free than the slave. He whose civil position was higher was regarded as morally higher. And to be prosperous and independent was in the eyes of an Aristotle an essential condition of a whole series of virtues (4).

Christianity has taught us to appreciate more truly and estimate more highly the dignity of morality; for it has taught us that the sphere of the moral is higher than that of the natural and its external distinctions.

In the sphere of nature we are indeed all unequal, for our parts in natural life are dissimilar. In the world, regarded in a moral point of view, however, we are all equal, for we have all the same moral duties, and our different natural gifts and circumstances only furnish us with material for performing them.

Let us now consider these two aspects more closely.

When men are viewed as natural beings, they differ in many ways one from another. A great gradation of inequalities is presented to our view by human society, and these very differences and inequalities constitute the abundance and variety manifested in the complex organism of human nature.

The first and most fundamental inequality in human nature is that of *sex*. Human, like all other terrestrial animated beings, are divided into the two sexes.

This difference forms the foundation of all others. It is the most ancient; it stands at the beginning of human history, and has given rise to every class of difference in human life. Nor is it historically only at the commencement, it also forms the actual basis of the whole structure of society, and on it too is based both its moral condition and our moral appreciation thereof. For when we inquire into the moral condition of an age or nation, we involuntarily direct our attention to the relation of the sexes, and make this the standard of our moral judgment concerning its whole life.

In Plato's *Symposium* there is a humorous speech of the comedian Aristophanes: At the beginning man was undivided, and not separated into the distinction of the two sexes. When, however, he became too arrogant and dangerous to Zeus the god, the more easily to manage him, Zeus divided him into two halves—into man and woman. Since then these two halves seek one another, because they are parts one of another (5). This humorous speech expresses a truth, the same truth which Scripture contains in what it tells us of the relation of man and woman. The two together form the complete human being. Each of the two halves is but a one-sided, a partial exhibition of human nature. In what, then, does the difference consist?

This is among the most interesting of subjects, for nothing more interests man than human nature. We all have indeed, in our instinctive feelings, an answer to this question, but how are we to make the matter clear to our thoughts?

We know that man is the summary of nature. The preceding stages of organic life, the vegetable and animal, are repeated in him, and raised to the higher stage of human existence. And we may further say, that the stage of vegetable life is the prevailing one in the peculiar nature of the woman, and that of animal life in the peculiar nature of the man.

The plant has its roots in the soil ; it is restricted to its native place. The life of the woman is more restricted than that of the man. Home is her place ; the roots of her being are implanted here. Home, with its protecting restrictions, is her native place. Her office is to be the fosterer of domestic life, the guardian of morality, which is, first of all, the morality of home, and restricts life to certain appointed forms. Freed from these bonds, the woman ceases to be womanly, and degenerates ; for there is nothing more contradictory and revolting than an immoral woman. The man, on the contrary, is more independent of the soil which has produced and nourished him ; his nature speedily shows a repugnance to all restraint ; it is with difficulty that he accommodates himself to custom and form ; his instinct is liberty, and his calling leads him abroad.

If the quiet existence of retirement is the part of the woman, the restless activity of public life, with its excitements and impulses, is the lot of the man. A restless, impetuous woman is an unpleasing phenomenon ; we can much more easily put up with passionate excitement—nay, sometimes we even require it—in a man.

It is not the woman's vocation to enter the arena of public life, nor to mingle in the bustle of party strife. When she does so, she does it at the cost of her womanliness. To fight the battle of life is the privilege of the man. The woman's fairer privilege is to heal, by silent efforts, the wounds which men have inflicted. They are themselves, however, heroines of endurance, and surpass in this respect the very strongest of men.

The result of the restricted and retired life of the woman is, that her world is more that of the inner life, of the soul and its individual condition; while we call the more general life of the mind our world. We have the stronger mind, they the better-disposed soul. Our mental constitution exhibits greater—I will even say coarser—features; the spiritual life of woman is more finely worked out. We employ ourselves with the things of the outer world, and enrich our minds with objects; woman lives and moves more within herself, in the inner world of her own spirit and its manifold and gentle sentiments. For this reason, the inmost nature of woman is far more difficult to penetrate, and new aspects and recesses of her hidden life disclose themselves one after another to a man; while we men are soon seen through by a woman, and lie open, from the very first, to her observation.

The soul is the soil of direct feeling. The impartial ratiocinative consideration of a subject is the business of the mind, *i.e.* of men. Women are generally weak in logic. To compensate for this, they are superior to us in that direct feeling which lights with a true instinct

upon the right conclusion, and sometimes looks to us like a faculty of prescience. The ancient Germans already attributed to woman something of a prescient power. Our mind, on the contrary, is reflective; and if we are to admit anything, we must make it clear by reason and consequence, cause and effect; in other words, we are made for scientific reasoning. When women seek to compete with us on this ground, they are hardly ever successful, for this is a province which is alien to them. To compensate for this, however, they have a direct power of apprehension and a tact that often put us to shame; while we, advancing step by step, with laborious mental efforts, are but half-way, they are already at the goal. You have certainly all found how much quicker the female mind is than our slow and heavy mind. When, indeed, we reach the goal, we are the more richly furnished, for we have acquired much more by the way. But it only too often happens that we lose our way and miss our end, and cannot see the forest because of the trees.

Hence, too, it happens that, in our contemplation of the world and its common sequences, we men so often stop at second causes, and do not arrive at the first and supreme cause—at God; while it is natural to women to hasten onwards to this first and highest, without pausing much at second causes. The religious way of viewing things is natural to women, while we often lose religion in science, because we forget the first cause in our consideration of second causes, and so lose ourselves in nature that we fail to find God. But while we are

inclined to excuse, though we cannot justify, this in the case of the man, it is doubly unnatural in the woman to be irreligious. An irreligious woman is a man spoilt, and doubly corrupting to those men over whom she acquires influence (6).

The same human nature, then, is manifested in the two sexes, but in each in a special and partial manner only. The difference which separates the one from the other, but which, therefore, refers the one to the other for its completion, is not a merely corporeal one, but a difference in the whole mental and spiritual constitution. This is the cause of the inexhaustible delight which a man feels in diving into the nature of a woman, and which a woman, again, feels in surrendering her mind to a man, each finding that a new world dawns upon him in the other. For the entirely different manner of viewing and of apprehending things which is peculiar to each, is ever new to, and excites and enchains the interest of, the other.

It is in this twofold manner, in the manner of the man or of the woman, that man is to fulfil his vocation in the world. Our life in the world, however, is to subserve our life in God, and our natural qualities and gifts are but a means for the fulfilment of this higher moral duty. Hence, then, the man and woman are called upon, by that difference which makes them mutually need each other, to help one another in their highest concern, and to contribute to each other's supreme and eternal interest. When, however, we view them as they actually are, we are constrained to say that they

contribute far more to mutual seduction and transgression than to sanctification and salvation.

We know that the ruin of the old world was caused by nothing more than by the corrupt state into which the relation of the two sexes had fallen. The women misled the men, the men misused the women, and that which should have been the noblest and the tenderest became the basest and most destructive. It was the gospel which asserted the equality of both the man and woman before God, and at the same time taught the difference of the position assigned them in the world. To this very day, as we all know, no greater danger threatens human society than that which menaces it from this quarter. Nor is there at the present time any power which maintains the dignity of nature except the gospel (7).

The next diversity in human nature is that which we designate by the name of *Temperament*. For a long time the whole question of temperament was declared useless and unprofitable, and it was said to be but labour lost to endeavour to lay down such distinctions. Recently, however, it has been again brought up, and made the subject of fresh investigation. You know the names of the four temperaments,—the melancholy, the phlegmatic, the sanguine, the choleric. These names are either of Greek or Latin origin, and derived from the word which means either the blood, or the bile, or a mucilaginous humour. It was thought that the difference of temperament was to be explained by a preponderance of one or other of these substances (8).

Though this explanation does not indeed stand the test of experience, it yet contains a true element, inasmuch as it makes temperament, though the expression of a mental disposition, depend upon the constitution of the bodily organism. For the mental life is far more closely interwoven with the bodily than we are wont to imagine. Thus temperament is indeed a mental disposition, but it is conditioned by the body, and might be called the constitutional mental nature. This disposition, however, has reference to the relation in which we stand to the external world. And it is according to this that the temperaments are distinguished, for our relation to the external world may be fourfold.

Perhaps we withdraw from contact with the outer world, and retire within ourselves. Here is our world, which we perhaps depict with the colouring of fancy. It seldom, indeed, corresponds with the external world. Hence, when we encounter this, it seems a thing so foreign to our feelings, that we are soon powerfully affected. An individual of this kind, ordinarily peaceful and self-contained, may be violently excited either to grief, fear, or dejection, or even to excessive joy. You will perceive that I am describing the man of melancholy temperament. If I go for examples to the well-known characters of the New Testament, I would name St. Thomas, who was now plunged into the night of dejection, and now soaring to the height of rejoicing faith; and St. John, in whose silent and contemplative character smouldered a flame which at times burst forth in passionate expressions.

If we belong to the second kind of mental nature, we take up a relation to the world, but it is rather one of quiet observation. We do not seek things out; we rather let them come to us; we let much pass, because we can wait; we maintain our tranquillity and moderation, and do not easily lose the command of our sober reason. A man of this temperament will, however, reach his aim, and perhaps reap what others have sown. The phlegmatic, it is said, belong to the world. Among New Testament characters, I should thus characterize Nicodemus, whose inward development advanced slowly, step by step, but who, when Jesus was dead, was found among the faithful friends who took charge of His body.

We belong to the third kind when we place ourselves in an active relation to the world, but in such wise that we let it influence us, and produce in us lively emotions. We feel a need for this continual mutual intercourse with the world; we live upon it; we yield ourselves to whatever the present moment offers; and we do not try to escape its demands. These men of the moment are the sanguine. Among the apostles, St. Peter was thus constituted, for he was a man of the moment beyond others, courageous and dispirited in rapid change of feeling, and possessing that gift of saying the right word at the right time, which made him the mouthpiece of the apostles.

Finally, we rank with the fourth kind when we fill an active relation of influence upon the world, when we are not so much formed by the world as it is formed and fashioned by us, and our mark impressed upon it by

the power of our will. Such are the choleric, the men of will and deed, the men of history. In the apostolic circle you will directly think of St. Paul, that man of energetic mind and decided action (9).

In past times, the melancholy temperament was extolled, as by Aristotle, as that of the poet and philosopher, and the phlegmatic despised as the Bœotian or boorish temperament, as it was called by the romantic authors. But Kant, the philosopher, was of the phlegmatic, and it may well be doubted whether Goethe was of the melancholy temperament. We have no right to exalt one temperament to the prejudice of another. Each has its own advantages, and each its own faults and dangers. The differences existing between them are of a natural, not of a moral kind. Temperamental virtues have indeed been spoken of, but these are in themselves no real virtues, though they are capable of becoming such. If the virtue of liberality is ascribed to the sanguine, and the vice of avarice to the phlegmatic, neither the nature of the sanguine, nor that of the phlegmatic, is in itself moral or immoral, but it becomes so by the position which the will takes up thereto. Least of all does one temperament bring a man nearer than another to the kingdom of God. The four kinds of ground in the parable (Matt. xiii.) are by no means emblematical of the four temperaments. Each, on the contrary, is radically as near to and as far from the kingdom of God as the others; and each needs to be disciplined as being seductible and corrupted by sin (10). Each, too, is a partiality which

needs its complement. But our nature is thus variously constituted that the general harmony of human society may result from the combination of its varieties.

The different *ages of life* have always been compared with the temperaments. Childhood is the stage of the sanguine temperament. The child lives for the moment, and sorrow and joy rapidly succeed each other in his case. This absorption in the present forms the charm of childhood. The sanguine always exhibit something of this childlike disposition; and it is this that makes them such general favourites. At the same time, they, like children, are, by this very feature, in danger of petulance, caprice, and instability. Oetinger, the Wurttembergian theosophist, himself of the sanguine temperament, says 'the mercurial' (he means the sanguine) 'temperament would be the noblest, if only it had fixity.' When I compare the season of youth to the melancholy temperament, you will perhaps be astonished, and ask whether youth is not the time of pleasure. But it is, above all other ages, the age of the ideal; and this is the feature which places the young among the melancholy. They mentally build up a world of their own,—an ideal world, of which their fervid imagination is enamoured,—and deem themselves raised far above the commonplace world around. There is something lovable in this youthful disposition, and we ought all to keep young in this sense, in which it has been well said that they who grow old never were young. But the danger of this stage is the pride which despises others, and that revelling in fancy and sentiment

which, shunning real earnest work, seeks its ideal in enjoyment, and at last in very un-ideal enjoyment. Manhood is the time of work. Now we seek to set our mark upon the world. Our will contends against the resistance offered by actual life, and strives to master it. And such, too, is the nature of the choleric. St. Paul, a man of choleric temperament, could say, I laboured more abundantly than they all. We are all called to labour; but the danger to which the choleric are exposed is the love of power. The season of work is followed by the season of repose, by old age. The storm of life is calmed, and gives way to reflection, and combativeness is exchanged for the patience which knows how to wait. God Himself is called in Scripture the Ancient of Days, and that which is most wonderful in His government is the patience with which He can wait. The obverse side of the phlegmatic temperament is, however, indifference and obduracy (11).

The whole world of nature is a hieroglyphic of the eternal thoughts of God. The temperamental qualities are no virtues, but they are natural images of virtues, and it is our part to elevate and transfigure them into real virtues. We ought to be always children in our lively yet unassuming receptivity for the blessings of the kingdom of God. We ought to be always young in our love for the good and the beautiful. We ought to be men in Christ, matured and strong for battle. And we ought to maintain that tranquillity of mind which is the ornament of the aged, and the type of the eternal rest for which we hope.

Not only, however, are different characteristics exhibited by individuals, but nations, too, are individuals on a larger scale. Each nation has a common type of mind, resulting from its natural disposition, its history, climate, occupation, etc. This common national quality is shared by the individual. In him is reflected the peculiarity of his nation; and this feature of mental affinity connects him with the whole, and calls upon him for devotion to, and sacrifices for, his nation and native land. The different historical vocations of the several nations in the world are determined by their different natures and gifts. The vocation of one nation may be more important, the vocation of another more humble; there are highly and less highly gifted nations. But one nation is not morally above another by reason of its natural endowments, nor has any a right to look upon another with contempt. National hatred is, however, the special sin of nations. However richly or poorly a nation may be endowed, all are equally called to the highest moral duty of mankind, at whose service they are to place their natural qualities. Each is destined and enabled to fulfil, in a moral spirit, that task of civilisation which is committed to it, and thus to furnish stones for building up the kingdom of God. This is the destination of the nations, and this should be the aim of their ambition, and the prize for which they should contend (12).

The several depositories of special dispositions form the many members of the one organism of humanity. Each peculiarity involves the duty of maintaining it, for

each has his special destination in the general and world-wide vocation of man ; but also the duty of combining with others, for only in combination do individuals form the harmonious whole of the joint organism of humanity, and fulfil their joint vocation. The natural endowments of individuals and nations differ in value and importance, but *personality* is the same in all. For while the world is manifold, God is one. Our relations to the world and our duties in the world vary, but with respect to God we are all equal. The deficiency in the view of man held by the ancient world was, that he was regarded only in his relation to the world, only as a natural being. The consequence was, that there was a sense of the differences, but no feeling of the equality of all men. The superiority of the man to the woman, of the free citizen to the slave, of the Greek to the barbarian, was exclusively dwelt upon. That one man, whether high-born or low-born, bond or free, educated or uneducated, was on a level with another, was a truth hidden from their philosophers. Individual anticipations of this truth are indeed met with ; but they are isolated, and uttered without consciousness of their importance (13). It was Christianity which first made the knowledge that all men are equal the common possession of the nations, and the foundation-stone of the new edifice of human society. For it was Christianity which first comprehended man not merely in his connection with the world, and as a natural being, but in his relation to God, and as a free moral personality. With respect to God we are all equal, in other respects we all differ ; but here there is

neither male nor female, Jew nor Greek, but all are one in Christ. In what then consists the essence of *personality*, by means of which we are raised above the bounds of nature? You will all say, In our free will. For however bound we may be to our nature, we are yet free in our bonds. We float down the stream of life, as nature and fate impel us; we cannot pass the bounds within which the ship of our life restrains us, but upon this ship our movements are free. We experience influences and impressions of various kinds, but we possess freedom of choice. We are placed in manifold connections, but we have the power of the initiative; we are able to begin what is new, though in connection with what is old. Our actions are occasioned by external or internal causes, but in every action we are conscious that we could have acted differently. This ability to act differently, this power of the initiative, of deciding for ourselves, is freedom. But, you will say, this ability to will is not yet true and perfect freedom. Power to will is not the highest power; to will rightly is higher. The faculty of willing is indeed the first thing, but the tenor of the will is the main point. Our will has true freedom when it has a tenor in true conformity therewith. And what is this? We are based upon a divine idea, which is our own truth. When this also forms our reality, when we act from it, when in conformity with God's will we put this our true nature into the resolve, and act of our own will, and make it the tenor of our actions, then, but not till then, are we truly free. Conformity with the will of God is

true freedom of will, opposition to the will of God destroys our liberty, and 'he that committeth sin is the slave of sin' (14).

Such is the *true morality* of man.

There is, it is true, a natural morality. I am far from denying it. I know that there is a series of natural virtues, that it is possible to live, and to make sacrifices for one's family, one's country, the public good, the good of mankind, without being a Christian. When we meet with so noble a disposition our heart rejoices over it, and yet this falls short of true morality. The aims to which such an one dedicates his life are not the true, the highest. They are but earthly and subordinate, and he who lives exclusively for these makes them his supreme good, makes a god of them, and this is erroneous, wrong, and sinful; for we ought to love God supremely. The decisive question is, whether our life has its source from this fountain, whether our soul places itself in this centre of all being, or stops at the circumference. The morality of a life does not depend upon the greatness of its sacrifices, but upon the inward tendency of the heart, its hidden motive, and its ultimate aim; for God beholds our secret thoughts.

The young man who asked the Lord what he must do to inherit eternal life was adorned with many excellent qualities and virtues; and Jesus, we are told, beholding him, loved him. But when the Lord required him to take the decisive step of giving up all that he had for the one pearl of great price, he could not resolve to do so; he went away with a conflict in his heart, and

beyond this internal discord the moral aristocrats of nature are unable to advance (15). We are all acquainted with this discord in the inward man. The eternal purpose of God, that we should find in Himself and in communion with Him the object of our life, is implanted in each of us, and is the law of our being. But our actual state contradicts, nor only contradicts, but resists this law. The sad paradox of our existence is, that while there is within us an attraction towards God, we yet resist it ; while we long for freedom, we yet love the chains of sin ; while the higher ideal of the good and the true is present to our soul, we yet struggle against it ; while we feel within us aspirations towards loftier regions, we yet love the dust and mire.

‘ Ein edler Sklave in dir ist
Den du Freiheit schuldig bist. ’¹

You all know the touching lament uttered by St. Paul : ‘ I am carnal, sold under sin ; for what I would, that do I not ; but what I hate, that I do. ’ ‘ I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing ; for to will is present with me ; but how to perform that which is good I find not. For the good that I would I do not ; but the evil which I would not, that I do. ’ ‘ I delight in the law of God after the inward man ; but I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members. O wretched man that I

¹ There is a noble slave within thee, to whom
Thou owest his freedom.

am ! who shall deliver me from the body of this death ? ' If even St. Paul was constrained to speak thus from his own experience, after God had already begun His work in his soul, how much more true is it of us, how much more true of the natural man, that a deep moral discord runs through his inmost soul ! We are in bondage (16) ; what shall make us free, truly free ?

Conscience cannot do it, the law cannot do it ; only the gospel and the Spirit of Jesus Christ, the Spirit of inward renovation, can effect this.

Conscience is the last thing left to man after he has squandered and lost all else that God has given him. It is the last tie by which God still retains a hold upon the man who has erred and strayed from Him, and by which He reminds him of the home he has forsaken. Even in the most degraded ages of heathenism it was still a power, and the times of deepest decay have been just those which have yielded the most touching evidence of the secret torments of an evil conscience (17). It is true that conscience itself has not remained unaffected by the universal corruption wherewith sin has overspread our whole being. Both its truth and its power have been weakened. If we contemplate the heathen nations, we everywhere find conscience made of matters indifferent, and matters which should be made conscience of, regarded as indifferent. Conscience has gone astray, and does not rightly understand its office. And how often does the power of sin get the upper hand, and so paralyze the operation of conscience that its authority is slighted. Yet in the midst of all this corruption and

perversion of conscience, the fact is not abolished. It is a universal fact, which holds good among all nations,—a fact which cannot be avoided,—an inward authority before which all are constrained to bow, and which all acknowledge, even by their struggles to escape its authority. And truly it is not merely the authority of a human moral law which conscience brings to bear upon man, but it accredits itself to him as an expression of the divine will, against which there is no appeal. For though it is saying too much to call conscience the voice of God Himself, it yet bears testimony in the soul to that will of God which we bear within us as the law of our being, and summons both our wills and deeds before its judgment-seat, to receive therefrom the moral law which is to guide, or the moral sentence which is to condemn them. For as God is both the lawgiver and judge of the world, so, too, is the agency of the conscience both legislative and judicial. But though it requires indeed what is good, and condemns what is evil, it is not able to deliver us from the power of sin, nor from the moral contradiction of our nature. It holds up before us the moral ideal, but does not give us the moral power to realize it; it discovers to us our sin, but does not free us from it; it shows us the internal discord to which we are subjected, but does not raise us above it; it can awaken within us a desire for freedom, for true moral freedom, but it cannot satisfy this desire, nor bring us to the aim of our existence. It is the remnant of creation, but it is not the instrument of redemption (18).

And neither is *the law*. The conscience of the heathen world was deposited in its legislation. Divine authority was on all hands sought and invented for these laws. This circumstance expresses man's consciousness that law must have its ultimate basis and support in the will of God, and be independent of the caprice of the human will. What the heathen world desired and feigned was realized in Israel. The law of Israel was the revelation of the divine will. It thus became the objective conscience of the nation, the former and purifier of its moral knowledge and notions. When we find in Israel a moral consciousness so far purer and truer than even in Greece and Rome, it is to its law that this nation is indebted for this superiority. In its form, indeed, this law was a national ordinance for Israel and for its national life, and consequently only for this people, and not for all ; only of transitory and not of abiding importance. In its substance, however,—even as forming the basis of various civil and ceremonial external observances,—it is of eternal and universal importance ; for it is the expression of that moral will of God which we all bear in our own moral consciousness, but its expression apart from the obscurations and corruptions to which the moral consciousness of man is continually exposed. Its office, therefore, is as the great objective conscience of mankind, to assist our conscience and to uphold its work within us. Simple as the Ten Commandments may sound, there is nothing in the whole literature of the nations that can be compared with them for the purity, earnestness, and universality

of the moral consciousness therein deposited. They are the simplest, and at the same time the grandest compendium of morality. It is a wondrous line which this compendium draws from the heart of God down to the heart of man—the one the source of all fulfilment, the other the source of all transgression of the law. For it begins with God, and with the demand that we should love Him whose love has redeemed us, and it concludes with the evil desire of the heart, and with the demand that this should not be suffered to prevail. And in doing this it declares that all fulfilment of the law springs from the love of God which is based on faith in Him, and all transgression of the law from the evil desire of the heart, the desire that forgets God. External as may be the letter of the commandments, their meaning is an inward one. And if we were still uncertain of their meaning, Christ has explained it to us clearly enough in His Sermon on the Mount. Not the outward act alone is the fulfilment of the will of God, and not with the outward act does the transgression of that will begin, but both fulfilment and transgression have their commencement and place in the heart, and all the several requirements of the law are comprised in this one of love to God.

But requirement is not fulfilment, and the ideal is not reality. The law contains the requirement and the ideal. But how are we to attain to the reality? The law tells us what we must do, and rebukes us when we transgress it,—the law disciplines us, and urges us to control ourselves. But even the strictest self-control

does not change the disposition, nor lead us to surmount the opposition between law and inclination. Can that be called true morality which does not get beyond the constraint we impose upon ourselves, and knows no higher motive than the commands of duty? There is true morality only where there is freedom, and true freedom is love to God. This, however, not the law, but only the spirit of renovation proceeding from Jesus Christ and making the man a Christian, can effect. To this point our next lecture will be directed.

LECTURE III.

THE CHRISTIAN AND THE CHRISTIAN VIRTUES.



THE theme of our last lecture was the man, that of our present is *the Christian*. For the Christian is the man truly such.

We all have an ideal within us, the idea of a perfect condition of human existence; each may perhaps depict it to himself in different colours, but all serious minds are agreed that the highest ideal is to be found in moral perfection. We all place moral perfection above the greatest earthly prosperity, or the highest mental endowments. The true ideal of our mind is the moral ideal.

This ideal is not a mere notion, but the law of our being. This law is within us; we feel that its fulfilment is the end for which we are destined, and our conscience tells us we are not our true selves until we bear the image of God impressed on our inmost will, 'Be ye holy, for I am holy.' Such is the divine demand re-echoed by our conscience, and which is in truth the aim also of our desires. We may not perhaps confess this to ourselves; but in the depths of every soul there exists the desire to be free from the empty vanities

which occupy so large a space of human life, and of its own life also.

This longing desire of the heart is a testimony that our reality is in opposition to the ideal whose image we have within us. Opposition between the ideal and the real is the lot of every human life. And yet we were created for harmony, not for discord. At those times when the Spirit of God touches our hearts, this feeling lays hold of us with a force which we cannot resist, and we long to escape from the moral discord of our life, and to enter upon a life of moral harmony. Which, then, is the way by which we may attain the goal of moral perfection?

This question has at all times been agitated by the nobler spirits. Socrates, who was the first among the Greeks to enter more deeply into questions of morality, thought that the way of wisdom and knowledge led to virtue. He was of opinion that sin originated in ignorance and error, and that he who had attained a clear conception of virtue could not be otherwise than virtuous (1). I need not tell you that this opinion of the noble Greek moralist was an error—a noble error, perhaps—one that did honour to the heart of the man, who could not understand how any one could be acquainted with virtue without loving it. But experience has shown us, times without number, that there is a great distance—nay, often a great gulf—between knowing and willing. Even Aristotle perceived this, and controverted this opinion of Socrates.

The error of Socrates is repeated in the notion so

kindred to modern thought, that we possess in education the means and guarantee of moral perfection. This is, however, to expect from education what it is not able to perform—what, moreover, it is not called to perform. In saying this let us not be so misunderstood as to be supposed to declare that we desire to have nothing at all to do with education. To say that it cannot do everything, is not to say that it can do nothing. Is it not evident to all that the province of education is diverse from that of morality? Sin may appear under coarser aspects among the uneducated, but it is not diminished or weakened by the refinement it acquires from education. ‘When the rose is brought to perfection,’ says Auerbach’s Irma, ‘it brings forth thorns of another kind, but still thorns.’ The human heart is agitated by the same passions and temptations, whether it be the heart of a man of high intellectual endowments, or of an ignorant labourer. Education changes the form but not the nature of that which proceedeth out of the heart of man. Progress in culture, moreover, is not progress in morality. The periods of highest culture, the age of Augustus in Rome, of Leo x. in Italy, of Louis XIV. in France, were also the ages in which a declension of morals set in. It was the perception of this fact which misled Rousseau to place the source of all evil in culture. It is superfluous to say that this was an exaggeration. But it is true, that when the eye lights with pleasure upon some single sunny spots in the dark picture of human passions, these are found to be more especially periods of moral elevation.

What, then, is to improve us in a moral point of view? Not knowledge, says Aristotle, but custom and the discipline of law. Man must be early accustomed to good, and by being thus accustomed to do good, he will become good. The means thereto are law and constraint. But do law and constraint reach the heart? The external actions may indeed be thus controlled, and customs may perhaps be produced, but not morality; manners influenced, but not the disposition. How, too, are sinful inclinations to be mastered? Aristotle thinks that as the young tree, when it is growing crooked, may be straightened by being bent towards the other side, so must the young be accustomed to that which is opposed to their evil inclinations. But this is not to alter the inclination itself. And even if this could avail in youth, of what use would it be when the character is settled? Then, according to Aristotle, it is no longer capable of being changed. To the ancient world it appeared a folly to attempt to change a formed character, for what we call conversion was esteemed impossible, was a thing unknown (2).

And certainly it is impossible in the way of custom, and equally so by the means upon which Kant erected his system of morality, namely, the dictates of duty. For how when duty and inclination are opposed? A morality based upon the supremacy of duty over the resisting inclination is, as Schiller says, a morality for slaves. 'But what had the children of the family done that he (Kant) should care only for slaves?' Schiller pronounces free inclination the highest acquirement,

and regards it as that which gives Christian morality the pre-eminence over the legal morality of Kant (3). How, then, is free inclination to be attained?

Kant's penetration showed him that a change of our inmost thoughts, a 'revolution' in which the hitherto evil man turns round by a single unalterable resolve, *i.e.* a new birth, must precede all moral development, if that which is really good is to be attained. But the question is: By what power is such a change to be effected? To this he could give no answer (4). The ideal of the good must be presented to us in the form of beauty, so as to captivate our hearts, and kindle in them an enthusiastic love of the good. Such was the answer of Plato; and it has been the opinion of the nobler spirits of all ages, that the soaring of the soul towards the fair world of the eternal ideal loosens the ties which bind us to the commonplace, and calls forth in us a new and higher life. Certainly this is the first step. What would become of the world if the power of the ideal were lost? and how would the soul be impoverished if the fire of enthusiasm were extinguished! This is the youth which we must preserve even in old age, and keep in our hearts even when our heads are grey. But we all know that such moments of mental exaltation are isolated, that such a condition is not permanent, that still less is it a power of moral renovation. Behind the moment of exaltation the sinful background of nature remains unchanged. The power of sin is a reality. Such a reality can only be overcome by another and more powerful reality; and only per-

sonal powers can operate upon the personal life. Why did antiquity so zealously cherish the worship of friendship, and its philosophers so assiduously elaborate the theory of friendship? Why does Aristotle, usually so cool and calm in his words, warm up when he speaks of friendship, and a breath of poetry linger upon his words? Why, but because those philosophers felt certain that the idea of the good can exercise no influence upon us, unless it is presented to us in corporeal personal reality. It is said, a friend is his friend's ideal. But our friend cannot be the realization of the highest ideal. He may be a help by the way, but he is not the end of that way (5).

Christians have at all times honoured the realization of the ideal in Jesus Christ; for He is the personal manifestation of the divine holiness and love. When Plato depicts the image of the righteous man, who maintains his rectitude even in the extremity of suffering; when the Stoics sketch the portrait of the wise man, whom they make the possessor of every virtue, these are predictions of a moral perfection, which was indeed sought for, but not found, and which we see fulfilled in Divine Love incarnate in Jesus Christ. There is something overwhelming in the image presented in the Gospels—something which involuntarily brings us on our knees—in that marvellous union of humility and majesty. Even if it were not reality, were but an image, the world at least would be the richer by a moral ideal such as it never knew before. But it is no fair romance; it is reality. It was not the

invention of the disciples, otherwise the disciples would have been greater than their Master (6). If it were not historical reality, it would be of little avail to us, for the power of sin, which is a fact, can only be overcome by a power which is also a fact. The first step to moral renovation is to let ourselves be influenced by the moral ideal in its historical realization. But this is only the first step, and we proceed to inquire what is the second.

Let me answer by reminding you of a significant narrative from the life of Christ, given in the Gospel of St. John (chap. iv.). Jesus, on His journey through Samaria, was sitting wearied by a well, when a woman approached from the neighbouring town to draw water. His request for a draught gave rise to a conversation, in which the different stages of moral renovation are exhibited. 'If thou knewest the gift of God, and who it is that saith unto thee, Give me to drink, thou wouldest have asked of Him, and He would have given thee living water. Whoso drinketh of the water that I shall give him shall never thirst.' This is the first stage, the stage of the ideal, as Jesus awakens it within us. We then long after a higher good, a better state of existence, and anticipate its realization in Jesus. This is the first step. But it must be followed by a second; and what is this? The Lord suddenly adds: 'Call thy husband.' And when the woman answered, 'I have no husband,' Jesus replied, 'Thou hast rightly said, I have no husband; for thou hast had five husbands, and he whom thou now hast is not thine husband; in

that saidst thou truly.' What then is His purpose in these words? They contain the history of her life, and it is a history of sin. Sin assumes one form in this case, another in that. The form is of no moment; it may differ widely at different times, and under different circumstances, but the thing itself is always and everywhere the same. The second step is to perceive the sinful principle of our being, and to get free from it, *i.e.* to be converted. But why is conversion necessary, and what is meant by it? Certainly the unconverted may possess many virtues, for there is a natural morality; and that deeds of self-sacrifice for our family, for our friends, for the commonwealth, for our native land, for mankind, are performed by the natural man, no lover of truth would dispute. Besides, it would be folly to deny that great moral distinctions exist among those whom we call unconverted. If some do not rise above the common level, we cannot withhold our respect from the moral nobility of soul displayed by others. Why then is conversion necessary, and what does it mean? Great as may be the moral distinction between individuals, this one thing is common to all: our life's centre of gravity is not in God, but in ourselves or in the good things of this life. To be converted is to transfer our life's centre of gravity from ourselves to God, to free ourselves from ourselves, to break with our self-sufficient and selfish nature, and to seek our supreme satisfaction not in ourselves, nor in the possessions of this life, but in Him who is the first cause and ultimate aim of our being. When we become conscious how far we are

from doing this, though it was for this that we were created, the perception causes us a grief and terror which no remembrance of the slight amount of good which we may perchance have to show serves to allay. On the contrary, it all vanishes like chaff, as we sit in judgment upon ourselves. In this judgment our heart gets free from the sinful principle of our nature, and turns to God. This is the second step. What is the power which produces this change in us? The third step to which the Lord leads this Samaritan woman at Jacob's well, is to refer her to the history of the divine revelation of salvation in Israel—'Salvation is of the Jews;' and finally, to reveal Himself to her as the Messiah, for He is the end of the ways of God, and the complete revelation of His love. This revelation of divine love in Jesus Christ, in which the heart of God is disclosed to us, this it is which conquers our hearts, and uncloses them towards Him. This love of God in Christ it is which converts us, and makes us Christians.

The apostle calls the Christian a new creation, and yet he is the end of all preceding history. As Christ Himself is the Son of man, *i.e.* the end of the history of man, the end in whom all his seeking is to be satisfied, all his questions to be solved, and yet at the same time a new beginning, from which a new development is to proceed, so, too, is it with the Christian. He is the end of the man in whom all the seeking of the natural man is satisfied, all his questions solved, and his higher truth found; and he is at the same time a new beginning planted by God, in which is deposited

the germ of a new moral life. For from the renewed heart is developed the new Christian morality in all the multiplicity of its virtues.

A good tree bringeth forth good fruit, and a corrupt tree corrupt fruit. If, as Schiller says, in opposing the Kantian morality, 'it is greater to conquer by means of the heart, than to conquer the heart' (7), the heart itself must first be good, *i.e.* renewed. First the heart, then the deed. According to Aristotle, we become good by doing good actions; but the gospel and the very nature of the case teach us that we must first become good before we can do good.

What, then, are the *Christian virtues*?

The old world reckoned four cardinal virtues: wisdom, justice, fortitude, and prudence. These were, so to speak, the stems upon which all the other virtues grew. You will easily perceive that these virtues refer not to man's relation to God, but to his external life in the world. To be just in the relations of human life, to be moderate in all things, especially in the indulgence of our sensuous appetites, such was the essence of this morality. It is evident at a glance, that such a morality is that of the external conduct alone, and not of the internal disposition. Yet the sphere of morality is, properly speaking, that of the disposition. For it is this which imparts moral worth to the actions. In this morality the outer world of civil society takes the place of the inner world of the disposition. Morality becomes civil justice; and what is the standard of this morality? The moral philosophers of the ancient world name a

twofold one : the law of the State, and public opinion (8). But we all know that the law cannot govern the heart, and that there is hardly a more uncertain tribunal than public opinion. If this is to give the final decision in moral questions, morality has lost its proper dignity. Is public opinion never mistaken ? Is it not, moreover, subject to change ? And is the standard of morality to change with it, to be one thing to-day and another to-morrow ? The dignity and supremacy of morality can only be preserved by the conviction that in all our thoughts and words we are in His presence to whom all secrets are known.

Nor can its *unity* be maintained unless it is referred to God. If morality begins and ends in our relation to the world and to human society, its idea is necessarily shattered into a multitude of single virtues. For the world is manifold ; God alone is one. Hence the morality of a life in the world is compounded of a mass of separate virtues and duties, while only life in God can be simple, and grow from a single root. The moral teachers of the old world discuss a great number of separate virtues, but are unacquainted with the fundamental virtue, which is the higher truth of all the rest (9) ; and the actual results correspond with this state of the case. The moral magnates of the old world are strong in this or that particular virtue, but they fail to give us the impression that the central point of their being is penetrated and renovated by the spirit of morality, and that we have in this a guarantee that the moral spirit by which they are animated will manifest itself in all aspects as

occasion offers. They represent only single virtues,—Aristides, justice; Epaminondas, truthfulness; Cimon, liberality; Leonidas, patriotism, etc.,—but they do not represent morality itself. Socrates is the model of a noble Greek; but in his last hours he was unfeeling to his wife and children. Plato and Aristotle were teachers of wisdom, but their verdict on the sensual errors of their fellow-countrymen was more than lenient. Cato was proverbial for his integrity in public life, but was cruel to his slaves; and we might adduce many more such instances. Everywhere we see single virtues; nowhere do we find the spirit of morality filling the whole man.

This reflection presses upon us in other provinces also. Let us take a glance, *e.g.* at the ancient drama! In the drama a moral conflict is carried on. Of what kind, then, are the moral conflicts in the ancient drama? They are only such as arise from the opposition between different single virtues and duties. Nowhere do we meet with the idea of the moral law itself in conflict with sin, and becoming that divine justice which presides over human history, and visits sin upon the sinner. Even that very drama which is most consonant with our sentiments, the *Antigone* of Sophocles, is based upon a collision of separate duties—duty towards a deceased brother, and duty towards the law of the State. Into such a collision I may be betrayed by fate without any fault of my own. But I cannot come into collision with the moral law itself except by my own fault. The feature which makes Shakespeare a Christian dramatist

is, that he refers all conflicts to such voluntary offences, though the transgression may be but slight, and have taken place in the inner world of the thoughts. Hence it is not the power of fate, but the law of righteousness to which he gives prominence in the intricate fabric of human affairs (10).

We see, then, that ancient morality was not acquainted with virtue, but only with the virtues, because it made virtue consist in the external action, and not in the disposition of the heart. The Christian notion of virtue is to make it consist in the disposition, and indeed in the disposition towards God. This was the morality taught by Christ in the Sermon on the Mount. It is in the inner world of the heart that the will of God is either fulfilled or transgressed. Whether the eye of man discerns it or not is a matter of indifference; God seeth in secret. And equally indifferent is it against whom our transgression is directly committed, for all sin is sin against God.

For this reason virtue is *the same* in all. The outward appearance of morality may differ in the man and in the woman, in the child and the adult. But to make from this a different morality, as the ancients did, is to misconceive its essential nature. God demands of all, high and low, educated and uneducated, the same love of the heart. For this knowledge we are indebted to Christianity, which introduced into the world the *unity of morality*. Where Christianity is unknown, distinctions prevail. Even the judgment as to right and wrong differs in different nations and countries. The unity

of morality is the supreme means of mutual understanding and association. The main bond of society is severed when the unity of morality is denied. Christianity, by placing morality in the disposition, and pronouncing the relation towards God to be that by which all the other relations are determined, brought into the world the unity of morality. We proceed then to inquire: What is this moral disposition which is equally required in all ?

Morality is the opposite of sin ; let us then first endeavour clearly to perceive wherein the *essence of sin* consists.

Sin is not merely *sensuality*. For ambition and pride, or self-righteousness, are as much sins as fleshly lust, and it is quite indifferent with respect to the dominion of sin whether the body is alive to sensible impressions or not. For the seat of sin is not in the body but in the heart.

Sin is not merely the *weakness* of human nature stopping on the way to its goal, but it is opposition to good ; and conscience does not merely find what excuses it can for our sins, but condemns them.

Sin is not merely the law of our *finiteness*. For then it would be a thing necessary, and God Himself, who is holy, its ultimate cause. We shall be finite beings to all eternity, but we hope to be free from sin. The perfection set before us is not to escape the limits of our finite nature, but to love God with all our heart, with all our mind, and with all our powers.

Sin is not the triumph of our *freedom*, but its misuse.

For to love God is true freedom, and obedience is the way to freedom. The misuse of freedom does not set us at liberty, but enslaves us. He that committeth sin is the slave of sin, as we may see every day in the tyranny exercised by certain sins and passions over those who are addicted to them. And this applies not to particular sins only, but to sin in general.

We theologians are often reproached with exaggerating sin, that the gospel which we proclaim may shine the more brightly upon this dark background of the picture. I think, however, that it is superfluous to paint sin in dark colours, for the deep shadows it casts on human life are dark enough. Let us then speak justly of it. And how can we speak of it in milder terms than to call it an error of the heart? Man, instead of giving his heart to God, has chosen to bestow his affections on the world, this world of perishable possessions and pleasures. But it is a fatal error; for it thrusts us from our true centre, and destroys the harmony of our existence. We are made for God, and are to find in Him the centre of our life and the end for which we are destined. To this appointment sin is the contradiction.

Every matter is to be understood by its origin. According to Scripture, sin had its beginning in this world in the fall of the first created human beings. Whatever opinion may be held as to the historical character of this narrative, the profound psychological penetration therein contained is unmistakeable. There are in this account three sayings to which significant prominence is given. 'Yea, hath God said?' is the first. Faith in

God is shaken. The beginning of sin is that unbelief by which a man inwardly severs himself from God. 'Ye shall be as God,' is the second saying, and it is one of proud self-deification. For when God ceases to be man's God, man becomes his own god. He then knows nothing higher than himself. 'And the woman beheld that the tree was good for food, . . . and took of the fruit and did eat.' This is the third saying. Sin is now become sensual lust, to which such enjoyment is the end of existence. Unbelief, pride, and lust—these are the three stages and aspects of sin; and these have obtained historical status in three mental tendencies. 'Yea, hath God said?' such is the motto of Rationalism. 'Ye shall be as God:' such is the motto of Pantheism. 'And the woman saw, . . . and ate:' such is the motto of Materialism. Rationalism, with its unbelief, led the way; Pantheism followed with its proud self-deification; we are now in the era of Materialism. This Materialism manifests its earthly and sensual nature under a threefold form. It appears either as the pursuit of gain, the pursuit of power, or the pursuit of enjoyment. But after all it is never these things themselves that man seeks; they are but his means, not his end. What he seeks in all is his own gratification, his own self. Man seeks himself in all. Even in the passionate love which he entertains for another human being, he seeks himself. His passion is egotism. For when he ceased to have in God the centre and aim of his life, he transposed that centre and aim to himself. The essence of sin is *selfishness*. In these three stages of unbelief,

pride and worldly lust, in all their various forms, it is always his own self that fills the thoughts and purposes of man, his own self that he places on that throne from which he has banished God.

The essence of sin is selfishness, but *the essence of virtue is love*. For this is the opposite to selfishness. Sin is the transgression of the law; but love is the fulfilling of the law. This is the ideal of Christian morality.

The ideal of the ancients was pride. When Aristotle depicts the magnanimous man who is his moral ideal, he is one who, being complete in himself, neither has need of nor renders service to others, who proudly and tranquilly goes his own way, self-sufficient and self-conscious. And when the Stoic philosophy portrays the wise man, it presents an image of one whose heart has died out and been replaced by a frigid resignation, of one unsusceptible of joy or sorrow, inaccessible to indignation or compassion, and raised in proud tranquillity above what agitates the minds of other men. It might almost be said that the saying of Cain, ‘Am I my brother’s keeper?’ was hovering on his lips (11).

How different is the ideal placed before us! We have learnt from Jesus Christ to esteem ministering love as of all things the greatest, and sacrifice as the most exalted of deeds. The virtue of the Christian is love. We love Him because He first loved us, is a summary of Christianity. The love of God to us is the subject of Christian doctrine; our love to God the principle of Christian morality.

The virtue of the Christian is love; what, then, is meant by love?

What we call love in the conduct of men to each other in this world, is an image of true love to God. We must understand the one by the other.

Love is not a matter merely of the feeling, nor certainly merely of the imagination. True love dwells in the deepest roots of the will. Here it has its secret dwelling-place when feeling is silent, and imagination has forsaken us. As we are to believe without seeing, so, too, are we to be strong enough to love God without feeling.

It is a tremendous thing to talk of love to God. For in all love there is something that is levelling. If I love any one, I put myself on a level with him, and place him on a level with me. Great as may be the differences separating me and one whom I love, love reconciles them. It is a tremendous thing to talk of love to God. Aristotle called it absurd. For truly we must have experienced the love of God to ourselves, before we can love Him in return. Only because He chose to love us, can we choose to love Him. What, then, is it to love?

To love is, first of all, not to seek self. Love is self-denial, and is in virtue thereof the opposite of selfishness. It is the nature of one who loves to desire to possess nothing for himself alone, nay, not to be his own, but another's. Love says: it is more blessed to give than to receive. The most blessed giving, however, is to give ourself. Love means: to seek not oneself but

another, his will, his profit, his pleasure. The words of selfishness are : I, my, my will be done. The words of love : Thou, Thy, Thy will be done. When we love, our chief concern is not that we, but that another should be appreciated and esteemed. Even the grief which one who loves experiences at the hands of the loved one, does not destroy his love, but only makes him more sensible, even though painfully so, of it. Such, too, is the nature of love to God. Our interest is in God, in God Himself. It seeks not His gifts, but Himself : ‘I desire not Thine,’ says Luther, speaking for the true children of God, ‘but Thee. Thou art not dearer to me when things go well, nor less dear when things go ill with me.’ And even if they knew that there were no heaven, no hell, and no reward, they would still love God for His own sake. To love God without reward is the maxim not of the mystics merely, but of all true Christians.

To love God is to seek not ourselves, but Him, and again it is to seek ourselves and all others only in God. For we do, in any case, love ourselves, and it would be unnatural not to do so. ‘No one ever hated his own flesh,’ says the apostle ; and the things of this world involuntarily awaken within us this feature of love, which it would be vain to try to obliterate. But all this love for self and the world is sanctified by being included in love to God. For God must so wholly fill our heart, and rule our will, as to leave room for no other love except as part of this love. The way rightly to possess, rightly to love the world and the things of the world, is

first to have released ourselves from love to them, and to have heartily forsaken and renounced everything that we may gain Him, and then to find and regain all in God. Our regards are to be so exclusively directed to Him, that we lose sight of all besides, until we learn to see and rejoice in it, looking at it so to speak through Him.

Such is love to God. There is nothing more free, and at the same time nothing more necessary than love. All else can be commanded, love cannot be commanded ; it must ever remain uncompelled. And yet when once we love, it is so natural to us, that we cannot understand how it could be otherwise. It is the most necessary thing there is—it is an intrinsic necessity which is one with freedom. That is true freedom in which inclination and duty are no longer opposed to each other. Therefore love to God is true morality. In it we find our truth. For to love God is the end to which we are destined. The other creatures were made to be the ministers of His will. Man was made to love Him. Hence love to God is our happiness. Never is man happier than when he loves, when through love he surrenders himself to live in another. Everything earthly is a parable, and finds its higher truth in God. It is man's highest happiness to love God, because this is the end for which he was destined.

Love, then, is the virtue of the Christian. And to love means to love God (12).

Out of this love to God grows all *the other virtues*. They are nothing else than the development of love.

They form, not a mass without order or connection, but, as springing from one common root, a unity, or, if I may use the word, a system of virtues. ‘Virtue,’ says Augustine, ‘is the order of love’ (13). God is the cause of love, in which he who loves Him sinks himself, the ever-present One in whom he lives, the future to which he is tending. From this threefold position the Christian virtues result.

Allow me a few words on these virtues.

Of all the Christian virtues, the first both in order and rank is *humility*. According to its measure do we estimate the Christian, and the Lord demands this childlike spirit of humility above all else from His disciples if they would be members of His kingdom. This was the very virtue which was unknown to the ancients, and a contemptuous meaning lingers in the word by which they defined humility. Their chief virtue was pride. But since the Lord spoke in this proud world the words, ‘I am meek and lowly of heart,’ humility has been promoted to the first rank in the circle of Christian virtues, has become the condition of the highest privileges. She who was chief in suffering, and he who was in labours most abundant, the Virgin Mary and St. Paul, were also humble beyond all others. For only so far as we are and desire to be esteemed as nothing in ourselves, do we leave God room to carry on His work within us, and to pour out His grace upon us (14).

With humility is combined *gratitude*. Humility abases us before God as creatures before the Creator,

as sinners before the holy God, as recipients of mercy before Him who is abundant in mercy. Love is humble when it looks to God, thankful when it looks to itself; all love is thankful. For when we think the love of another is deserved, there is no true love. True love exists only in connection with the feeling of undeserved favour. And what is more undeserved than God and His love?

Love to God is humble and thankful when it sinks itself in the contemplation of God, its eternal cause. *Obedience* to God and *delight* in Him are its qualities when it lives and moves in Him. For love makes the will of the beloved one its own in obedience. Without obedience, love would not be moral conduct, and without love, obedience would not be free. Without delight, moreover, love and the obedience it renders would not be lively. No one loves another without delighting in him, because he knows what a treasure he possesses in him. God is the supreme treasure, the treasure of treasures, the soul's highest joy. When God created man, He rejoiced in him and rested in him; He created and purposed nothing beyond him. And when man finds his God and possesses Him in love, he rejoices in Him, and rests in Him, for He desires nothing beside Him.

But he desires to possess Him more and more. The present is to the Christian only a pledge of the future, and inasmuch as love finds the future which it hopes for in God, is its *desire* after God and *rest* in Him. All love exhibits this characteristic feature of desire, and is

ever striving to reach a higher stage than it has yet attained ; nor does the amount of intercourse enjoyed ever fully satisfy it. As the eyes of one who loves are ever seeking the beloved, because his heart and mind are ever with him, so does the soul of one who loves God ever follow after Him, and say with the Psalmist, ‘My soul thirsteth for God.’ But the Christian is assured of attaining that which he thus longs after. This gives him true repose : ‘My soul is silent to God, of whom cometh my salvation.’ His longing desire is not restlessness, but patient, waiting rest in God. He who is not sure of attaining his end is uneasy, because uncertain, by the way. But the fact that this is assured to us makes us tranquil and calm even in the storms of life, and enables us to keep an eternal Sabbath even in the midst of this restless life in time.

These are the virtues involved in the virtue of love, which diffuse their gentle rays over the Christian’s life. For a Christian’s whole demeanour in this world is but the reflection of his inward disposition towards God. As God maketh His sun to rise upon the evil and the good, and sendeth rain upon the just and the unjust, so too is the love of the Christian all-comprehending, and not conditioned by the merits or amiability of others. It has indeed—as is natural—its narrower and wider circles, and its degrees of greater or less intensity. But as the love of God is bestowed on all, and is not to be turned aside by the ingratitude of man, so too does the Christian’s love embrace, in intercession at least, all mankind, and include in its prayers even the hostile

and unthankful. Our Lord designates this love as the token of His followers, 'By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another.' And it was by this quality that the ancient heathen world recognised Christians. 'See how they love one another!' 'They love before they know each other!' they exclaimed with astonishment, for it was a thing wholly incomprehensible. Such a saying as the well-known words of Christ, 'Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, and pray for them that despitefully use you and persecute you,' had hitherto been unheard in the world, or even if perchance uttered—as an involuntary testimony to the truth which exists in the depth of the soul—it had been but a saying, and never realized. Now it became, however, as we all know, reality in Christ; and in Christians also, for it was the power by which they overcame the world (15).

You will say, perhaps, that I am drawing an ideal picture,—that this may apply to the early days of the first love of Christendom, and to certain elect souls, but will question whether it holds good of Christians in general. I reply that it is not an ideal, but reality, though not indeed the whole reality. For though the new spirit proceeding from Jesus Christ attains the supremacy, yet the power of the former opposition is never entirely subdued, so long as we are within the bounds of this earthly existence. As Luther expresses it, we still carry the old Adam round our necks. That we shall not be wholly free from this discord so long as we live on earth, is the fact which casts a tinge of sad-

ness on the Christian's countenance. But the power of sin is to the Christian not a source of sorrow merely, but also a challenge addressed to his will. Scripture not seldom portrays the Christian as a cross-bearer and a warrior; and in so doing, it describes the double duty of self-denial and conflict imposed upon the Christian by sin.

Self-denial—for the seductive power exercised upon the Christian by sin makes it incumbent upon him to debar himself of all that might minister thereto, that he may be faithful to the moral task imposed upon him. The Romish Church requires abstinence, and various ascetic exercises as proofs of piety. Our Church rejects this doctrine; for such exercises are not proofs of piety, but only means of attaining it. In this latter aspect, however, they are both lawful and necessary. We have no right to misuse the body; but it is our duty to keep it in subjection, that it may be our obedient instrument in the fulfilment of our moral duty. We have no right to suppress our intellectual gifts; but it is our duty to deny ourselves anything which might excite our imagination in such a manner as to interfere with our life in God, or with the performance of our moral duty in the world. The twofold standard of life in God, and the fulfilment of our moral task in the world, is that by which all self-denial must be estimated. To remind us of this is the office of the sorrow which we have to experience; for all sorrow has the property of loosening the ties that bind us, of withdrawing us from the ordinary turmoil of the world, of attracting us

to God. Such is the great and blessed office of sorrow. And in proportion as we allow it to exercise this, does it become the cross which we carry after Christ. For as Christ prepared salvation for us on the cross, so are we to be prepared for salvation by the cross (16).

One duty, then, imposed upon us by sin, is that of renunciation and self-denial. The other is that of *conflict*, by which we defend ourselves against it, and against its seductive influence. The whole life of the Christian exhibits this form of conflict; for the new man in Christ has constantly to defend himself against the old man. The power of sin is indeed broken in the central point of the personal life, and restricted to the circumference of our mental and bodily nature. But the secret force of its temptations, amounting even to the demoniac form of evil thoughts, which expose the soul to the power of doubt, and plunge it into profound melancholy, or cast about it the dark net, which drags it to the very brink of the precipice, is sometimes only the more keenly felt. In such hours of temptation, we feel but too well that we wrestle not with flesh and blood, but that other powers lurk in the background of this life. And the higher the vocation of the Christian in the kingdom of God, the more, we cannot but think, will he have to pass through of such experiences. When Luther says that he was well acquainted with the depths of hell, we will not call this a figure of speech or an exaggeration. I know well that flesh and blood rule over a vast realm of temptations, that such strange forms may be taken by disturbance of the

nervous system, as may seem to us temptations from another world, and that we must not deal in a simply spiritual manner with a state which is the result of physical affections. But even these physical bodily disturbances and dangers involve moral duties, and demand moral effort. Besides, we know that the limits of the bodily organism are not the limits of reality, but that, beyond it, other powers of a spiritual nature are ever active, who make use of the disorder of the bodily functions to endanger our souls, and who must be opposed with mental and spiritual weapons.

According as we carry on this warfare negligently or vigorously, do we advance or recede. But one who is far advanced may fall, so as not to rise again; and one in whom the work of renovation is begun, so completely forfeit salvation that deliverance is no longer possible. The will of God, however, when He suffers us to be in conflict and temptation, is our safety and progress. Every victory over sin is a step in advance. The goal of perfection will not be attained on earth. Saints are not made perfect here. The Christian, says Luther, is becoming, not become; what we shall be is not yet present, but it is in process.

We are, however, helped onwards by prayer and the word of God. To these is the Christian with his moral duties directed. The life of the Christian in these ordinances and means of divine grace must form the subject of our next lecture.

LECTURE IV.

THE DEVOTIONAL LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN, AND HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CHURCH.



WE were made for work in the world. What our Lord said of Himself: 'I must work while it is day; the night cometh when no man can work,' applies to each of us. Now the value of our work is to be computed according to the moral force of will with which we work, and the moral disposition which we bring to it. Our life and work in this world, moreover, have true value and lasting worth only when animated and impregnated by the powers of the world to come, for it is by these that our souls live. Our life is passed on earth, and our work is part of our temporal vocation, but the roots of our being must penetrate to those depths where flow the perennial sources whence strength and refreshment, even for our work on earth, are derived. These sources are prayer and the word of God; and of the divine word the Church is the steward. Permit me, then, before directing your attention in my next lecture to our manifold earthly duties, to speak to you to-day of the *devotional life of the Christian, and his relation to the Church.*

The soul of the devotional life is prayer.

We all know that Jesus is more to us than a mere example. But if He were only this, we could not for a moment doubt of the importance of prayer with regard to our whole life. For if we consider the life of Jesus, the impression universally made upon us will be, that it was a life of constant prayer. It was indeed a life of labour, of consuming labour, but all its labour was based on prayer, on the secret intercourse of His soul with His Father. Before every word which He uttered, before every miracle which He wrought, He ever secretly applied, as we may plainly perceive, to His Father. And when the hours of day were all engrossed by the work of His calling, He dedicated the solitary hours of evening or morning, or the silence of night, to prayer. Every feeling which stirred His soul He transformed into prayer, and when at last the anguish of His soul threatened to overcome Him, His remedy and refuge was prayer.

In all ages, since we have known anything of man's life on earth, he has prayed. The time when prayer first came into vogue has not yet been discovered, for it is natural to man to pray. The child learns to do it almost before it learns to speak, and the old man practises it when he is capable of nothing else. It is the first thing in the history of mankind, and it will be the last in those times of the end of which Scripture prophesies. There is no nation ignorant of prayer, for no nation has been discovered without religion, and the central point of religion is prayer. Among the heathen, prayer has indeed lost its truth and inwardness, and become a merely external work ; but still it exists, and is

in the midst of its disfigurement a testimony to the inmost need of the human soul. The nation of revelation has been the soil on which it has borne its fairest and most abundant blossoms. The supplicatory passages of the Psalms, after so many centuries, still stir our souls. But the supreme example of prayer is the life of our Lord (1).

From Him we learn the position prayer ought to occupy in the life of the Christian. We are accustomed to set apart times in which to practise prayer. It must not, however, be limited to such seasons. Prayer is the abiding background in the life of the Christian. Prayer must give support to his whole life, his every action; in it must all originate, in it must all terminate. The standard by which to estimate our true condition is the degree in which we are conversant with prayer. The life of the Christian must be a living in prayer. It is upon this background that all the special exercises of prayer must be practised, and thus enter into connection with the rest of our life. The day's routine, with its recurrence of morning, noon, and evening, times and seasons of sacred remembrance, the special occurrences which agitate our souls, the cares and wants by which we are so sorely burdened, the experiences of divine goodness which are bestowed on us, the various frames and emotions of our mind,—all these should be occasions and incentives to prayer, that thus our whole life in time may be pervaded with an atmosphere of eternity.

What is it to pray? *What is prayer?*

In daily life, with its labour and unrest, the external

world makes claims upon us, and withdraws us from ourselves. In prayer we retire within ourselves, we betake ourselves to the silence of the inner sanctuary, in which we have the presence of God. To pray is inwardly to draw near to God, to leave awhile this transitory world and enter the eternal world, that we may breathe its pure and invigorating atmosphere. Our bodies cannot live without inhaling the air of this world, nor can our souls live without inhaling the air of the eternal world. Prayer is the soul's respiration. The mind of man is stunted if it has no intercourse with other minds. No being is nearer to us than God. Our inward man is stunted if it has no spiritual intercourse with God. Prayer is the secret intercourse of the soul with God. Love cannot exist where there is no opening, no pouring out of the heart to the beloved. For a love shut up in itself would be no true love. And so too does the love of a child of God impel him to pour out his heart in prayer to his Father in heaven. It would be unnatural to him not to do so. Nothing is more natural to the Christian than prayer.

What we ought to pray for has been shown us by Christ, in the prayer which He taught His disciples.

The Lord's Prayer is the prayer of prayers. Brief and simple, and yet so copious that it includes everything, and that every one can connect with it whatever else may specially concern his soul. In the address we express our glad belief that God our Father is willing to help us His children, and that being the Almighty One, who from heaven rules over all earthly things, He is

also able. Upon this persuasion we base the petitions we bring before Him. And these do not in the first place concern our own, but His interests. For love seeketh not her own, but first of all that which is another's. 'Hallowed be Thy name, Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done.' That God, as He has revealed Himself, may be acknowledged by man in word and deed is the first thing desired. This is the way in which the kingdom of God, that happy sway in which His will alone prevails and is performed, is realized. To this future is the third petition directed with ardent longing. But how many wants and sorrows of this earthly life still lie in the way between now and then ! To these wants the thoughts of the suppliant then descend. The bodily need is the first thing which he lays before the Helper in all need. For bodily life is the foundation of spiritual life. It only occupies, however, the space of one petition. The others are all devoted to the wants of the soul. That God should pardon the guilt of sins already committed is the first and most pressing need of the soul ; then follows the request that He would preserve us from further guilt ; and finally, that He would deliver us from all the seductions and troubles of this life. This closes the petitions. The Church has added an ascription of praise : 'For Thine is the kingdom, the power, and the glory, for ever and ever,' thus making all the emotions of the heart resound, as it were, in one full chord in these words (2).

One petition follows another in harmonious connection, and the seven form a whole so simple that a child may

pray it, so wide and copious that the most advanced Christian can never exhaust it. Whatever else may affect us, we can and must include it in the words of this prayer, or add it to this prayer in words of our own.

What, then, is to be the *subject* of prayer? All that affects us. Nothing is so small that we may not and ought not to bring it before God in prayer. As God in His government of the world cares not only for that which is great, but also cherishes in His fatherly love that which is least, so should nothing seem to us too small to bring to Him in prayer. It is true that the concerns of the soul should occupy the first place, that our chief and first interest should be our salvation. But the concerns of our earthly existence, the little interests of everyday life, must not be regarded as too trifling to be brought before God. A child will pour out even the lesser cares of its heart into a mother's ear, and God's love is tenderer than that of a mother. We must not indeed think to extort temporal relief by prayer, but must commit our circumstances to God and His wisdom, for there is but one thing absolutely needful, and for which we may unreservedly pray, and that is our soul's salvation; for all else we may and must ask only conditionally.

Our Lord has, however, promised us that these petitions too *shall be heard*; but how they shall be heard must be left to Him. When Augustine desired to leave Africa and to go to Italy, his mother Monica, fearing the effect which the seductions of Rome might have upon his impulsive mind, earnestly entreated God not

to suffer this to take place. God, however, permitted him to go to Italy, that he might find at Milan his soul's salvation. 'Thou didst deny her,' says Augustine in his *Confessions*, 'Thou didst deny her what she prayed for then, that Thou mightest grant her what she prayed for always.' The history of the Church down to our own days is full of experiences of the power of prayer (§). Why, then, should not such an experience be ours? Whatever arguments may be used against the possibility of prayer being answered, we know that God, the living God, is Love, and that even a wordless sigh does not go up to heaven unheard. 'God will call the sigh prayer,' says Vinet in a passage of unsurpassable beauty, 'and the prayer power; and the power of God will, if I may venture to say so, bow before the power of the sigh which is from Himself.

The Christian's *attitude towards the Church* is closely connected with his devotional life.

Prayer is the most inward thing there is, and religion is a concern of the inner life. But we are made for society, and even religion is a matter of association. It is true that Christ desired to kindle in the secret sanctuary of the soul that fire of love and faith whose warmth and light have since pervaded the whole life of Christian mankind. But he also united His disciples in a society, and purposed to found a *church*. When religion had become legal and external, the preaching of the Reformation reopened the secret sources of religious life, and the living streams have flowed forth from that time to the present, even during that period which has

been designated the age of stiff orthodoxy ; for this was also the age of those Church hymns which are the boast of our Church, and whose heart-reviving power we are all acquainted with. But the Reformation also founded an evangelical church ; for religion, though it is first of all an internal matter, becomes stunted and morbid if it continues to be only an individual interest. All mental life is healthy, in proportion as the life of the individual is in harmony with the life of the community. What then ? If the great general ideas which govern human life become associative forces, by whose operation human society obtains points of contact about which individual life congregates, must not that supreme truth which nourishes the inner life of our soul, and ministers to the highest and most important interests of public life, be designed to become first of all the central point of an association fitted to serve as a support to all others, and to be to them a source of higher vital powers ?

They indeed who are conscious of no religious wants, will also desire to know nothing of a church. That alienation from the Church which is now so wide-spread, is for the most part rooted in indifference to religion itself. But though an individual may perhaps think that, as far as he is himself concerned, he can do without religion, human society cannot do without it, for every intelligent observer perceives what a chaos we should be involved in if life were to be deprived of religion. It is not, however, merely in the interest of order that religion is required, but by the inmost craving of human nature itself. However large may be the number of

individuals who deceive themselves into esteeming religion either superfluous or pernicious, they will never succeed in uprooting it from the minds of men, because they will never succeed in separating God from our spirits. But he who says Religion, says the Church; for as religious men also we are made for society, and the Church is the religious corporation (4).

There is, however, a difference between church and church. The Romish Church regards the Church as a great world-embracing political organism, claiming supreme power even in temporal and mundane affairs. Nothing besides has any power but in so far as it subserves the interests of the Church. Hence the Church is, in fact, a declaration of war against all independence in the various departments of natural life, and peace with these is only possible because the Romish Church meanwhile refrains from fully asserting her claims. We understand the Church differently. It is in our eyes the association of the new and spiritual life, appointed to guide souls, by the spiritual means at its disposal, to their eternal home. It is indeed also an external⁴ association, for its members are men who are still in the body, and whose locality is here upon earth. But the soul of the external association is the inward and spiritual society of the kingdom of God; the aim of all its efforts is the building up of this kingdom of God; and its means of operation are chiefly the word of God and the sacraments (5).

The Church question is now the order of the day, and the interest felt in Church matters is widely diffused.

I will not now stop to inquire into the motives of this interest, and its consequent value ; I speak only of the fact. But when by reason of this interest taken in Church matters the question is to arrive at a decision, by what standard must Church matters be judged and decided ? The Protestant principle is that in such questions the last appeal must be to *Holy Scripture*. To it are we above all referred ; it is to be the divine mirror for ourselves and for the Church. For this purpose does our Church put the Scriptures into our hand, that we may dive into them, read them, live in them. And it is the glory of the Protestant that he has free access to them, and that no authority may block up his way to them. And they deserve this. We read much. But Holy Scripture deserves beyond all other books to be read. What a marvellous book it is ! How stupendous and wondrous an edifice, from its foundations, laid with the huge and solid blocks, so to speak, of the account of the beginning of all things and of the origin of the people of God, up to its lofty spire, towering above the limits of earth, and reaching into that eternal world of which the Revelation of St. John gives us a distant glimpse !

We tread on holy ground when we enter this wondrous structure of Holy Scripture. And the voices which resound through its courts are sacred voices from another world ; nay, the voice of God Himself addresses us not merely as the Lawgiver and Judge, but as the Father seeking for His children. When we enter here we must first of all silence whatever opinions and prejudices we may

entertain or bring with us, surrender ourselves unreservedly to the impression which God's word makes upon us, and let it do its work upon our souls. This is the main point. Human scholarship may be needful to give us access to the full understanding of Holy Scripture; but then, having entered, we must leave all human knowledge without, and simply hearken. Scripture was given to us by God not to be an object of learned investigation, not to enlarge our historical or philological knowledge—it does indeed do us service in these matters, but its ultimate aim is a religious one, and our proper attitude towards it must also be a religious one. The first essential in the Christian life is prayer, and the second is love to Holy Scripture and living in it.

It may be truly said, that there never was a time in which Scripture was so widely diffused as in our own. Care is taken that it shall be in the hands of all. But it may also be said, that since the press made Scripture the common property of Christians, there never was a time in which it was, on the whole, so little read and known, and so foreign to the masses of Christendom, as the present. To be well grounded in Scripture was formerly the boast and the acquirement of many. How few can be called so now! Much time and pains are devoted to religious questions; much interest taken, it may be, in matters of Church government; much conflict perhaps waged for the advancement of the Church; but that which should have the first place is passed by, and very little attention is paid to the Bible. And yet it

is the Protestant principle that in all matters, religious and ecclesiastical, the decision rests with Holy Scripture. And apart from this, is there a work in the German language of which we have more reason to be proud than Luther's translation of the Bible? What have we not as a nation possessed in our Bible? It has ever furnished the best and purest nutriment of our intellectual life. Hence have we derived our poetry and our practical wisdom; here have we found gladness in labour, even solace in suffering. Nor let it be forgotten that there is nothing so calculated to form a bond of union between the different classes and grades of our population, nothing which can make our national spirit so healthy, and in the best sense so popular, as Holy Scripture. A French scholar, Rosseuw St. Hilaire, published, in the French language, some few years since, a collection of Alsatian proverbs and tales. In the midst of his learned labours he met with these productions of the German mind in Alsace, and was so struck with their simplicity and poetical beauty that he left off for a season his *History of Spain*, upon which he was then engaged, to translate these little tales, and thus to introduce them among his own people. He preceded these *Tractates d'Alsace* by a preface, in which he speaks of the difference between the French and German mind, and of the influence of the Bible upon the national spirit and literature of a people. 'There is in the German mind a strangely charming mixture of the naïve and the sublime, of the childlike and the profound, resulting from the honest nature of this primitive people, who

have kept closer to nature than we have done, and are endowed with an indestructible youth which defies the lapse of ages. If there are in the world two types of mind so oppositely constituted that they can never understand each other, they are the French and German. One always ironical, ready to jest at itself and others; the other sincere even to childishness (*enfantillage*), indignant at jesting which is contrary to its nature, and ready to take offence when it feels itself misunderstood. I have travelled much, both in north and south, and there is one fact which I have everywhere met with. Wherever the Bible is not made the foundation-stone of education, of society, and of every form of life, there is no literature for children or for the people. Look at Spain, Italy, and even France—in a word, at every country in which the Bible is not read: nowhere is there any reading for the child or the labourer. In Germany and England, on the contrary, there exists a Christian children's and popular literature, in which, as in a mirror, the national spirit is clearly reflected.' In these words does a Frenchman tell us the secret of our strength and of the soundness of our national life. The Bible in the family, the Bible in the school, the Bible in the Church, is the good old German and Protestant custom. From Holy Scripture our thoughts involuntarily pass to *preaching*.

You are aware that it was the Reformation which made Scripture and preaching upon Scripture the central point of divine worship. This fact teaches us what we ought to seek in preaching,—not the human

art of eloquence, nor brilliant and ingenious ideas. They whom God has endowed with an acute intellect and an eloquent tongue may thankfully use them, but they must place them at the disposal of that eternal truth which is proclaimed to us in Scripture. The saying of John the Baptist, 'He must increase, but I must decrease,' is the best motto for preachers. And as the preacher should recede in comparison with Him whom he proclaims, so too should the concern of his hearers be not intellectual or æsthetic enjoyment, but the preaching of the word whose matter is Jesus Christ and our salvation. When we come to hear preaching in this frame of mind, we shall both have more patience with the manifold deficiencies inseparable from every human performance, and find something that may be of use to us under the unpromising covering. We are but too much inclined to require of preaching a perfection which calmer and wiser reflection must declare to be impossible. If even a Paul felt himself justified in writing again the same things to the Philippians, how should we require that our preachers, who are certainly no Pauls, and whose days and weeks are often passed amidst the distractions of external and time-consuming employments, should always present us with what is new and striking, or provide us with displays of oratorical art? (7)

The Reformation did the right thing when it placed the reading of Scripture and the sermon in the middle of the service. Subsequently, however, especially during the era of Rationalism, the other parts of divine worship

were but too much cast into the background ; and it is still our habit to undervalue them, and to give undue prominence in our service to the human word of the preacher. And yet the sermon can never produce its full effect unless it is properly supported by the other acts of worship, nor can the edification resulting from divine service be really attained, unless not only our understanding and will, but all the other aspects and powers of our inner life, be claimed, and the numberless religious wants of the heart satisfied thereby (8).

The false and exaggerated demands made upon preaching are chiefly to blame for the habitual absence of so many from public worship. They think, it may be, that they do not need the instruction there to be obtained, or that they are capable of giving it to themselves. And we all know from experience how readily a certain natural distaste and love of ease may combine with and be concealed under all kind of excuses. But this secret pride and this concealed idleness are both mistaken, for in our religious as well as in our natural life, we are made for association, and thereby alone are we in this, as in other respects, healthy and vigorous. We all find again and again what a power to elevate and animate there is in association. It is by heaping log on log that we feed the flame, in which each single log then burns brightly and cheerfully.

It was to give opportunity for public worship that the Church followed up the Old Testament celebration of the Sabbath by the appointment of *Sunday*. Even in apostolic times we find traces of the observance of

Sunday. There are both natural and religious reasons for this institution. When the Old Testament law set apart a day to be devoted to rest, it acted in accordance with a law of our nature. That nature is ruined physically as well as mentally, unless the time of labour is repeatedly interrupted by a day of rest. This is a necessity both of individual and social life. The physical and mental powers are prematurely worn out, and family and social life also suffer loss, if this divine law of nature is disregarded. And the more so in these days when labour has so increased, when it makes such far larger demands than formerly on our powers, and withdraws so many members of the family from their home. Body and soul both need breathing time, to rest and to rejoice in God's works in flower and field; parents and children need quiet time in which they may belong to each other and live together again, after their work has so much separated them; and the heart needs the opportunity of calmly surrendering itself to the associations of love and friendship, without feeling the goad of the driver behind it. The mind dies out, the heart grows empty and desolate, selfishness and the love of material enjoyment reign supreme, where the day of rest is not observed. England and America well know what they are about when they insist so strictly upon the rest of Sunday. They know that their progress and prosperity depend upon it. For their populations would have been long ere this used up, if the whirling machine of modern industry had not at intervals been brought to a compulsory pause. The celebration of Sunday by

these nations may seem to us too legal, and their Puritanism will always be repulsive to our feelings and opinions, but we have certainly something to learn from them. The future of our nation depends in a great degree upon the observance of the Sunday. Hitherto this day, which ought to be a blessing, has been, in wide-spread circles, a curse to our people.

It can, however, only be a blessing when, besides being a day of rest, it is also made a day of religious observance; for we do not live for this world only, we live also for the eternal world. Our body and soul must both rejoice in the living God. The creation of the world closed with the Sabbath; the new creation, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ, began with the Sunday. It is by virtue of the powers proceeding from that new creation that we live, and it must be our part to immerse our souls in this world of vital powers, that we may thence derive refreshment after toil and new vigour for the labours of life. Sunday is the sun of days, whence light and warmth are diffused over the week days, and which sheds even over our saddest seasons a glow of relief and enjoyment. For this purpose was the day given us, and for this set apart by the Church for common prayer and hearing of the word (9).

The Church, like every other corporation, requires its appointed ordinances and its *government*. The era of the Reformation was, at least in our Church, little solicitous as to the carrying out of a system of church government; for it was an era of creative ideas, and concerned itself more with the internal life, and with

great and new thoughts, than with external ordinances. Our age is, in respect of the Church, one poorer in new thoughts, and has therefore the more zealously thrown itself into questions of government and external order. If such matters were somewhat neglected by our predecessors, it is perhaps our office to repair this deficiency. The main thing, indeed, is that this should be set about in the right manner. Christ gave us no precepts concerning any definite form of church government. He proclaimed the word, He instituted baptism and the Lord's Supper, He commanded that the gospel should be preached, He appointed apostles. He left the rest to the free development of the future. We learn from this that government occupies a subordinate position, and must be looked upon not as an end but a means, a means to help the Church to fulfil her proper duty. This duty is to save souls by preaching Christ and administering the sacraments. Hence our supreme aim in all questions of government must be, not to pursue ideals, or satisfy self-seeking thoughts and ambitions, but to procure for the Church such an order as best may conduce to the fulfilment of her essential office.

You know that the effort to procure for the laity a participation in church affairs has made this question, which has been the source of so much contention, its own. This effort is founded upon a certain amount both of truth and justice. For there is latent in every commonwealth a mass of gifts and powers ever striving after their proper application; and the Church, too, is a commonwealth, endowed with various gifts and powers

which God has bestowed upon her, that they may find their appropriate and appointed application. It is a hierarchical disposition which prevails in the Church when this free co-operation of different powers is rejected or disallowed. I willingly admit that too much apprehension is perhaps entertained in many circles concerning this concession, and I do not deny that our Church has in this respect large omissions to repair. But this question is regarded from a false point of view when it is made a question of supremacy, of whether the clergy or the laity are to be the leaders in the Church; for the matter in discussion is by no means supremacy or sway, but service—the service to be rendered to the Church, to enable her the better to fulfil her office of saving souls by preaching Christ. And equally so when notions, native to the foreign province of politics, are imported into it, and the Church laid out according to a pattern of political constitutionalism; for every department of life must be judged of and treated according to its own nature and laws. And, finally, when the Church is regarded as the exercising ground for all kinds of freethinkers to carry on the pranks which they are perhaps forbidden to play elsewhere; for every sphere of life has, together with its proper nature, its proper restrictions, which are the standard and law of all action within it (10).

In support of the demand in question, the *universal priesthood* is generally appealed to. The universal priesthood of Christians is a great truth, for whose re-discovery and recognition we are indebted to the

Reformation, and from whose admission no misuse that may be made of it must be allowed to deter us. It is based upon the Reformation perception, that though the individual is brought to faith in Jesus Christ by the ministrations of the Church, his faith is not to stop at the stage of dependent nonage, but to advance to independent certainty of that salvation, the knowledge of which he owes to the Church. Every believer is a priest, *i.e.* he has through Christ direct access to God in Christ; and it is at once his privilege and his duty to offer to God the gifts and sacrifices of his prayers and life. This is the first and also the chief meaning of the universal priesthood. It is however true that this does not exhaust it. For as the Old Testament priest returned from the sanctuary, where he had been offering prayer, to bless the people, so, too, is it the privilege and duty of the New Testament priest, *i.e.* of the Christian, to be a blessing to others, by those works of love which prove the reality of his faith. All the care we take for the spiritual and temporal good of others, whether by word or deed, the entire field of action which we comprise under the name of the Inner Mission, what is it but a performance of the functions of the universal priesthood? For this priesthood may be exercised either by organized associations or individual effort. And when, as at the present time, a demand is made in the interest of the Church and of congregations for church representation, in the form of deputies and synods, this demand is equally based upon the universal priesthood.

Let us not, however, forget that there is one very

essential prerequisite to this universal priesthood, viz. to be a Christian. I do not mean a Christian in name and in church registers only, but in reality. For a man is not morally entitled to church privileges because he is five-and-twenty or thirty years of age, and has, it may be, never incurred any disgraceful penalty from the civil power. For this, it is of the first necessity that he should know himself to be in unison with the faith of the Church, and should be living in the fulfilment of all church duties. For it is in the very nature of the case that he who has inwardly fallen away from, or is utterly indifferent to, the Christian faith and his Church, cannot possibly claim any right of government therein. Otherwise the Church and its faithful members would be subjected to the most insufferable of all tyrannies, because a tyranny affecting the most sacred and secret interests of the heart and conscience. This must not be forgotten when the universal priesthood is appealed to. And those church provinces which are esteemed models of synodal action—the Rhine Provinces and Westphalia—express themselves very decidedly on this prerequisite, and have in more than one case very decidedly insisted upon it (11).

But besides the universal priesthood of the Christian, there is also the regular *ministry of the word*. It is self-evident that the former is not opposed to the latter, but to be exercised in accordance therewith. It may well be, indeed, that a member of the congregation may stand far above his pastor in intellect, in knowledge, and even in piety; but such a fact no more annuls the

ministerial office than it could annul an analogous relation in secular affairs. We Protestants reject the Romish doctrine, that the office itself, or ordination to the office, bestows on its possessor certain personal qualities, by virtue of which he is elevated above his fellow Christians. Such a distinction between clergy and laity we do not admit. That which distinguishes the minister from others is his office of proclaiming the word of God; and this gives him the right, or rather imposes upon him the duty, of speaking to others in the name of God, and of saying with the apostle, ‘We are ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech you by us, we pray you in Christ’s stead be ye reconciled to God.’

Whatever we may be, however, whether private Christians or ministers of the word, we still belong to a *definite church*, and have to be faithful thereto in faith and practice. We may lament the separations of the Church, but it is a fact, and certainly did not come to pass without divine appointment, that thus the wholeness of the Christian spirit might in this multiplicity be developed. For each church has its special gifts and its special office. But this acknowledgment, which we owe to all churches, does not relieve us of the duty of testing the several churches, and comparing them with each other. The standard by which this testing is to be effected is, according to Protestant principles, Holy Scripture. In proportion as a particular church has maintained with more or less purity the saving truth which is deposited in Holy

Scripture, is it a more or less true manifestation of the Church of Jesus Christ, and should stand proportionately higher in our estimation than other churches. Now the several churches have laid down their views of Scripture truth in their several *confessions*. No church can be without a confession, for none can be without some definite characteristic by which it is specially distinguished from the rest; and the expression of this specialty is its confession. Hence its confession is the internal standard of each particular church. We require that the church ordinances, the doctrinal teaching, and the preaching of the ministers of a church should be in conformity with its confession; for in every utterance of a particular church its special character should be manifested and expressed (12). As it is the duty of a German to be German in thought and act, so is it also the duty of a Lutheran Christian to prove himself a Lutheran in word and deed, where religious or church matters are concerned. But as it is not merely the duty of us Germans to be German, but rather our pleasure, and an expression of our love for the German nature, because we know what a gift God has bestowed upon us in it, so should it be to us, as Lutherans, not merely a duty, but a pleasure and an expression of grateful love, to show ourselves such in word and deed; for they who know what they possess in their Lutheran Church, and in the Lutheran form of Christianity, will naturally show their thankfulness by their fidelity to their Church and its confession. In many circles faithfulness to the confession is still a

somewhat doubtful merit; and to have emancipated oneself therefrom is esteemed a mark of intellectual freedom, and an act of progress. And yet no one would regard it as an act of intellectual freedom or mental progress to renounce his Germanism, and exchange it for a cosmopolitanism, which would, moreover, be impossible. And is not the testimony of Luther the flower of the German mind, and of its espousals with the spirit of the gospel, and, we boldly add, as yet at least, the truest form of saving truth? (13)

When I call love and fidelity to *our Church* a moral duty, I do not say that we are to idolize it. I know very well, perhaps better than most of you, what are its deficiencies; and I know, too, that the work of improvement must never cease in the Church; but the treasure of truth which is within her pale, and which is the noblest jewel our nation possesses, far surpasses her deficiencies. Our Church would cast away her best blessing if she renounced her confession of truth, and our nation would despoil itself of its best treasure if it should suffer the Lutheran Church to be spoiled and disturbed. I do not speak thus as thinking that our Church has an exclusive tenure of truth; I know that all churches have their shares, some larger, some smaller. According to the measure of that truth which they hold in common with us are they nearer or more remote; but one bond of fellowship connects us with all, and our ultimate aim is the same. War is not the normal state of affairs, but a crisis; and to live on polemics is immoral. But so long as error opposes truth, the con-

flit with error must not and cannot cease. The strife is inevitable; the only question is as to the spirit in which it shall be conducted. There is a strife which is according to God's will, and which subserves His holy purposes. In the midst of strife, too, we must be building up the kingdom of God, which is the kingdom of peace! This it is which is the ultimate and supreme aim of all church action.

LECTURE V.

CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE.



THE subject of our present lecture is *Christian Marriage*.

We belong to two worlds. We have a heavenly and we have an earthly calling. Each has its independent province, and is distinct from the other, yet they must not exist in severance, but in alliance, and each must furnish assistance to the other. The gospel does not teach us how to perform our worldly business, but how to obtain the salvation which it announces. It is not, however, indifferent, much less hostile, to our earthly employments. Christianity does not command its professors to go out of the world; for it was God who placed them in the world, and in it are the tasks which He has assigned them. On the contrary, it helps them to accomplish these very tasks aright, by the new mind and spirit it bestows, and by which even our earthly calling must be animated. We must not think that we may be bad artisans or men of business if only we are good Christians. Our Christianity must not be used for the purpose of excusing or

covering our unskilfulness in our calling. The Christian ought, on the contrary, to be the best workman, the best merchant, the best artist and scholar. Christianity and the interests of natural life are mutually related to each other. Christianity exercises a sanctifying power upon the employments of life, and these again are of educational importance to Christianity. Redemption was effected upon the soil of creation, and God has placed the ordinances of natural life at the service of His kingdom. It is one and the same God who rules in both provinces, and they should both co-operate in promoting the fulfilment of His purposes. The means for attaining this end is to let the earthly life be pervaded by the spirit of Christianity. Now the fundamental and most important ordinance of life is marriage. I will therefore begin my discussion of the natural relations of life with marriage and Christian life therein.

When we inquire into the moral condition of a nation or an age, we first of all direct our attention to the state of married life therein, and by this we judge of all else. If the married life of a people is disorderly, we know that their moral condition in general is in evil case. And if the tone of morality is to be raised among them, we should all say that marriage must first of all be placed upon a better footing. It is a kind of instinct which leads us to take this as our standard, and to judge of all social relations accordingly. We need not make any special study of social science to perceive the importance of marriage, as deciding the whole state

of national life. It is a direct feeling which tells us that it does so (1).

Holy Scripture says in its own natural yet profound manner, 'God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him, male and female created He them.' In these words, which place marriage at the head of the history of mankind, Holy Scripture teaches us that marriage is the foundation of all human society. In our current language we talk of *Holy Matrimony*, and we apply this designation to no other state of natural life, thus expressing our moral estimation of this condition. And justly so, for marriage is the oldest and most important of all human institutions. Long before there were nations and states, there were marriages and families. Before the nation of Israel, the depositary of God's revelation, existed, we meet with marriage in the family of Abraham. When our Lord became a member of this nation, He became a member of a family; and before He entered upon His ministry, He blessed a marriage and the family in which it was made. When the apostles called the nations into the Church of Jesus Christ, they first brought the word into families, and made them the nurseries of Christianity. And Christianity, whether in civil society or in the State, is still based upon the Christian family. If it disappears from the family, the laws of the State will not avail it. The last hour of Christianity will have struck among us when we have no more Christian wives and mothers. But not of Christianity alone. With respect, then, both to time and importance, marri-

age, the family, the home, come before all the other institutions of natural life.

It is in this particular that our Christian views differ from those of the old heathen world. The ancient world accorded the first place to the State, and subordinated marriage and the home thereto. Children belonged to the State, and respect to the interest of the country decided, *e.g.* in Sparta, whether they should be reared or exposed in the Valley of Taygetus. When the position due to marriage is misconceived, its due moral dignity will also be misconceived. It may be rightly said that the history of religions is also a history of marriage; for it is the history of women and of their moral estimation. If Christianity reckons among women its most numerous and faithful friends, this is but just and fair. For women owe their best possession, their moral elevation and its recognition, to Christianity. The darkest shadow in the pre-Christian world is the history and position of its women. From of old has the saying of Mary, 'Behold the handmaid of the Lord,' been regarded as the turning-point in the history of woman, and the contrast to the transgression of our first mother, related in the opening pages of Scripture. The Gospels tell us of the loving fidelity with which women ministered to our Lord, and stood beneath His cross, when the disciples had timidly withdrawn; they teach us how He received the 'woman which was a sinner,' and how Mary Magdalene was the first to behold the risen Saviour. It teaches us that women were, equally with

men, reckoned members of the Church of Christ, Christianity having bestowed upon them a new moral dignity, raised them out of the dust, and placed them on a level with men. When, however, we speak of woman, we speak of marriage, for the history of marriage is the history of woman (2).

We perceive, then, how closely religion and natural life are intertwined, for marriage is the most natural of the relations of life, and the most universal of all earthly vocations.

Marriage is a vocation.

When God created mankind in the distinction of male and female, He thereby announced, and, as it were, impressed upon our nature the fact, that it was His will that we should marry. Hence we are justified in saying that marriage is a duty, and the most universal duty incumbent on us.

It is a duty we owe to the human race, to the kingdom of God, and to ourselves.

We owe it to the human race. For God has ordained that the continuity of the race should be combined with the relation of marriage, and we have no right to obstruct the fulfilment of His purpose by declining marriage.

We owe it to the kingdom of God, for which we ought to prepare a place in the home and in the family with which God may bless our marriage. Nothing is more lovely than a home in which the Spirit of God rules. Both angels and men delight in it, and God's approbation rests upon it.

But we owe it also to ourselves. All the natural

ordinances of life have an educational purpose. They are means and institutions to educate us for the kingdom of God. The Christian also needs this education for his inner man. The means of education may not, perhaps, be pleasant—it is not in the nature of education that they should be—but they are always salutary. We need not, however, direct our attention to the ultimate and supreme purpose of our existence, to perceive the importance of marriage to individuals. Even when we stop at our more immediate interests, its great influence upon our whole mind and character is directly evident. However highly gifted some individuals among us may be, we are still all of us but one-sided beings, even by the very fact that we are all either men or women. For we have already seen how this distinction extends even to the inmost recesses of the mental life, and ever presents human nature to us on one side only. Hence these two halves of human nature are directed each to the other for mutual completion, even with respect to mind and character. Each side contributes to the enrichment of the other; the woman helps the man, and the man the woman, to make a nearer approach to the ideal of a complete human being. And to what a multiplicity of tasks and moral duties does marriage introduce us; and what a value, which nothing else can replace, does it bestow on life! This value is forfeited by those who wilfully deprive themselves of marriage (3).

There is a view held by some which places *celibacy* above marriage. This view appeals to certain misun-

derstood passages of Scripture,—such, perhaps, as those in which our Lord declares that His disciples must have the moral strength to be able to renounce marriage for the kingdom of heaven's sake, or those in which St. Paul pronounces celibacy, under certain circumstances, the more advisable, as being the freer condition. In saying this, he does not pronounce celibacy more moral, but only more easy than marriage, because the latter involves a series of duties and tasks which the single are spared. These, however, we ought not to seek to spare ourselves for the purpose of leading an easier life, but should decline them only when we plainly perceive this to be in accordance with the will and providence of God (4). An individual may certainly be so led by Providence, that marriage is made impossible to him, either by external or internal causes. But these are exceptional cases, which are justified by the circumstances under which they occur. And we may be certain that they whom God so leads, and who humbly submit to such guidance, will receive compensation from Him in the inner man for those educational means and tasks of marriage which they forfeit. There is an order of services in the kingdom of God which require celibacy, and which are indeed capable of affording to heart and mind that inward satisfaction which sheds over the whole character, and even over the external appearance of such servants and handmaids of Jesus Christ, a spirit of peace and joy which makes them worthy of all love and reverence. This is a just and sacred celibacy (5). But to remain unmarried for the sake of convenience, or other selfish reasons,

is morally blameworthy and also morally pernicious. Celibacy, even when not immoral, nay, even when it is real celibacy, and a victory over nature, is still a fosterer of an immoral selfishness; while a celibacy which renounces all struggle for such a victory places itself beyond the pale of all moral consideration (6).

It is the common vocation of mankind that we fulfil when we marry, and in fulfilling it we subserve the will of God. Testimony to this will of God is inwardly experienced by us all. To every healthily organized man, to every right-feeling woman, the time of love will come in due season. As the flowers unfold spontaneously, when the sun shines upon them in spring, and open to the genial warmth and refreshing dew, so does that feeling of desire which we call love involuntarily arise in the soul of the youth becoming a man, of the girl who has reached womanhood. It may be that the desire is in vain and does not attain its end, or that it must be resisted and overcome; but it will arise in every one, and we should regard its absence as something abnormal. It appertains to a healthy development of the natural life of both mind and body. And we may boldly say that it is a work of God Himself in our nature, which we are not to be ashamed of, but to thankfully respect (7).

This *love of man and woman* is not merely a mental interest taken by one in another. It differs in kind from the love of friendship, for there is included in it from the very beginning a sensuous element. Its aim, though at first its unconscious aim, is marriage, and marriage is an intercourse not merely of mind, but also

of body. It would, however, be a low view of this love, to regard it as produced by that which merely pleases the senses. A complacence evoked only by the external appearance, and not also by the heart and mind of another, does but affect us externally, and does not touch our heart and mind (8).

It is not single features of external appearance or internal character which captivate us in another; it is the whole man to which the whole man is attracted. We are wont to speak of the inclinations of the heart. But the heart is the whole man, for it is the inmost fountain of life. It is in this inner nature of man that love dwells, and thence pervades both soul and body when it is of the right kind.

There is nothing of which poets have sung and said so much as of love. It is not, however, always true love which they depict, but the consuming flame of sensuous passion, which plunges a man into utter ruin. We all know, indeed, that there is not upon earth a mightier power than love. True love, however, is not the storm of passion and the intoxication of the senses, but the calm determination of the soul. It is quite as powerful in prosaic as in poetic natures, and as true and deep among the uneducated as among the cultivated. It is the same wherever it is truly found; it differs only in form. It is no privilege of a select few, distinguished beyond others. If certain shining examples of betrothed and married love are so deeply engraven by history upon the memory of man that they can never more be effaced, we still know that love has blessed or plunged

into deepest misery not only these elect ones, but that it finds a home wherever two hearts are sincerely given to each other. It is not the office of Holy Scripture to extol this love, but to tell us of the holy love of God to fallen man; yet throughout its sacred pages married love serves as a type of that supreme love of the eternal God for us men. The thoughts and poetry of the philosophers and poets of Greece never ventured to raise love to such a height, nor to bestow such honour upon it. True love is tranquil and simple; but it is the true poetry of life, the tender exhalation which after it is set free covers like a veil the mystery of marriage (9).

This love has ever in it an element of restlessness and seeking, until it finds its aim in the *one* being in whom alone it can repose. It is by this fact that God shows us that monogamous marriage is in accordance with His will. To the discipline of this appointment has God subjected the intercourse of the sexes, and thus rescued it from licentiousness; hence this is alone compatible with piety and communion with God, and every other kind of cohabitation is displeasing to Him (10).

The aim of love is marriage, and marriage is a fellowship of body and soul. It has not only a mental, but also a sensual side. Permit me to speak of the sphere of sensuality as far as it is needful and possible. As far, I say, as it is possible, for you know the saying of the apostle, "That it is a shame even to speak of those things that are done of them in secret;" and when we look at life as it actually is, and perceive the world of sin, shame, and coarseness which meets us, we may well

be seized with a horror which may make us avert our faces with fear and shame, and depart in deep consternation at the corruption of mankind, well understanding the wish that the whole world of sense were annihilated, and that we were, as Plato desired, mere spirits; and yet our sensuous nature also is a work of God, in which we ought to rejoice (11).

It is, however, but too true that by reason of sin our body has ceased to be to us a subject of pure and irreproachable delight. For sin involves the corruption not of the soul only, but also of the body. And we all have the feeling that the invisible robe of innocence and purity, which covered our body as it came from God's hands, and caused us to behold in it an admirable work of God, is lost. This feeling we call *shame*. It is the conscience of the body, and was given us by God, when we were forced to leave the paradise of innocence, to dwell within as a faithful guardian, and to give us inward warning of the slightest contact, even in thought, with the coarse and rude. This fine instinct for what is proper and of good report produces that timid reserve which diffuses, especially over the young, that atmosphere of coyness which is their greatest charm, and which involuntarily provokes our admiration in proportion as such admiration is less sought after.

This instinct becomes a power which consciously sways the will and conduct in *chastity*. Our body was not given us to be the instrument of our own pleasure. It is a noble gift of God, and must fulfil its office, according to the appointment of the divine will. No

one has a right selfishly to misuse and corrupt beforehand what is not his own, but is to be another's. It is true that marriage itself is, as our ancestors loved to call it, a remedy and preventative. But we ought not to enter upon marriage merely to preserve our purity; we ought also to maintain our purity that we may marry with a good conscience. Our body is not a matter that we may deal with at our own discretion; it is the instrument of our personality, and not our absolute property. It is the image of our Creator; it is the temple in which the Holy Ghost carries on His work; it is destined for immortality. Our treatment of our body is not a matter of indifference. The Grecian world placed the matter of which I am speaking on a level with eating and drinking. Even men of elevated minds, as Aristotle, so regarded it (12). We know, however, that there was nothing which so ruined the ancient world as the dominion of the fleshly lusts; and nothing would be so sure a sign of our own approaching destruction as their unrestrained indulgence. History teaches us that a nation is in either a healthy or a decaying state in proportion to its judgment and conduct with respect to these sins. It was for their chastity before all else that Tacitus extolled the ancient Germans, and held them up as patterns to his Roman fellow countrymen (12). It is an act of patriotism to bring the sins of the flesh to the strictest standard, and to pass the severest judgment upon them.

But marriage is not merely the association of the sexes, it is also the *association of personal life*, and

it is the former only that it may be the latter. It is this which gives it its moral consecration. As a personal association it has two requirements: personal inclination, and harmony of moral opinion.

A distinction is sometimes made between a marriage of *inclination* and a marriage of prudence. But that is no true inclination which is not confirmed by prudence. Inclination is not the intoxication of the senses, for intoxication passes away and gives place to temperance. Inclination is not a mere frame of mind, for frames change and depend on circumstances. Inclination is the attraction of heart to heart, resulting from the harmony of two different kinds of mind, which find in one another the completion which each requires. Two married people may be excellent persons, and even earnest Christians, and yet their natural dispositions may not agree. They were not made for each other. Such a marriage was a mistake, and the mistake makes itself felt in the difficulties which married life entails, and which only earnest moral effort can conquer or at least alleviate.

Harmony of moral opinions must go hand in hand with inclination. For marriage without this would be a merely natural and not a personal association. Now the highest of moral relations is the relation to God. If, then, marriage is to be a fellowship in every relation of life, it must be a fellowship in the highest of all, in life in God. The most important prerequisite of marriage is religious fellowship.

If there is one step in life which ought to be under-

taken under the *guidance of God*, it is this. For as there is no greater happiness on earth than a happy marriage, so also is there no greater torment, no heavier burden, than an unhappy one. In all matters a Christian's first concern will be to know what is the will of God. And nowhere is this more necessary than here. There are indeed in every marriage more or fewer periods and hours of uncertainty, doubt, and vacillation. For it is the sinful custom of our nature never to be satisfied with what we have, but always to wish it different from what it is (14). In such seasons of doubt, we need to be able to fall back upon the certainty that we acted according to the will of God, and to use this certainty as a shield against such temptation. The question then is, that we should be certain of having acted according to the will of God. But how are we to arrive at this certainty? First by the secret inclination of our heart, for by this God speaks to us. We must indeed be careful to understand it aright, and correctly to interpret the voice of God therein. To this must be added the providential guidance of our life. Our decision must be no capricious fancy, but one to which we are naturally led by our condition of life and external events; and finally, we have to consider whether certain external conditions are in accordance with our desire.

The first among these is the advice and approbation of *parents*. To them, first of all, should the young apply. For they have the knowledge furnished by experience. Previous to marriage, none conceives of married life as

it really is, none realize either its quiet pleasures or its burdens. And the blessing of parents builds up the houses of their children. When the young scion separates from the old family, if it is to flourish and prosper it must take with it the blessing of the old home, as in ancient times colonists were accustomed to bear fire from the domestic hearth in their ships to the distant land to which they were bound.

But much besides must be considered if the family is to be built up at unity with itself. The wife has to enter into the husband's sphere of life. She ought, then, to be able to take her part in it, and to enter into the interests in which he is concerned. When the woman is mentally far the man's inferior, the true fellowship which marriage ought to be cannot exist, and this will tempt the man to be unfaithful, at least in mind. The education of a woman does not, however, consist in her learning and being as far as possible acquainted with those special branches of knowledge which are not perhaps in unison with her own nature, but on the contrary tend to obliterate it. An education whose aim it is to teach a girl all kinds of knowledge in every department of culture, that she may perchance be able thereby to shine in society, does more harm than good, if only by destroying through its multiplicity of acquirement that singleness of character which is the distinctive excellence of woman. The best female education is the head and heart in the right place, true sensibility without affectation, and a genuine sense for the noble and beautiful (15). Such a woman will soon be at home in

any sphere of life, and amidst the circumstances of any calling, much sooner than we. This special elasticity of the female above the male mind also reconciles discrepancy of social position.

Social *position* being an external matter, the inclination of the heart is independent of it. Nor indeed ought position to settle into caste, and it is the very office of marriage to combine the heterogeneous, and thus ever to keep in action the amalgamation of human society. But, as laying the foundations of a family, marriage enters into the intricate web of political and social relations, and experiences their reaction. Hence the matters of rank, family, and society should also be considered, and should coincide with inclination, unless marriage is from the very first to involve the future in difficulties and dangers. But even in this case it will be much easier to the woman both to descend and ascend in the social scale; while the man, if marriage should impose upon him a renunciation of his former social position, would have greater difficulty in forgetting it; and if it should raise him to a higher grade, he would not so easily as a woman obliterate the traces of his former modes of life and action.

If those who love were alone in the world, there would be no need for them to take counsel of any but of God and their own hearts as to whether they ought to marry. But the family which they found forms part of the civil community. Hence the State brings its laws to bear upon the conclusion of a marriage, and the Church also seeks to make her voice heard.

It is true that marriage is marriage even without the *blessing of the Church*, and the State may decline to require it, and deem the fulfilment of certain civil conditions sufficient. But when the Church requires of her members, that if they conclude a marriage they should come to the house of God, this is no arbitrary act on her part. For she has to bring before them the words of God concerning marriage, and to impart the divine blessing upon marriage for the consecration of their new path in life. When, then, they who are contracting marriage contemn, in this most important act of their life, the Church and the Church's blessing, and thus deny their church membership, it is but consistent that they should be regarded and treated as having by this act renounced and forfeited their church privileges.

For it cannot be a right state of mind which despises the blessing of the Church, nor can it be said of such a marriage, that it has been entered upon in the name of God, which is the main point in every marriage (16).

But it must also be *carried on* in His name.

The strongest bond of union in married life is union in religious life. This it is which sanctifies its joys, helps to bear its cares and wants, and changes life's heavy sorrows, which are not wont to leave any family unvisited, into blessings. Every department of life needs its regulations, and so also does religious married life. It is natural, it is moreover right and just, that the religious life of married people should find its common expression in the religious regulations of domestic life. In

former times *family worship* was the general custom. At present it is the constant habit only in comparatively small circles. I know well that under many circumstances it has its difficulties, especially where the husband or both parents must be at work very early. But generally the obstacles allowed to prevail are the mere excuses which are contentedly made to stand for real difficulties. The chief reason of its omission is convenience, or the fear of being called *fromm*, or pietistic. I have, indeed, seen married couples begin the introduction of religious forms into domestic life after heavy afflictions. But why should we wait for these? Can any family exist without appointed rules and regulations? And if we make rules in every other department of life, why not in religious life, which is the soul of all the rest? Can it be fear which restrains us? Such timidity is far less known in England and America. Why will we not have the courage to act upon our convictions? Or do we really think it is a thing improper, or even preposterous, to remember in our family circle that God upon whose blessing the success of all our undertakings depends? A man cannot be invested with a higher dignity than that of being the priest of his own household, and none more fitly raises his position in the family (17).

Husband and wife must both occupy their proper positions in the family, the positions which correspond with their respective characters and duties. From the man proceeds the proposal of marriage, the woman consents to the proposal. Hence, too, it is the husband's

part to decide on the course to be taken, even in matters pertaining to daily life and the management of the family ; the initiative and the final decision are equally his. But his, too, is the responsibility. He may surrender much of detail, but responsibility for the family he cannot surrender. If the husband, however, is the determining will of the home, the wife is its animating soul. As the soul is present in the whole body, so are the thoughts and eyes of the wife to be everywhere present in the home. Not that she is to do all herself. She is not to be used up in external work, and to be merely a housekeeper to her husband. She must maintain her freshness of mind and gladness of disposition, that she may minister refreshment to him after his labours. It may be that the wife is superior to the husband, but this does not release her from the duty of taking the second place, and of acknowledging the position of her husband. The decision lies not in her hands, but in his. But it is just because she does not decide and command, but obey, that she exercises a secret power, which we all perceive, and from which no man can or should seek to escape. Neither does this secret power fail her even with respect to the despotism of a tyrannical husband, but is the greater in proportion as it is the quieter. An entreaty is mightier than a command, and nothing subdues the heart so soon as the silent sadness of a woman who is able to maintain her amiability even when she is enduring (18).

The positions of husband and wife in the family are different ; but married love is common to both, and has

a levelling power. Love is a *communion of giving and receiving*. It pertains to the perfection of married life that each should disclose himself or herself to the other, and give and take a share in all that affects or is possessed by the other. For they who enter upon the married state are no longer their own, but give themselves to be the property of another. This applies also, and indeed applies pre-eminently, to the inner life. In saying this, it is not meant that we should burden each other with every trifling vexation or every passing annoyance; but that which is an essential part of the inner life, viz. the manner in which it is influenced by God and the world, ought to be the common property of both. Love, however, is not merely a mutual giving, it is also a mutual receiving. At first, perhaps, all that is done by the one interests the other, and each takes pleasure in drawing out the other, that the whole character may be manifested and developed under every aspect. This delight in another, and in another's peculiarity, is moreover inseparable from love, and never disappears till love too departs. We ought ever to see in each other a gift bestowed upon us by God, which we ought neither to leave uncherished and undeveloped, nor to endeavour to transform according to our own perhaps vain notions and likings, and when we cannot succeed, to recoil from with inward disappointment. We ought, on the contrary, with a loving acquiescence and delight in the disposition of each other, to take pains to mature and cultivate its native qualities. It is this which gives a life and charm to

the intercourse of married life, and preserves to it that atmosphere of poetry, which should no more vanish in the course of years than should that tenderness of treatment which neither destroys with rude hand nor contemns by indifference, but thankfully receives what God has bestowed upon us in each other.

But marriage is not merely the enjoyment of a good, it is still more a work—a work to be wrought first of all upon ourselves. We have in marriage first of all a work with ourselves. For it is against our sin, which endangers the happiness of married life, that we must unceasingly strive. The greater events of life, and especially its greater sorrows, have a uniting power; but everyday life, with its many little annoyances, soon exercises a chilling or even an alienating agency, unless we are constantly upon our guard. Or perhaps certain qualities or customs in each other so unpleasantly affect as to make us inwardly recoil. Every moral relation of life demands fidelity. Now marriage is the most intimate and comprehensive of all relations, and none requires fidelity in an equal degree with this. Every secret coldness, every inward recoil, is an infraction of faithfulness, and by all ill-humour and repugnance we incur the danger of unfaithfulness. This is a danger which we must overcome, not by mere feeling, which it may be we endeavour to revive, but by a regard to the will of God, who has placed us in this state of life, and bound us together by His word, that we may learn in this school of life to fulfil the moral duties to which we are called.

This is the work we have to do in ourselves. But we have also a task to perform with respect to each other. For we must be fellow-helpers in the work of salvation, and allies in the war with sin. It would be no true love which would not dare, but from false tenderness or love of ease decline, to rebuke sin in the loved, and that would be no true love which would not endure, but reply with irritation to such rebuke. We must, however, take care to reprove from love, and not from self-exaltation or a conceited notion of our own superior merit. Love will reprove kindly, and know where to stop, and will speak more of the matter with God than with the offender.

We must oppose the sins, but we should bear the *weaknesses* of each other; for each gives the other enough to bear. At first, indeed, each appears to the other, as it were, in Sunday attire; but marriage soon puts on its work-day garments. Then many an ideal vanishes, and much that is unlovely makes its appearance. Spring ever bears more blossoms and hopes than the season which succeeds it matures. But let us not be unjust. One fruit on the tree is worth more than a whole branch of blossoms. And the best of any human being is never known till after long acquaintance; the whole treasure of love, faithfulness, self-sacrifice, and patience which a human heart may contain can be but gradually disclosed. Much with which our fancy once invested it may indeed vanish, but we shall find other and better riches; for a faithful heart is the most precious of all treasures, and married life is ever deepening

and increasing this experience. The kind of intercourse may and must vary, but the tie itself must not decrease but increase in strength.

Hence, where marriage is rightly ordered, the thought of a *dissolution of the marriage* tie cannot, and, by the Christian, ought not to be entertained.

Marriage is in its nature indissoluble. If it might be dissolved, that complete and unreserved surrender which takes place in marriage would be morally impossible. To enter upon marriage with the idea of possible separation is to deny one's personal dignity, degrade oneself to a means for any end, and show signs of moral depravity. Where marriage is rightly regarded, the longer it lasts the more indissoluble does it become. Marriage may indeed become a heavy burden, either because some mistake or sin committed when it was entered upon is thus avenging itself, or through the fault of either husband or wife, or through some grievous providence. In such cases, the Christian must either bear with humility the punishment of his own fault, or endure with patience what God lays upon him. Where there is a right state of mind, the burden may perhaps be inexpressibly heavy, but it cannot be impossible to bear it. If the moral power to do this is wanting, it must be prayed for, and God will not let Himself be entreated in vain.

In one case only can separation be a moral duty, or at least morally allowable, namely, when either husband or wife has through unfaithfulness so transgressed in that which makes marriage marriage as to deserve to

be deprived of marriage, as of a possession forfeited by unworthiness. This is the self-evident exception laid down by our Lord, and confirmed by His apostle. For the wilful departure of one partner, of which St. Paul speaks as setting free the other and Christian partner, because he is thus defrauded of marriage, belongs to the same kind of transgression against the nature of marriage (19). We have no right to set up another point of view for divorce than that stated by the Lord, for by the very nature of the case no other is justified.

You know that this question forms one of the points of dispute, in which Church opinion is at variance with the law of the State, and one which has ever furnished matter for repeatedly accusing the representatives of the Church of excessive rigour. And yet they ought rather to be thanked for risking the favour of public opinion, for the sake of keeping up in the popular consciousness the higher moral view of marriage; for no greater injury can be done to a people than to shake their moral view of marriage, and degrade it into a contract which may be dissolved as well as entered into. It is a boon to the general morality, and to the entire life of a nation, when the spirit of laxity is decidedly opposed; for it is powerful and seductive enough already, and by no means needs any further support. And if the State is prepared on grounds of expediency to make concessions, and to legalize relations which ought to be called not marriages but decent concubinages, it is still the office of the Church, as guardian of the highest moral possessions of mankind, to enforce those stricter moral

principles which may prevent the moral ideal, without which life threatens to sink to its lowest level, from vanishing out of the world. Its indissoluble nature is implied and required by the very idea of marriage. Without this it ceases to be really marriage.

Marriage is then by its very nature indissoluble, and becomes, when rightly entered upon, only the more so the longer it lasts ; and when God blesses it with children, these form a fresh bond of union between their parents. It is of the children and the home that I intend to speak in my next lecture.

LECTURE VI.

THE CHRISTIAN HOME.



OUR present subject—home—naturally follows upon our former one—marriage.

Marriage and home are intimately connected, for the family results from marriage; and even when a marriage is childless, it still forms a home life complete in itself. Not till he is the master of a household is a man truly free; while to be the mistress of the house is the chief dignity and pride of a woman. Love for home and pride in home are deeply imprinted in the German character; and when the Englishman proudly says that his house is his castle, it is the German spirit which speaks by his mouth,—the same spirit which, among ourselves, calls domestic authority an unquestionable one, and looks upon home as an inviolable sanctuary.

The State is a result of history, the home a production of nature; for it is marriage and its association—an association not mental only, but also corporeal—which forms the foundations of the home, and gives rise, too, to that common feeling which binds its members to

each other. *The family feeling* which unites them is no resolve of the will, no result of reflection, but a natural feeling owing its existence to a common source, which arises spontaneously, and combines individuals into a whole. For it is not law and order, nor even a community of interests, that keeps the members of a family together, but it is this natural feeling of a common origin that forms the soul of domestic life. We may truly say, It is God the Creator Himself, present by His Spirit in the natural ordinances which He has instituted, who produces this sense of mutual connection. This *family feeling* we call natural piety, *i.e.* that spirit of reverent love which holds sacred the common origin and soil which has produced and bears us. This feeling of piety is the natural morality of domestic life. We all know how greatly we are concerned to maintain and cherish this feeling of natural piety. Upon it depends the temporal wellbeing of families. The members of a family can be guilty of no greater transgression than impiety, which all regard as contrary to nature, and as a token of an utterly corrupt disposition (1).

Wherever natural piety exists, there too we find the feeling for *tradition*; for we rest upon the past, and it is of the nature of piety to reverence it. To despise history, to know only a to-day and no yesterday, is impiety; for life must be pervaded by the breath of history if it is to attain its full development, to be kindled to a noble ardour, to be animated by a soul.

The feeling for the past obtains a firm footing and definite shape in *custom*. Custom is the deposit of the

past in the life of the present. It is no mere matter of agreement resulting from a felt need, that all life must move according to certain definite forms, if it is not to be scattered to fragments by caprice. Custom has a deeper, even a moral importance. By it we maintain the connection of history. It is the experience of former generations, their views, their practical wisdom, which are deposited in custom, and which we preserve for future ages, when we hand down custom to them. Customs change; for we correct, and ought to correct, the thoughts and opinions of past ages. But custom itself remains as the bond which connects the ages with each other. It is a revolutionary spirit which breaks with history and does away with custom; and its effect is the restlessness that it introduces into the life of a nation, which, having lost the connection of its history, is seeking to reunite the broken threads. The healthiness of national life is intimately connected with the preservation of its continuity. Now the feeling for tradition manifests itself in custom. Hence the healthiness of family life also is intimately connected with the power which custom exercises in it. A family must not be regulated by inclination or fancy, which is one thing to-day, another to-morrow. The active flow, indeed, of individual life must be allowed free course, and must not stagnate in forms and customs; for the family belongs not merely to the past, but chiefly to the present. But when the gates are open to admit the current of the present, care must also be taken to maintain the protecting dams which restrain the stream within due

limits, and direct it into that appointed course by which its blessing may be most abundantly diffused. The spirit of a family is expressed in its customs, and so, too, should be its religious spirit. Every home worthy the name requires also its religious, its Christian customs; for these alone give sacredness and truth to the family spirit, and raise the feeling of natural piety to higher moral dignity, by incorporating it into our life in God (2).

The family feeling forms the internal, the family custom the external bond which combines the several members into the unity of the family. From marriage as the trunk, the several members of the family branch off in their various gradations. The relations of parents and children, brothers and sisters, masters and servants, are included in the one home. These are then followed by that relation of kinship in which the home stands to the offshoots which have been formed from the parent stock. It is these various circles of the home life which are to employ our thoughts to-day.

Children are an heritage and gift which cometh of the Lord, says the Psalmist. Our language speaks of the blessing of children, and the proverb says, *Viel Kinder viel Vaterunser* (many children, many Lord's prayers). Modern opinion, however, has undergone some alteration in this respect. You all know that when in any nation marriages are but scant of children, such a fact is a symptom of a deep moral corruption. The prevailing fewness of children in French marriages is one of the darkest points in the married and moral life of France; and the same phenomenon

in certain circles of North America has been deemed sufficiently important to evoke a discussion of this suspicious circumstance even from the pulpit. Marriages abundant in children evince not only the physical but also the moral healthiness of a nation. Children are a gift of the Lord, but a gift which entails serious duties, as any one possessed of children knows full well.

The first and most self-evident of parental duties is the *maintenance* of children. Every privilege is dependent upon the fulfilment of duties. To be a parent is the highest privilege to which a human being can lay claim ; for there is nothing greater in this world than to have given life to a human being. Hence, this privilege involves its corresponding duties. The first of these is the preservation of the child's life. Neglect of this duty is a crime. Heathen antiquity looked upon a child as a thing of which its parent had an absolute right to dispose. In other instances, the State claimed the right of deciding the fate of the young life, according as it gave promise or not of doing service to the commonwealth (3) ; and similar notions still exercise a devastating power among heathen nations. It is Christianity that has taught us to recognise in a child that personality which belongs not only to men, but to God, and on which He has the first claim.

This constitutes the great significance of *Infant Baptism*. It is not merely a happy family solemnity, at which we welcome, as it were, and dedicate the new life to human society, but the delivery of the child to its Lord and Saviour as His property, and the admission

thereby that it has an equal claim with ourselves to eternal treasures, and stands with respect to God and Christ on the same level as we who are grown up. It is by means of Infant Baptism that Christianity has preserved the recognition of the moral personality of children by the general consciousness of Christendom. When, then, Infant Baptism is rejected or treated with indifference, it is not merely the stability of the Church, but the interests of mankind in general that are endangered (4).

It is the greatest comfort to parents to know that their children are not merely theirs, but that they are more especially the children of their God and Saviour; and if at other times we have not as vivid a consciousness of this comfort as we ought to have, we at least find how much we possess in it when we stand beside the sick or dying bed of a beloved child. There is nothing which so helps us to bear the sorrow of so great a loss as the certainty that we are resigning our child into the same faithful Hand to which we committed it at its baptism. In that Hand we know it to be well covered and better protected than it could have been by us in this world of temptation. It is true that this certainty, though it comforts us in our sorrow, does not, and ought not to do away with our grief; for we received our children from the hand of God chiefly that we might have them, not that we might lose them. This is one of the most painful among the painful contradictions of our existence.

Infant Baptism is a comfort beyond any other; but it

is also a responsibility beyond any other. The *maintenance* of our child is our first duty, its *education* our second. The more we feel that our child belongs not merely to ourselves, not merely to society, but, above all, to its God and Lord, the more shall we feel ourselves bound to Him also, for the preservation of the gift which He has bestowed upon us. The duty of maintenance extends to the time of the child's independence. Certainly the growing child may be required to contribute to its maintenance, but only in such wise that the other essential duty which parents owe to their children may not be infringed on. All use made of the child in co-operating towards its support, ought at the same time to subserve the purpose of its education. All work which has not also an educational purpose is a misuse of the child. May children, then, be employed in factories for the sake of their earnings? Those terrible conditions under which even the youngest children were employed in factories in certain districts in England, and which resulted in a mentally and physically stunted generation, seeming to have sprung from a totally different race—those conditions have indeed been alleviated by the enactments of the last twenty years. Still we cannot but designate it as an injustice to the age of childhood that children of eight years of age may legally be employed in factories for five hours a day. It is to the interest of the general welfare and of the future, that their youth should be preserved to the young, and the factory is surely the most inappropriate of places for such a purpose (5).

There is certainly an educational value in work abstractedly considered, and a child ought early to be accustomed to it. But its natural place being *home*, this is also the place of its education (6).

It is the general spirit of home, the whole atmosphere which a child breathes, the domestic arrangements by which it is surrounded, which will educate it. And it is this circumstance which gives such educational importance to custom. Education is now much more talked about than formerly. I do not know that the result corresponds with the greater pains applied to the discussion of this subject. And how is this phenomenon to be accounted for? In proportion as custom loses its sway must its loss be replaced by special exertions. Nothing has greater educational power, nothing is of greater assistance in the work of education, than custom. And no age is more susceptible of the power of custom than youth, which is still, or at least ought to be, ruled by direct influence, and not by reflection (7).

It is the husband who appoints the arrangements and customs of the home, the wife who maintains them; and thus both concur in the work of education. Education is a matter which necessarily pertains to parents. They can give up the work of instruction, but not that of education. They may procure assistance in this work, but the final decision, and consequently the final responsibility, is theirs. For the child has been committed to them by God, and in that relation of natural piety which exists between parents and children, an educational power is bestowed on them which none other

can possess. The child belongs to both parents : hence its education is the affair of both, and not of the mother only. However much the father may be engaged elsewhere, and absent from the home, it is nevertheless his to determine the principles by which it shall be ruled, to give the final decision, and to take upon himself the final responsibility. The task which husband and wife have severally to perform in the work of education is differently apportioned to each, according to the different nature and constitution bestowed by God upon man and woman. And it is just the union of these differences which renders education efficient, each of the two supplying what is lacking in the other. There must, indeed, be harmony between them ; for nothing can have a more evil influence upon education than discord between parents. Nothing can be worse than when each has a different relation to the children behind the back of the other. And even though the discord may not prevail in the matter of education, the very fact of its existence is sufficient to render any salutary education impossible ; for the conjugal love of the parents is the common hearth whence the warm atmosphere of love, which fills the home and unites children and parents, must be diffused.

Parental love, which has its roots in conjugal love, is an educational power. It must not, indeed, be a carnal and selfish, but a holy love ; for parents must see in their children not only their own flesh and blood, but a gift of God. Hence they must look upon their duty to their children as an office with which they have been invested

by God, and the duties of which they must perform in His name. This will produce both that self-sacrifice which cares nothing for its own ease if it may but live for and serve the children—a self-sacrifice which calls forth, especially in mothers, those deeds of devotion to which the strength of the man will willingly yield the palm; and, on the other hand, that moral earnestness which deals with the child with the authority of a divine vocation, and demands unconditional obedience (8).

For the road on which we have to lead the young is the road of *obedience*. Whether children understand why they are to obey or not is all one; it is enough that the parents have commanded. For it is their parents' word, and not their own understanding, which they are to obey. They neither need, nor, indeed, ought at first, to understand it; for it must be an absolute confidence which they place in a parent's word—a confidence which must not be subjected to the criticism of a precocious reflection. A child's duties are all summed up in the duty of obedience, and the special sin of youth is disobedience. Learning itself is, in the first place, a matter of obedience, and not of understanding; hence the first form of learning is an exercise of memory, and not of reason. For memory is the obedience of the intellect, in respect of matters which present themselves as much in the form of a law to the child's intellect as the commands of a parent do to its will (9). To submit to this law, whether it addresses the will or the intellect, is the first step. To understand this law is the second. The essence of education consists, first of all, in the practice of obedi-

ence; for obedience is the road to liberty, and self-control is education for independence.

Hence, where this obedience is refused, it must be compelled. This brings us to the duty of *punishment*. It may well go hard with parents to punish, it may well be that a mother would far rather suffer punishment herself than inflict it on her child; yet it is love for the child which makes the punishment of disobedience a duty. It must, indeed, be love, and not temper and irritability or mere severity, which punishes. Love will know how to inflict the right amount of punishment, and to exercise due forbearance. In such a case, it need not be feared that punishment will alienate a child's heart. On the contrary, it will bind the heart of the child more closely to the parents, for it will feel through the punishment the pain it causes to its parents. In the case of a child, punishment has the value of asserting the authority of the moral law in a manner suitable to the stage of childhood, and of bringing the child to a consciousness that the guilt of transgression lies not with its power, but with its will. In proportion, however, as the stage of consciousness is developed from the preceding stage of sense, punishment must give place to moral motives (10).

Love and firmness, in due proportion, constitute the educational powers. What, then, is their task? We have not to make something out of our children, but to receive them, and be thankful for them, as God gives them. Whether they answer to our notions and desires or not, they are not bestowed to be the toys of our vanity or the

objects of our pride or caprice, but are a gift entrusted to us, and which we have to preserve. To educate is to preserve and to develope. God has bestowed its peculiarity on the child, and this peculiarity He would have us first to recognise, and then in such recognition to develope. Gifts and characters differ. To one is given much, to another little. It is folly to set before all children the same goal in respect of culture, for they have not equal capacities, nor are they equally favoured by outward circumstances. We ought not to try to make equality where God has made inequality, nor to correct what His wisdom has ordained (11). To bring to their full and harmonious development those capabilities which God has deposited in the child is the true task of education.

And also of *Christian education*. As Christians, we know that God has bestowed upon our children not only natural but spiritual gifts. For our children have been baptized, and received by baptism into the covenant of grace. To preserve them in this baptismal grace, to develope in them the life of God's Spirit, this is one side of Christian education; to contend against sin in the child is the other. For though we are accustomed to call children innocent, we still know that they are not so. And though in them sin rather assumes the form of naughtiness, it is still sin itself which lurks behind the mere naughtiness. And we must have been but very superficial observers of children if we have not perceived, even in their childish impulses, the secret germs of passions which, if developed, may be the ruin of the whole life.

But the Christian knows also that the conflict with sin cannot be successfully waged by human strength, but only by the grace of God. This knowledge will restrain him in the work of education from the use of any kind of force, the ultimate motive of which is compounded of unbelief and pride,—the unbelief which does not trust in God, the pride which makes us feel that we must do all ourselves. We certainly ought to exercise an unceasing watchfulness over our children, and to lead and guide them to the best of our ability; but they are confessedly the best teachers who make themselves least conspicuous, and the best that we can do for our children is after all to commend them to God in prayer, and to train them betimes in the way of godliness.

How, then, is a child to be religiously educated? Religion is first of all a thing to be lived, and not till afterwards a matter to be instructed in. Religion must first approach a child in the form of life, and afterwards in the form of instruction. Let religion be the atmosphere by which the child is surrounded, the air he breathes. The whole spirit of his home, its order, its practice—that world in which the child finds himself as soon as he knows himself—this it is which must make religion appear to him a thing natural and self-evident. And let it be ours to lead him so to regard it!

We cannot begin too early with prayer. When the child cannot pray himself, let his mother pray with and for him. As soon as the child can speak, as soon as he can prattle, let him be accustomed to say a few words

of prayer himself. Let it not be objected that the child cannot understand them. The way of education is by practice to understanding, not by understanding to practice. And a child will have a feeling and a presentiment of what it cannot understand. The world of heavenly things is not an incomprehensible and foreign region to a child, but the home of his spirit. He will speak to his Father in heaven without our needing to give him much instruction as to who that Father is. It seems as though God were the well-known friend of his heart. And when a child is accustomed to speak to Him, he will observe this custom more strictly than his mother will, and if she forgets it, will remind her of it, even with tears.

The first nourishment for a child's mind is not instruction, but *poetry and history*. For there is an element of poetry and romance in the mind of a child, and we must all of us have frequently contemplated with delight the play of its imagination. It is in this form that religion also will approach a child. Poetry and history will be unconsciously the means of instruction. A child will willingly learn little verses, and likes nothing better than listening to stories. With what enthusiasm have we each in our day heard the stories of the Old Testament, of David and Goliath, of Samson and the Philistines, of Joseph and his brethren, and of Abraham's sacrifice; and with what silent devoutness have we listened to the history of the Saviour! And when these narratives are accompanied by the sight of an illustrated Bible, what a source of pleasure is opened

to a child ! They utterly misconceive the nature of a child who would deprive him of the Bible and of Scripture history. How poor and barren they make childhood ! And why ? Because the history is miraculous ? A child is at home in the world of marvels. Criticism and doubt are sure to come soon enough ; and the spirit of reflection should not be prematurely evoked. It is equally pernicious to bind a child, as pietists too often do, to religious confessions, which have as yet no truth for him, and to feed him, as rationalists advise, on morality, thus leading him away from the flowery fields of Scripture narrative to the arid wastes of moral commonplaces. Let us suffer a child to continue a child, and allow him his world of poetry and history, and let us afterwards, when he has reached the time of rational reflection, initiate him in the earnest teaching of the Catechism, and lead him to make it his manual (12).

Many objections have been recently raised against the *Catechism*. They, however, who find fault with it do not understand it. Its diction has been blamed ; yet it was written by the greatest master of the German tongue, and contains—it might perhaps be said—in its second article the most famous paragraph extant. Offence has been taken at its matter. But, after the Bible, there is no book that can be placed on a level with it. Its pages are few, but they are golden pages. Next to his translation of the Bible, it is the best gift bestowed by Luther on our nation, and that which has been most abundantly blessed. Former ages were inclined to ascribe to it a kind of inspiration. Leopold

Ranke, the great historian of the Reformation, speaking of it, says: 'The Catechism published by Luther in 1529, and of which he himself said that, learned doctor as he was, he made a prayer of it, is as childlike as it is profound, as comprehensible as it is unfathomable, simple and elevated. Happy he whose soul is fed by it, who cleaves to it. He possesses at all times an imperishable consolation, and under its easy form that essence of truth which is sufficient for the wisest of the wise' (13).

Let us not fear that the religious character of their education will enslave the minds of our children. On the contrary, they who have learnt to bow to God will be able to stand erect before men; while they who know nothing higher than earthly human power, will bend before it. As Tocqueville rightly says: 'A people that does not believe must be servile, for none but a religious people can bear liberty.' We require of youth that ideality which despises all that is coarse and common, and is acquainted with something higher and better than the petty cares and gains of every day, an ideality which may refresh and refine ordinary life. It is one of the duties of education to cherish this spirit of ideality in youth. And though it sometimes becomes excessive, or is combined with a deficiency of practical skill, yet it far more becomes the young to live in the ideal, than prematurely to cherish the practical tendency at the cost of the ideal. All true ideality, however, presupposes religion. For it is religion which raises the mind to the world of everlasting good, while ideality without

religion is but a phantasm, which dissolves with advancing years as the morning dew, and gives place to the ordinary doings of everyday life. If we desire that our youth should be fresh, glad, and free (*frisch, frohlich, frei*), and cannot imagine them otherwise, let us remember that in the old German gymnastic motto, *pious (fromm)* precedes these three qualities.

Custom and habit are the beginning of education, *independence* its end. Education has the twofold task of fitting the child for both its heavenly and earthly vocation. In both its aim is to render him independent, and in order to attain this we must separate him from ourselves. In every education, that most critical period of all, the time of separation, comes. It is not without care and anxiety that the child is suffered to leave the shelter of home and removed from parental guardianship. Then is the time for faith and hope, and casting our care on God. And this applies both to the heavenly and the earthly calling. At first it is the home atmosphere and the home customs that keep the child in the realm of religious thoughts and feelings. But what was inherited custom must become a matter of independent conviction and individual possession. And this is brought about amidst both internal and external crises. When the world's many voices reach the ear of our son, can we be surprised to see him perplexed about what is as yet a matter of tradition? The young love freedom, and feel a repugnance to constraint. They are much more inclined to break with tradition than to maintain it. And this is a fact we must understand, and to

which we must accommodate our conduct. The young desire not to be ordered, but to be allowed reasonable liberty. And least of all will the inmost convictions of the heart suffer the law of obedience to be applied to them. Here liberty must be granted. But if the piety of the home was sound and not affected, if our son's innermost feeling is a sincere love of truth, we may confidently commit all to Him who takes His different ways with each, and who demands our confidence, while He will not suffer us to prescribe His time. It is the school of life which makes us independent, whether in secular or religious matters.

But we belong also to the world. Education must fit us for our earthly calling, and in this respect it ought to have some definite end in view. This is needed to give it unity, and hinder it from being desultory. It is not, however, left to our arbitrary choice to bring up our children for whatever calling we please. On the contrary, we should seek to ascertain God's will concerning them, as expressed in their nature and dispositions, their talents and inclinations; and according to these must we first guide and then advise them. What this calling may be is in itself a matter of indifference. Every calling is good and noble which contributes to the fulfilment of the general tasks imposed on man, whether it is nearly or more distantly connected with the kingdom of God. For it is this which we serve in every calling which is according to His will.

If children belonged only to their parents, their instruction and education would be a matter in which

their parents alone were concerned. They belong, however, also to the Church and to the commonwealth ; and home education has therefore an ecclesiastical and a political aspect. It is the interest of the Church that children should be brought up and instructed in the faith into which they were baptized ; it is the interest of the State that children should be qualified for the performance of those duties which the civil and political community to which they belong imposes on them. Hence both Church and State have ever cared for the education of children. The Church has set the example, the State has followed it. And it betokens a healthy condition of affairs when neither of these powers seeks to supplant the other, but both act and work in unison (14). With us in Germany education is compulsory. Other nations are gradually imitating us in this respect, and it must be confessed that this is a needful and beneficial institution ; for many parents would neglect their duty to their children if they were not compelled to perform it. When this is the case, however, the school must be so constituted that parents may entrust their children to it with a good conscience. The various interests of the home and of the Church must be consulted in the school, as well as those of the State. The tone and spirit of the school must be of a genuinely moral and Christian character. Compulsory education in non-Christian and non-Church schools is to Christians and members of the Church tyranny, and their relegation to private schools robbery. The manner in which certain teachers may view this matter cannot be

regarded as decisive, for children belong not to teachers, but to parents. The calling of a teacher is honourable and important, but his highest duty is to assist and strengthen parents in their office of bringing up pious Christians and worthy members of society, and thus serving both Church and State. But it is not parents and teachers only that have duties to fulfil with regard to children, but all *grown persons*. We all know how sharp-sighted children are. Every weak point which grown people expose to children, and which leads them astray to sin, or becomes to them an occasion of irreligion, is a transgression against them. You all know what stern words they were which our Lord spoke concerning those who offend His little ones. Especially have the aged members of their home a serious duty to perform to the young, and the more so in proportion as it is chiefly to the old that the young are more strongly attracted. The aged are both the bearers of the tradition of the past and the witnesses of the eternity to come. Both these circumstances invest the old with a mysterious charm, compounded of respect and attachment, in the eyes of the young.

The *duties of children* correspond with those of parents. They look up to them with reverence and confidence, and their authority is glorified in their eyes with a reflection of divine authority. This reverent confidence finds its exercise in obedience and gratitude. These are the virtues of a child. And gratitude remains even after the time of obedience has been succeeded by that of independence; and when there is no longer a

possibility of showing gratitude, the grateful remembrance still endures.

Home is a place of various relations and their appropriate duties. With the relation of parents and children is connected the mutual relation of *brotherhood*. The more numerous the family, and the more diversified by sex, age, and nature, the more is the home life enriched, but the greater also is the responsibility of each separate member. For each member of a family helps to promote or to disturb the peace and harmony of the whole. And it is here that the sisters especially find a field of operation. It is in every one's nature to assert himself and his own peculiarities, without much regard to the likings of others. Hence arise frictions, wounded feelings, and interruptions of harmony. It is the happy part of the sisters in the family circle to exercise by their patient and quiet manner an appeasing and reconciling influence. It is that of the brothers to contribute, by promoting and exciting it, to the general cheerfulness. The world of history and of intellectual life is far earlier and far otherwise disclosed to their view than to that of their sisters. From these flights of mind into the broad and varied world it should be their part to bring back with them into their home, gifts and treasures which may serve to increase its resources and enlarge its views. It is true that the circle will afterwards be broken up, and new connections formed, which will then fully claim both the external and internal life. But if the home life was healthy and happy, the memory of their youthful days will, even in these later

seasons, bind the brothers and sisters together in love and gratitude.

There are few families which do not require assistance from other quarters. And on the other hand, there are many families possessed of superfluous energies, which they desire to impart to others. Hence arise the new connections occasioned by various kinds of service and assistance. The most important tie thus formed is the relation of *masters and servants* (15). We all know how much the welfare of the home depends upon this. For servants enter into the circle of the home life, and can therefore promote or disturb its comfort according to the position they occupy thereto. It is true that this relation is based upon a legal agreement. But this does not embrace the whole of its conditions. It becomes a personal relation, involving personal obligations, and thus differs widely from the relation of workmen and employers. Domestic servants have not merely to do their work, and to do it well, like day-labourers, but, entering as they do our household, they have to be restricted by its rules, to share in its habits, and to show by their actions that they belong thereto. It is indeed this very confinement to the house, this submission to its rules and ways, that repel so many of our poorer female youth from domestic service, and makes them prefer the freedom which the factory seems to offer. And yet the house is the fittest place for a young woman, the best external protection for her youth, the best preparation for her future. The moral duties, moreover, of masters correspond with the moral

obligations of servants. If the servant enters into the life, and submits to the rules of the home, the master has to look upon the servant as belonging to the home, and sharing its life and arrangements. Domestic servants are not mere labourers, but members, though transitory ones, of the household. Hence they must be maintained, and not selfishly misused. They must have their share in the joys of the family, that they may also be able to sympathize with its sorrows; they must take part in the religious exercises of the family, and not be excluded therefrom, that they too may be able to fulfil in a right spirit the duties of their calling; and they must be regarded and treated as free personalities, who have not sold all their time and all their powers to their masters, but have also a right to belong to themselves, and to have some time to themselves, some time for the care of their intellectual and spiritual interests. For both parties are responsible for each other; servants are responsible for the moral order, the property, and the good name of the family, which all so greatly depend upon them; masters are responsible for the physical and mental well-being of their servants, and, if it so happens, for their future. For if the possibility of a home of their own is offered to servants, the relation of master and servant must not be dissolved without counsel and assistance on the part of the master, or opposition to an inconsiderate step.

Every home has, or at least ought to have, its individual character, and to form a circle complete in itself. But each again is also related to the outer world around

it, and bound to intercourse therewith. If it wilfully isolates and confines itself to its own members, its inner life will become as morbid and distorted as would be that of an individual under like circumstances. But as it is our duty to maintain and not to lose our peculiarity in the intercourse of giving and taking, so too is it the duty of a family not to lose itself in the society with which it has intercourse. The nearest circle is that of *relationship*. We have no right to ignore this, for it is by the ties of nature and the providence of God that we are directed to it. The feeling of kinship must be maintained and intercourse with relations cherished, but still so that this is not done at the cost of the peculiarity and definite character of our own home. It is upon such a mutual recognition, both of the ties of kindred and of the definite character of the home, that the right keeping up of intercourse with relations depends.

Next follows *social intercourse*. From this we have no right to withdraw our family. Our duty, both to our own household and to those with whom our course of life brings us in contact, binds us to engage in it. For the cheerfulness of our home requires that fresh air should be allowed to pass through it by the open doors and windows. But we are not called upon to sacrifice the sanctuary of our home, and our object should be to promote, and not to endanger, its peculiar character by society (16).

No family is without *property*. For, be it ever so poor, it has still the natural mental powers and gifts bestowed by God upon its members. Intellectual no

less than material possessions form the property of a family; and poverty in the latter aspect may be counterbalanced by affluence in the former. Whatever is possessed by its individual members should be regarded as the property of the family, and applied to its service. For the duty of the head and of the members of a family is not fulfilled by merely acquiring, whether in a material or intellectual respect, they have also to place their acquisitions at the service of the home and its members. Nor are such acquisitions rightly applied by being merely made use of. Our whole earthly life and its sensible existence subserves higher moral purposes. Whatever we possess must contribute to enable us the more completely and comprehensively to fulfil the moral duties of life. And among these is not only care for ourselves and ours, but for others also. It would be folly to insist upon equality of goods. If equality were instituted to-day, it would disappear to-morrow. Communism is a delusion; but it is nevertheless a duty to seek by sympathy and love to compensate for, and mitigate, glaring discrepancies, and thus to effect a reconciliation between different social classes. Christianity is the religion of reconciliation, not only with God, but also of man with man; and one of its fairest fruits is the history of mercy which it has produced, and in which every Christian household should participate. Even if it is poor in goods, it can still be rich in love (17).

No family has a right to shut itself against external interests, for each is a component part of the whole of

human society. And as each receives so much and in so various ways from society at large, so too must it contribute to the general welfare. The circle next in order to the family, in which it is immediately placed, and to which a relation of active intercourse and mutual service, of giving and taking, is to be occupied—is the State; and this is to form the subject of our next lecture.

LECTURE VII.

THE STATE AND CHRISTIANITY.



OUR reflections will to-day lead us beyond the limits of the family into the wider circle of the State.

We all grow up as members of a family. The protecting walls of his home shelter the son of the house till the lapse of time brings his youthful years to a close, leads him towards his future independence, and loosens the tie which had hitherto bound him to his family. At least his thoughts reach beyond the narrow space of home, and aspire after public life and his own future position therein. And though when he has reached manhood he may again settle in a home of his own, he does not then belong to his family alone, but also to that civil community of which he is a member, to the national and political life of his country. Both these spheres now claim his services ; he is himself the living bond between them, and a necessity is laid upon him to place them in active intercourse with each other. He brings into his family the spirit and the interests of general life, and thereby raises the tone of domestic life; he makes the position and possessions of his family

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serviceable to the community ; he is concerned to instil into the youthful members of his family a national spirit ; he strives to evoke in his sons the genius of the commonwealth which they are one day to serve. In this respect it is a matter of indifference whether he occupies a definite official position in the State or not. For we demand of every one that he should take an interest in the public concerns of his State and nation, that its fate, its greatness or decay, should affect and move his inmost soul. We blame the man who confines himself to the narrow limits of home life, and regard such conduct as selfish or unmanly. Even when care for his daily bread, or the bounded horizon within which his thoughts move, prevents his taking a part in public affairs, we still demand from the man of the most limited intellect, from the most scantily paid artisan, an affection for his country, an inward interest in its fate, which affects even him in his narrow sphere. For we are all born not only members of a family, but also members of a particular nation ; and what we are by the disposition of natural circumstances we ought also to be consciously and willingly. We have no right to withdraw from those connections in which we have been placed by God Himself.

It is from this relation which he holds to the State that Aristotle defines man as ‘ a political animal ’ (a ζῷον πολιτικόν). This is certainly an exaggeration, and rests upon that ancient view which knew of nothing higher than the State. We know of higher than political aims of life, of a higher than a national community. When

we would name this highest and ultimate object of man's life, we name not the State but the kingdom of God. And yet we conceive and speak of it after the analogy of the State, for we call it a kingdom. In so doing we express a feeling that, in the stage of earthly existence, the State represents a certain finality attained in the institutions of life.

We regard it as a higher grade of national life when the idea of the State governs the individual. A nation in which the idea of the State is a power influencing the hearts and minds of its members possesses in this circumstance a moral preponderance over others. But it would be an error to require that the entire life should be absorbed thereby. For the State as such does not furnish life with its matter, it is but a form which life assumes. Its matter it receives from the different departments of real life. The State is the means, not the end, but it is a necessary means and a God-designed institution. *How then did the State originate? and in what does its nature consist?*

We have all a feeling that the existence of the State is a thing not accidental but necessary. We cannot conceive that this form of human society might just as well be non-existent. And yet it did not exist at the first, and will not continue to exist always. We all bear about with us a hope of the future. Revelation announces this future to us, and calls its consummation the kingdom of God. This is the higher glorification of the relation of the State, but yet it is the State no longer. In that future age of the world for which we

hope, there will be no more states. The State will not last for ever, nor did it exist at the first. It belongs to this interim of the world in which we are living. It had a beginning, and it will have an end ; it is a product of history (1). How then did this form of human society originate ?

There are various views on the subject. Some make it proceed from the family, others found it upon compact, while a third party regard it as originating in *force*.

The first of these views has in it an element of native simplicity and kindliness, and is most akin to our natural notions. The family preceded the State. It was by the extension of families that states were formed, and the authority of the head of the family transferred to the supreme head of the State. Do we not call rulers fathers of their country, and invest them in a certain fashion with parental authority ? And yet, when we set this plainly before us, do we not all directly feel what a deep-reaching difference prevails between the province of the family and domestic life and that of the State ? They are two utterly different spheres. The family is the sphere of affection and custom, the State that of justice. In the former prevail free confidence, loving submission, willing obedience. In the latter, the strict severe spirit of justice, which compels obedience to its behests by law and force. The family knows nothing of the unbending behests of justice which prevail in the State, and the State is unacquainted with the warm breath of kindness which forms the soul of family life. Both must exist in this world. There must be

justice and order and law, but none of us would wish that there should be nothing else. There must also be heart and love and affection, or the world would become one great prison. The family and the State are both necessary, but they are totally distinct from each other. The State cannot be the natural product of the family, for it is animated by another kind of spirit. The family is a product of nature; the State is not a product of nature, but is brought to pass in history (2).

Yes, say those who hold the second view, by the free will of its several members, the State is the result of compact. Men exchanged the lawlessness which at first prevailed, by mutually agreeing to enact ordinances, and to constitute legal authorities for their enforcement. And thus states arose. This doctrine of a social compact, advocated especially by Rousseau, was for a long time the prevailing one; and though it is now for the most part given up in principle, its consequences are still at work. For when far-reaching political ordinances are made to-day after this fashion, to-morrow after its opposite, according to the decision of the majority, what else is this than carrying out the notion that the State is a mere formation of the will or an invention of the intellect? But the State is not this. No State was ever produced by the mere resolve of the will and by compact. And we may thank God that compact is not the foundation of the State, for we well know what compacts are worth. The State rests on a firmer basis. It was not created by the free resolves of the will, for a people living in a lawless and irregular manner has no inclina-

tion for order. And savage nations are just those which are not wont to make compacts (3).

Certainly, say the advocates of the third view, states are neither the result of compacts, nor the invention of the intellect and will of the parties concerned, but an act of violence, and they who employ force usurp them. From the days of Nimrod onwards, men of violence have from time to time arisen, who have subjected others, imposed upon them laws, and thus founded states. All states originated in despotism, and it has been but gradually that subjects have extorted from their rulers a greater or less amount of liberty. This is especially the doctrine of papistical authors, who then proceed to place in broad light upon this dark background the need of the papal power to protect the freedom of nations from the despotism of their rulers. Nor can it be denied that most of the states of primitive times exhibited the form of despotism, and that men of violence have in all ages usurped power over others. We all know, too, of what importance men of energy are to the development of the states which they govern. But pure force is that which is in most direct opposition to the nature of the State. For the very reason why states exist is, that human affairs may not be arranged by force but by justice. This is true even with respect to the weaker states. And whether we appeal to their actual condition or past history, we find that states are founded on justice (4).

Justice existed before states. Scripture informs us that the fundamental elements of justice are based upon

a divine ordinance. After the deluge, when men again began to spread and to settle upon earth, God, for the purpose of securing the preservation of human life, established the foundations of justice by the words, 'Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed, for in the image of God made He man.' Such is the oldest definition of justice existing, and this is referred by Holy Scripture to the immediate ordinance of God. By it the stability of human affairs is placed under the protection of justice, and this justice under the protection of punishment. To live is the fundamental right of man; hence to deprive another of his life is the fundamental transgression against human society, for it violates its fundamental condition, and endangers its existence and its future. Hence this right must be maintained and this sin prevented by opposing to this sin an act most emphatically corresponding to it. Thus God Himself places human affairs on the basis of justice, and places this justice under the protection of punishment. Because men are sinful, and will not if left to themselves do what is needful and right, there must be justice and punishment on earth, and those also who administer them, *i.e.* magisterial authorities. Such is the divine basis of that institution which we call the State. Justice and its development devolve upon history, and so too does the formation of states. All states bear within them an historical element which is subject to change. But beneath this changeable and accidental element there is a permanent one, *viz.* the divine foundation of justice, and of the administration of justice by its authorized

organs for the protection of the manifold interests of men (5).

But that which is thus comprised by justice is national life. States are the judicial arrangements and forms of national life. And the latter is the second and natural foundation of the State (6).

The same Holy Scripture informs us, some chapters further on, that when men began to multiply, and to feel the power of the differences which were beginning to appear among them, they attempted, for the sake of obviating them, to maintain their unity by force, and that they endeavoured to effect this by creating, according to their own choice, one great centre of union, but that God separated them into different nations and languages. What then are we taught by this information ?

The effort to combine different nations into the unity of a great empire, and thus to satisfy by human means the craving of the heart after the union of the whole human family, runs through the whole course of history. This end, however, God has reserved to Himself, and He is the enemy of all combination brought about by force. We see again and again how His judgments have been poured out upon those empires whose unity has been founded on force. It was such an attempt at centralization that God punished by the dispersion. Scripture tells us that a confusion of tongues took place. What it tells us of the separation of languages applies to that of nations, for language is the most direct expression of the national spirit. The law of multiplicity, on which the difference between one nation and another is based,

is no doubt a divine law, whose purpose is that the richness of human nature should be developed in the abundant diversity of national distinctions. Through sin, however, this multiplicity has grown into a separating and hostile opposition, and history is not merely the history of the maintenance of national distinctions, but of uninterrupted national strifes.

The causes of national diversity are partly moral, partly geographical, partly historical.

We meet not merely with natural, but with moral differences between nation and nation. We recognise in the national genius of the several peoples, not merely different degrees of endowment which in themselves are indeed morally indifferent, but we also judge them according to a moral standard, and speak of national virtues and vices; and these point back to former moral decisions, which we are no longer able to point out in past history, but which we recognise in their effects. For as, in the case of an individual, the after effects of an early moral determination continue through the whole of his subsequent years, and produce a decided effect on the formation of his character, so too is it with nations. And the greater number of national peculiarities of temperament are to be accounted for on this ground.

With this moral factor is combined a geographical one. You all know how emphatically and how successfully modern geographical science, as established by Carl Ritter, has pointed out the historical and intellectual influence of the soil upon which the different nations have settled. Not only plants, but ourselves also—who

seem so separate from it—assimilate the nature of the soil, and this was especially the case in times when the bond of association therewith was a far more intimate and active one than it is at present. But even in these days we all acknowledge what an influence the soil has upon the temperament of its inhabitants, nor is it difficult to prove this in individual cases. We all bear in our mental constitution the character of our native land, and even when we seek out a new home, we take with us, in our whole mental nature, the character of our original home into our new world.

To these influences exercised upon the mental constitution of a people by original moral decisions and by its geographical position, must be added the history which it goes through. For, after mankind separated into the multiplicity of nations, God appointed to each the separate road upon which it should go, and in which it should gain its experience. The aim indeed of each national history is the same. In his great speech on Mars Hill, St. Paul expresses it in the words (Acts xvii. 26, 27): ‘God hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation, that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after Him and find Him, though He be not far from every one of us.’ History is the development of the possibilities latent in human nature. It lasts so long as these possibilities are not utterly exhausted. As long as anything new can happen it does happen. The history of any nation is the develop-

ment of the possibilities existing in its special nature. It must develop the whole wealth of its nature. One nation is more, another less highly gifted. So too is the history of one nation more rich and varied than that of another. But the nature of each people has its limits, while its history is to serve the purpose of making it conscious both of its limits and its powers ; and it is just this experience which is to lead it to God. The more thoroughly a nation deals with its history, the more decidedly will it acknowledge God to be its Lord and helper, and the more religious a nation will it become ; and the more superficially it deals with its history, the more irreligious will it be. To seek and to find God is the purpose of all nations and of their history. But the ways to this end are different, each nation being led by God upon its appointed path. Now the experiences which each gains upon this path settle down into the legal ordinances which it enacts. As the experiences made in the social life of individuals settle into, and are, so to speak, deposited in custom, so too is law the deposit of the history of the nations. In so far as this history is a common one, it obtains a common expression in the legal enactments of nations. In so far as it is a different one, so too are their legal enactments different. Law is not invented, not made according to notions and theories ; it is a product of history, an expression of the actual circumstances of a nation as brought about by history. Laws and ordinances may indeed be made, which are merely inventions and devoid of historical foundations, but these have no roots, and are not the

expression of the common consciousness (7). Thus is it that a people becomes a legally constituted, legally ordered commonwealth, *i.e.* a State. According, then, to what has been said, every State requires a national basis. But a State is not necessarily co-extensive with nationality, for it is the product of a common history, and this may have variously modified the national status and composition. Hence the exclusive and absolute enforcement of the principle of nationality upon states is a revolutionary theory, for it ignores the rights of history, and this is the essence of revolution (8).

To sum up what has been said, we have seen that upon the foundation of that fundamental enactment by which God protected the life of sinful man from arbitrary violence, have arisen the manifold historical enactments in which the different nations have deposited their common history, and comprised their national life. And thus the State is the *legal organization of national life brought about by history* (9).

What, then, is the relation of the State to *actual life*?

There are various spheres of life which the State finds already in existence, which it does not create, but finds, and has to recognise; on which it has only to impress the form of its legislation for the purpose of securing them from arbitrariness, and thus promoting their healthy activity. These varied spheres of life which the State presupposes, which are not indebted to the State for existence, but are merely under its protection that they may the more comprehensively and perfectly fulfil their different tasks, are those of personal, of family, and of

religious life. The State does not first create the religious association ; it existed prior to the State, and is not its product. The State does not institute the family, but finds it long pre-existent ; the State does not bestow upon personality the right of free self-determination, but only recognises it. All these departments of life are embraced by the State, and placed under the protection of its laws, but do not owe to it their origin. The State cannot ignore them, but must minister to their activity, and help them in the discharge of their special duties. Each of these spheres of life has in itself its own nature and character, its special justification and its peculiar rights. The State does not create but merely formulates, as it were, and guarantees them (10).

Let us briefly consider this subject.

There are certain imprescriptible human rights involved in the very nature of human personality. These are the inalienable right of free self-determination, and the inviolability by any earthly power of the sanctuary of human personality. The State did not create these rights of man, but has merely to recognise and protect them (11).

There is also a *family* sanctuary, before whose threshold even the power of the State must pause. It has no right arbitrarily to deprive the husband of the wife, the wife of her husband, the children of their parents, the parents of their children, and to dispose of them at its own discretion. The State is neither one great family nor is it the negation of the family. Political order is not an extension of family order, nor are the political

rights of magistrates and rulers individual rights. We do not belong to the ruler as children belong to us who are parents, and his country and people are not his property in the same manner that an estate is the property of its owner. The State is not a kind of family order and an individual relation, but it includes within itself the family and individual relations, and protects them in their condition and in the fulfilment of their special duties. But as little is it the negation of the family. The order of things of which Socialists dream is not a State, but a monster which swallows up the independence of the family in its general dissolution of all special and independent life (12).

Finally, the *religious community*, while it is placed under the all-ordering authority of the State, is no fief thereof. Its peculiar nature distinctly separates it from the sphere of the State. It is no product of the State; its existence has roots independent thereof. It is as much an absolute independent quantity, as the sphere of religious life is an independent quantity with respect to legal life. In the pre-Christian world, religion, and its exercise, was the affair of the State. The Christian order of things rests upon a severance of these two spheres. It is the characteristic of the Christian view and the foundation of the Christian order of society, to regard Church and State as two essentially different and yet equally authorized quantities (13). Neither of these two powers is the servant, neither the ruler of the other. They have different duties, by which they are distinguished from each other, to fulfil. The

Church does not owe its office to the State, nor the State its office to the Church, but each is independent of the other, and yet there is a connection between them. Their absolute separation is an abstraction, not a reality—a mere theory, which is nowhere and will never be a fact, for it is an impossibility. The various spheres of actual life are so intimately interwoven, that while it is possible to subject one to another, it is impossible to tear them asunder. All such attempts lead to greater conflicts than those which they are made to escape, for they contend against reality. It is easy to put such a separation on paper; a moderate amount of legal schooling will enable a man to draw up in a day a constitution in which the absolute separation of Church and State is consistently carried out. But a legislative scheme on paper is one thing, its actual realization another.

‘*Leicht bei einander wohnen die Gedanken
Doch hart im Raume stossen sich die Sache.*’¹

Besides, what is called separation would only be an injury to one of these spheres. Even in those states in which such a separation is apparently carried out, there is in reality only another kind of relation between Church and State; their relation may perhaps be a more spontaneous one, and allow each to take a freer and more independent course of action, but they are not entirely unconnected. Neither of these institutions should interfere in the province of the other. The State, for instance, must not prescribe to the Church what it

¹ Thoughts easily dwell together, while things—things which take up room—bruise each other sorely.

is to preach, and how it is to conduct the guidance of souls; the Church must not lay down rules as to how the State is to legislate in civil affairs; but each must do service to the other, that both may contribute to the common welfare of the nation. The State does service to the Church by placing it under the protection of its laws, and thus rendering the safe and peaceable fulfilment of its office possible; the Church does service to the State by improving and elevating the minds of its members, and thus giving them moral power and alacrity rightly to fulfil their political duties. Thus should each be independent of, yet at the same time in friendly alliance with, the other. It is not enough to speak—as the fashion is—of the free Church in the free State; for the one must not be unconnected with and indifferent towards the other, but both must occupy a position of mutual co-operation and fellowship (14).

Every legal enactment should be an expression of actual relations. So too should the legal enactment of the relation between Church and State. When the people of a State is a Christian people, the State naturally does not ignore, but takes account of this fact in its enactments. It would be unnatural for such a State to legislate as though the people comprised by its laws was not a Christian people, or out of regard to a vanishing minority to lose sight of the consideration which it owes to the Christian character of the mass of its population. Such mistaken justice towards some would be injustice towards others. Hence it is the duty of

such a State to adapt its legal enactments to the Christian character of its people, and to endeavour to bring them into harmony with the principles of Christianity. Herein consists the nature of what we call the *Christian State*. This term may certainly be misunderstood, and so misunderstood may give rise to just opposition. But rightly understood the Christian State is a truth, for it corresponds with reality. In politics we all require that actual circumstances should be taken into account. Now there is no greater reality than the religious creed of a people. Hence it is a lawful requirement, and moreover a true policy, that the religious creed should not be ignored, but taken into account even in the legal enactments of the State. Those only who deal in abstract reasonings apart from the active current of real life could think of constructing ordinances to suit all nations, whatever their religious creed, or whether they had any religious creed at all. When we demand, on the ground of the fact that the German nation is a Christian nation, and that Christianity and the Church is an historical power in German national and political life—when on this ground we demand a Christian State, we do not mean that the State should derive its legislation directly from Scripture, or borrow its enactments from the gospel. For it is not the office of the State to practise theology, and there is an essential distinction between the gospel of the kingdom of Jesus Christ and the laws of states. What we mean, however, and what alone should be understood by the term ‘the Christian State,’ is that the legislation and constitu-

tion of a state should be in such harmony with the Christian convictions of its people as to make it possible to the Christians within its jurisdiction to acquiesce with a good conscience and hearty alacrity in its enactments. For though Christianity is in our days much attacked and opposed, it is not yet abolished, and it still exercises a far greater influence upon our customs and convictions than is generally known or admitted. And however coldly many of us may look upon its truths, even these would not desire that it should cease to exist. We may hold different views concerning this or that question of doctrine, but our common Christianity is yet broad enough to furnish the State with a basis of agreement, sufficient for the purpose of legislation (15).

But it may be asked: *Can Christianity on the whole be reconciled with the exigencies of the State, and the gospel with the administration of justice?* The gospel requires us to suffer injustice, the State to assert and seek our rights; the gospel bids us forgive, justice bids us punish; the gospel forbids oaths and homicide, the State demands oaths and military service. These seem irreconcilable opposites, and if they are really such, the Christian cannot live in a state of this nature. It was but slowly that the primitive Church accommodated itself thereto. It is true that it was chiefly the heathen element in the then existing governments which gave offence to Christians. But it was not this alone, for many scruples were felt concerning institutions without which no State could exist, and it was but gradually

that this hesitation was exchanged for intelligent certainty. Down indeed to our own days, certain sects have been unable to attain to any settled relation to the enactments and demands of the State, refusing, *e.g.*, oaths and military service. And yet it is impossible to institute any external order on earth according to the gospel, in which, for instance, evil-doers are to be forgiven instead of punished. What would this be but a proclamation of universal disorder? So long as sin is a power in social life, justice, law, coercion, and punishment must exist, and war continue to be an inevitable evil. Now with respect to this external order, as conditioned by sin, Jesus gave and intended to give no laws; in fact, none of His laws relate to the external national polity. When appealed to, He declined to decide a dispute concerning an inheritance, for this was the office of the secular judge, and not a matter pertaining to His ministry. He proclaimed the gospel of the kingdom of God, and required the dispositions of love and purity of heart. These dispositions, which He demands in all who would be members of His spiritual kingdom, we must and we can inwardly maintain, even when, as subjects of the State, we govern our external civil life according to its maxims. To illustrate our meaning by an example: it makes all the difference whether I move for the punishment of an evil-doer with a feeling of a malicious pleasure or with heartfelt sorrow, and only because order must be maintained and justice done upon earth. Externally, indeed, the act is the same, but the inward motive is different. And as in this, so in all similar

cases. The external act is neither Christian nor unchristian, but merely the judicial act which the existence of the State involves. But the temper in which I perform it is either Christian or unchristian. It is just because the words of Christ refer, in those utterances which sometimes sound so strange, to the disposition and to the individual state of the heart, and not to the external official act performed in compliance with the laws of the State, that Christianity can be reconciled with this institution (16).

If Christianity were a code of external precepts, it might indeed come into collision with the State; and they who so regard it are perpetually exciting such collisions. But it is a misconception of Christianity to make an external and legal act of that which is a question of internal disposition. Christianity at first altered nothing, as far as legal enactments were concerned. In this respect it let everything be as it was. It did not feel called upon to give new laws to states, nor to change the ordinances of civil life. It did not enter the world as a social revolution, but as a spiritual reformation. It gave to the world, and to life in the world, a new soul (17). But it is not indifferent whether or not the life led within civil society and its legal forms is animated with this soul of love or not, and whether or not this disposition is combined with the administration of justice; for it weaves bonds of fellowship in this world of variance. Law and justice can maintain order and compel obedience, but cannot unite hearts; in fact, law has nothing whatever to do with the state of the heart. The judge may be

inwardly persuaded that punishment will have a morally pernicious effect upon the heart and mind of, perhaps, a youthful criminal; but justice must be done, and the order of civil society maintained, though individuals should be ruined thereby. The law must take its stern, unyielding course, unmindful whether or not hearts are broken, and whether or not hatred and variance are the result. But the gospel unites men in bonds of fellowship, and effects a reconciliation of hearts. When the law makes, and must make, wounds, the gospel applies a balm; and when the law condemns, the gospel seeks to save. It is not, however, a matter of indifference whether justice alone prevails in human life, or whether it be accompanied by this gentle and conciliatory power. It has been said: the State has no need of religion and the Church; in the State of the future the penal code will take the place of religion (18). We should none of us, however, like to live in such a future, in which only law and punishment should reign. The world would have reached its saddest form when it should have been converted into one great penal institution. The spirit of justice must be combined with the spirit of love,—human life depends upon their alliance. Love must not prevail to the exclusion of justice, for we are sinners, and our evil-doing demands punishment; nor must justice prevail to the exclusion of love, for we are immortal souls, which are to be saved.

Nor does the spirit of Christian love exist merely together with justice; it has also entered into the sphere of justice itself, so far as this is compatible with the

nature of the latter, and mitigated it by that spirit of gentleness for which it has made room. This is true even of the heathen world at the period of transition from the old to the new era, when it became the task of legislation to reconcile justice and leniency. For Christianity met this effort, and brought about a transformation of the former rigid justice into a clemency which did away with those marks of cruelty which the administration of justice still widely exhibits even among ourselves (19). It is the triumph of law to be the expression of justice, and yet, at the same time, to leave room for clemency. In our days it is universally demanded that, even in penal legislation, humanity should not be forgotten; and that even in the criminal, the man must not be ignored. This humanity is not Christianity, and it has many friends who are no friends of Christianity; but it is nevertheless a fruit of that Christianity which first taught us to recognise the human in every man.

In contrast with the severity of former times, the danger of modern humanity of the day is an amount of tenderness prejudicial to strict and full justice; and in proportion as regard is had to this temporal life alone, and it is forgotten that there is besides a life of the soul,—a life not absolutely dependent upon the outward lot of this earthly life, nay, that earthly life must frequently be ruined that the life of the soul may be saved,—in proportion, I say, as this is forgotten, will the danger of this false tenderness be incurred (20). A merely earthly view of life will ever oscillate between the cruel severity which offends against love, and the false tender-

ness which violates justice. It is Christianity alone which teaches us both the full seriousness of sin and of justice, as revealed to us by God's pardoning grace; and though it does not thus create right, it yet bases human rights upon those everlasting foundations of God's moral order and God's kingdom, upon which, as upon two massive columns, the whole edifice of national and political life now rests.

We see, then, that the sphere of justice and the sphere of the gospel are two different spheres, which, externally considered, seem at variance with each other. But each promotes and does service to the other, and by their combination they form the unity of moral life in a world of sin. Our next lecture must treat of the various ways in which a Christian's life is affected by this sphere of justice, which we call the State.

LECTURE VIII.

THE LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN IN THE STATE.



OUR last lecture dwelt upon the nature of the State and its relation to Christianity; the present will treat of *the life of the Christian in the State*.

We saw that as the Church is the commonwealth of grace, the family the association of piety, so, too, is the State the commonwealth of justice. With the State, justice enters human life as a new factor; and in saying this, its office is declared.

The State is founded upon justice, and to maintain and administer justice is its first duty; for it is only under the protection of justice that the various circles of society comprised in the State can find free and undisturbed opportunity to fulfil their several duties. Hence the court of justice is the sanctuary of the State, and the judges its priests. Hence it is in the judge, more than in any other servant of the State, that we require calmness and dignity, and that no act of public life appears to us so weighty and important as judicial transactions and decisions (1).

Justice is the supreme power of the State, and justice must be done even to the most refractory. Now, since justice must be maintained and enforced, punishment is necessary. What, then, we proceed to inquire, is the meaning and aim of *punishment*?

Punishment is not a means of improvement. Improvement may be combined with punishment; still it is not justice, but human and Christian love which has combined efforts for the improvement of the criminal with the administration of justice. Neither is deterrence from crime the proper import of punishment. There is of necessity a deterring element in punishment, inasmuch as it is an exhibition of the full strictness of justice; and thus deterrence from crime is, and must be, combined with punishment, though it is not its proper nature and special end. Punishment, on the contrary, is simply the infliction of penalty; it is the upholding of justice against disobedience; it is the necessary reaction of justice against its violation. Justice must exist, either in the guise of performance or in that of retribution. In punishment, justice carries out its authority and glory against that self-glorification of man which opposes it (2).

Herein lies the *duty of punishment*. If God intended that justice should prevail, He also intended that punishment should not only be justified, but that it should be a duty. Not according to human caprice, but in the name of God, must punishment be decreed and inflicted on the criminal. If punishment originated merely in the will of man, it might well be asked whence man derives the right to deprive his fellow-

man of his liberty, his property, or even his life. But since it is not man's, but God's righteous will which is carried out in the punishment of His adversaries, we may with a good conscience, and in God's name, decree the punishment of others.

Herein, too, lies the justification of *capital punishment*. This question has recently excited so much, and often such irritable discussion, that any one who advocates the lawfulness of capital punishment runs the risk of being regarded as still immersed in mediæval darkness. The attacks made upon it proceed, however, from a mistaken humanity, and really rest upon a misconception of the double truth, that punishment and penal justice are not of human, but of divine origin, and that punishment must be commensurate with the violation of justice committed. Violations of justice differing in kind and degree, penalties must thus differ also. These differences are infinite in number, but there is an extremity of crime against mankind which cannot be exceeded. Hence there must also be an extremity of penalty which cannot be exceeded. The extreme violation of justice is murder, and the corresponding extreme in the administration of justice is capital punishment. For to live is the fundamental right of man, and the prerequisite of all the other possessions of life. Hence, wilfully to deprive another of life is the fundamental transgression against the stability of mankind,—the special outrage against human society. With this extremity of crime, then, the extreme penalty must be commensurate; and this is capital punishment. It is,

indeed, the most grievous thing possible to deny a fellow-man the right of living, but it is also the most heinous thing possible to have forfeited this right; and He in whose name we act in passing such a sentence is the supreme protector of justice on earth. Such is the holy severity of justice (3).

To administer this justice or to secure its administration is the affair of *rulers*. When we speak of the State, we include in this term the distinction of rulers and subjects; for there is no State without rulers. If it be the will of God that mankind should live in the form of civil society, and that there should be therein appointed organs for the administration of justice, it is also His will that there should be rulers, and thus, as the apostle says, there is no power but of God. Not only is it the will of God that there should be rulers, but they who are actually such are such by that providence of God which works in history. What may be the form of government, whether hereditary or elective monarchy, or aught else, is in this respect a matter of indifference; the government, and whoever may be at its head, exists by reason of God's will, and acts in His name, in virtue not of personal excellence, but of official authority. Our rulers were wont to express this fact by the designation 'by the grace of God.' This expression is one of humility, and not of presumption, and is meant to say that it is not a personal right, but an office committed to him by God, which is exercised by the possessor of the supreme power. And on this ground it indicates the divine authority of His office, and not,

as has been supposed, the absoluteness of his sway ; for it deals not with its extent and matter, but with its foundation. In this sense it is a sound and correct expression, and a wholesome reminder both to the bearers of magisterial authority and to their subjects (4).

The State cannot exist without this distinction of rulers and subjects, which is involved in its very nature. It follows that neither the ruler nor the people constitute the State, neither has the former a right to say *l'état c'est moi*, nor the latter to regard itself as 'sovereign,' instead of being subject to the law, and to the magistracy to which its execution is entrusted (5). The two together constitute the State, and are consequently referred to each other. It is characteristic of what has been called bureaucracy, for the possessors of magisterial power to isolate themselves from the people, as though the latter were not an essential and lawful factor in the State, instead of feeling it the duty of rulers to quicken the idea of the State in the whole people, and to call forth its active expression. But however lively may be the idea of the State among the people, and however mature their understanding of political matters, subjects are still devoid of one thing which the holders of magisterial power possess, and the recognition of which it is not merely their right but their duty to demand ; and that is official authority, and the recognition they must demand is *obedience*.

You are all acquainted with that famous passage in Romans xiii. : 'Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God ; the

powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever, therefore, resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to themselves condemnation.' When the apostle in these words so strictly and earnestly exhorted Christians to obedience, he had regard both to the revolutionary tendencies of existing Judaism, which might exercise a seductive effect even upon Christians, and also to the danger which Christians incurred of so misconceiving their Christian liberty as to suppose that, because they were now the subjects of Christ and members of His heavenly kingdom, they were no longer bound to obey their earthly superiors. Upon the Christians of the first century this warning of the apostle, combined with their memory of their Lord's saying, 'Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's,' had its effect. Never were there more cruel persecutions, never was there more unlawful cruelty, than that which the Christians of the first century suffered from their Roman rulers. None could have been more sorely tempted than they to opposition and resistance. But they conquered the temptation, and persevered in silent and patient obedience; and God gave their cause the victory, while the Jews of those days, who raised up one rebellion after another, were only the more completely crushed on that account. These facts of the early Christian centuries are typical for all times. Christianity inculcates obedience to the civil rulers, even if they are unjust and tyrannical. No one preached such obedience more decidedly than Luther, while no one had a more lively feeling for

liberty than he. He uses a freedom with respect to the persons of rulers the strong language of which may sometimes almost startle us. But with respect to their office he recognises and inculcates only the obedience which submits even to injustice, and absolutely forbids all right to active and armed resistance (6). It is this which distinguishes Lutheran Protestantism from many Reformed circles in non-German nations. To this very day these are far more ready to embrace the notion of armed resistance to an unjust and tyrannical government, which our Church decidedly rejects, by requiring for all action that right which is conferred by the calling. But we have no calling to offer arbitrary opposition to the civil government. It may be a duty to refuse obedience, if it commands what God has forbidden, or forbids what God has commanded. We should then, indeed, like the apostles in Jerusalem, obey God rather than men, and patiently bear the consequences of such disobedience as an evil of God's ordaining. They whose office it is may indeed be bound to offer opposition within the sphere of their official calling to the unjust ordinances or demands of the organs of authority. There is an opposition which is lawful ; but it is the business of those only who, by their official position, may be regarded as the chosen and appointed representatives of the nation, or may have, in some other official capacity, a regular calling thereto. Where such a calling is wanting, opposition to the enactments of government wears the guise of rebellion. But rebellion is always blameworthy, and *revolution* is sin ; for

it is the assumption of a power which is not possessed. To this must be added, that it imperils the existence of the body politic itself. For though the beginning of a revolution may be under control, its results are entirely beyond the power of its authors. How the State will come forth from it no one can know; and we have no right to imperil the existence of states. Revolutions may sometimes, perhaps, have resulted in salutary political progress, yet this advantage is fully counterbalanced by the evils with which they are combined. Revolutions are always misfortunes, and greater evils than the abuses against which they are directed. But if a revolution proceeding from beneath is blameable, the *coup d'état* proceeding from above is equally so, for both are infractions of law; and in every commonwealth law is supreme, and rulers exist for the sake of law and its administration,—not for its arbitrary overthrow (7).

In this question of obedience to rulers, the Christian conscience will feel little difficulty in deciding. Far less easy will a decision be when the question is not between ruler and subjects, but between ruler and ruler, *i.e.* when it is a question of *legitimacy*. How far does duty to a former ruler extend? When does duty towards the new one begin? These are questions which may bring a Christian conscience into a state of grievous internal conflict. A revolutionary movement within the commonwealth, or force from without, may overthrow the old government, and set up a new order of things. How, then, is the Christian to regulate his

conduct? I speak not of his heart, but of his civil duty. His heart may be bound by gratitude and affection long after his conscience is bound to new duties. Our question is simply one of conscience. As long as the old government is attacked, it is the duty of every man to stand up for it with heart, word, and deed, according to his office and position. But when it no longer exists, when another has come into its place, and—which is the decisive point—undertaken the administration of justice, and thus become the embodiment of law, then we are bound by duty and conscience, though not perhaps by inclination, to the new. It may be a heavy sorrow to him, but even in his sorrow the Christian will recognise God's purpose and providence, and submit himself thereto. It would not be the fulfilment, but the violation of his duty to the State, and an act of caprice, were he, for instance, to regard the dethroned dynasty as his ruler, while it really was such no longer. Such changes are not, indeed, generally made after so clear and decided a fashion, long periods of perplexing transition usually intervening. At such times, when a lawful claim to his obedience is wanting, or when it is no longer obvious with whom it may lie, perhaps nothing is left to a Christian but to withdraw for a season from public affairs, in which he could not participate without sin (8).

Such withdrawal, however, must be only exceptional, participation in public affairs, according to his station and calling, being no less the civil duty of the Christian than of other citizens.

The disposition of mind which induces a lively consciousness of this duty is *the love of one's country*, or patriotism. This is the most essential of political virtues, and that from which all the political activity of the Christian citizen should spring.

Let us see, then, wherein it consists.

Its first form is the love of *home*. The ties of nature connect every one of us with the soil on which we originated. For we have received it into ourselves, and have, as it were, transmitted it into our natural temperament. With our native soil we live as with a friend, and we are bound to it by ties of affection. Even in the mature and much tossed about man there is found a certain longing for the home of his youth, which impels him to see it once more before he dies (9).

But this is not patriotism properly so called, but only the natural feeling on which it is founded. Patriotism is a moral, and therefore a freely chosen course of action, which may consequently be separated from this natural basis. A nation may leave its home and seek out a new one, but its members transport their patriotism with themselves to their new home. For it is an affection for the *nation* to which we belong, to its *manners and customs*, that we bear about within us in our own mental constitution; and we love it, with all its weaknesses and narrownesses, just as we love a friend in spite of his faults.

But all these natural characteristics of a people still form only the natural foundation of its political constitution. Hence patriotism in its highest sense is love to

the *political constitution* of the nation to which we belong (10). Love of country does not always coincide with affection for the hereditary dynasty. It will not, indeed, be unaccompanied thereby, especially where a dynasty has acquired an historical importance for a State and nation, or where the sovereign holds up to his people an illustrious example of moral excellence and faithful performance of duty. Happy are the people that can boast of such a ruler ! But attachment to him is not equivalent to patriotism, for the latter must exist even where the dynasty is unworthy of affection, or where it changes. Neither has patriotism aught in common with that flattery of the multitude practised by demagogues, which is quite as immoral and more repulsive than flattery of princes. It is an attachment to the political institutions of our native land, and is rooted in our nature. The love of country is innate in every breast, and is not the result of our own reflection that our State and nation is a thing necessary, or admirable, or famous. It is not produced by us, but effected by God, who is present in all our natural tendencies. It is not force, nor fear, nor reflection, but this natural feeling wrought in us by God, that keeps states and peoples together, and unites to each other with firmest bonds the different members of a nation. But it is ours to make that which God works in us our conscious inward act, to raise a natural inclination into a voluntary and conscious attachment to the political institutions of our country, and to make it the source of all our political conduct.

This source must, however, be kept free from all that might obscure or corrupt it.

The first transgression against patriotism is committed when an individual makes political institutions subservient to his own interests or those of his class, instead of placing himself and his class at the disposal of the country. The fundamental sin is selfishness, and this is also the fundamental sin of political life. The State is not merely a means to be used for money-making, or an institution to provide appointments and maintenance for individuals. This is indeed one source, but a selfish one, of interest in the State. Nor is the duty of patriotism less transgressed when homage is done to that vulgar cosmopolitanism which is indifferent how the national and political affairs of its own country are arranged, if it can only carry on its business; or that sentimental cosmopolitanism which is in love with the whole world, and neglects or depreciates its own home, its people and State, in comparison with others, admiring and esteeming all that is foreign merely because it is foreign.

This is the old fault of which we Germans ought by this time to have been cured. But if I see aright, the cure is as yet but partial. For German patriotism is not merely a rejoicing in German industry, or a pride in German greatness, but above all an appreciation and administration of those special gifts and possessions with which God has endowed us, and of the special office He has committed to us.

And what, we ask, is this office? It is twofold, and while it constitutes our pre-eminence above other

nations, it also imposes upon us duties above all others. It was not by accident that the Reformation was effected on German soil. We all rejoice in and boast of this act of the German mind, and regard it as the date at which a new era begins. And what kind of act was it? An act which liberated the mind from unjustifiable and untrue restrictions, an act which thereby introduced a new era in whose blessings we participate—certainly it was all this. But above and beyond this, it was a religious act, an act of the religious conscience, and of the religious craving, an act of piety. The mere feeling for liberty, or the scientific conscience alone, would never have given Luther power and courage to cope with all the world, nor led his cause to victory. In such a spirit have many others made the attempt, and have been either brought to confusion, or betaken themselves to repose. No, it was his religious conscience, it was the question of his own soul's salvation, it was the inward craving for assurance which gave him that godly disregard, which cared neither for Pope, nor Emperor, nor any human authority, because his conscience was bound by God and His word as the supreme authority. It was from the spirit of true piety that the Reformation proceeded, and hence modern German life is rooted in the religious conscience and the pious heart. Religion is the source of our life. From of old we have been wont to speak of pious German ways, and thus to comprise piety and Germanism in one notion, nay, almost in one word. A pious and believing mind is the heritage of our nation, and he who denies piety and

despises faith denies and despises his best possession. This trait of piety reaches back to the earliest beginnings of our literature. The oldest monument of the German language is the Gothic translation of the Bible by Ulfilas, and the epic which stands on the threshold of our national history is a religious epic—an old Saxon harmony of the Gospels called the Heiland, the most characteristic saying of which is the saying concerning the disciples, They knew not doubt (11). Our nation was ever a pious nation, and unbelief has been imported from Italy and France. To be an unbeliever is to become an alien, and he who can ridicule faith and piety is a degenerate son of Germany. Not till we remember and turn to our good old German ways, and do away with foreign ones, shall we do away with unbelief. The vocation of our nation in the world is a religious one, that of being the protectress of piety and faith (12).

It has also a second and secular vocation, that of being the guardian of good faith and right dealing between nation and nation. The memory of old German honesty is indissolubly intertwined with the old German ways and customs, and German faith is a well-known word. But no other nation has ever done such justice to the ways and customs of other nations as ours has. We have the gift of entering into the mental peculiarities of foreign nations as no other people has; it is our sense of justice, our power of recognising the qualities of others, which makes us capable of this, and this very capacity points to our vocation. We are not indeed ignorant of the weaknesses which are the result

of this capacity, but these weaknesses are the shadows of virtues. Our nation is called upon to keep faith and maintain justice in its intercourse with other nations. It is an Italian principle to make interest instead of truth and justice the law of action. But Italian ways have ever been a temptation to our people. Their apparent brilliancy and their seeming success have always exercised a seductive effect upon this nation. It would be a denial of our vocation to be seduced into setting up a policy of interest in the place of a policy of faith and justice for the sake of the brilliant results which it promises. It has been a frequently repeated phenomenon that victorious nations have been morally conquered by those they have subdued, and have adopted their customs. This might almost be said to be a law of retribution prevailing in history. Hence a moral duty is in this respect imposed upon the victors. It is in such a position that we now find ourselves. May our nation perceive and overcome the danger! When Alexander the Great had conquered Asia, the Asiatic spirit obtained the mastery over him, and when Rome became the mistress of Greece it succumbed to Greek customs, and its best and honourable days were over. And will Germany, after its brilliant victories over France, find French gold a temptation, and let the French spirit prevail? Shall the time of our greatness be also the era from which we must date our decay? God forbid!

Every nation has its limitations and its weaknesses. With these we must have patience, and strive by patient

effort to overcome them. But with *sin* we should have no patience, but earnestly oppose it. It would be but a poor kind of love which would not permit us to rebuke the sins of our own nation. Those who love their nation most have ever been the most strenuous opponents of its sins. The history of Israel offers us abundant examples of this fact. No man ever loved his people more than Moses did, who was ready to purchase its prosperity even at the price of his own salvation, and yet never was any more strict or uncompromising with respect to the transgressions of his people. He did not hesitate to sacrifice hundreds and thousands in strict justice for the moral preservation and deliverance of the nation. And in this path he was followed by all the great characters of Israelite history. The sharp rebukes and threatened judgments of the prophets are the expressions of a love which earnestly fears and hopes for the future of their nation. And such has ever been the case. The best friends of their country have always been its strictest and severest judges.

But our love will not be shown in rebukes only, but above and beyond all in *earnest moral work* with ourselves. All moral work with ourselves, all moral progress in the fashioning of our own lives, is a contribution towards the edifice of our nation's future. God has given us the German Empire, and we ought all to be workers in building it up, and the best work we can contribute thereto is the moral earnestness of our own lives. With this it is that we can serve our country and its future. Not power and territory, not armies nor

talents nor riches, but earnest morality is the true foundation of a nation's present and future greatness. To contribute to this is within the power, as it is the duty, of all. And it is thus that we may best testify our patriotism (13).

Every State occupies its special position among other States, and this its *position in the world* depends upon both its actual relative power and the history it has passed through. For the position assigned to a State by reason of its history may be a more important one than its actual proportion of power might in and by itself involve. Such a State imposes on its members the necessity of great exertions of moral power, that the lack of an actual basis of power may thus be compensated for, and the temptation escaped of endeavouring to remedy such a disadvantage in the way of conquest. A State may need indeed to extend or rectify its boundaries; but such extension of boundaries depends not only on necessity, whether real or supposed, but must be regarded from the point of view of a judicial act. There are, however, moral conquests, which give a State a wider basis with respect to the estimation in which it is held by other States, and to these all patriotic conduct on the part of individuals may contribute. The several States stand in relation and intercourse with each other, and this is regulated not by their greatness or their smallness, but by justice. For the relation of one State to another, as well as the State itself, is based not on force but on justice. Even the most powerful State has no right to issue commands to

a weaker, as to a subordinate, but each has equal rights in respect of another. And this is true not only of civilised, but also of uncivilised States. Uncivilised nations are not, according to the ancient view, and indeed to that of many at the present day, without rights; nor are heathen nations, according to the mediæval papistical notion, without their rights in respect of Christian nations. Christianity has taught us to recognise the equal rights of all men and all nations, for it has placed them all under the rule of God. God has appointed to them all the bounds and times of their habitation, as St. Paul preached at Athens (Acts xvii. 26), and has thus removed them from arbitrary treatment.

Thus has the Christian religion become the foundress of international rights. What the pre-Christian era knew of the rights of nations was limited chiefly to the maintenance of certain forms and limits in the conduct of war. But the recognition of the independent rights of others, which forms the foundation of all international justice, was wholly wanting, and was first brought into the world by Christianity. As it teaches one man to love and to serve another, so also does it preach the peace, the fellowship, and the mutual assistance of the different nations (14). National hatred is the fundamental sin in international life. Joint labour in the common duties of mankind is the calling of all nations, and peaceful intercourse the means thereto. From this fact it is that *commerce* derives its higher moral importance. It is not merely a means of gain, or a medium for the supply of the most urgent external wants, but it

forms a bond of association and intercourse between the nations of the earth, and thus opens up ways of mutual influence which are subsequently used by the intellectual and moral powers of national life (15). Thus also does missionary enterprise advance on the paths opened by commerce, and bear the gospel to the distant heathen lands, as the best gift we have to offer in return for the production of the soil or the results of labour brought thence by commerce. Thus does commerce help to promote and maintain a feeling of kindred among the different nations of earth.

The nations are not, however, always treading these peaceful paths, and their history is a history of *wars*. The strongest testimony against the moral excellence of human nature is furnished by the fact that nations cannot dwell together in peace, nor exist without war. For war, as being murder on a large scale and the destruction of the works of peace, is at once the greatest crime and the greatest scourge of mankind. It is true that it also evokes salutary forces, and that, like a violent storm, it may clear the atmosphere and result in actual progress. But this is because God employs in His service even the passions and sins of man. Sin does not cease to be sin because it may result in good as well as evil, nor war to be an unchaining of the passions because it is also a school of virtue, nor its work to be a work of destruction because it destroys also what is bad and obsolete. All the scourges of human nature unite in war and march in its paths, and all the woes of human life have here a meeting-place. Let a war be

ever so prosperous and victorious, it is a heavy judgment even upon the victors. It is not without the greatest moral earnestness, and not without supplication to the Almighty, who holds the fate of battles in His hand, and who alone can heal all wounds, that a nation may enter upon a war which is forced upon it. We have but to bring before our minds what that word war means, and what sorrow and misery it involves, to make all frivolous talk about a quick and lively war die upon our lips. Every war which is voluntary, and not forced upon us by necessity, is a crime. Only when thus inevitable is it moral, because conformable with duty. Hence every war of ambition and conquest, or of vengeance, is blameable, and nothing but a war of self-defence justifiable. For it is certainly the duty of every people to defend its independence and national possessions against flagitious attacks, and to punish such criminal action on the part of a foreign nation by force of arms. The belligerent nation then becomes the executioner of divine judgments; but it must also know and confess that it is used by God for this purpose, and that it only carries on war aright when it does so with this conviction. Then only can we, though with bloody hands, come before God with confidence and a good conscience, because it is His will that we have performed; while every wilfully undertaken war forbids our having free and happy access to God (16).

Christianity entered the world with the angel's proclamation: 'On earth peace.' And Jesus parted from His disciples with the words: 'My peace I give unto

you.’ And yet wars have not since been of less frequent occurrence upon earth. This is no testimony against Christianity, but it is a testimony against the nations. For every one that knows anything of Christianity will confess, that if the nations were governed by the spirit of the gospel, peace would reign and wars cease among them. An era of peace has often been dreamed of, and it has been hoped for from the prevalence of humanity. The theory of the friends of peace is a pleasant dream, but only a dream. Humanity is indeed itself an effect of Christianity, but it is not the power that can ensure peace, because it is not a victory over the passions. As long as the passions are a power upon earth, whether in the breast of the individual or in the life of the nations—and that will be till the end of the world—so long will the era of wars last, in spite of Christianity. Christianity meantime celebrates its triumphs even in the midst of wars, and especially in those abundant works of mercy which follow in the sanguinary paths of war, and heal the wounds thereby inflicted (17).

But there are other difficulties in the mutual intercourse of nations and states, arising either from opposing interests, or from the intricacy of the general situation; and these require to be obviated by the patient labours of *diplomacy*. For the natural virtue of diplomats is the patience which employs itself in solving difficulties. And their object is the peace of nations and their emulation in the labours of peace. We are wont to combine a sinister meaning with the word diplomacy, and it is difficult to us to imagine that a diplomat can be a

true Christian, or that Christianity is compatible with his calling, and yet this must be possible. For if this calling is a necessary one, it is according to the will of God, and must be compatible with and subserve the interests of His kingdom. If lies and deceit are often regarded as inseparable from diplomacy, we still may confidently apply the proverb: 'Honesty lasts longest,' and designate it as the best policy, even in the department of international intercourse. And this is confirmed by a not inconsiderable number of truly Christian statesmen (18).

The highest problem in politics is national prosperity. True prosperity, however, is not merely the elevation of the natural life of our race, but the attainment of its highest moral aims. And the ultimate aim of the nations and of mankind is *the kingdom of God*. All political science must, and true political science will, subserve it. It is Christianity, however, that has placed this object before mankind, and promised its attainment. Christianity is the redemption even of international life. The ancient world placed the different nations in sharp contradistinction. This principle of exclusive nationality is, however, a permanent declaration of war, for it raises this into the normal form of national intercourse. Christianity cast among mankind the new great thought of the kingdom of God, and thereby set before the nations enduring peace as the aim of their history. Since then this thought has never been lost. And though the subsequent history of the nations has been one continuous transgression against it,

it still lives unextinguished and unextinguishable in the hearts of men, and does its quiet but mighty work, spreading its blessings even among those who sin against it, and exercising its influence even over those who desire to know nothing of Christianity (19). Jesus Christ is not in an earthly sense the Ruler of the nations, and His kingdom is not of this world; but from Him goes forth a blessing upon the kingdoms and nations of the earth also, and Christianity helps them even in the attainment of their earthly aims. The ideal of our hopes and desires is, a people willingly and piously submissive to their God and Saviour, and fulfilling the works of their calling in vigorous, happy Christian faith, and a State which so orders secular matters as to leave Christianity room to pour out its blessings in the manifold manifestations of national and civil life.

Into the manifold manifestations of the social life of mankind I would ask you to accompany me in our next lecture.

LECTURE IX.

CULTURE AND CHRISTIANITY.



OUR observations to-day will lead us beyond the borders of national and political life into the wider circle of human society. We belong to the Church, to our family and household, to our nation and its political institutions; but we are also members of the human race, and have a calling common to us as human beings. To this common human calling we give the name of *culture*. And it is of this and its relation to Christianity that our present lecture is to treat.

If the ancient view, which was acquainted only with separate nations living in each other's neighbourhood, but not with one universal manhood, were correct, a common human duty would be out of question. Christianity introduced into the world the notion of humanity, and in so doing it introduced also the notion of culture. Our era insists, with a certain amount of pride, upon the human duty of culture. But let us not forget that this presupposes the knowledge expressed by Holy Scripture in the words: 'God hath made of one blood all nations of men to dwell upon the whole earth' (Acts xvii. 26).

What, then, is *this common human duty of culture*? When we read in the simple account given in Holy Scripture of the first beginnings of our race, that God commanded men to fill the earth, to subdue it and rule over it, these words express the nature of culture. To appropriate and subject his world to himself is the task of culture committed to man. God in this respect assigns to man the whole world, and we have no right to prescribe to him boundaries. The entire earthly creation is to be the possession of man, his material and his intellectual property; such is the will of God and our vocation. History is the progressive accomplishment of this task. We accomplish it by the means of external dominion, and by the means of intellect. For to be acquainted with is also to have dominion over matter, and knowledge is power. The shares which individuals have in this vocation are diverse—according as God hath diversely endowed them, and assigned to them their different positions. When we contemplate human life, we behold a wondrous concatenation of agencies at work one within another, all subserving the same object, but each contributing thereto in its proper place.

From of old a distinction into *three classes* has existed. These may be called respectively the labouring, the educated, and the governing classes. The first contributes to the external, the second to the intellectual subjugation and appropriation of the earth; while the third takes the various activities comprised in the two former classes under its protection. Of this protection, as afforded by the legal enactments of the State, our two

last lectures treated. For the governing class includes both the rulers and the armed defenders of a country. The two other classes will therefore form the subject of our present observations. For to them is committed the task of culture properly so called.

The foundation of all culture is *agriculture*. You all know in what brilliant colours Schiller carries out this thought in his *Eleusischen Feste* :—

‘Dass der Mensch zum Menschen werde
Stift er einen ewigen Bund,
Gläubig mit der frommen Erde
Seinem mütterlichen Grund.’¹

From this covenant between man and the earth has arisen all civilisation, and all the salutary order of human society, and upon it are based even the adornments of art and the attainments of science.

The same fact here brought before us in poetic imagery is also taught us by historical research. The science of comparative philology, that youthful conqueror in the world of mind and history, has attempted, by means of its linguistic researches, to produce a sketch of the primitive condition of our Aryan ancestors in Central Asia, whence proceeded those nations that were the bearers of culture. The picture thus sketched exhibits tribes practising agriculture and cattle-keeping. In such employments we are made to perceive that the

‘Let—that man to man may soar—
Man and earth with one another
Make a compact evermore—
Man the son, and earth the mother.’

—Lord Lytton's translation.

firm foundation of our existence is that patient perseverance, without which the ever-shifting vicissitudes of life would lead to the dissolution of all relations. Life here runs on in the quiet uniformity of the seasons; it requires settled order, it requires patience. That the quality of perseverance should, in such a state of life, be advocated above all others, is but just and natural. For the spirit of restlessness, and the inclination for rapid changes to intrude upon this condition, would be unnatural and pernicious. Conservatism is the natural virtue of the peasant and the landholder. Nor are any more inclined to religion than they who, day by day, morning and evening, are led to have regard to a blessing from above. When they sow their seed in the furrow they place it at the same time in the hands of God. For after the utmost has been done, and after all the certainty which the advance of science may offer, the chief dependence must be upon Him who gives rain and sunshine in due time, and sends both fruitful and unfruitful seasons (3).

While the ancient world, especially the Romans, always respected this class, and the latter did not scruple to call their dictators from the plough, *handicraft* was regarded in Greece and Rome as the business of the half free and the servile. Its practice was left for the most part to the slaves, the Athenian citizen roaming idly about the markets in quest of their produce, the Roman citizen being supported by the State. Such a condition of things was one cause of the ruin of these States. A different view prevailed in Israel. Here

handicraft was honoured, and it was customary for even scholars to learn a trade. St. Paul combined with his learned studies the trade of a tent-maker, and the Lord Jesus Himself assisted His foster-father in his trade of a carpenter until His ministry claimed His time. Christianity has ennobled trade, and how greatly the ancient guilds contributed in former times, in their respective spheres, to maintain among us a spirit of ability, honour, and piety, is known to all. Forms change, and when they are obsolete it is neither desirable nor possible to retain them by force. But it is possible to maintain the sense of honour in this class under whatever forms it may adopt. And the name master is the most honourable one that can be given, for in the highest departments the most gifted cannot get beyond mastership (4).

The opinion entertained by the ancient world concerning *trade* was fluctuating. Cicero allows wholesale dealing to the free citizen, but thinks retail dealing beneath him, though the former cannot exist without the latter. The early Christians, too, had scruples about trade, for they thought it scarcely possible that the pursuit of gain should not debase the soul, or that competition should not ensnare it into lies and deceit. And who can deny that this employment has dangers above many others? Experience, however, shows that its temptations are not insuperable, as may be seen in the most opposite ages of the world by many examples of honourable conduct in this class. The whole benefits of trade are not exhausted in the profits it returns. It is ser-

viceable to human society. If it only furnished the necessary material foundations for our intellectual existence, it would even then subserve the higher tasks of mankind. But it contributes to them in a still more direct manner. The nations are called upon, not to live side by side in mutual indifference, but to carry on active intercourse with each other, that by this mutual exchange of both their material and intellectual produce, the association of mankind may be promoted. Trade subserves this duty of international intercourse. It forms ties between lands and nations, and unites the different quarters of the world with each other. And when national jealousy and aversion are so enhanced that outbreaks of violence ensue, and the blessings of peace are annihilated in the horrors of war, it is the interests of trade which assert themselves by obstructing enmity, and exhorting to moderation and peace, and thus become the messengers of culture. There is something great and significant in the manner in which the thoughts of the great merchant will mentally balance and compare the conditions of nations, and unite the nearest with the most distant lands. And in proportion as we have learned to view commerce on this large scale, and to treat it accordingly, has it become itself great and morally important. Not only, moreover, has wholesale trade its honour and its intellectual satisfaction, but retail trade also has its moral value and importance. It is a service rendered to one's neighbour, and when rightly carried on promotes no less than the former a right moral feeling. When the fear of God, however, no longer exists,

rectitude will soon disappear, and where there is no trust in God the heart will ever oscillate between arrogance in prosperity and anxious despondency in adversity or distress. For, however well considered may be the plans of the long-sighted merchant, there is in all his calculations a something that is incalculable, and which ever directs the mind to Him who holds in His hands the fortunes of commercial houses as well as the fate of nations (5).

No branch of human activity has attained such importance in our days as *manufactures*. The factory is the symbol of the age, and steam the ruler of the day. This it is which so sharply distinguishes our times from those which precede them, this which gives its special form to the age. The Reformation era, and that immediately succeeding it, began to recognise the laws of nature; ours has enlisted the powers of nature in its service; and we cannot but say that in so doing it has made a great advance towards the object which God has set before man—to subdue the earth. Machinery is a triumph of mind over the blind powers of nature. It is not indeed without sacrifices that man fights for his victory. The captive powers of nature do him but unwilling service, and break their bonds when they can with destructive violence. Nevertheless, they are compelled to serve. Man has bound them to the triumphant chariot on which he rides over the whole earth to subdue it (6). This supremacy of the human mind has its temptations—especially the temptation to forget God, and to ascribe all progress to the intellect of man. If we

are unwilling to admit that the progress of the industrial arts in our day involves this danger, we have only to look around us to perceive and comprehend it. The temptation, however, lies not in the industrial arts, but in ourselves. The great minds of a former age, the discoverers of the great laws of nature, a Copernicus, a Kepler, a Newton, and others, gave God the glory and acknowledged Him in His works; and why should they who have learned to use the forces of nature find themselves less ready to rise in mind and heart to the First Cause of all force and of all their knowledge of it? We know, too, that there are very many pious Christian manufacturers, and I never hear that they are less esteemed in their calling or less successful in their undertakings because they are Christians.

There is, moreover, another aspect of their calling, which directs them to that supreme spiritual Power in whom is our last resource in all the dangers and difficulties of life—I mean *their relation to their workmen*.

In this relation entirely new conditions have supervened, involving new duties and new dangers, and these are the greater and the more momentous because this new order of things is still only in a state of development. The old forms of carrying on business are destroyed, and their restoration is out of the question, while safe and settled forms for the new conditions have not yet been attained. There is consequently and necessarily on all sides a feeling of uneasiness and insecurity, and none can tell what the future may bring forth. The conviction, however, is universal, that in this

question — the social question, as it is called — the decision of our future is involved.

Let us bring before us the existing state of things. A manufacturer employs a hundred, perhaps a thousand work-people, who are more or less dependent upon him and the state of his business, and therefore exposed to greater or less uncertainty with respect to their whole means of subsistence. We all feel that such uncertainty cannot exist without a dangerous reaction upon the moral quality of the life they lead. Near to this factory are others, each employing a like number of workmen. Thus is formed a numerous class, who, in opposition to the agricultural population, have no solid ground under their feet, and are uncertain of the morrow. The relation in which these workmen stand to their employers is, in the first place, not a personal one; they have not, like domestic servants, entered into the atmosphere of the family, and are not enclosed in that bond of piety which unites all the members of a household. They have only temporarily sold their skilled labour; in other respects they are free. Hence they apparently form a complete contrast to bondmen or slaves—and yet extremes meet. Aristotle defines a slave as an animated instrument. And what else are these workmen but animated tools with which so much work is done? As such they are necessary; but if they are nothing more, this is not in accordance with the personal character of man. And, free as they appear, who are more dependent on the will or the fortunes of an individual than they? If the manufacturer should choose, or be compelled, to close his

factory to-day, the work-people are dismissed to-morrow. They can look after other work, but if they find it, the same event may be repeated—and what if they cannot find it?

The moral remedy of the agriculturist is found in the circumstance that he is obliged to live for the future. What he does is done not merely for to-day or to-morrow, but with an eye to a more distant future. In autumn he has to care for summer, and in spring for autumn. This involves a salutary waiting to which he is constrained. The danger, on the other hand, of the working classes is the absence of this salutary constraint. No man can bear the absence of such constraint without detriment. The lack of this enforced waiting in external life results in want of moral firmness and restraint. If, then, a remedy is to be applied, and the dangers by which our future is threatened averted, waiting and restriction must be introduced into the external life of this class. I know well that natural inclination is opposed thereto; but we none of us naturally like what is salutary, and this very opposition is a proof of its necessity. Willingly to wait and to submit to restriction is a moral resolve. A certain amount of moral spirit must exist if evils are to be remedied; to consent to restriction is a moral remedy. We all need such external supports and remedies. None are strong enough to bear entire freedom, and to dispense with such remedies and helps.

The ties which restrict us are of many kinds. The best is home and home-life. Let us take care lest

this should be broken up and made impossible by female and juvenile labour, and lest we be defrauded of the leisure indispensable thereto by Sunday labour. This tie is fundamental. If this is absent all else is in vain. It is well when the consciousness of possessing something, be it ever so little, is combined with the feeling of domesticity. The efforts of certain noble-minded and intelligent manufacturers to assist their workmen in obtaining small possessions of land are worthy of all assistance. Besides, there are interruptions to earning by times of sickness or want of work. To provide beforehand, and to know oneself to be provided beforehand against such times, is not merely an ease to the mind, but is also for the present a waiting. It is the affair of manufacturers to direct their attention to organizing and assuring such care for the future, whether the provident fund is in their hands or in those of the workmen. But in this, as in all other respects, visitations will occur for which no human foresight or remedy will avail. If there were nothing beyond this earthly life and its resources, we might well abandon ourselves to despair, or to that kind of resignation which is of no moral worth. But we know that there are deeper resources than those which deal with outward circumstances, and consist in earthly means—resources which are developed in the heart of man and in his connection with a world beyond this. It is religion which opens up to us these sources. The labouring classes, like all other classes, can never properly fulfil their earthly duties without morality and religion. This was the

sentiment of Franklin, and is the advice of their best friends.

There are times when indefinite notions and misty expectations exercise upon certain generations or classes an almost intoxicating effect, difficult to account for on psychological grounds. We need only call to mind certain cases of an excitement, now scarcely comprehensible, of which the history of the French Revolution brings before us so many examples. They now appear to us like cases of intoxication, which are ever followed by terrible prostration. Deceptive hopes, arising from ill-reasoned out general ideas, so captivated the minds of men, that they imagined themselves to be in pursuit of a state of happiness, while really treading the path of destruction. The temper now prevailing in large circles of the working classes seems somewhat similar. A state of prosperity is being pursued by paths which lead over the ruins of the moral and religious foundations of both social and individual life. Preachers of certain indefinite ideas and deceptive hopes have obtained a power over the thoughts and feelings of these classes of society which threatens serious danger to the future of our nation, and is the more dangerous, inasmuch as the prophets of these new doctrines are surrounded by that atmosphere of enthusiasm and voluntary self-sacrifice which are wont to accompany the announcement of a new religious faith. And, in fact, their doctrine has, in their own eyes, the importance of religion—of an earthly, which they put in the place of the heavenly religion. With Christianity and the Church they have, for the most part,

broken, regarding these as the source of all evil, and believing that while heaven is preached to them they are being defrauded of earth. And yet can this earthly life dispense with religion? As the field needs the rain and sunshine from above, that the seed committed to the dark bosom of the earth may germinate and bear fruit, so does the human heart need the animating light and warmth of that heavenly sun, which in Christ Jesus rose upon this dark, cold world, that the good seed in the heart may be developed. What is the whole of this earthly life but a seed-time, to be followed by the harvest, which God has reserved to Himself? Unless I am deceived, the future depends upon our subduing the mistrust of the doctrines and preachers of Christianity, so widely and so firmly entertained among these classes, —a mistrust almost greater than that felt towards the possessors of capital, to whom they are so hostile. External remedies are inadequate. Much has been talked and written and read concerning this question, which has not been less, but perhaps more, discussed by Liberals than by Conservatives. But needful and salutary as external arrangements and enactments may be, its final decision lies not in the province of external measures, and, least of all, in the military power of the Government—for only avenging spirits rise from the blood of the vanquished—but in the realm of morals.

The relation between workman and employer is based, in the first place, upon the mere realization of the physical working powers of an individual. But this external

relation, which treats a man as an animated machine, and degrades him to a thing, must be raised to a moral relation by the bond of personal interest. When, indeed, gain and the enjoyment of his gain are the manufacturer's sole aim ; when he squanders in immoral luxury what has been obtained by the sweat of his workmen, and shows no personal interest in them and their life-battle, can it be wondered if envy and bitterness should poison the minds and tempers of the workmen, and they should lend an ear to the deceitful words of seducers or enthusiasts ? The selfish disposition of our men of property is, for the most part, the cause of the dangers which threaten us ; and if we condemn the greediness and irreligion of the working classes, we certainly ought not to keep silence concerning the sins so conspicuous on the other side. The first thing needful is, that the mere material and legal relation between employers and employed should be raised by personal interest to a moral one. In proportion, indeed, as industrial enterprises are transformed into the enterprises of companies, will this personal interest become more difficult, or even impossible. Hence it cannot be without anxiety that we contemplate this most recent form of our industrial relations ; nor can we cease all the more emphatically to insist upon this first prerequisite to a better state of affairs. When this personal interest exists, the next thing to be considered is, the manner in which it may find expression in external arrangements. But the first is, the personal interest itself ; for if once a mutual concern in each other's welfare is entertained, the way

will soon be found in which the respective material interests may be combined (7).

The world in which we live is a world of inequality. To institute equality here is impossible. If we take the utmost care for the education of the working classes—and it is right to do so—we shall still be unable to abolish the distinction between them and those more highly educated. Circumstances make this impossible. In one respect only is the lowest on an equality with the highest; he, too, is an immortal soul, and has the same lofty destiny. Of this consciousness, which we owe to Christianity, is begotten that sympathizing love in which alone is found the possibility of morally compensating for those differences in external life which are otherwise irremediable, and inducing that reconciliation to our earthly lot which is the foundation of a peaceable life. In the Christian spirit will be found the solution of the problems now presented by the labour question, and our ultimate resource against the dangers by which society is threatened when it renounces Christianity (8).

Upon the material are based those intellectual activities which we are accustomed to comprise when we speak of the educated class. Two nearly related but distinct provinces, the provinces of *art* and *science*, are occupied by this class. Both have their foundations in the nature of man. For the mind is impelled by a twofold instinct with respect to the world of being which surrounds it; to know this whole being, its nature and its laws, and thus inwardly to appropriate it in the idea which we mentally form of that which is external to

us, is one impulse of the mind ; and then to give to this mental image a visible and palpable form by such means of sensible representation as we are gifted with, is the other. In one mind the former, in another the latter preponderates ; one man is more gifted in knowing and perceiving ; another in forming and portraying ; one in science, another in art. The nation of the ancient world which surpassed all others in mental endowments, the Greeks, were addicted both to scientific investigation and to the cultivation of art. If our artists still resort to Grecian works of art for the proportions of beauty, the science of to-day is still based upon Aristotle, and the mind still loves to dwell in Plato's world of ideas. But highly as we may esteem the Greeks, and willingly as we may confess ourselves their pupils, they only who are wilfully blind to what is evident will deny that both science and art are indebted to Christianity for a progress of which the ancient world had no conception.

Science is older than Christianity, for its roots are found in the human mind itself. Man's mind is destined for knowledge, and science is well worthy the devotion of the life. But as our mind first finds its own truth in Christianity, so too does Christianity first raise science to higher truth. It is true that Christianity is religion and not science, yet it has opened a new and extensive world, and given a powerful impulse to the latter ; and the point to be aimed at is not the antagonism but the union of the two. When the apostle says that in Christ are hid all the treasures of knowledge (Col.

ii. 3), he means that when we find in Him our soul's salvation, an entirely new perception of the connection and course of the world at the same time dawns upon us. Not till we start from salvation in Christ do we learn truly to understand our own life, the destiny of man, and the ways of God in history. Even those who made the nearest approaches to truth, the disciples of Plato, are compared by Augustine to men wandering in a dark forest, and seeking the way out into the broad, sunny plain, but seeking it in vain. The Fathers of the Church were themselves too conversant with Hellenic learning not to admit that it was acquainted with certain isolated truths; but these truths were like the stars scattered over the heavens by night—the sun did not rise till Christ appeared; He is the Truth, and His teaching the true philosophy. What, in fact, is the knowledge of individual truths worth unless connected with the knowledge of the whole? This, however, is not possible until we know the answer to the highest and deepest questions of human life and of all existence. This answer is given by Christianity. For it teaches us to know God and the destiny of man, and the ultimate aim of history. A whole new world of ideas entered the human mind with Christianity—broad and lofty prospects, great and elevating views, comprehensive associations of ideas, affording infinitely copious matter for scientific thought and suggestion. And best of all, not merely for individuals, not merely for a select circle of the initiated. Ancient philosophy was never the affair of the people, it always kept at an aristocratic

distance from the multitude. Christianity is a popular matter, and has made the greatest ideas the common possession of all. Wherever it spreads, it evokes within its adherents an impulse to strive after higher knowledge, and a tendency towards the ideal. Hence, since its introduction, science has been cultivated to an all-embracing extent, and with an untiring perseverance, quite unknown to the ancient world (9).

And the connection between the two, between science and Christianity, is not merely a historical one; they are also referred the one to the other by an inward necessity. It is true that an individual may be a man of science, nay, a scientific magnate, without being a Christian. The fact is unquestionable. And yet, besides personal morality, there is such a thing as scientific morality. In Christian circles we sometimes find an anxious dread of the danger of knowledge; knowledge puffs up, it is said, and to love Christ is better than all knowledge. Certainly it is better, but it does not follow that knowledge is not good. It is more needful that I should be a good Christian, than that I should be able to make good shoes. But this, too, is needful for one who is a shoemaker, and his Christianity is to show itself in his earthly calling, and not to be an excuse for unskilfulness therein. And here, too, the case is similar. It is true that knowledge puffs up, that is, superficial knowledge, the appearance of knowledge, where its reality and solidity are wanting; while true knowledge and earnest genuine research make a man humble and modest. For the more we learn, the more we perceive

what we owe to others, and the more we know, the more we perceive how little we know. Real research, moreover, is impossible without self-denial, devotion, and a feeling for truth which will not be ashamed to confess its errors to itself and others. To investigate is a moral labour, and not a mere exercise of the mind. True science cannot be separated from morality, and true morality has always a religious root, even when this is unacknowledged. When we investigate, too, we owe our best discoveries to God; our best possessions are a gift from above. When Pythagoras had discovered his famous geometrical theorem concerning the squares of a right-angled triangle, he sacrificed a hecatomb to the gods. And Kepler concluded his famous work on the motion of the planets with hearty thanksgiving to the Almighty. The true disciples of science have ever been the pupils of that heavenly wisdom of which St. James says, that it is 'peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated, without partiality, and without hypocrisy.' And does not all knowledge when we go deeply into it lead us to God? What Bacon said of philosophy, that 'a little inclineth men's minds to atheism, but a depth in it brings them about to religion,' is true of knowledge in general. If we range through heaven and earth, the highest and ultimate object, the top-stone of the edifice of being, is God. True knowledge of God, however, is united with His revelation in Christ. Science requires Christianity, and Christianity requires science. For it is not a religion merely of rites and ceremonies, but of word; it is not a code of laws, but a proclamation of truths; not

merely a matter of frames and feelings, but a world of ideas and knowledge. Thus by its very nature it is referred to science. Scarcely had it made any way in the world than the germs of its scientific treatment were already generated. The history of the Christian Church is at the same time a history of theology, and our own Church especially has ever regarded the cultivation of theology as its vocation. Theology, however, is directed to the other sciences, to philology, history, and philosophy. For it is from these that it obtains the tools with which it works. Thus Christianity with its theological science on the one hand, and the secular sciences on the other, are directed to and in alliance with each other. Our universities, in which theology makes one in the series of faculties, exemplify this alliance, and in them we possess a pre-eminence over other nations of which we are justly proud. Its essential characteristic is the union of the different sciences. It would be disastrous both to theology and the other sciences if the bond which unites them were to be broken (10).

Still closer, it might almost be said, is the tie which unites *art* and Christianity. I speak of the fine arts, properly so called,—of architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and poetry, which make the earthly material, whether stone, colour, tone, or word, manifest the thoughts and feelings of the mind in forms of beauty, that by the external manifestation of harmony our minds may also be tuned to harmony, and our souls may, by the pleasure thus awakened, become susceptible of that language of mind incorporated in sensible beauty.

We call these the fine arts to distinguish them from those which are merely useful, and not to imply that they minister only to luxury. Artistic delineation is an intrinsic necessity to the mind. The intellectual involuntarily becomes incorporate. They who desire to remain without sensible representations in the higher provinces of life, in religion, for instance, misconceive the nature of man. We are not pure spirit, and our spirit itself seeks after that which is sensible. Art sets the stamp of beauty on the sensible. The beautiful, it may be said, is not necessary, it were better to direct attention to the useful; but we do not live upon the useful only, we live also on the beautiful. The very harmony of the universe, and of its several parts, which resounds in and affects our souls, conduces also to our mental nourishment. Every one is called upon to take an interest in art, if not in the way of production, at least in that of enjoyment (11).

But here, as everywhere, labour is the prerequisite of enjoyment. Art-work itself should not indeed be looked on in the light of labour—the breath of beauty must wipe off the dust of toil. It is the perfection of a work to give us the impression of being a matter of course—everything so exactly suitable that it seems to have been thrown off at one effort. But if we here see a triumph of mind over matter, the way to this triumph was a conflict with the resisting material element. And this laborious way must be trodden by the poet no less than by the sculptor and the painter. The enjoyment, too, of the lover of art is the result of labour—unless it

is a mere passing taste of emotions, which vanish as quickly as they come. We must learn to enjoy a work of art, we must learn to devote ourselves to the work before us, to immerse ourselves in it and thus inwardly to appropriate it. Premature attempts at criticism will never teach us to do this, for they only will attain to it who have sufficient self-control to preserve a mental tranquillity which will silence their own thoughts, and suffer the work of art to speak, and to touch their souls with that spirit of harmony which awakens within us the notion of an eternal harmony (12).

The origin of art is man's natural mental constitution, and its native home is religion. To this it at first devotes its services, until by degrees secular art is developed as well as religious art. It is a natural attraction which binds religion and art to each other. Every religion has an inward need externally to represent under a symbolical form those truths and notions which it proclaims, a form in which the mind finds that sensible manifestation which man's nature demands. For we are ourselves mind clothed in sense, and all our actions have in them a symbolic element. The dignity of religion requires that the sensible garment in which truth is clothed should exhibit the form of beauty. Religion has taken all the arts into her service, and it is in combination with her that they celebrate their highest triumph, and exercise their mightiest influence. When under the venerable roof of a cathedral, from whose towering columns sacred forms speak to us of the days that are past, and remind us of the cloud

of witnesses by whom we are surrounded, while the mellow light which streams through the richly-painted windows of the choir raises our souls above the troubles of the times, and bathes them as it were in the mysteries of heaven itself; when under such roofs the tones of the organ resound, and the holy words of Scripture or of sacred psalmody are borne to us upon the rolling waves of the music,—Bach's Passion music, perhaps,—and penetrate our souls with irresistible power, we should all declare such a result to be the highest that art could possibly produce or attain. For in such a combination of all its parts art celebrates its highest triumph.

It needs but a thought to convince us of the progress which Christianity has enabled art to achieve. Christianity has bestowed upon art a higher ideal. There is something incomparably beautiful about Grecian art, with its splendour and finish. But it is not the highest art. What it represents is the finite in its ideality. But Christianity has revealed the sphere of the infinite, and Christian art is the conception of that infinity which constitutes the mystery involved in the finite and its representation. The idea on which the former is based is: the finite is itself the manifestation and realization of the infinite. The idea which lies at the foundation of the latter is: the finite is but the transparent image of the infinite—all that is transitory is a parable (13). In the former also art does service to religion, but Christianity has invested it with a higher importance. The former were religions of external representation, of

ceremonies ; Christianity is the religion of the word. On this account, the arts they most esteemed were the plastic, by which the divine was directly represented ; now poetry, combined with music, occupies the first, and the plastic arts only the second place (14). In Christianity, pictorial or sculptured representations are language made visible, symbolized thought. In proportion as the word was cast into the background in the Church of Rome did a one-sided æsthetic interest become prominent in religious art. Hence Zwingli, for the sake of saving the word, rejected all plastic art ; Luther, however, assigned to the word the foremost position—it was to bear rule, while the arts were to be the servants of the gospel. He loved the arts, and specially delighted in music and song, which he diligently cultivated (15).

And what a world of great facts has the word proclaimed by Christianity opened up to art ! There are no subjects which, for nobleness, and at the same time general comprehensibility, can be even remotely compared with those offered to art by Christianity. Opinions may perhaps differ as to the propriety of so dramatically carrying out the most sacred of histories as is done in the Oberammergauer Passion-play, but every one, whatever may be his religious feeling on the matter, must confess that this is the drama of dramas ; that the great moral contrasts which stir the world could not come into more direct or more violent collision than they do as here visibly embodied before us ; that nothing could be conceived which would more powerfully possess, affect, and elevate the mind, than

the history here produced before us. Christianity has afforded to art the noblest matter she possesses (16).

But it is not merely by the external material it has afforded that Christianity has promoted art, it has also developed to a far greater extent than the religions of the ancient world the inner life of the soul, and has thus opened to art a world of feeling with which it was previously unacquainted. We stand astonished before the plastic representation of a Laocoon, in which human strength is vainly contending with the power of fate, and our minds are deeply moved by the fate of Niobe, and the incessant grief which turned her to stone; but how different, how infinitely deeper, are the feelings developed by the contemplation of a picture of the *Mater Dolorosa*, and her sorrow, over which is shed at the same time the gentle light of the Atonement! And what contrasts are combined in the image of the Crucified: triumphant majesty in lowliest humiliation! To have regarded a representation of a crucified man as the highest of artistic tasks, would have been an incomprehensible notion to ancient art. For that most sublime of all objects—majesty in humiliation—here manifested, was unknown to her. The ancient world knew the divine only as the majesty of power, not as the grace of condescension to the depths of human woe. Christianity not only disclosed a new world to art, but bestowed upon her a new soul (17).

But the vocation of art is not merely to be the handmaid of religion, it has, besides this, by reason of its independent origin in the natural mental constitution

of man, its independent office. As God adorns the dusky earth with the flowers of the field, so should the arts contribute, as Luther says, to adorn this sad life of ours. It is true, that as the flowers turn towards the sun which allured them into being, so do the arts love to turn their countenance towards the more genial sun of Christianity which has raised them to a more elevated condition. But even when they are not proclaiming the praises of the Redeemer, but confining themselves to the sphere of natural life, they are still bearing testimony to the Creator whose gift they are. The soil on which they flourish may indeed be polluted, but they are still gifts of God, and conferred upon us that we may enjoy them. Why should we not enjoy a rose even if it grew in a soil rank with weeds? What does it matter to us what sort of man Heine was, if only the pure atmosphere of poetry breathes from his compositions? Plants are, however, affected by the nature and odour of the soil they grow in, and the immorality of the artist can mar the noble gift which God has implanted in him. Art, abstractly considered, is not dependent upon the morality of the artist; and the spirit of art, the spirit of poetry, which chooses a man as its instrument, and speaks to us through him, is higher than the spirit of the artist, and often puts more into his work than he is himself aware of. Nevertheless the immorality of the man sets itself in opposition to the spirit of the art, whose servant he is. For all true art is moral; it comes from God, and it is the spirit of moral truth which clothes itself in the beautiful. Im-

moral art ceases to be true art, and the more pleasure it finds and excites in mere sensuousness, the more does it deny its proper origin. Hence he only will be a genuine artist who so purifies and tunes his own soul, that those tones, which come from the world of the ideal, and seek to remind us that there is a harmony of existence beyond the discords of this world, may reverberate from its strings (18).

Science and art are in themselves productions not of morality, but of the natural powers of the human mind. But only moral nobility can make a man a genuine disciple of science or art. The natural cannot find its truth without the moral. And the source of morality is religion.

To conclude: Religion and Christianity are not the origin of culture, whose roots, on the contrary, are to be found in the natural intellect of man. Religion, however, has ever been to culture that heavenly sun in whose warming and quickening rays it has flourished. Its future, too, depends upon its alliance with religion. It can assume a hostile position towards religion, but it then enters into alliance with the immoral powers, and becomes a potent means of corruption to the moral future of the human race. Only when it preserves its internal association with religion does it become a blessing. In this respect, as in others, we perceive that it is Christianity which raises natural life to its truth, by imparting to it a new and sanctifying spirit.

Our next and last lecture will be devoted to considering how human life finds its ultimate object, and the idea of humanity its realization, in Christianity.

LECTURE X.

HUMANITY AND CHRISTIANITY.



CULTURE and education are the ruling powers of the age. But the end towards which all their efforts tend is humanity, *i.e.* the perfection of human nature in its every aspect. Of this end, and its relations to Christianity, I now propose to speak to you.

Culture is the development and appropriation of external nature; education is the development and appropriation of our own human nature. By the former term we designate our task with respect to the world, by the latter our task with respect to ourselves (1).

Every man bears within him a wealth of natural endowments and susceptibilities. That which is within him needs, however, to be developed. Education is the development of what we bear within us. An uneducated may be as highly gifted as an educated man, but he does not know it, and has not made what he possesses his own. All as yet slumbers undeveloped within. The treasures latent within him must be brought forth and made his own by labour. Education is not scholarship. A man may be a scholar, and yet not, properly

speaking, educated. It is not the mass of information I may possess, but the development of my nature in its every aspect that constitutes education. My vocation may perhaps make various kinds of knowledge necessary. But this knowledge only becomes an element or means of education when it serves to develope and enrich my own nature. Learning and knowledge, when not required by my calling, may, if they do not subserve this end, be rather a hindrance than an assistance to education, for they then form a foreign element which is not in unison with myself, but, on the contrary, disturbs the harmony and peculiarity of my proper nature. This applies more particularly to the education of women, whose vocation does not, like that of men, require a mass of learned acquirements, but all whose knowledge should be an element of education, in other words, should subserve the purpose of developing their proper nature.

As culture developes the various forces of the natural world to give them into the possession of man, and make them his own, so is it the part of education to develope the various gifts and aspects of our nature, for the purpose of making them our own and placing them at our disposal. That which is in us by nature must become our conscious possession; we are to get ourselves into our own hands, and become our own masters. Wherever there is education, there is also self-control. Nations in a state of nature are under the ascendancy of their natural feelings and dispositions. Civilised nations have more dominion over the outward manifestations of their inner life. Education has been

divided into different stages, and a social, an intellectual, and a moral education spoken of. But in all its stages the form under which education manifests its presence is that of self-control. My social education consists in my not allowing my external behaviour, my gait and deportment, my tones and voice, my language and laughter, to take their own course, but having them in hand and ordering them according to the established form required by custom and regard for others. My intellectual education consists in my so having the capabilities of my mind and the material of my knowledge at my disposal, as to be able to use them as the exigencies of the moment or a regard for others may require. But the essence of man is his moral nature. Social and intellectual education are not worth much if the ornament of moral culture is absent. A true development of the moral worth of our nature will, however, only be attained when the feeling for the highest moral ideal, for moral beauty, is a lively one. And genuine self-control can only be said to exist where not merely outbursts of ill-feeling are repressed, but where the inward emotions are subject to the will of the moral agent. When there is no feeling for the moral ideal, and when it is thought sufficient to keep up an appearance of external propriety, education, in its proper sense, cannot be spoken of. However brilliant the talents, and however charming the demeanour, they do but conceal a really common mind. Religion is not, indeed, identical with education, but it is the prerequisite of true education. An irreligious

man will never be an educated one in the highest sense, while religion will shed an atmosphere of refinement even over the uneducated. Among peasants who are true Christians a tact of behaviour and a tenderness of feeling will often be found which might shame even the most highly educated.

Education is the development and appropriation of our own nature. Now our nature is the tie which unites us with the external universe,—it is the sounding-board in which all its various tones are echoed. Hence education is a universal receptiveness for the manifold wealth of that life of nature and of mind with which our souls are in contact. The indifferent and non-receptive we call uneducated. Of the educated we require an expanded feeling for all that is of importance to human life. But the more the feeling expands to an inward perception of the voices of nature around, the more sensible will it also be of the terrible discords which so harshly disturb the harmony of the world, and the more conscious will it be of the internal struggles and conflicts, of the yearning and hoping—in short, of the tragic nature of reality. For life is indeed a tragedy. The more profound the education, the more serious will it be. An atmosphere of melancholy broods over the highest degrees of education. The most cultivated people of the ancient world were the Greeks, and cheerful as is the picture of their life, all deep investigations have shown that a feature of profound melancholy is impressed upon this picture. Thus education directs us above and beyond this actual existence to that in which

the resolution of the discords of this world is to be found. Genuine education, far from opposing religion or making it superfluous, on the contrary demands it (2).

Education, then, is an expansion towards the wealth of life around us. But in nothing have men a greater interest than in man. The end of education is *humanity*. And the fairest manifestation of humanity is *universal love to man*.

The ruling principle of the ancient world was not the love of one's neighbour, but selfishness. As the different nations secluded themselves from each other, so that national boundaries became the boundaries of human interest and benevolence, except where hospitality between individuals might here and there break through such limits, so too were the lives of their members governed not by a spirit of mutual interest, but of selfish exclusiveness. The ideal set up by Aristotle in his description of the 'great-souled man' is that self-contained pride which makes its need of no one its ideal. And the maxim of the Stoic philosophers was neither to give nor retaliate, *i.e.* to maintain absolute indifference towards others. The characteristic of the ancient world was selfishness, both national and individual. Selfishness is, however, contrary to nature. The sympathy felt by man for his fellow is deeply implanted in the human breast, and here and there we see it bursting through the limits drawn round it by selfishness (3). It was never, however, recognised as the ruling law of life; for nothing was known of the love of God. Aristotle defines it as madness to talk

of love between God and man, because love can only exist between beings of a like kind (4). Where, however, nothing is known of the love of God, love to man lacks the deepest source of its vitality. The love of God and love to man stand or fall together. Christianity inculcated the latter because it revealed and proclaimed the former. 'We desire a republic of the whole human race,' says Tertullian. It was Christianity which first introduced an association of men which did away with the limits set by selfishness, and made the love of one's neighbour the law of life. It is true that the Stoic philosophy also inculcates the association of the whole human race, and that this is a frequently repeated saying in Cicero's treatise on duties. It is, however, a mere thought, without vitality and without real meaning. It was Christianity which first filled it with the new spirit of love, and thereby imparted to it a vital power. We are told, indeed, of certain Roman emperors, that they founded benevolent institutions. But the new spirit of Christianity was then already asserting itself, and so far as the Roman world remained closed towards Christianity, so far did it remain subject to the ancient law of selfishness. The attempts of Julian the Apostate, as he is called, in the fourth century, to transplant Christian benevolence into the soil of the heathen religion, were futile: it was an exotic which could not strike root in such a soil (5).

The history of the Christian Church is a *history of mercy* (6). The heathen beheld Christians not only united to each other by a bond of love, at which they could not

but marvel, but also exercising toward their non-Christian neighbours an active benevolence, which was something new and strange in the cold and selfish world. When, in the terrible pestilences with which Carthage and Alexandria were visited in the third and fourth centuries of the Christian era, the sick and dying were abandoned by their heathen relatives, it was by Christians that they were received and cared for. The poor had hitherto been objects of contempt, they now became objects of attention. The history of the Church is a history of charitable institutions. The feeling of charity may sometimes have erred ; its results may not always have answered the purpose they were designed to serve ; but even in its errors, Christian compassion is a witness to that new spirit which entered the world with Christianity. Great and powerful as may still be the sway of selfishness, it is at least rejected in principle, and love to one's neighbour acknowledged to be the supreme law of life. If the perfection and cultivation of humanity is designated as the highest object of the age, the exercise of universal philanthropy is regarded as the most essential feature of this humanity. But let us not forget that it was Christianity that first introduced this spirit of philanthropy into the world, and awoke it in the hearts of men. And if this love to man may be compared to a beneficent stream, adorning and fertilizing the cold and barren steppes of earthly life, this stream cannot, even at the present day, dispense with the source whence it arose. That source is the love of God announced to us by Christianity, the love which created

man in God's image, the love which redeemed him. When we see in another nothing more than mere present reality, when we stop at this our love soon grows cold. All experience shows us that our love can only continue ardent when we penetrate through the coverings with which the man's reality, his faults and unloveliness envelop him, to that hidden germ which God has implanted in every man, when we descry in every one, even the most degraded and abandoned, the image of God in which he was created, and that immortal soul which is, equally with our own, redeemed by Christ, and intended to bear His image. You see that it is Christianity which adorns humanity with its fairest crown,—the exercise of universal love to man.'

Within this wide circle of human fellowship are formed the narrower circles of closer intercourse. It is not merely the pursuit of a similar calling which brings men nearer together; there is also the inner relation of natural peculiarity and feeling, which draws individuals together within the closer bond of *friendship*.

Friendship played a great part in the ancient world, and was of great importance in both a political and scientific sense (7). Spartan legislation made the friendship of the man with the growing youth the foundation of political virtue; the man was to inspire the youth with the spirit of the political constitution. In battle friends stood by and protected each other, as Socrates and Alcibiades in the battle of Potidæa; the friends Epaminondas and Pelopidas were associated in the work

of aggrandizing their country; and the sacred band of Thebans was an association of friends. Art, moreover, whether plastic or poetic, delighted to do honour to the alliances of friends, from the friendships of Achilles and Patroclus, of Orestes and Pylades, down to that of the tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogiton. It was, too, with the purpose of being a thorough Greek that Alexander entered into the bonds of friendship with Hephæstion. If friendships were generally commenced upon the arena of the gymnasia, their importance extended not merely to personal and political life, but formed also the basis of scientific studies and schools of philosophy. It was a tie of friendship which united the Pythagoreans to each other, and attracted the disciples of Socrates to their beloved master. Hence it is no marvel, that not only poets and artists did honour to friendship, but that philosophers made it the subject of their investigations. Aristotle devotes to it no less than two of his ten books on Ethics; and he who is elsewhere so calm, cold, and sparse in words, rises almost to poetic flights and warmth of feeling when he speaks of friendship.

What, then, let us ask, was it that gave such importance to friendship in the ancient world? It was assuredly perceived that morality must be the basis even of political action. But what force was to impart strength to morality? Nothing for such a purpose was known but law. Even Aristotle knew no other means of moral education than the law of the State. But it is obvious that, while law can determine and regulate

the external conduct, it is powerless to impart the inward spirit of morality. The letter killeth ; the spirit alone giveth life. Antiquity had, however, no other and higher moral power. Its religion was a summary of external precepts, and knew nothing of personal self-surrender to God. To us the family is the sphere of the highest and dearest of human associations. In the ancient world marriage was too much regarded from the point of view furnished by the interest of the State ; and in Athens it was rather a sensuous than a moral fellowship. It did not then offer the personal satisfaction and moral elevation which we seek in it. Hence, friendship took the place of the wanting moral power. One friend was to be in the eyes of another the realization of the moral ideal, and to furnish him with that inward spiritual impulse which the law was powerless to produce.

This view of friendship, however, exacted more of it than it was able to afford. It was a pleasant delusion, indeed, but only a delusion.

Reproach has often been cast upon Christianity for lacking that high appreciation of friendship which pre-existed in the ancient world. With the revival of humanism at the time of Petrarch was revived also the eulogy of ancient friendship ; and during the decadence of Christianity in the last, and the subsequent romantic period in the present century, the worship of friendship was renewed. Christianity and Holy Scripture are, however, quite as well acquainted with friendship as the non-Christian world. The friendship of David and

Jonathan is equal in poetic tenderness and fervour to any mentioned among the ancients ; and what was it but a tie of friendship that subsisted between the earliest disciples of Christ ? It was by friends that the new epoch of the Christian era was introduced ; and the history of the Church presents us with many examples of friends, whose affection became a mutual incentive in the service of the Master to whom they had devoted their lives. It is, however, true that friendship does not occupy in the Christian the exclusive position it possessed in the ancient world. It is no longer all in all ; it is but one member in the organism of moral life—one ray of the moral sun. That sun itself, which rose with Christ, is Love—Christian love to the brethren, and general love to man, with its whole circle of Christian virtues. To this highest of all virtues, friendship is subordinate. But what it seems to lose in importance it gains in inward worth by the consecration it receives from the Christian spirit (8).

Friendship in the abstract is independent of Christianity ; for it is a relation natural to man. Internal affinity of natural qualities and feelings brings together the like-minded and like-disposed. It is at the time of life when the properties of heart and mind develope that we seek in another the supply of that which is lacking in ourselves by combining with kindred souls. Youth is the time for forming friendships. Later years, when peculiarities become settled and confirmed, make us more conscious of difference than of affinity in others. It is but rarely that the man

of mature age enjoys the happiness of obtaining a friend in the true sense of the word. The period of youthful development is the time for friendship. For even though in later life, not only their outward lot, but their inward opinions, whether political or religious, may more or less sever youthful friends, the ties of memory and of former connection will still remain, even between those now parted.

Friendship seeks in another merely himself. It is not the profit which may accrue to our own nature, to our mental development or wealth, which we must seek in friendship. Such a friendship, in which one man regards another merely as a means for the attainment of his own ends, be they ever so intellectual, is but selfishness. It is inward communion of heart that we seek, and this it is that friends cherish by that personal intercourse in which each devotes himself to the other, and finds mutual pleasure in the other's affection.

Friendship is based, indeed, upon natural properties, but it is itself a moral relation, and cannot therefore exist without exercising a moral agency. That is no true friendship which would not venture upon or endure moral exhortation and reproof. It is on this account that no friendship can be durable which does not rest upon an agreement of moral sentiments. The latter decades of the former, and the first decades of the present century, exhibit a series of friendships, especially in the various literary circles of the period, which were of a merely æsthetic nature.

The terms in which these friends speak of and to

each other are often of a very excessive kind; but a perusal of their respective correspondences forces upon us the conviction that there is a lack of heartfelt earnestness in this superabundant worship of friendship. And this is borne out by facts; for in many instances it has happened that these friends have become indifferent, or even hostile. Friendship is durable only when it is based upon common moral and religious sentiments. I cannot be the friend of him who rejects or despises my Lord and Saviour(9). Christianity does not, indeed, make friends, but it is the spiritual force which binds their inmost hearts together. And it is true of friendship, as of every other human relation, that it finds its highest truth in Christianity.

Friendship exists only between the few, but we have intercourse with the many; and even those who are far removed from ourselves in intellectual respects must not be objects of indifference. Man must show a kindly feeling to and find pleasure in his fellow man; for from all flows forth that varied wealth of human nature which God has displayed before us, that we should rejoice in and enjoy it. Thus are formed those various relations of a slighter kind which must be cherished. The form of this manifold and freer intercourse is *sociability*. This purely human relation of social intercourse extends beyond the limits of business, association, and friendship.

It is true that business and friendship will ever form the central points round which this wider circle of society will gather; for we must not seek acquaintances

arbitrarily, but take them as they arise from the manifold contact into which we come with our fellows. But what we seek in another with whom we enter into social relations is not the business associate nor the friend, but the man himself; for his fellow man is to be regarded with indifference by none, but to be to him an object of affection and delight. God has implanted certain natural gifts in every man, and these each must offer to and rejoice over in another. It is this unreserved and mutual interchange of giving and receiving that forms the charm of social intercourse. We do not frequent society to learn, or in some way to profit by it; we frequent it for its own sake. And it is just this that forms its value and importance. It brings men together, arouses their mutual interest and good-will, and obliges them to exercise that self-control which opposes their natural faults, and thus removes all that might interrupt or destroy social intercourse. By thus disposing every one to show his better side to others, it generates that healthy atmosphere of social life which reacts with salutary and moralizing effect upon each individual. It is this that imparts to society that refreshing influence which sheds itself over the dusty hours of labour, like the refreshing dew that falls upon the thirsty flowers (10).

Christianity, you will however say, has not much to do with such sociability; and it must be admitted that companionship is a human want even in a Christian. Not religious subjects and spiritual songs alone should constitute the matter of intercourse, even of Christians.

The abundant variety of natural life, and the sphere of intellectual interests, as well as the hidden depths of the soul, must furnish such matter. But for this very reason, social intercourse, like all else, is placed under moral law, and must receive therefrom its measure, and its precepts of modesty, truth, and love(11). Social intercourse is not work, but enjoyment; and enjoyment is recreation from work. It is this which must determine its measure, and that of the various pleasures and enjoyments that may be connected with it. These are all lawful, so far as they furnish the recreation needed by work, and thus subserve, instead of hinder, the business of our calling.

Every enjoyment has its sensuous side, and sensuousness of every kind has its dangers. You all know how great are these dangers, and how numerous are the offences of ordinary society; for there is a refined as well as a coarse sensuality, and the former is often more infectious than the latter.

In social intercourse each should show his best side to others. This involves the danger of untruthfulness. We try to appear better or more amiable than we really are. There are untruths of external appearance as well as of word. The temptation to untruthfulness dodges our every step in daily intercourse. I know well that there is in our language a multitude of expressions which are worth far less than they seem; it is a depreciated currency. We cannot dispense with these expressions of courtesy, if we mean to have any intercourse at all with others. We are obliged to speak

of esteem and devotion, when perhaps little or none exists. But there is a tacit understanding with respect to such phrases. Every one knows what they mean, and no one attributes to them a higher meaning, though even in such matters there is a certain moral tact, which will know how to preserve moderation and avoid extremes. Our words, however, become really untrue when we give others occasion to attribute more meaning to them than is really intended. Our social intercourse is full of courtesies and flatteries, which are purposely designed to be taken in a fuller sense than the heart of the speaker feels, and therefore to deceive those to whom they are addressed. This is contrary to the moral law of truth, and a Christian must not be misled into treading the path of such conventional falsehood (12).

Sociability is the expression of that general good-will which man should show to his fellow ; and grievously as others are sinned against by unloving words even in social intercourse, it still conduces, or at least should conduce, to arouse and cherish mutual interest and good-will. Such good-will, however, as is shown by sociability, is not worth much, unless it is more deeply rooted in that love which beholds in another not the natural amiability or interesting mental qualities he may possess, but an immortal soul created by God and redeemed by Christ. We soon feel the difference between a merely external and transitory interest, and that deeper heart-interest which desires our real good ; and we experience but too often how acquaintanceships

of many years' standing are exchanged for complete indifference, when they have no deeper foundation than merely sensible or intellectual enjoyment. Here, too, it is the religious and moral basis of the inner life which bestows its higher truth upon even this outmost circumference of natural life.

A life of action requires its pauses of *recreation*. Play of one kind or other is the most usual form of recreation, whether our minds find pleasant exercise in the various forms of playful conversation, in wit or humour, or we employ the intervals of labour in the many forms of gymnastic exercises; whether the young amuse themselves with the easy and harmonious movements of the body in the dance, or the old seek repose for their weary minds in easy and alluring games of chance (13). All this seems of a nature so indifferent, as to withdraw altogether from moral estimation. And yet it may be a widely different moral substance with which these varying forms are filled. I may betake myself to a certain recreation in a moral spirit, and seek therein invigoration for renewed exertion, or I may seek and find in it food for my immoral inclinations. In fact, nothing a man does is morally indifferent, but every act, down to the most seemingly indifferent, down to eating and drinking, and to the very fashion of our garments, has a moral importance and value bestowed upon it by the spirit and intention which we put into it. And not unfrequently will the practised eye detect the inward character manifested in these most external of matters.

The forms of life change, but amidst all their fluctuations *progress* is still being accomplished. In every sphere of action there is a struggle to attain to a mode of life more befitting the dignity of human nature. And who can deny that the diversity prevailing in their respective ways of living, between a rude and barbarous and a refined and civilised nation, besides being the result of a different degree of cultivation, is also of moral importance? The stage which we have reached is more conformable with the idea of human nature than that occupied by the inhabitants of Terra del Fuego, or the aborigines of New Holland, or even the Chinese. The history of nations marks not merely a progress of particular nations, but a progress of human nature. What we call universal history is in truth the history of man himself, whose God-created nature is ever struggling to attain its more adequate manifestation. The progress of the ages has been ever increasingly abolishing slavery and serfdom, raising the position of woman, subjecting the power of rulers to definite limits, making the authority of law universal, obtaining recognition for the rights of conscience, taking measures for the extension of education, seeking to alleviate the condition of the poor, and promoting all similar measures. And the thought which has furnished an impulse to these improvements and advances is that they are consistent with the dignity of man and required by his nature. It is the idea of humanity which takes effect in the course of history, and works even in the most isolated and exterior forms of life, that thus

the life of man may exhibit in its every aspect the beauty and nobility of his nature.

There is no thought which has for the last hundred years so ruled the age as this *idea of humanity*. The idea of pure humanity may be called the ultimate object of all recent movements. It is in the paths of culture and education that the attainment of this object is sought. The treasures of the world are continually accumulating, and man's dominion over the world extending, while his mental acquirements increase and his skill is enhanced. Thus are we struggling onwards towards the goal of perfection, which goal is beheld in the full and complete manifestation of human nature, the realization of the idea of humanity. Indeed, if we are to express the most recent notion of our age, we should say, that this realization of the idea of humanity is esteemed by it as the religion of the future.

Certainly no higher worldly task than that which is comprised in the tasks of culture and education can be set before man, no sublimer earthly idea than the idea of man and the perfect manifestation of human nature, and no fairer ideal than the ideal of humanity. The realization of this ideal would be peace on earth. But it must be a realization of *genuine* humanity.

For there is a difference between humanity and human. The full nature of man cannot be said to be grasped when he is viewed only in his relation to this world. Does he stand in no other relation? Is it only this world which is reflected in his mind? Do not the

tones of another world reverberate in his soul, and are not the profoundest depths of his being stirred thereby? Do we possess only the notion of transitoriness, and not also the notion of eternity? And do we not bear within us the consciousness of an immortal existence? Do we belong only to the world, and not also to God? Are we simply men of culture, and not also men of religion? It is right to strive for the realization of the idea of humanity. It is an object well worthy the toil of the noblest spirits. But human nature must not be maimed and stunted, but conceived in its whole full truth. Whether we interrogate history, or listen to the deeper utterances of our inmost soul, both testify that the religious propensity, the religious craving, is an element of man's nature. No age, no nation, which has dissolved the connection between religion and politics has fulfilled its mission. Those ages only have been great, and those nations alone have flourished, who have made religion the foundation of their entire life. A breach between politics and religion is a shattering of the moral foundations of all, even of national life. But when we speak of religion we mean Christianity, for every unprejudiced observer must admit that every other religion is eclipsed by this. And all candid investigation of history will teach us that this has been a blessing to nations and the fruitful source of their civilisation (14).

Harmony alone is peace. If we obliterate religion from the inner, if we remove it from the organism of the external life, we destroy the harmony of life, and

make discord the prevailing law of existence. Culture cannot take the place of religion, nor education make up for its absence. Happier—if in such a case we could use the word—may we call the people whose minds have not yet been aroused from their state of slumber, and among whom the questions and cravings which torture man until he accepts the answer and the satisfaction given to them by Heaven, have not yet been stirred. Not with impunity does man eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, unless that divine grace is at hand which heals not only the wounds and sorrows of life, but also the tortures of knowledge. Culture and knowledge without God are the Prometheus of Grecian fable (15). You are acquainted with this fable. Prometheus, in contemptuous defiance of the King of heaven, stole fire, the foundation of culture or civilisation, from heaven, for which he was chained to a rock, while a vulture, to his endless torture, devoured his constantly regrowing entrails, until a god—so runs the legend—at last delivered him. Schelling rightly says of this fable, ‘that it is one of those outward forms given to divine truths, not by the fancy of a single individual, but by the presentiments and perceptions of the spirit of human nature itself.’ What the legend intends to express by its figurative language is the fate of mankind. Its earthly progress, when obtained by a rejection of the Deity, tends not to happiness but to suffering. And the desires thus aroused prepare ever new torments. Not culture, but the help of Deity alone, can deliver man from such torment. It is the union of culture with religion which

constitutes the earthly happiness of individuals and nations. There are *two paths* in which the progress of the human race is accomplished. In the times of unconsciousness these two paths are still often inseparably blended. In proportion as the historical consciousness is developed, and men know what it is they desire, these two paths diverge. Not their union, but their separation, is the future of history ; and a separation of minds is already taking place before the eyes of all who choose to see. Culture, education, humanity,—we all desire these. But the question is : *with God or without Him?*

The one mode of thought and feeling confines itself exclusively to secular life, and seeks to make it complete in itself. Nothing extraneous is to intrude. The world is a harmony. There is nothing which did not originate therefrom. This is the thought of Pantheism. And the prevailing characteristic of the age is the translation of this thought into practice. Labour, research, activity are, it is true, going on on all sides. And just in proportion as life is, in a religious sense, impoverished, are efforts made to adorn and make it happy in a worldly one. This thought, however, accomplishes its inexorable results. Life is not being knit to heaven above ; its way leads downwards to the deep. Out of the deep arise those spirits which soon usurp authority. And the nobler-minded advocates of this notion of a merely secular culture will soon be dispossessed and supplanted by others, who understand that heaven on earth which all desire in their own coarser fashion. In speaking thus, and reminding you in these terms of

the acknowledged phenomena and dangers of the times, I am neither taking gloomy views nor using the language of calumny; I am but pointing to the consequence of the inexorable logic of the case. This is the sole end of the matter: a kingdom of this world is desired—a kingdom of this world only—this way terminates in the deep.

The other scales the height. The end for which it is striving is *the kingdom of God*. This is the sublimest thought of man, the supreme aim of all earthly effort. Of effort, I repeat it. For it is to be not merely the work and gift of God, but also the result of our choice and of our labour. God has called us all to be His fellow-labourers in this work. In the divine factory of history, man takes his place at the loom, and works at the garments of the future, at that new fashioning of all things for which we hope. Our task is not religion only, and the kingdom of God is not merely the Church. For we have been placed in this world, and have callings to fulfil in it. But religion is the soul of action, and the Church the helper of our earthly tasks. In inexhaustible fulness does God spread before us the gifts of creation, whether in external nature or in the human mind. This whole rich world is given to us to rejoice in and appropriate. We are destined to subdue and enjoy it by knowledge, and by that dominion over it which God has given us as our destination. But it is His grace which bestows upon us a good conscience in this matter, and it is religion which teaches us the supreme end of this destination.

To know the world as a prophet, to rule it as a king, such is man's earthly vocation, and there cannot be a prouder one. But what we know as prophets, and rule over as kings, we must, as priests, consecrate, together with our own selves, to God. This is man's highest dignity. To serve God means to be lord and master on earth. And to combine these—the lordship of the world and the service of God—is the fulfilment of our moral duty. *And this harmony of our earthly and our heavenly calling is the fundamental idea of Christian,* and the truth of all other morality.

This it is, my respected hearers, which I have desired to point out to you. I have come to the end of my task. We started from the nature of man, and saw how this finds its truth in its renovation by Christianity. We next accompanied him through the various spheres of earthly life, and saw that in all these it is the spirit of Christianity which leads the earthly life towards its destiny and perfection. You will have been convinced, I hope, that Christianity is not the denial of that natural life which God has created, but its genuine affirmation; not the curse, but the blessing and the healing of the world. Christianity is, in the first place, the message and the doctrine of the soul's salvation. But by gladdening us with the assurance of this divine salvation, it makes us inwardly free to enter into all that life offers us or requires of us; free and joyful in the world, because inwardly united to God. Thus we pursue our tasks in the world, and carry the kingdom of God into earthly life, rescuing for the future kingdom

of God all who will allow themselves to be rescued from the judgment with which all the ungodly will be visited. Such is the moral task of the Christian.

I have done. May my words have contributed to make you more fully acquainted with this duty of the Christian life, and to impress it more deeply on your hearts! May God so bless them that they may not be fruitless! May they remind us all that the best evidence of Christianity is the evidence of our lives and actions, the fulfilment of our duty in the world!

NOTES.

NOTES TO LECTURE I.

(1) 'The Apologetic Lectures on the Fundamental Truths of Christianity' were delivered at Leipsic in the beginning of 1864, and appeared in print during the spring of the same year. The seventh edition came out in 1870. Of the various translations I have seen—as yet seven in number—I have been especially pleased with that into Modern Greek by Dr. Myrianthus, teacher of theology at the theological school in Jerusalem, printed at the press of the Holy Sepulchre. The list of subscribers attached to it contains pretty nearly the whole hierarchy of the Greek Church. The second series of lectures on 'The Saving Truths of Christianity' was delivered in the beginning of 1867, and the third edition appeared in 1870. The present course is for the most part based upon the prelections on theological morality which I have been for a long series of years accustomed to deliver in the University of this place.

The intrinsic connection of divinity and morality is generally admitted in theology; while not a few theologians, as *e.g.* Schleiermacher, Nitzsch, Sartorius, Von Hofmann (of Erlangen), have required, and the three last named carried out their treatment as mutually dependent portions in the one system of Christian doctrine. Theology has during the few last decades taken a very lively interest in morals. Almost every year has witnessed the appearance of some new work upon the subject. Among the most recent may be specially mentioned

Martensen's *Christliche Ethik*,¹ a work adapted also for non-theologians. The interest taken in the subject is connected with the importance which practical, and especially social questions have, with respect both to our present and our future—an importance which makes it incumbent upon Christianity and its advocates to show how Christianity proves itself to be the final solution of all such questions. This perception has also been occasioned by the turn which ethical science is upon the point of taking. For while it has hitherto been chiefly confined to its individual and personal aspects, its social character is now more strongly insisted on, upon the ground of the connection in which the individual stands to society. In France, a mode of viewing this subject which chiefly keeps in view the social importance and office of religion, and consequently the influence of Christianity upon the state of society, has, in connection with the interest there felt in social problems, already been for a long time usual. This is made evident not only by the works of Franck, Edgar Quinet, and Benjamin Constant, mentioned by Naville in his admirable section on 'Society' in *Le Père Céleste*, to which may be added those of Villemain, Troplong, and others, but also by the tendency and matter of some of Guizot's writings. These views are also predominant in the sermons of the most celebrated preachers; and the French Academy has done us a service which we shall never forget, by offering in 1849 a prize for an essay upon the subject of 'The Influence of the New Spirit of Christian Love upon Civil Society in the Ancient World,' and thus calling forth the excellent works of C. Schmidt of Strasburg and Chastel of Ghent. Among ourselves, it was chiefly the cultivation of moral statistics which induced the notion of raising morality from an individual to a social position. This notion is chiefly advocated by D. Von Oettingen of Dorpat, in his

¹ A translation of this work into English is now published in Clark's Foreign Theological Library.

comprehensive work on Social Ethics, of which only the first part has as yet appeared (*Die Moralstatistik*, Erlangen 1868).

(2) Our Lord, in the Sermon on the Mount, already exhorts His followers to let their light so shine before men that they may see their good works, and glorify their Father which is in heaven (Matt. v. 16); and in His farewell discourse in St. John xiii. 35, declares love to be the token whereby His disciples are to be known; on which Bengel remarks: 'Gnorisma Christianorum amor.' In like manner do the apostles repeatedly add to their exhortations to a walk worthy the Christian name, the motive of the effect it is calculated to produce. The first Epistle of St. Peter, in particular, pursues this train of thought. The adversaries of Christian truth and of the Christian Church are to be put to shame by the holy walk of Christians (ii. 12, 15, iii. 16), and unbelieving husbands to be won over without the word to the Christian cause by the meek and quiet spirit of their Christian wives (iii. 1). In an exactly similar spirit does Origen († 254), in his work against Celsus, thus appeal to the silence of Christ before Pilate's tribunal as being both then and always the best answer to false-witness: 'But the irreproachable and holy walk of His true disciples speaks in His stead. This is more eloquent and emphatic than aught else, and casts down all blasphemies and slanders' (comp. Stirn, *Apologie des Christenthums*, 2d edit. 1856, p. 13). To this evidence of the life do the early Christian apologists repeatedly appeal; I adduce but one passage from the beautiful early Christian Epistle to Diognetus, on which the well-known hymn, 'Es glänzet des Christen inwendiges Leben' (The inner life of the Christian shines resplendently), is founded. They are in the flesh, but they do not live after the flesh. They tarry on earth, but they walk in heaven. They obey appointed laws, but by their own conduct they triumph over all law.

They love all men, and are persecuted by all. They do good, and are punished as evil-doers. To speak briefly: what the soul is to the body, Christians are to the world, etc. (chaps. v. and vi.). And a like tone runs through the writings of Justin and other apologists.

(3) On the power of moral renovation possessed by Christianity, comp. *Lectures on Fundamental Truths*, lect. ix. pp. 275-278, and notes 18-22; Stirn, *Apologie*, 2d edit. letter 8. Goethe (*Westöst. Divan*) says: 'The greatest praise is due to the Christian religion, which has at all times proved the purity of its origin, inasmuch as it has ever re-emerged in its pristine and admirable peculiarity as a mission, a brotherhood, a family friend for the supply of man's wants, from those great errors in which man had in his blindness involved it unawares.' On the influence of the gospel upon the history and intellectual life of the German nation, comp. Gustav Baur's lecture, *The German Nation and the Gospel* (Leips. 1871), and *Lectures on Fundamental Truths*, lect. vi. p. 169, etc. On the need of a renovation of our national life by the spirit of religion, comp. Constantin Franz (*Die Wiederherstellung Deutschlands*, 1865, p. 443): a religious renovation is 'unquestionably the most pressing need of all nations at the present day. *This is as certain as it is that the deepest reasons of all political and social questions refer to religion.* What association, in fact, could be more important and more fruitful in results to all men, than one whose bond is faith and the worship of God? What tie is there which could so closely bind together nations, and in nations ranks and individuals, as religion, i.e. the alliance of the human soul with God. Herein have all human compacts received their final consecration, and sought their final confirmation, and will do so as long as the world endures. Hence no unprejudiced observer can doubt that religion is the best source of all human development.'

(4) Aristotle already regarded conscience as that characteristic of man by which he is distinguished from the brutes. 'For that which specially distinguishes man from the other animals is that he alone has within him a feeling of good and evil, of right and wrong, and the like (*Polit.* i. 1, 11; Lotze, *Microkosmos*, ii. 240). 'The self-condemning power of conscience has even here separated the human being, as a member of a spiritual world, from that dominion of the natural passions which prevails in the animal world.' 'The capacity of becoming conscious of the Infinite is the distinctive gift of the human mind.' 'In conscience, the specially spiritual world of moral truths and facts, as distinct not only from the world of scientific facts, but from that of logical truths, is implied and certain. Hence conscience is not an element in the logical progress of the mind, to be solved in the way of the dialectic process, as the Hegelian philosophy supposes. For no dialectics can get over an evil conscience. No arguing delivered Macbeth and his wife from an evil conscience, or lightened the heart of a Richard III.' On the ethical spirit of the Shakespearean drama, comp. e.g. Phil. Fischer, *Grundzüge des Systems der spek. Ethik*, Erlangen 1851, p. 366, where he points out that Shakespeare's poetry 'brings before us the union of freedom and necessity and *God's moral government of the world*, with such reality and truth, as to justify the great maxim that "the world's history is the world's judgment;"' or p. 368, where he says: 'The retribution of moral good or evil by their external consequences is presided over by divine justice, as the characters of Shakespeare's tragedies learn either through the inward purification or the moral determination of their nature and life, or from the judgment of their conscience,' etc. 'The world's centre of gravity is transferred to man, to his heart and conscience, and his lot is but the result of character' (Broekhaus' *die Convers.-Lex.* 11th edit. 15,629; compare also Ulrici, *Shakespeare's Dramat. Kunst.* 3d edit. pt. i. 1868,

p. 410, etc. We may also refer to the words he himself puts into the mouth of Hamlet: 'The end of playing, both at the first and now, was and is, to hold as it were the mirror up to nature, to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image,' etc.

(5) Compare the kindred notion carried out by Grau in his *Lecture on Faith as the Highest Reason*, 1865, p. 4: 'Things of a lower are more easily understood than things of a higher nature, and it is easier to avoid mistakes in the former than in the latter.' We need only think of the science of mathematics. This science ranks so high only because its results and propositions are so certain, and not because its subjects are elevated or its propositions make deep disclosures concerning the nature of things. Hence I consider Schopenhauer in the right when he says: 'You never cease to boast of the reliability and certainty of mathematics. But of what use is it to me to have this very certain and reliable knowledge of that about which I care nothing?' and, 'In mathematics the mind is contending with its own forms of knowledge, time and space, and is thus like a cat playing with its own tail.'

(6) The opinions here referred to are those of so-called *Positivism*, as advocated especially by Auguste Comte, who has found numerous disciples in France and England, and has not lacked followers in Germany, especially in those circles in which natural science is looked to to account for everything. Guizot, in his *Méditations sur la religion chrétienne*, vol. ii., 'Medit. sur l'état actuel de la rel. chrét.,' Paris 1866, p. 249, etc., gives interesting information concerning Comte, the founder of this school, and his system as laid down by himself in his *Cours de philosophie positive* (vol. vi. 1830-42), and further developed by his disciple Littré in his biography of Comte, 1864. Comte's fundamental thought—according to the passages cited by Guizot from the

above-mentioned works—is the subjection of all fates and facts to unalterable laws of nature, in conscious opposition to every religious or metaphysical tendency, and their corresponding political systems. ‘Le caractère fondamental de la philosophie positive est de regarder tous les phénomènes comme assujettis à des lois naturelles invariables, en considérant comme absolument inaccessible et vide de sens pour nous la recherche de ce qu’on appelle les causes soit premières soit finales. Les travaux que je poursuis obstinément pour élever les théories sociales au rang des sciences physiques, sont évidemment en opposition radicale et absolue avec toute espèce de tendance religieuse ou metaphysique, et par suite avec les systèmes politiques correspondants.’ ‘La religiosité,’ says Littré in his biography of Comte, ‘lui paraît une faiblesse et un aven d’impuissance.’ Absolutely, however, as he rejected theology, he still treated it with more respect than metaphysics. Guizot reduces these opinions to the fundamental law, that matter, with its laws and forces, is the sole subject of human knowledge, the sole province of the human mind. This view, opposed as it is to all metaphysics, has nevertheless a metaphysical foundation, viz. the sensualism of Locke and others, that man’s whole knowledge is produced by the outward impressions of the senses. Comte then presses his mode of regarding history into the service of his views, and seeks to make it a proof of the truth of his doctrine, which in reality does nothing less than make man the highest of beings, and put him in the place of God, while he is himself the priest of this God. This is that purely natural religion which must, in his opinion, supersede the supernatural, the Christian religion. ‘At any other period,’ says Guizot, in concluding his remarks, which we have followed in the above, ‘his doctrine would have been regarded as folly, but having been born in our times, he has been more fortunate; his fundamental principle, and the coincidence of his first ideas with the method and

tendency of the physical sciences, which are the favourite pursuit of the age, have given him more weight and influence than he actually deserved.'

The consequences of these opinions, as asserted by Taine, are opposed with righteous indignation by Naville in his *Le Père Céleste*. Speaking of Macaulay, he says: 'The noble Englishman presumes to judge and condemn the men who make so pernicious a use of their talents.' Now this appeal to conscience is a Gothic prejudice in the eyes of the French author (Taine), who thus expresses himself on the matter: 'In France, criticism assumes a freer deportment. When we attempt to relate the life of an individual, or to give a sketch of his peculiar character, we like to regard him simply as an object of artistic or scientific study. We do not judge him, we want only to represent him graphically and intelligibly. Whether this man or that was a rogue does not trouble us. We leave all such care to his contemporaries who had to suffer from his crimes. To-day we are beyond his reach, and hatred vanishes with danger. . . . I experience neither dislike nor disgust. I leave these feelings behind me at the gates of History, and I then enjoy the very deep and pure pleasure of seeing the soul treated according to definite laws' (*Essais de critique et d'histoire*, 9). 'You understand, gentlemen,' continues Naville, 'the distinction between right and wrong, between error and truth, is like a pair of old and heavy shoes, which must be put off before the sanctuary of History is entered. Holy sympathy with magnanimous deeds, and righteous indignation at the sight of meanness or cruelty, are childish emotions, which must disappear to allow us to contemplate vice and virtue with a like very deep and very pure pleasure.' This teaching is not the aberration of a young and still unbalanced mind, it is that of an entire school. I open again the *Revue des deux Mondes*, and meet with the theory which Taine has brought into vogue. It is here said: 'We are now acquainted not with morality, but

only with moral conditions, not with principles, but only with facts. We explain, however, and as has been already said, the mind at last accustoms itself to tolerate everything which it can explain. Modern virtue consists entirely in toleration. Enormous innovation! whatever is, has, as far as we are concerned, a right to be!' It is easy to see how akin such opinions are to the Hegelian maxim of the reasonableness of all that is actual. Naville continues his criticism of 'these monstrosities' by saying, 'All principle vanishes, all morality is overthrown. There is no longer any difference between might and right, between what is and what ought to be. Upon what, then, is all this founded? Ultimately upon the following proposition: Mankind is the summit of the universe; there is nothing higher. Mankind is God, if we allow that this sacred name may be used in a new sense. How then can mankind be judged? In virtue of what law, when there is no law? In the name of what right, when there is none? Condemnation is but personal prejudice, the view of a narrow mind. God is not to be judged, He is to be described; His acts are to be recognised, they are all to be equally honoured. . . . The deification of the human race is the justification of all its acts, and involves as its direct result the annihilation of all morality.' Naville is perfectly right when he continues: 'The glorification of success is the first and most certain consequence of moral indifferentism, and if we will let ourselves be fashioned by the world, instead of bringing the world up to our own standard, the first thing needful is to do homage to victory. . . . It was necessary that Louis XVI. should be beheaded, and the guillotine be in action for years, to bring to light the transgressions of Louis XIV., the infamy of Louis XV., and the moral dissolution of French society. It was necessary that Louis XIV. should be an adulterer, and Louis XV. a debauchee, the clergy corrupt, and the nobility degraded, to bring about the earthquake of the

Revolution. Events are linked together; I explain them and acquiesce in them. In the eyes of the modern philosopher everything is right.'

We have purposely lingered, and given such copious particulars concerning this tendency, because it is in this final abolition of the moral view of things, and of all morality, that we behold the results of that Pantheism by which modern opinion is far more governed than it knows or thinks. The notions of philosophy gradually descend from the heights of pure conception, and take that shape and body in the denser atmosphere of actual life in which they are comprehensible even to the ordinary understanding. The fathers would neither recognise nor acknowledge the children which are yet their true offspring. The end to which this road leads is the dominion of brutal fact; for, says Pascal, there is nothing more brutal than fact. Comp. also *Lectures on Saving Truths*, lect. ii. pp. 73, 349.

(7) Spinoza, *Ethik*, iv. 53: 'Dejection is no virtue; in other words, it does not arise from reason.' 54: 'Repentance is no virtue; in other words, it does not arise from reason; on the contrary, he who repents of an action is either miserable or impotent.'

(8) On the question of moral statistics, comp. *Lectures on Saving Truths* (3d ed.), lect. ii. pp. 71, 345. To the literature there adduced may be added the interesting lecture of G. F. Knapp, *The Recent Views of Moral Statistics*, 1871. On the whole, the opposition to the confirmation of Determinism, *i.e.* the denial of moral freedom, seems to increase in the recent literature on this subject.

(9) It is among the services rendered by Von Oettingen's above-cited work to have emphatically pointed to this fact, and thus to have directed attention to the agreement between the facts of statistics and the announcements of Holy Scripture. Comp. p. 973, etc. On the next

question, the relation between freedom and necessity, comp. my *Lehre vom freien Willen*, 1863, p. 5, etc.; Martensen, *die christliche Ethik*, i. p. 153, etc.; Rückert:

‘Grundlage hat gelegt Nothwendigkeit, Natur,
Baumeisterin des Baus ist deine Freiheit nur.’¹

(10) It is a fundamental thought of Wolfg. Menzel’s *Kritik des modernen Zeitbewusstseins*, 1869—a work of some exaggeration, but full of serious truths—that the Renaissance or Humanism marks the commencement of the heathen opinions and feelings of modern times. Comp. p. 160, etc. On the heathen character of Italian Humanism, comp. *Lectures on Fundamental Truths*, lect. i. p. 11, note 6. With respect to the independence of religion claimed for morality, I have discussed this question in ‘Die religionslose Moral,’ an article in the *Allg. ev.-luth. Kirchenzeitung*, 1869, No. 27, and have there directed attention to the interesting discussions of this question at the Bern Congress of 1865. The judgment of enlightened moral philosophy on this question is shown, *e.g.*, in the well-known work of Martensen, *Grundriss des Systems der Moralphilosophie*; comp. preface, p. 12: ‘A moral philosophy which ignores Christianity, ignores also actual morality, and thus renders itself unpractical. If ethical science is, on the contrary, pervaded by the principle Christianity, it cannot forbear entering into the religious element of morality.’ Religion shows how the great moral contrast of the world is reconciled by God, and morality shows how man is to reconcile it in his life in the world. But this can be done only on the ground of the fact thus pointed out. For only the certainty that reconciliation already exists on the part of God can impart a cheerful willingness in labouring at the moral work of reconciliation; while it, at the same time, involves a demand that this principle

¹ Nature has laid the foundation of necessity. Thy freedom is alone the architect of the building.

of religion should be carried out in the world of reality (comp. Martensen, *Grundriss*, p. 3).

(11) Compare my University programme on the Ethics of Aristotle as distinguished from the Morality of Christianity (on the festival of the Reformation, 1869), where this fact is proved from history in a more circumstantial manner.

(12) On the Stoa, comp. the same, p. 23. Zeller also recognises the religious character of the later Stoic morality in his *History of Greek Philosophy*, iii. 1. 1, pp. 618, etc., 647 sq., and 672.

(13) The passage is from Naville's *Le Père Céleste*, 1865, p. 51. Comp. Martensen, *die christl. Ethik*, i. p. 25: 'History at all times confirms the fact, that an abstract antinomian morality can only prevail in times when a decay of religion has begun. It was when the religions of Greece and Rome had fallen that the moral philosophers appeared and promulgated their new doctrines on the ruins, so to speak, of the ancient temples and altars. And whenever the Church and Christianity have appeared to be, to a certain extent, approaching their dissolution, that well-known cry has been heard again: it is to morality that we must now look, and the days of genuine, unselfish virtue and true freedom have now dawned,' etc. etc.

It will surely be admitted, that in appealing to the testimony of Jäger the Darwinian, with respect to the connection of morality with religion, we are citing an unprejudiced witness. In quoting from his work, *Die darwinistische Theorie und ihre Stellung zur Moral und Religion*, 1869, we are not concerned with his attempts to show the accordance of Darwinism with morality and religion—attempts which cannot but fail, as proving that both are endangered, because their special ethical character is compromised, by the Darwinian theory—

but with the testimony, entirely independent of these attempts, which he furnishes to the intrinsic connection of the two: 'A morality without religion may look very well as a paradox, but when a weapon is needed, and you should draw the sword, you will unsheath but a peacock's feather, a thing that can neither cut nor thrust. Just try it if you have children. Tell them how good and virtuous they ought to be, and you will soon see that this will do no good. But talk to them of their Father in heaven who seeth in secret, of their Saviour who gives them all things, of the holy angels who guard them, and you will see in their beaming eyes that this touches their hearts, and that religion is the only means of educating a man to be a man indeed.' And in answer to the ironical reply of opponents: Then religion is a good thing for women and children! he replies: 'And is not this alone sufficient to rescue religion from all opposition? If you allow that women and children need it, you cannot but make use of it yourselves as long as you are children, and when you have wives and children. In this case none can do without it who do not condemn themselves to be dried up branches on the thriving tree of human nature.' In another passage of the same work he continues—and we cannot here refrain from citing the passage, although it is but slightly connected with the train of thought at present engaging us: 'It is objected that religion is an invention. Well, language too is an invention, and inventions are made that they may be used. Just as I would say to you: Teach your children to speak, that when it is time to do so they may be able to utter words; so would I exhort you: Teach your children to pray, that when they want to do so they may be able. That there are people who talk when they ought to act, and pray when they ought to work, is sad enough; but this does not prove that speech or that prayer is worthless, but only that the education given has been a mistaken one. Let us learn in our youth

to do both, and let us be careful not to unlearn either, for none can tell whether he may not find himself in such a condition as to make prayer as necessary as speech.' He thinks that 'Darwinians especially ought to keep some terms at the university to study theology,' that they may be able to deliver an opinion on religious matters.

To place a politician in juxtaposition with the Darwinian investigator of nature, I refer to the expressions of Constantin Franz, in his work, *Die Wiederherstellung Deutschlands*, 1865, p. 445. Opposing the theory of Liberalism, which proclaims the separation of Church from State, and of law and morality from religion, and regards the latter as merely an individual concern, with which politics have nothing to do, Franz writes: 'As if the religious man and the political man were two different beings. If, however, it is one and the same man who acts in the atmosphere of religion and in the atmosphere of politics, how can religion be prevented from exercising a very extensive influence upon politics? This theory, then, demands the impossible. It is also an error to regard justice and morality as absolutely independent; for the relation of man to man depends on the relation of man to God, and justice and morality cannot even be conceived of, much less carried into practice, without the consciousness of God.' The same writer, in his *Vorschule zur Physiologie der Staaten*, Berlin 1857, p. 161, says: 'However philosophers may deceive themselves on the subject, it will not escape the unprejudiced observer, that the moral consciousness of nations is indeed and in truth everywhere rooted in religion. Even history itself confirms the fact that all moral ideas originally entered the world by means of religion, and never by means of speculation, which, under the most favourable circumstances, has only elaborated, but has never independently produced such ideas. Never yet has there been a philosophical book of equal influence even with the Koran, not to mention the Bible.'

(14) 'I do not know,' writes Rousseau in the *Troisième Lettre de la Montagne*, pp. 85-88, 'why men will insist on ascribing the excellent morality of our books to the progress of philosophy. This morality, which is derived from the gospel, was Christian before it was philosophical.' Kant acknowledges the excellence of Christian morality in his *Kritik der prakt. Vernunft*. Schopenhauer, moreover, who is a decided opponent of Christianity, esteems 'the purely ethical portion thereof as unassailable.' On the progress for which the moral consciousness is indebted to Christianity, comp. Lotze, *Mikrokosmos*, 2d ed. ii. 338: 'It may be that there is in the conscience an ineradicable germ of good—and undoubtedly we shall persevere in this belief—inherent in the human mind. It may be also that the natural goodness of man's nature may take care that this general formal feeling of justice shall not always and absolutely sanction relations contrary to the true duty of mankind; but even then we cannot but persist in the conviction, that the natural heart of man by no means produces that clear understanding of all moral precepts which seems so natural to us, because education is the source whence they flow to us so easily.' On the other hand, Dr. Abraham Geiger, formerly of Frankfort, but now of Berlin, a leader of the Jewish reform party, dares to write in the *Jüdische Zeitschrift*, 1869, No. 3, p. 287: 'Christianity has exercised a deep-reaching influence, but has conduced not to the progressive development but to the torpidity of human nature; not to the recognition of the human, but to its disfigurement; not to freedom, but to the suppression of all that could not be restrained within its narrow circle of ideas.' Christianity is a frustrated revival of Judaism and Hellenism, which is just kept on its legs by the power of habit! More arrogant insults could not be hurled at Christians on the part of Jews.

(15) Compare E. Schmidt's *Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft*

in der altröm. Welt und ihre Umgestaltung durch das Christenthum, translated by Richter, 1857, p. 288, etc., for historical confirmation of and testimony to that new spirit of love which came into the world with Christianity, and which constrained even the heathen to perceive and acknowledge it. The expression, 'Enthusiasm of love for man,' is taken from the interesting English work *Ecce Homo*, of which a German translation appeared at Erlangen, 1867, under the title, *Darstellung von Jesu Christi Leben und Wirken*.

(16) I have discussed the difference between Christian and ancient morals in the above-named Programme on the Ethics of Aristotle. *Ecce Homo*, pp. 160-187, also contains an able discussion of this subject. The question has been treated from the Romish standpoint in Leitmeier's *Apologie der christl. Darstellung des Verhältnisses der heidn. und christl. Ethik, zunächst nach einer Vergleichung des Ciceronianischen Buches de Officiis und dem gleichnamigen des heil. Ambrosius*, Munich, 1866.

NOTES TO LECTURE II.

(1) On these two aspects of nature and personality in man, and the necessity and freedom respectively connected with them, compare my *Lehre der freien Willen*, p. 4, etc.

(2) This it is which distinguishes the opposite views of Determinism and Indeterminism. The former has exclusive regard to the whole, of which individuals are but members; the latter to individuals, the aggregation of whom compose the whole. Hence the former view leads to a denial of all creature liberty, the individual being absolutely determined by, and dependent on, that whole of which he is a member, and therefore subject

to the law of the necessity of universal connection. It is the consequence of Pantheism, which ever dwells on the categories of the whole and its parts or manifestations. The latter view teaches the absolute freedom of creature will, as if this were not determined by the manifold natural and historical connections in which it is placed. It is the consequence of Deism, which, being unacquainted with a living and active God, refers the individual to himself, and thus really puts him in the place of God. In the former sense it was that Augustine regarded mankind as a *massa (perditionis)*, in the latter that Pelagius regarded each individual as a sheet of white paper, which was first to fill itself with writing. Luther and Melancthon at first taught Determinism until they perceived its objectionable consequences, and altered their former course; while Zwingle and Calvin persevered in the path they had adopted. Rationalism following, Pelagius embraced the perverted doctrine of liberty. On the earlier doctrine of the Reformers, compare my *Lehre vom freien Willen*, pp. 87 sq., 149 sq. On these opposite views in general, compare the discussions in A. von Oettingen's *Moralstatistik*, p. 943 sq.

(3) In the 'Sturm und Drang' period, and also in the circle of the romantic authors, freedom from the ordinary morality of the 'Philistines' was demanded for genius. We need only call to mind Fried. v. Schlegel and kindred spirits, or Schelling's wife Caroline, as we know her through her correspondence, and the whole of the Jena era of genius, and the characteristic literary memorial of this opinion in Schlegel's *Lucinde*, to the defence of which even Schleiermacher devoted himself.

(4) Compare my treatise on the Ethics of Aristotle, etc. ii. *die Tugendlehre (Univers-Programm, 1870)*. The defect of ancient morality did not lie in the fact that it erroneously identified the spiritual with the natural, as Zeller shows in his *Gesch. der griechischen Philosophie*,

vol. i. p. 93 sq. 'The distinctive character of the Greek nature lies in that unbroken union of the spiritual and the natural, which constitutes both the excellence and the narrowness of this classical nation' (p. 96). Christianity is said to oppose spirit to nature in a one-sided manner, and modern Humanism to reconcile them. But it is not the relation of the spiritual but of the moral which is here in question. Ancient ethical science naturalized morality, and this was its fundamental error. Christian ethics comprehend the independence of morality, in which independence, moreover, it is to be the animating soul of the natural.

(5) Plato, *Sympos.* 14 : 'The shape of each human being was round as a ball, his back and sides forming a circle ; he had four hands, and as many legs as hands, and two faces, exactly like one another, upon his circular neck, but there was only one head over these two faces, which were placed opposite each other ; there were four ears, etc. He went both upright as he does now, and also with a swift, circular motion upon his eight limbs, lifting them up outstretched around, like the spokes of a wheel. . . . Men were then of great strength ; they possessed elevated minds, and made themselves gods. . . . Now Zeus and the rest of the gods were perplexed, and took counsel what they should do. . . . Zeus having with some difficulty devised an expedient, said : I think I have found out a contrivance by which, on the one hand, men may continue to exist, and on the other, their insubordination may be restrained by their becoming weaker. I propose now to halve them. . . . If, however, they still continue too presumptuous, and give us no peace, I will halve them again, so that they may go on one leg only. . . . The nature of man having been thus divided into two, each half feels a longing for its corresponding half. Hence mutual love, which brings the original nature together again, has so long been innate in mankind, and tries to heal human nature

by making its two parts one.' Extravagant and fanciful as this speech of Aristophanes may be, the harmony of the truth upon which it is based with Scripture is obvious. Comp. also Fichte, *System der Sittenlehre*, p. 332: 'The unmarried person is only half a human being.'

(6) On the difference between man and woman, J. P. Lange, among others, has made some interesting remarks in Gelzer's *Monatblätter*, 1858, 8: 'The life of the woman is pre-eminently an individual and personal one; and hence individual separate and personal cares are committed to her ministering and ruling love. The man is pre-eminently an intellectual one; hence he applies himself to the general ordering and regulation of life. As the female nature is on the one hand inclined to a constant, an almost vegetative continuance within accustomed and traditional spheres of action, so, on the other hand, does its power of presentiment anticipate its appointed development.' Edw. Erdmann (of Halle), in his ingenious *Psychol. Briefe*, 3d ed. 1863, p. 82 sq., gives a series of excellent remarks and observations: 'Rousseau observes that there is a motion which ill becomes even the most beautiful woman, and this is swift running. He might have said the same of all movements of the arms requiring great exertion, *e.g.* those of wrestling or fencing. They are not graceful in a woman, because it is not fitting in her to flee from or contend against us. She is intended to let herself be overtaken, and to submit. In the man, tendency outwards predominates. The man's circle of sensible perceptions is wider; hence the perceptive power of the woman within her narrower circle is more acute than his.' See the work itself for further particulars. Lotze (*Mikrokosmos*, 2d ed. ii. 380 sq.), besides dwelling on that feeling of obligation which teaches a woman to find her calling in the midst of the circumstances at hand, directs attention also to her greater powers of adaptation, in virtue of

which she accommodates herself more easily to new conditions of life, change of rank, etc. than the man does. With respect to the mental capacities of women, he says, p. 388: 'They are not inclined to scientific labours, and their thoughts take a more evidently artistic course.' With 'a preponderance of practical acquaintance above scientific classification, is connected a certainty of religious faith and a repose of moral feeling.' Essentially agreeing with Lotze, Rothe (*Theol. Ethik*, ii. 265 sq.) endeavours to point out that the individual aspect (feeling, sentiment, intuition, art, etc.) predominates in the woman, the general (intellect, argument, science, produce, business, politics) in the man. Schopenhauer (*Die Welt als Wille*, etc. ii. 447) remarks in a kindred sense: 'Women may have considerable talent, but not genius, because they are always subjective.' On the mutual completion and co-operation of both, not merely that they may live, but that they may live a complete life by means of each other, Aristotle (*Nikom. Ethik*, viii. 14; *Politik*, i. 13) has some good remarks, to which Trendelenburg (*Naturrecht*, 1860, p. 247 sq.) directs attention. The latter says, p. 233: 'On the part of the man there is more of active origination, on that of the woman of passive receptivity. If love, working in harmony with nature, appears in woman, fills her soul as wife and mother, and becomes the motive power of her life, that reasoning power which is destined to rule, and does not shrink from working even against nature, comes forth in the man. On the part of the man, thoughtful contrivance is prominent; on that of the woman, sensible appreciation; in the man, independent, well-defined character; in the woman, feeling supported by confidence; in the man, singleness of purpose, as in the plastic arts; in the woman, the gentle blending of differences, as in the musical; in the man, the self-imposed law; in the woman, the received custom.'

(7) The judgment of Holy Scripture on the relation of

the sexes is contained in the passages: 'It is not good for the man to be alone' (Gen. ii. 18); 'Neither is the man without the woman,' etc. (1 Cor. xi. 11); 'There is neither Greek nor Jew,' etc. (Gal. iii. 28); 'For the man is the head of the woman,' etc. (Eph. v. 23, 33),—which recognise both the natural differences with the special calling and position involved therein, and the personal equality of the sexes before God and in Christ. On the condition of the female sex in the heathen world, and at the close of the pre-Christian era, when, as Montesquieu (*Esprit des Lois*, viii. 9) says, 'Love had still only a form which cannot be named,' comp. the particulars and proofs furnished by Schmidt, *Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft in der altröm. Welt*, etc. pp. 23 sq. and 33 sq., and Stirn, *Apologie*, 2d ed. p. 263 sq. In contrast to which, the Christian women of the New Testament, the female followers of Christ, the women among the circle of disciples in the Acts, and such exhortations as 1 Pet. iii. 1 sq., may be appealed to. On Christian women in history, comp. Schmidt, p. 109 sq.; on the vocation of women, my essay, *Der Dienst der Frauen am Reich Gottes*, 1868; Wichern's *Der Dienst der Frauen in der Kirche*, 2d ed. 1858; Monod's two able lectures, *La Femme*, etc. On this subject, and on the fallacies of the spurious emancipation movement, comp. the interesting article upon the position and calling of a Christian woman in the *Allg. Ev.-Luth. Kirchenzeitung*, 1872, Nos. 6 and 7. The frightful state of morality in Berlin (where the magistrate computes the number of prostitutes at 30,000) has been the occasion of much public speaking and writing on the increase of prostitution in great cities. Police regulations alone will not, however, remedy this inveterate evil of modern society. On its greatness, and on the labours of Christian love in opposing it, comp. Herbst, *Die Magdalenensache*, etc. 1867, and Lehmann's admirable work, *Die Werke der Liebe*, a series of lectures on the present sphere of action of the Inner Mission, Leips. 1870, p. 54 sq.

(8) While most of the ancients referred the temperaments (*χράσεις*, *temperamentum*, mixture) as well as diseases to the supposed four fundamental principles—the dry or the damp, the warm or the cold—there were, according to the theory of the Hippocratians, four chief humours of the body—the bile, produced in the liver, the blood, in the heart, the water, in the spleen, the phlegm, in the head—from the mixture of which arose both diseases and the temperaments. In Galen, the temperaments are themselves regarded as morbid conditions. More recently the temperaments were deduced (as by Stahl and Haller in the eighteenth century) from the varying sensitiveness and strength of the nerves and muscles, and therefore from the whole bodily constitution. In any case they are not of a purely physical nature, but depend upon the bodily constitution.

(9) Descriptions of the temperaments are exceedingly numerous. While only partially mentioning the literature of the different subjects in question, I take the opportunity of directing attention to (*Die Temperamente des Menschen in gesunden und kranken Zustände*, Würzb. 1856) a pamphlet by the recently deceased physician, Theod. v. Haupt. Fortlage of Jena has devoted the fifth of his eight Psychological Lectures to the temperaments. Erdmann speaks ably as ever of them in his *Psychological Letters*, 3d ed. p. 34 sq.

(10) The educational method pursued by our Lord with respect to individuals of differently constituted natures is instructive on this point. A characteristic example is found in Luke ix. 57-62. The first individual there spoken of was of the sanguine temperament, and full of ardent zeal; the second of the phlegmatic, wanting first to arrange everything; the third of the melancholy, and desirous of once more satisfying his emotional nature. To these must be added the preceding narrative, in which our Lord rebuked a manifestation of natural impetuosity.

(11) Aristotle had already made a similar remark in his psychology. This parallel is especially carried out in Lotze's *Mikrokosmos*, ii. 2d ed. p. 365 sq. I subjoin a longer extract from this discussion. He is treating of the temperaments in connection with the different ages of life, and refers the sanguine to childhood, the sentimental—as he prefers calling the melancholy—to youth, the choleric to manhood, the phlegmatic to old age. Lotze designates an ‘all-sided excitability of all the physical states by each other, and of the soul by all external incentives,’ as the characteristic of the *sanguine* temperament. ‘We find it natural that childhood, which is intended for the gathering up without prejudice, and even without special inclination, of the impressions which may contribute to its education, should exhibit this readiness to be excited, and to pass from one frame of mind to another; in fact, a child's development makes the most rapid progress where this facility appears without lasting too long. Equally natural does this sanguine activity appear among uncivilised races, whose life generally yields too little variety of interests to make it desirable that their unbiassed susceptibility of all kinds of impressions should be weakened by the partial pursuit of definite objects.’ The melancholy temperament Lotze prefers to designate as the sentimental, for the sake of obviating the notion of dejection, which is no more essential to this than to the other temperaments. ‘For the *sentimental temperament*, which we intend, is not, he says, the special predominance of one of the many moods which we may experience, but the inclination to give way to moods in general, to cherish them, and to generate them with more readiness and to a greater extent than the occasion justifies.’ ‘The less well-defined objects of life, with which individual experiences would certainly be combined, are prominent in the season of youth, the more will the heart's interest be bestowed upon the emotional value of impressions. Thus the natural hue of the emo-

tional life of youth produces that sentimental temperament upon which, when it does not outlast the limits of its rightful existence, depends the greater portion of our best progress. Pre-eminently adapted to grasp the harmonious or inharmonious value concealed within the formal circumstances of impressions, it delights in the dreamlike repetition of the rhythmical and of æsthetic impressions in general; disinclined to work properly so called, but impelled by restlessness of feeling to great activity of imagination, it seeks to vent itself now in artistic creations, now in the formation of ideals of a better reality. Sensitive, however, as it is to the emotional value of perceptions, it is nevertheless inclined also to theoretical indefiniteness, because it is less successful in maintaining a hold of those definite points of reference among which these circumstances filled with value exist. It thus becomes unpractical, because while it would indeed desire to reproduce in action the value of its moods, it has no interest in the indifferent details of those reasonable means which might conduce thereto, and it is often unjust in regarding the indifference or opposition of others to its own æsthetic prejudices, with a bitterness which excludes all fair judgment and all tolerance of a different kind of cultivation.' The sentimental temperament is said to be followed in manhood by the *choleric*. 'The duller susceptibility which, together with greater power of reaction when once aroused, is ascribed to this temperament, is undoubtedly very often the result either of a moral stability of character, which, having decided on certain definite objects, is not to be easily turned from its faith by opposite attractions, or of the narrowness of imagination, induced by monotony of circumstances, by means of which the natural interest in various kinds of attractions is blunted.' 'I may seem to be making a very strange assertion when I adduce the *phlegmatic* temperament as that which is natural to age, and which is at the same time the correction of the partialities of the

choleric.' 'A constant equilibrium would be insufferable and repulsive in the soul which has to advance to its maturity, and to receive the form of its culture from the manifold commotions of life; but this serene repose is venerable in the mind which has already surmounted these commotions, and learned by varied experiences neither to suffer itself to be impelled by the changing impressions of feeling, nor to prefer in a one-sided manner any single form and tendency of human effort above all others.' 'It is not the great names of history which we have now in view, but those peacefully happy beings who pass through life unnoticed, like direct incorporations of the ideal. They who have played important parts in history have far more frequently owed the power of their influence to those one-sided harshnesses by means of which they were able, without any inward counterpoise, to impart their own motion to the world around them.' When I wrote and delivered what is found in the text, I was still unacquainted with Lotze's views, and am therefore the more pleased to find how frequently they coincide with my own.

(12) Erdmann, *Psychol. Briefe*, p. 32: 'The inestimable benefit of directing attention to the close connection between the nature of a country and the historical destiny of its inhabitants, has been conferred on science by C. Ritter, the creator of scientific geography.' Lotze on the other hand (*Mikrokosmos*, ii. p. 351) thus warns us against too hasty conclusions: 'Much as the mental disposition in general depends upon external nature, still it depends not upon this nature as it really is in itself, but upon the effect it produces upon the yet uneducated mind of the man who is constantly surrounded by it. This influence, moreover, cannot even be divined by the impression it makes upon the attention of an already cultivated mind, not living in and with it, but merely observing it' (iii. 40). He dwells upon the transmission of work in common upon common territory, as that by

which above all else the history and the historical consciousness of a nation is determined. On the vocation of the German nation, Rothe (*Theol. Ethik*, v. 338 sq.) thus ably expresses himself: 'As by its geographical position it forms the heart in the body of European mankind, so should it also take upon itself the functions of the heart, the office of preparing the blood, in the great moral community of Europe.' 'It is to be the quiet laboratory in which those moral ideas which are to produce the historical development of European Christendom must be perfected.' It may not be uninteresting to take a glance at the comparative weight of the brain among different nations. The following is from the *Ausland* for 1872, No. 16: 'The German brain weighs 1425 grammes, the English 1389, the French 1353, the Roumanian 1303, the Bohemian 1245. The female brain is unfortunately considerably lighter than the male. Among most Asiatic races a great diminution of weight is found. The medium is 1235 grammes. There are, however, races on the slopes of the Himalayas with an average weight of brain amounting to 1304 grammes. The Chinese, too, form a remarkable exception, the brain here averaging 1357 grammes, *i.e.* 4.92 above that of the French. The brain in the negro races varies in general from 1319 to 1249 grammes, while the skull of the Caffre contains 1364 grammes of brain. In North America, beginning with the Esquimaux and other inhabitants of the Polar regions, we find an average weight of 1219 grammes. The brains of the different Indian tribes are somewhat heavier, their medium weight being 1310 grammes, while those of the entirely savage, barbarous, and nomad races amount to only 1214 grammes. Among the Caribs, the aborigines of the Antilles, the average is still lower, being about 1189 grammes. Among the Selaves the medium weight of brain is 1340, among the Gipsies 1327, the Magyars 1319, the Roumanians 1317. Among Slavonic females 1171, and German 1157. The female brain

(whose medium weight is 1159) is 150 grammes lighter than the male; the cubical contents are about 215 centimetres cubic, the circumference of the skull about 18 millimetres smaller than that of the man; it is less porous, and seems also denser, for in the same space is contained about 002·548 grammes more female than male brain.'

(13) Aristotle, *Nikom. Ethik*, viii. 1, 3. Even when wandering in foreign lands we may soon see how near akin and how dear each man is to man (ὡς οἰκεῖον ἅπας ἀνθρώπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὡς φίλον), viii. 7, 6. He acknowledges man even in the slave, viii. 18, 8. These are isolated *testimonia animæ naturaliter Christianæ*, still they are not, as even Zeller admits in his *Gesch. der griech. Philos.* 2d edit. p. 539, taken into consideration in connection with his system and the entire view therein expressed, but are merely happy and honourable inconsistencies. Comp. my *Programm* on the Ethics of Aristotle, ii. *Tugendlehre*, p. 15 sq.

(14) On the distinction between real and formal freedom, comp. my *Lehre vom freien Willen*, pp. 6-11; Rothe, *Theol. Ethik*, 2d edit. pp. 349-380; Jul. Müller, *Lehre v. d. Sunde*, ii. 7 sq. [translated into English by Urwich].

(15) On the limits of natural morality, comp. my *Lehre vom freien Willen*, 451-457; Frank (of Erlangen), *System der christl. Gewissheit*, i. 106 sq., 246. It is something, and should not therefore be slightly regarded, when a man strives with all his might and main to resist in those matters which his natural moral consciousness teaches him to regard as right and commanded to do so. But even though such an one should really succeed in attaining to the righteousness for which he is striving by fulfilling all the commandments of which he is morally conscious, the Christian knows

that the eye of love can only look upon him and say (Mark x. 21), 'Go thy way, sell all that thou hast. It is true thou art seeking after goodly pearls, and hast found many, but the one whose value surpasses all others hast thou not yet found,—sell that thou hast.'

(16) On the internal discord in man, comp. *Fundamental Truths*, Lecture vii. p. 181.

(17) Testimony to the power of conscience from authors of the era of decaying antiquity, from the Greek tragedians and Roman satirists, as well as from modern poets, is cited in *Lectures on Saving Truths*, p. 350 sq. Single passages are also given by Schneider, *Christl. Klänge aus den griech und rom. Klassikern*, 1865, p. 13 sq.

(18) The saying with which Kant concludes his Criticism of Practical Reason is well known: 'There are two things which fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration, the oftener and the more continuously the mind is occupied in their contemplation—the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me' (Works, edited by Hartenstein, v. 167). On the nature and character of the conscience, comp. the discussions in Frank's *System der christliche Gewissheit*, i. 88: 'Just as the natural ear is constructed to be sensible of the waves of sound, when the vibrations which reach it from without are continued within the organs which exist to receive them, so also the conscience of man, the organ of moral perception, is not productive by itself, but becomes conscious of the moral idea, in virtue of the *rapport* into which the moral powers enter with it, and forms in a certain measure the resonance by whose means moral vibrations from the sphere of objective reality become audible in the subject. By means of an organ homogeneous with the nature of moral realities, the subject perceives with

reference to the activities proceeding from himself that rule which shows him whether and how far his conduct corresponds with the supreme object of his personal life, and determines the absolute value of his personality accordingly.' 'It is not left absolutely to the arbitrary choice of the subject to become conscious of this directing and ruling idea of his being; on the contrary, he becomes conscious thereof, either with or against his will: in other words, there is an objective moral power, which in this case as much obtrudes itself upon the organ for its perception, as sensible realities force themselves upon the organs of physical perception.' Among the various discussions on the conscience, I would refer to the sections on this subject in the *Ethics* of Harless (secs. 7-12), and Vilmar, i. 65 sq.; also in Philippi's *Kirchl. Glaubenslehre*, iii. 7 sq.; Delitzsch's *Bibl. Psychologie*, 2d ed. p. 133 sq., translated into English—Foreign Theological Library; my *Lehre vom freien Willen*, p. 444 sq; and finally to the separate works on this subject of Kähler (*Lehre vom Gewissen*, 1869), Rud. Hoffman, 1866, and Gass, 1869.

NOTES TO LECTURE III.

(1) How incompatible it seemed to Socrates to know what was good and do what was evil, may be seen, *e.g.*, in Erdmann's *Grundriss der Gesch. der Philosophie*, i. 73. Comp. Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, iii. 8, 4: 'He was of opinion that he who knew what was truly good and excellent would act accordingly, and that every one who knew what was disgraceful would be on his guard against it;' 5: 'He also declared that justice and virtue in general were wisdom—and that it was as impossible for those who had been acquainted with it to prefer anything to it, as for those to whom it was not known to practise it.'

(2) According to Aristotle, virtue is a matter of practice and custom, *Eth. Nicom.* ii. 1, 1-3. As a man becomes a builder by building houses, and a lute-player by playing the lute, so do we become just by acting justly, moderate by acting moderately, and brave by practising bravery, etc. 'To express it briefly, from like activities arise like qualities and skill,' ii. 1, 6 and 7. Most things, or rather all things, depend on what is the habit from youth upwards, ii. 1, 8. Virtue consists in the medium between two extremes (τὸ μέσον, ἡ μεσότης), ii. 2, 1-7, 6, 9, 13. How, then, are we to hit this happy medium? By accustoming ourselves to do that which is directly opposed to the fault to which we are most prone, 'as they do who would make crooked wood straight,' ii. 9, 5. To this, law conduces beyond all else, *e.g.* x. 9, 8. For the law is more powerful than paternal commands, x. 9, 11, 12. At first we are at liberty to choose to be either unjust, intemperate, etc.; 'when once, however, they have become so, it is no longer in their power not to be so,' iii. 5, 14, which is as much as to say that a change of character, a conversion, is impossible.

(3) Schiller to Goethe (17th Aug. 1797): 'If we keep to that special characteristic of Christianity which distinguished it from all the monotheistic religions, it is no other than its abolition of law, of the Kantian imperative, in the place of which Christianity insists on placing free inclination. Hence, in its pure form, it is the manifestation of moral loveliness, the incarnation of the Holy, and in this sense the only (aesthetic?) religion.' On Kant and Schiller, comp. my *Lehre vom freien Willen*, p. 347 sq. The saying quoted from Schiller is from *Anmuth und Würde*; Works, 1847, vol. ii. p. 354. Schiller, in opposition to Kant, required the union of duty and inclination, as in the well-known distich against Kant:

‘Ueber sein Herz zu siegen ist gross, ich ehre den Tapfern;
Aber wer durch sein Herz seiget, er gilt mir noch mehr.’¹

For this, however, the heart itself must be in a right state. Schiller put in the place of Kant’s rigorous idea of duty, the charms by which virtue wins the heart. Comp. *Anmuth und Würde* (Thalia 1793, 2d), and the letters on the *Æsthetic Education of Man* (Horen 1795). Good remarks on the different attempts of moral philosophy are found in Rössler’s *System der Staatslehre*, 1857, p. 445 sq. On Kant he says (p. 494), ‘Virtue is only negative, not the employment of the nature as a moral organ.’ On Schiller, with reference to his poem, *Die Ideale und das Leben*: ‘Schiller relegates to the contemplation of beauty, i.e. to art, the task of educating mankind.’ ‘It is by the image of beauty that the priests of truth are to arouse men from moral ruin’ (p. 496). On Schiller’s position with regard to the Kantian morality, comp. Drobisch in the reports of the Royal Saxon Society of Sciences, Leipzig, xi. 1859, pp. 177-194.

(4) Kant, *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft* (1793-94, published by Rosencranz as the 10th part of Kant’s collected Works). The first treatise is ‘On the indwelling of the evil, together with the good principle; or, On the radical evil in human nature.’ He calls it ‘radical’ because it corrupts the root of all maxims, and is at the same time also a natural human proclivity, not to be extirpated by human powers (p. 41). It is this which constitutes the fell disease in our species, which, as long as we do not get rid of it, hinders the germ of good from developing as it would otherwise do. That we may become morally and not merely legally good, a revolution in our mind and a reform in our character are necessary. ‘That is

¹ To conquer one’s heart is great, I honour the brave one. But he who conquers by means of his heart is superior in my eyes.

to say, when he (man), by a single unchangeable resolution, reverses that supreme reason of his maxims, by means of which he was a bad man (and thus puts on a new man), he is, as far as principle and mind are concerned, a being susceptible of good,' etc. (p. 54 sq.). But how this moral miracle—for it is no less—is to take place, Kant cannot inform us. Comp. Frank, *System der christl. Gewissheit*, i. 120. The same may be said of Jacobi. He admits that things cannot be better, 'unless a change, whereby the relation between his inclinations and his powers is reversed, takes place in the nature of man,' etc. (Waldemar, Works, v. 1820, p. 217). 'He who trusts in his heart is a fool' (p. 482). Reason cannot think out a power of being virtuous (p. 431). 'My self is bad—I am a worthless man—I am a horror to myself' (p. 427). But to the question how this change is to be effected, he has no reply to offer.

(5) On Friendship, comp. Socrates in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, ii. 4-6; Aristot. *Eth. Nicom.* viii. and ix., e.g. viii. 1, 4: 'Friendship seems to be the bond which holds States together, hence lawgivers direct their attention more to it than to justice.' (So also Plato, *Resp.* i. p. 351 d. Aristotle often insists that true friendship can exist only between the good, and that it is based on kindred virtue, e.g. viii. 8, 5, 4, 5: 'A friend is his friend's second self.' So too 8, 2, ix. 9, 7: 'Hence one might say with Theognis, that it is practice for our own virtue to live with excellent men.' The verse of Theognis, a poet of the sixth century B.C., used also as a favourite maxim by Socrates (Xenophon, *Memorab.* i. 2, 20; *Sympos.* 2, 5, etc.) is as follows: 'Associate only with the good. Never have intercourse with bad men. For from the good thou wilt learn that which is good, while if thou dost associate with the bad, thou wilt lose even thine own reason.' Curtius (formerly of Göttingen, now of Berlin) gave

an able lecture, published in Gelzer's *Monatbl.* July 1863, 'On the Importance attributed to Friendship in Antiquity.' Scripture, however, declares, Ps. xlix. 7: None can by any means redeem his brother, nor reconcile him to God. And Pascal says: 'I am no one's object, nor is there anything in me that can satisfy another' (*Pensées*, ii. 198).

(6) Comp. my *Lectures on Fundamental Truths*, pp. 294 sq., 422, especially the passage quoted from Rousseau's *Emile*.

(7) Comp. above, note (3).

(8) Aristotle puts in the first place the moral tact of the reasonable and excellent man, *Eth. Nicom.* ii. 6, 15. To the question, however, how this may be attained, he answers by referring to habit and law, e.g. bk. x. 9, 8. Public judgment, as expressed by prevailing opinion, together with law, occupy the second. The latter plays a great part, especially with Cicero, e.g. *de Officiis*, ii. 11, 39, 18, 64, 75. Christian morality, on the other hand, lays stress on the disposition and the divine approbation.

(9) Comp. my treatise on the *Ethics of Aristotle*, ii. 10 sq.

(10) Comp. Fischer and Ulrici in note (4) to lecture i. Also Ebrard's interesting lecture on *Shakespeare's Relation to Christianity*, 1870, in which he shows that, while in the ancient world the idea of morality is broken up (p. 5), and hence the tragic conflict is one between single duties, and originates rather in fate than sin, in Shakespeare, on the contrary, it is the conflict with a man's own guilt which brings about the catastrophe (p. 11). I commend this little work to my readers.

(11) Compare the description of the high-souled man in Aristotle, vi. 3, 10 sq. I cite only a few passages. 'It is also characteristic of him that he does not rush to places and opportunities which are highly esteemed, and where others have already played the first part; that he is in general but slowly roused, except where a great honour or a great work is concerned, etc. He is candid, because he looks upon men with contempt, hence he is always inclined to speak the truth, except in cases when he ironically reserves his real opinion, a part which he may well play with respect to the multitude.' 'Nothing can easily astonish him, because nothing is great in his eyes,' etc. 'Even in externals, it is generally admitted that the gait of the high-souled man is slow, his voice deep and emphatic, his words few. For a man to whom few things are important is not inclined to haste, and he who regards nothing as great does not exert his voice. So too the wise man, the Stoic ideal, is the representative of indifference towards men, and his morality is nothing more than cold resignation.'

(12) I may mention the well-known eulogy of love in 1 Cor. xiii., which concludes with the words: 'Now abideth faith, hope, love; but the greatest of these is love.' For faith will give place to sight, and hope to possession, while love is that which is eternally present. In other passages also of the New Testament, the Christian life is described by this triad; comp. Col. i. 4 sq.; 1 Thess. i. 13, v. 8; Titus ii. 2, etc. Theology comprises these three under the title of the theological, in contradistinction to the philosophical or cardinal virtues (wisdom, justice, valour, and prudence). In the morals of the scholastic theologians (*e.g.* even in Thomas Aquinas, the greatest of the mediæval schoolmen), love forms only the pinnacle, so to speak, of the pyramid of virtues, whose ascending gradations are formed by the other chief virtues; while with Luther, on the contrary, it is the 'fountain whence they all spring, and to which they are all to return.'

How Luther thus attains to a view of Christian morality which regards it as a whole is shown in my *Ethik Luthers*, 1867, p. 48 sq. The passage of Luther on 'Love without reward,' cited in the text, p. 38, is taken from vol. xxii. p. 139 (Erlangen ed.); comp. *Ethik Luthers*, p. 54. 'This commandment, then, of love is both a short commandment and a long commandment; it is a single commandment and many commandments; it is no commandment and all the commandments' (8, 58 sq.).

(13) *Virtus est ordo amoris.* Aug. *de Civ. Dei*, xv. 22. The attempt has often been made to develop a system of virtues, without any one of these attempts finding general favour. Such an attempt is made in the text, where the several virtues are developed from the three-fold relation in which we stand to God (as our origin, our present, and our object), and from the twofold mental activity of the reasonable soul (willing and knowing).

(14) Ancient ethics know nothing of humility. The ideal both of Aristotle and the Stoa is pride (comp. note 11). *Humilitas* has the bad meaning of meanness, humiliation; comp. Cic. *de Or.* 1, 53, *de Inv.* 1, 56; and *ταπεινός* means low, desponding, fearful, subservient, for the most part in a bad sense. In scriptural language, on the contrary, *ταπεινός* is never used in this bad sense, but only employed to designate the noblest of virtues, the having a lowly estimate of oneself before God and man. The New Testament substantive *ταπεινοφροσύνη* is a newly formed word. Comp. Cremer, *Bibl. Theol. Wörterbuch*, 2d ed. 1872, p. 543 sq. In the German word *Demuth* (humility) is involved the idea of *Dienen* (service). Of this service of humility Christ set us the example, Matt. xx. 28, and hence requires this disposition in His disciples, 'He that humbleth himself shall be exalted,' etc. Matt. xxiii. 12; 'The last shall be first,' etc. Matt. xx. 16; and many

other passages. While Heine calls humility a hound's virtue (e.g. *Gesch. der schönen Liter. in Deutschl.* 1833, i. 8), Goethe says of it (14, 253): 'It is undeniable that no teaching can cleanse us from prejudices but that which first lowers our pride, and what teaching is it which builds upon humility as upon that which is from above?' Luther, too, expounding the *Magnificat*, says (Erl. ed. 45, 236): 'True humility never knows that it is humble, for if it did it would be proud of this excellent virtue, but it fixes its heart, mind, and feelings on the mean things which it constantly beholds. And so long as these are present to it, it cannot see itself. For this reason if honour comes, it must come unawares, and find it in a train of thought far removed from honour. Hence we find in Luke i. 29 that the salutation of the angel astonished Mary. Had such a salutation been given to a daughter of Caiaphas, she would not have cast in her mind what manner of salutation this should be, but would soon have accepted it, and thought: Ah, this is well!' (comp. Ackermann, *Luther*, No. 1, 1871, p. 144.)

(15) John xiii. 34. For heathen testimony, see Stirn, p. 239; Schmidt, p. 289 sq.; *Lectures on Fundamental Truths*, p. 413 sq. We are reminded of the words of Holy Scripture, when we read in the Buddhist morals (*Dhammapadam Palice ed. Latine vertit*, etc., Von Fausböll, Harniae 1855, p. 40, proposition 223 sq.): 'Clementiâ iram vincat, malum bono avarum liberalitate, veritate falsiloquum. Verum loquatur, ne irascatur, det parvulum rogatus: per has tres conditiones ibit in deorum propinquitatem.' The similarity is, however, one of sound only. The Buddhist morality—which is perhaps the best and most excellent of the heathen world, and has often been placed on a level with that of Christianity (comp. testimony of this fact in the *Introd.* to the work, p. 11)—starts from the fact of suffering, and seeks, in the way of reflection and self-denial, to be free from earthliness (the chief matter is to

know: 'Dolorem, doloris ortum et doloris interitum; excellentem optopartitam viam ad doloris sedationem ducentem,' maxim 191). Christian morality, on the contrary, is based upon the facts of sin and grace. The former requires a struggle against nature, the latter its healing and sanctification. The former is akin, not to Christian, but to Stoic morality. Hence its demands reach only to the external act, while the latter really produces the disposition required. This distinction must be borne in mind amidst any similarity of pre-Christian to Christian moral maxims.

(16) Our older dogmatists generally treated on the 'cross' (*de cruce*) in a single section. To this belongs also the doctrine of *Askesis*. According to Romish doctrine, ascetic practices are in themselves holy, meritorious, and expiatory; according to Protestant teaching, asceticism is only a means in the warfare with the flesh, and its practice only justified so far as it is required therein. Comp. Luther's doctrine on this subject in my *Ethik Luthers*, pp. 60–62. On the history of asceticism, comp. Zockler, *Krit. Gesch. der Askese*, a contribution to the history of Christian morals and culture, 1863.

(17) According to Calvin's doctrine, the man who is born again cannot fall. This is, however, in opposition to unquestionable statements of Scripture, *e.g.* Matt. v. 13; Rom. xi. 20 sq. According to Romish doctrine, there are perfect saints who have supererogatory works and merits which may profit others. This is opposed to the Lord's Prayer, in which our Lord directs all His disciples to pray for the forgiveness of sin. The Christian, as Luther says, 'still bears the old Adam round his neck;' comp. *Luther's Ethik*, p. 46. On the temptations of the Christian, see the same work, p. 58; on the warfare of the Christian, p. 59.

NOTES TO LECTURE IV.

(1) With this section on prayer, comp. *Lectures on Fundamental Truths*, vi. note 6. On prayer in general, as the culminating point of the inner life, comp. the excellent section in Löher's thoughtful work, *Das innere Leben*, 1867, p. 217 sq. On the devotional life of our Lord, compare the passages Mark i. 35; John vi. 15; Matt. xiv. 23; Mark vi. 46; Luke vi. 12; Matt. xxvi. 36, xi. 25; Mark vii. 24; John xii. 27; John xvii.; Matt. xxvii. 46. He teaches to pray, Matt. vi. 5 sq.; prayer must be an inward transaction between the soul and God, Luke xviii. 1; we should pray always, Luke xi. 13. The Holy Spirit, the essential gift, Matt. viii. 8. The promise that prayer, in the name of Jesus, *i.e.* in and through communion with Him, shall be heard, John xiv. 23, xv. 16, xvi. 23 sq. See also the example of the Church, Acts ii. 42; and the apostolical injunctions to continuance in prayer, Col. iv. 2; 1 Thess. v. 17; to pray in the spirit, Rom. viii. 26; in faith, James i. 6 sq. The history of the Church displays a goodly roll of names belonging to men who were mighty in prayer. Foremost among them are Bernard of Clairvaux, who sometimes passed the day and night in prayer; Luther, of whose powerful prayers of some hours' duration, in the fortress of Coburg, we are told by Veit Dietrich; Spener, one of the most faithful intercessors who ever lived, and who daily brought separately before the Lord in prayer, kingdoms, towns, princes, and nobles, the children whom he had baptized, those whom he knew to be in the right road, his friends, etc. For some he prayed weekly, for some daily, for some three times a day.

(2) Luther in particular has written often and excellently on the Lord's Prayer. Among his many works, there is a small one called, *A Simple Way of Praying*, which we commend to our readers. In concluding it he says: 'How I am myself accustomed to pray the Lord's

Prayer may be briefly told ; for to this very day I suck it like a child, and eat and drink it like an old man ; I can never have too much of it, and it is to me the best of all prayers, surpassing even the Psalter, which I love so well. One soon finds out that it was ordered and taught by a true Master of the subject, and it is a thousand pities that such a prayer, by such a Master, should be indevoutly gabbled through, all over the world. Many say perhaps a thousand paternosters in a year, and if they were to say them thus for a thousand years, they would neither have prayed nor tasted one jot or tittle of them. In short, the paternoster—whether as the name or the word of God—is the greatest martyr on earth, for every one tortures and ill uses it, few comfort and gladden it by use' (Erlang. ed. 23, 223).

(3) From the life of Luther I adduce two great instances of prayer being answered. These relate to Myconius and Melancthon. Luther found Melancthon dangerously ill at Weimar ; his sight and hearing had both ceased, he no longer recognised any one, his jaw had fallen, and the lineaments of death were already visible in his sunken countenance. 'God forbid, how has the devil disfigured this organon' (instrument), exclaimed Luther, shocked at his appearance ; and applied himself to prayer, casting his burden on God, and so bringing before Him all His promises contained in Scripture, that, as he himself expresses it in the narrative, 'He must hear me if I am to trust His promises another time.' Then, seizing Melancthon by the hand, he exclaimed, 'Be of good cheer, Philip, thou wilt not die ;' and with earnest words called him back to life. Melancthon then began to breathe again, and gradually recovered the power of speech. When he perceived Luther, he prayed him, for God's sake, to let him die, saying that he was now on a happy journey, and desired to depart. 'By no means,' exclaimed Luther, 'thou must serve our Lord still longer ;' and besought him to live, and

to take nourishment. Thus he brought him back, as he wrote home, from the gates of death, by the power of prayer and encouragement. Less known perhaps is the manner in which he recalled from death his friend Myconius, the venerated superintendent of Gotha. Myconius was in the last stage of consumption, and already speechless. Luther wrote to him that he must not die: 'May God not let me hear, so long as I live, that you are dead, but cause you to survive me. I pray this earnestly, and will have it granted, and my will will be done herein. Amen.' 'I was so horrified,' said Myconius afterwards, 'when I read what the good man had written, that it seemed to me as though I had heard Christ say, "Lazarus, come forth."' And from that time Myconius was, as it were, kept from the grave by the power of Luther's prayer, and did not die till after Luther's death. The orphanage at Halle is a standing memorial of the prayers of Francke and of a pupil of the orphanage being heard. And George Müller has by prayer effected the erection of large institutions at Bristol, which are called in England 'the wonder of the age.' Comp. Delitzsch, *Syst. der Apologetik*, 1869, pp. 233-235.

(4) The craving for association in religion is expressed, e.g., in the words of Schiller's *Mary Stuart* :—

'Ach, die Beglückten die das froh vereinte
Gebet versammelt in dem Haus des Herrn.'¹

'The Bell' is the voice of the Church in daily life. It is true that the religious craving of the individual sometimes loosens itself from religious tradition and the society it has formed, as at the close of the pre-Christian period. In the case of Luther, too, the individual need of salvation broke with the official Church. Still the religious life of the individual has always struggled towards a religious society, with which it could feel itself in unison. Unbelief is a separating, but never an associating force. Faith is this by an inward necessity.

¹ Oh, happy ones, whom glad united prayer assembles in the Lord's house.

(5) The Romish idea of the Church absolutely identifies it with its external manifestation in that definite hierarchical form which it assumed in the Romish communion. The evangelical idea of the Church insists, in opposition to this externalism, on its truly inward and spiritual nature, but does not, in doing this, make the Church merely invisible, as the evangelical doctrine has been so frequently misinterpreted both by friends and foes. Just as we ourselves are not merely spirits, and as our bodies are constituent parts of our nature, so also does a corporality adapted to its spiritual nature form a constituent part of the Church, which is composed and exists for the sake of men in the body. This corporality consists chiefly in the means of grace. By these is formed that external and empirical Church in which the Church proper is contained. If then we would have the latter, we must adhere to the former, and are bound to render it obedience, service, gratitude, and affection. Comp. on this subject *Saving Truths*, lect. vii. 'The Church,' p. 195.

(6) On Holy Scripture, comp. the lecture (viii.) on this subject in *Saving Truths*, p. 234, and the testimony of Reville, W. Wenzel, Rosseuw, and St. Hilary, in notes 10 and 25 to this lecture. On the organism of Holy Scripture, note 16 to the same.

(7) In the Greek Church especially, preaching was looked upon as a rhetorical art. The highest fame in this respect was attained by Chrysostom, whose sermons were not unfrequently applauded in Church by the clapping of hands, and whose polemic even had the same sign of approbation bestowed upon it. I quote a passage to this effect from one of his sermons: 'When I hear loud applause bestowed upon my discourse, a human feeling—why should I deny it—overcomes me for the moment, and I feel delighted. But when I go home and reflect that they from whom I have received

these public signs of approbation have not profited by my preaching, and that even if they might have derived some profit from it, they have lost it in these marks of approval, I sigh and weep, and feel as if I had spoken in vain. I have often intended entirely to forbid this public applause, and to entreat you to listen to me with becoming silence and order. Let us then, from this time forward, make it a rule that none of the hearers shall thus interrupt the preacher. If he admires the sermon, let him do so in silence, and devote all his energies to the comprehension of what is being delivered. Why is there a noise again? I am just laying down a rule against it! But as for you, you cannot endure to hear me quietly even for once. It is for this reason that even the heathen reproach us for doing all things for show and effect. (Comp. Alt. *Der kirchl. Gottesdienst*, etc. 2d ed. 1851, p. 613.) Many excellent pithy and wholesome sayings of Luther concerning preaching are preserved in his *Table-talk* (by Förstemann, pt. i. p. 366 sq.) I quote a few. He gave the following instruction to Erasmus Alber, when he went to Berlin as court chaplain to the Elector Joachim II.: 'Let all your sermons be of the simplest kind, and have respect not to the prince, but to the simple, foolish, rude, and unlearned people, for the prince is made of the same stuff. If, in my preaching, I were to have respect to Philip Melancthon and other learned doctors, I should do no good. I preach in the simplest way to the unlearned, and it pleases all. If I understand Greek and Hebrew, I put all this aside, and when we scholars get together, we get into such tangles, that God is astonished at us' (p. 384). 'Every preacher should accustom himself to preaching plainly and simply, and should resolve and reflect that he must preach to ignorant people, such as peasants, who understand as little as children of twelve, thirteen, and fourteen, whom one is accustomed to address separately. Of such are the masses; let these be able to understand our sermons, or to get something out

of them to improve their lives. We must not preach splendidly and artificially, and scrape fine words together, that people may see how learned we are—thus seeking our own honour. No, this will never do!’ (p. 401.) ‘A pious, God-fearing preacher cannot but feel that nothing is dearer to him than Christ his Lord and Saviour, and the eternal life to come, that even if he should lose this present life and all it can bestow, Christ would say to him, “Come hither, thou hast been my dear and faithful servant”’ (p. 412). ‘Whatever we do in the way of preaching or suffering, let us do all for the glory of God and the salvation of His elect, that they may believe’ (p. 413).

(8) On the fact that the Lutheran service offers just the due combination of the objective and subjective, of the divine and human, of the instructive and the emotional, of the word and the transaction, of worship and art, etc., compare among others Alt’s above-cited work, p. 302 sq.; the description given in which is based especially on Kliefoth’s able and touching work, *Die ursprüngliche Gottesdienstordnung in den deutschen Kirchen lutherischen Bekenntnisses, ihre Destruktion und Reformation*, 1847. Kliefoth’s subsequent important works on this subject are all based upon this, which, however, as a first and rapid sketch for an historical picture of Lutheran worship, has a value and importance of its own. The foundations of the order of Lutheran service were laid by Luther, especially in the *Formula Missæ*, 1523, and the *Deutsche Messe*, 1526, a complete purification and modification of the Romish Mass according to evangelical principles. ‘Divine worship, as now everywhere carried on, is of good Christian descent.’ ‘It is not our intention to abolish the service, but to bring it back to its true course.’ ‘One thing is needful, and that is that Mary should sit at the feet of Christ, and daily hear His words.’ ‘Where what is preached is not the word of God, it is better that there

should be neither reading, nor singing, nor assembling' (Luther). From that time a twofold custom was formed in the Lutheran Church: the fuller and more copious order of Lutheran worship prevailing in the north, east, and middle of Germany, and in the south-west a simpler form, which takes up a medium position between the Lutheran and the plainer Reformed type, in which preaching so preponderates, that the other essential elements of divine worship are repressed and abbreviated, while scarcely any room is left for art. *Pietism* had less feeling for what was objective and ecclesiastical, than for what was subjective and edifying, and rather cherished the vitality of smaller associations than that of the whole congregation of the Church. Hence the traditional, fixed liturgical element was made to give way to the subjective element of extempore prayer and momentary excitement. Finally, the age of *Illuminism* had no feeling at all for the liturgical, sacramental, and artistic element in worship, and suffered it to be absorbed in moralizing songs and pulpit lectures. It was not till after the first decades of the present century that recourse was again had to the ancient treasures of the Church. In this respect good service was done by the Prussian Agenda of Fred. Will. III., 1823. The genuine Lutheran demand, however, for a greater elaboration of the liturgical element in our worship, still encounters, in consequence of the traditions of the Illuministic period, much unjust suspicion, as being 'catholicizing,' etc.

(9) The first traces of a celebration of Sunday are found in the New Testament, *e.g.* in Acts xx. 7; 1 Cor. xvi. 2; Rev. i. 10; also in ancient Catholic literature: Epistle of Barnabas, chap. xv. Justin Martyr's (†168) *Second Apology*, chap. xxv.: 'We hold our common assemblies on the Sunday, for this is the first day, on which God created the world, by transforming both darkness and matter, and also the day on which Jesus Christ our

Saviour rose from the dead.' Pliny, the imperial proconsul of Asia Minor, in his well-known Epistle to Trajan (Plin. *Ep.* x. 97) in the second century, speaks of the assemblies of the Christians on an appointed day (*stato die*), by which we are unquestionably to understand the Sunday. It is not uninteresting to read this heathen account, based as it is upon the confessions extorted by torture from Christian maidens. 'They are accustomed to meet together on an appointed day before sunrise, and by turns to sing a hymn to Christ as God, and to bind themselves by an oath not to any crime, but to commit neither theft, robbery, nor adultery, to keep their word, and not to deny what has been committed to them when they shall be called to confess it. Then it is the custom to go forth, and afterwards to reassemble at a meal, of which both sexes participate, but which is nevertheless conducted in a respectable manner.' We have a more accurate description of the worship of the primitive Church in Justin Martyr, *Apol.* c. lxv. lxvii. To set apart certain days of rest was customary even among the heathen (comp. Alt's work, p. 28 sq.). If every seventh day was appointed for this purpose in Israel, this corresponds with the constitution of human nature, on which the proportion of seven to one is founded. Consequently the Sunday has a twofold importance, a natural and a moral one. Its natural importance, moreover, consists in the fact that it is both an individual and a social necessity. A comprehensive work on the institution of Sunday has been written by Irmischer, under the title of *Staats- und Kirchenordnungen über die christliche Sonntagsfeier*, Erlangen 1839. Many works on the Sunday, specially suggested by the offer of a prize for an essay on the subject in England in 1847, have recently appeared; e.g. *Die christliche Sonntagsfeier*, by Oschwald, Leipz. 1850; *Die Sonntagsfeier*, by Liebetrut, Hamb. 1851; *Ueber den Tag des Herrn*, by Hengstenberg, Berlin 1852; *Ueber Feiertagsheiligung*, by Wilhelmi,

Halle, 1853. Even a Proudhon has sung the praises of Sunday, in a work entitled, *The Celebration of Sunday considered with respect to the Public Health*, etc., and frequently translated into German. Various treatises have sought, especially by an appeal to facts, to render evident the blessing of the Sunday; e.g. *Die Perle der Tage*, a prize essay by a gardener's daughter, translated from the English by Wentz, Stettin 1850, Hamb. 1858; *Die Fackel der Zeit*, German, Marriot, Basle; *Das Licht der Woche*, German, by Kayser. Compare Palmer in Herzog's *Theol. Real-Encycl.* xiv. 535 sq. More especially would I mention and recommend for general reading and distribution the excellent lecture of Dr. Uhlhorn, *Ueber die Sonntagsfrage in ihrer socialen Bedeutung*, 1870, delivered at the second General Lutheran Conference, held at Leipzig, 1870. I add an interesting passage from W. von Humboldt's *Briefe an eine Freundin*, 5th ed. p. 282: 'I am quite of your opinion, that the appointment of certain days of rest, even if utterly unconnected with religious celebration, is a very delightful and really refreshing idea to every one who has a philanthropic feeling towards all classes of society. There is nothing so selfish and heartless as for the rich and the upper classes to look with displeasure, or at least with a certain amount of contemptuous dislike, upon Sundays and holidays. Even the choice of the seventh day is certainly the wisest that could have been made. Arbitrary as it may seem, and to a certain extent be in reality, to lengthen or shorten labour by a day, I am convinced that the six days is just the right measure, and best adapted to men, with respect both to their physical powers and their continuance in uniform occupation. There is also something humane in the provision that those animals who assist man in his labour should share in his rest. It would be as foolish as inhuman to lengthen beyond this proportion the period of recurring rest. I once saw in my own experience an example of this. Being for some years in

Paris during the period of the Revolution, I was there when this institution was subordinated to the dry and wooden Decimal system. The tenth day was that which we were to call a Sunday, and all ordinary occupations were to be carried on for nine days. When it was found that this was evidently far too long, several kept the Sunday as well, so far as the laws would allow, and then there was too much leisure. Thus we ever oscillate between two extremes, when we leave the regular and appointed medium.

‘If, then, the case is as above stated with respect to merely reasonable and secular considerations, how differently does the matter appear in its religious aspect, when both the idea and the enjoyment of the holiday become a source of spiritual joy and true consolation. The great holidays are moreover combined with such remarkable historical events, that they receive from them a special consecration. It is certainly the most appropriate way of keeping them to read in the Bible itself, and in all the four evangelists, the narratives of the events to which they refer,’ etc.

(10) On the relation of synods to church doctrine, I may be allowed to refer to my small work on this subject, *Die Synoden und die Kirchenlehre, den Synoden der evang. luth. Kirche gewidmet*, Leipz. 1871, in which are discussed the various subjects of synodal constitution, the indispensableness and danger of synods, the importance of church doctrine, its foundation in the nature of the Church, the relation of church doctrine to ecclesiastical legislation, the consequences of synodal government, and finally, the question of church progress. The importance which these subjects have acquired may perhaps render the discussions of this *brochure* acceptable to many.

(11) The Rhenish-Westphalian church injunctions require, as a condition of election to the presbyterate, that the church members in question should be of ‘blameless

conversation,' should have a good report in the Church, and should have given proof of their affection for the Evangelical Church, especially by having brought up their children in the evangelical creed, and 'should have diligently participated in public worship and in the Holy Communion, or (add. 1) have shown their disposition towards the Church by participation in public worship and the Lord's Supper.' Among their duties is (§ 15) 'that of giving information to the preacher concerning any who, by absenting themselves from public worship, or by any transgression, become causes of offence to members of the Church,' etc. The (Reformed) Confederation of Lower Saxony also requires (in its church orders, § 60) of the president of the congregation, that he should, 'by diligent attendance at church and participation of the Sacrament of the table, prove himself a true and lively member of the Church.' Compare Dove, *Sammlung der wichtigsten neuen Kirchenordnungen*, etc., 1865.

(12) I may here be allowed to repeat explanations which I have already given elsewhere (in a report delivered to the Saxon Country Synod, 1871): 'The very fact that every existing church is more or less based upon a confession, or something similar, is, if not a proof, at least a token, that a confession is not an incidental matter, but one required by the very nature of an ecclesiastical commonwealth, and a necessity induced by historical circumstances. 1. In considering, first, the *necessity* of a confession, we may designate this as a threefold, *i.e.* a psychological, a historical, and an ecclesiastical, necessity. The Christian Church is based on faith on Jesus Christ, produced by the operation of the Holy Spirit. In this faith she has within herself that saving truth which is deposited in Holy Scripture, whose subject-matter is Jesus Christ. It is a psychological necessity of this faith to express itself in a corresponding confession of faith. Christ Himself imparted to

His disciples, in the baptismal confession of the Triune God (Matt. xxviii. 18, 19), the fundamental confession of the Christian Church, as the most comprehensive expression of its faith, and the germ of all further development. From this has been developed the entire church confession of subsequent centuries; and this development has advanced in proportion as errors have appeared, which, obscuring the saving truth that constitutes the matter of faith, needed to be repelled by their opposite truths. Thus, to the psychological was added that *historical* necessity which gives to a confession its definite historical expression. It was in this way that the confessions of the ancient Church and the confessions of our own Church arose, as those developments of the original creed of the Christian Church and those statements of Christian faith which events had rendered necessary. In the general Christian confession, the Christian Church gathers itself together, and withdraws from the non-Christian world; in the special confession, each particular church gathers itself together, and withdraws from the other churches. Thus each church has in its confession its internal bond of union and its external boundary; and both are necessary for the expression and manifestation of its inward peculiarity and its distinction from other churches. Hence a definite confession, besides being a psychological and historical, is also an ecclesiastical necessity to the individual churches. 2. Upon the necessity is based the authority of a confession. A confession claims *internal* authority because, and in proportion as, it is a confession of the truth proclaimed in the word of God, and as this truth forms its matter. It is the conviction of our Church that her confession is the most adequate expression of that general Christian and evangelical truth which we are indebted to Luther for having again brought to light in its full purity. With this her conviction our Church stands or falls. For in proportion as she should lose confidence

in the truth which she teaches in her confession, would she lose confidence in herself. On the ground of this conviction, therefore, our Church has imparted to her confession an *external* authority also, as far as the members of her own communion are concerned. And this, in the first place, to the Confession of Augsburg, as the fundamental confession of our Church; and also to those other confessional writings connected with it, in which its doctrines are repeated and more precisely defined, in consequence of errors which have since arisen. In these confessional writings, then, and their doctrine, are expressed our Church's perception of Christian truth and her peculiar nature. It is this that constitutes their ecclesiastical authority. 3. Upon this depends the necessity and the right of requiring that an *engagement* to the confession should be entered into. For they who would be teachers in a particular church, and be invested with its ministry, must be not merely in external, but also in internal fellowship with the same, and must therefore agree in its peculiar nature, and share that perception of truth which the church expresses in its confessional writings and their doctrine, and desires to have taught by those who exercise within its pale the office of teachers. The declaration of such agreement is an engagement, whether this is made in the form of an oath or a promise. Hence our Church, after having stated her doctrines in the Confession of Augsburg, bound her teachers to this Confession. It was Luther himself who, in conjunction with Jonas and Bugenhagen, introduced in 1533 the engagement to the Confession of Augsburg (*perseveraturum esse in consensu doctrinæ comprehensæ in Conf. Aug.*), and the statutes of the Theological Faculty of Wittenberg of 1533, drawn up by Melancthon, also contain an engagement to this Confession (*puram evangelii doctrinam consentaneam confessioni quam, 1530 exhibuimus*). 4. From what has been said, the *meaning of this engagement* is obvious. If the confession is the

expression of that perception of divine truth peculiar to the church in question, the engagement naturally concerns this confession, and this only. The oldest form of engagement in our Church, dating from the very era of the Reformation, speaks of an "agreement in doctrine as comprised in the Confession of Augsburg" (*consensus doctrinae*, etc.). The engagement, then, does not concern each and every particular in the confessional writings, is not entered into with respect to each separate argument, each theological detail, each peculiarity of diction, nor to such private opinions of Luther and Melancthon as may be therein expressed. No enlightened theologian of our Church has ever understood, and none even of the strictest theologians of our own days understand, the engagement in the extent here denied, but regard it as applying to doctrine only, *i.e.* to that perception of Christian truth laid down, both negatively and positively, for our Church above others, and specially stated in the various confessional writings and in the connection of its several elements. It is true that the engagement is not fulfilled when applied only to the "spirit" of the Confession, which each might conceive according to his own pleasure, for the spirit of our Church is expressed in that very doctrine laid down in the Confession. Nor when restricted only to "the letter," but when regard is had to the matter of the Confession. Neither must the engagement be limited to "general principles" or "fundamental doctrines,"—for it is always uncertain and optional what we are to understand by these,—but to the doctrine of our Church as here clearly and definitely stated.'

I have discussed the demand for unity of doctrine connected with this subject, and the consequences resulting from this demand, with respect to variety and arbitrary diversity of doctrine, in a lecture 'On the Importance of Unity of Doctrine to the Lutheran Church at the Present Time,' delivered at the second General Lutheran Conference (Leipz. 1870).

(13) Even a Rothe acknowledges the affinity between Lutheranism and the German mind. Comp. *Stille Stunden* (Wittenberg 1872), p. 258: 'The Lutheran Reformation, with all its weaknesses, has the great strength of being *especially German* (Luther was a thorough and genuine German). Hence the Protestant world of Germany has still an instinctive leaning to Lutheranism.' 'There is no son of our nation of whom we have more right to be proud, and no teacher of the Church since the days of the apostles for whom we have more reason to thank God, than Luther. The best aspects of the German character were comprised in him, and in him attained their fullest and richest development. Depth of feeling and a childlike mind, holy seriousness and playful cheerfulness, an eye which penetrated to the depths of eternity, yet at the same time joyfully tarried with every flower of the field, a mind which could be agitated by violent indignation, and yet could pour itself forth in sacred hymn and joyful song, whatever of great and noble our German nature has received of God's grace, all were combined in him. If any one individual is fitted to be a symbol of the mental unity of our nation, it is this son of a Thuringian miner' (*Allg. ev.-luth. Kirchenzeitung*, 1869, No. 1). A large number of like testimonies is to be found in the introduction to the commendable work, *Martin Luther als deutscher Klassiker in einer Auswahl seiner kleineren Schriften*, Frankfort 1871. Thomasius, in his able theological work, *Das Bekenntniss der luth. Kirche in der Konsequenz seines Prinzips*, 1848, shows that the testimony of Luther and the confession of the Lutheran Church are the genuine scriptural form of saving truth.

NOTES TO LECTURE V.

(1) To perceive the importance of married and family life to the entire moral condition of a people, we need only think of France and the decreasing fruitfulness of its marriages. Comp. Roscher, *System der Volkswirthschaft*, vol. i. 9th ed. 1871, p. 553; indeed the whole section, in which he treats of matrimonial and family matters in general, is in the highest degree instructive, as bringing before us the great importance of the subject. Trendelenburg, *Naturrecht*, p. 232 sq., carries out the fact that marriage is the foundation of all the moral order of natural life. I specially recommend, however, Riehl's *Familie*, reprinted for the sixth time in 1862, and forming the 3d vol. of his *Naturgeschichte des Volks*—a book worthy to be repeatedly read. Political revolutionists are generally destroyers also of domestic life, because this forms the foundation of civil society. This applies to the socialism of a Proudhon and a Fournier (comp. Roscher, i. 167). 'It is because marriage is the precious foundation and corner-stone of all society that the misanthropic spirit of our age shows itself most emphatically in the laws concerning marriage.' 'Fecunda culpæ secura nuptias primum inquinavere et genus et domos; hoc fonte derivate clades in patriam populumque fluxit,' Horat. *Od.* iii. 6, as we are reminded by Hamann, *Versuch einer Sibylle über die Ehe*, 1775 (*Schr.* iv. p. 227). It is characteristic that the determining powers of life, the virtues and vices, are usually represented as women. In Holy Scripture the figures by which the kingdom of God is represented are for the most part taken from domestic life. God is 'the true Father of whatever can be called a family in heaven or earth' (Eph. iii. 16). 'As a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear Him' (Ps. ciii. 13). He will comfort us 'as one whom his mother comforteth' (Isa.

lxvi. 12). 'Can a woman forget her sucking child?' etc. (Isa. xlix. 15.) And Paul Gerhardt says:

'Mit Mutterhänden leitet Er
Die seinen stetig hin und her.'¹

The highest relation between God and man, between God and the Church, is represented under the image of marriage (*e.g.* Eph. v. 23). The Church is the bride (*e.g.* Rev. xxi. 9).

(2) On women in the ancient world, comp. Döllinger, *Heidenthum und Judenthum*, 1857, p. 680 sq. (*ihre Stellung bei den Griechen*), p. 698 sq. (*bei den Römern*). Grecian history and literature are remarkably barren of noble female characters, and we very seldom receive a favourable impression of the influence of the mothers and wives upon the acts and characters of their sons and husbands. 'Not voluntarily and naturally, but constrained by law, do we accommodate ourselves to marriage and the begetting of children,' says Plato, speaking quite generally (*Sympos.* p. 192). Spartan legislature regarded marriage as an institution for the production of healthy and robust citizens, and laid down laws concerning it entirely from this point of view. The law-giver desired, as Plutarch says, not that citizens should jealously claim the exclusive possession of their wives, but that they should, on the contrary, be willing to share them with others, etc. 'Even in the time of Socrates, the Spartan women were notorious throughout all Greece for their profligacy.' In Athens it was the men. 'We have,' says Demosthenes of the Athenian, 'prostitutes for pleasure, concubines for the daily care of the body, and wives for the production of legitimate children and the trustworthy guardianship of the house.' If retirement, constraint, ignorance, and legal respect were the portion of wives, freedom, education, the admiration of men, and, at last, contempt, were the

¹ He even leads His own hither and thither with the hands of a mother.

portion of prostitutes. In Rome, where things had formerly been in a better state, the shocking disorders in the relation of the sexes, and the moral degradation of women, especially in the times of the Emperors, are universally known. And equally so is the degraded position still filled by women in the East. Comp. also E. Schmidt (*die bürgerliche Gesellschaft in der altröm. Welt*, etc., trans. 1857), p. 20 sq., on the condition of married women, where the passages on the point in question are cited from the ancients; and p. 168 sq. on the dignity imparted to women and marriage by Christianity. An interesting discussion of this subject is found also in the *Allg. ev.-luth. Kirchenzeitung*, 1872, 'Thoughts on the Calling and Position of the Christian Woman.' Many lectures and articles on the position and vocation of Christian women have recently appeared. I name among others my lecture *On the Service of Women in the Kingdom of God*, 1868; Wichern, *der Dienst der Frauen in der Kirche*, 1857; Frank (of Erlangen), *das Christenthum und die Frauen*, 1868; Ad. Monod, *La Femme*.

(3) For what Luther says of the divine institution of marriage and the universal duty of marriage, see my *Ethik Luthers*, pp. 96-100. With exceeding beauty and feeling does he portray the charms of married life, and sound the praise of conjugal love and fidelity. 'The highest gift and favour of God is a pious, kind, godly, and domestic wife, with whom thou mayest live peaceably, and to whom thou mayest entrust all thy possessions, yea, thy body and thy life,' etc. (*Tischreden*, Erl. ed. 61, 169). Comp. in general the whole section on Marriage, etc., in the *Tisch.* (61, 164-304). Trendelenburg (*Natur.* p. 233 sq.) well carries out the subject, that, by reason of the distinction of the sexes, the two opposites mutually need each other for the formation of a common and harmonious whole.

(4) Harless (*Christliche Ethik*, 6th ed. 1864, p. 512).

Christian conduct will, in conformity with nature, sanction a desire for marriage. Where external circumstances do not show it to be the will of God that this desire should be suppressed, it is natural and God-ordained; while abstinence from marriage is, on the contrary, arbitrary and wilful. 1 Cor. vii. is appealed to, on the Romish side, in favour of the superior sanctity of celibacy. But St. Paul is here speaking only of considerations which make it *advisable* to abstain from marriage, not of such as show this abstention to be the *absolute* will of God to individuals. Comp. also Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, ii. 2, 2d ed. 1860, p. 416 sq. 'It is certain that the apostle recommends celibacy as decidedly as could be done without derogating from the dignity of matrimony. He does not, however, recommend it as a state holier in itself, but as one which makes a Christian life easier, and undivided activity for the kingdom of God possible.' Equally impossible is it to understand what Christ says, Matt. xix. 12, concerning those that have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of God's sake, and those who alone are capable of receiving the saying concerning the indissolubility of marriage, as an unconditional requirement of celibacy. 'He who makes himself an eunuch foregoes entirely the exercise of his manly powers, and when he does this for the kingdom of God's sake, he does it because he is more concerned to enter into and to serve that kingdom than to taste the joys of married life. As, then, the Lord Jesus, in the narrative which (in Matt. and Mark) immediately follows, requires of the rich young ruler that he should give all that he had to the poor for the kingdom of God's sake, without saying that no one can enter into the kingdom of God without first giving all his property to the poor, so is it with the renunciation of marriage. He who does not feel—would the Lord say—that he would willingly make such a sacrifice, when the kingdom of God requires it, cannot enter into heaven. And such an one is also incapable of embrac-

ing such a view of marriage, and of leading such a married life as the Lord, upon scriptural grounds, insists on. For he would certainly find the indissolubility of marriage an insufferable restraint, because the bent of his life is not towards God, but towards the enjoyment of this world' (Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, p. 411 sq.). The Romish view of the sanctity of celibacy is based upon a view of marriage prevalent among the Romish clergy, which regards it as a merely sensual intercourse—a view not infrequently expressed in the works of even esteemed Romish theologians (comp. *e.g.* the coarse manner in which Alban Stolz expresses himself in *Kalender für Zeit und Ewigkeit*, 1864, p. 38), and which is only natural, considering the instructions concerning the relations of married life given to young priests with respect to the confessional. We need only refer to the much talked of Latin *Compendium of Morality* by Gury, whose German translator did not venture to translate the section on the subject in question. Comp. on this Compendium, Nos. 50 and 51 of the *Allg. evang.-luth. Kirchenzeitung*. This view is, on the other hand, connected with the doctrine so long held by the Church of Rome, that there is above and beyond ordinary Christian morality—that fulfilling of the commandments required of all Christians—an observance of the so-called 'evangelical counsels,' which cannot be enjoined, but only advised to those who follow after a high perfection, and which consists especially in the fulfilment of the three monkish vows of poverty, chastity, *i.e.* celibacy, and obedience, as opposed to the lust of the eyes (*i.e.* covetousness), the lust of the flesh, and the pride of life, which form, according to 1 John ii. 16, the essence of worldliness. Upon this doctrine of a twofold morality is based the whole fabric of the Romish system. The evangelical counter-doctrine is, that the highest moral ideal is to be set before all who would be really Christians. That which is not for all cannot be the moral ideal, for it is characteristic of Christianity, in opposi-

tion to the aristocratic character of ancient morality and philosophy, to have made morality as well as truth the common possession of all. The morality required of all Christians is love to God, and even the most perfect can perform nothing higher than the works of this love. On what Luther taught concerning and against this Romish morality, comp. *Ethik Luthers*, pp. 68-75.

(5) On Protestant deaconesses, comp. Lehmann, *die Werke der Liebe*, etc. p. 151 sq. and p. 226 sq. The Evangelical Church at present possesses 42 deaconess houses, about 2000 deaconesses, and almost 600 deaconess stations. During the three last years the number of sisters has been increased by about 500, and that of stations by about 150. The need of them is, however, still greater. The community of Protestant deaconesses should ever bear in mind, that it is based upon an entirely different foundation from the Romish institution of Sisters of Mercy, and should therefore feel no inclination to imitate the Romish fashion of regarding the consecration of deaconesses to their calling as a 'betrothal' to Jesus Christ, but remember that this service is simply a fulfilment of the general duty of Christians in this special form of activity.

(6) It is no marvel that socialists should inculcate the unrestrained intercourse of the sexes, when even poetry devotes itself to the glorification of sin. Comp. Count Strachwitz' 'Solemn Protest' against conjugal love as Philistinism:

'Ich aber sag' euch eher fesseln,
Könnt ihr im Sturz das Wasserfall,
Eh' ihr's vermögt mich einzufesseln
In euren engen Gänsestall.

'Ich aber sag' euch eher wandeln,
Könnt ihr zur Gans den Falken um,
Eh' ihr's vermögt mir einzuhandeln
Eu'r häuslicher Elysium.'¹

¹ I tell you, you may sooner chain the waterfall in its course than chain me into your narrow goose's nest.

I tell you, you may sooner change the falcon into a goose than get me to bargain for your domestic Elysium.

And how many modern poets have adored and extolled an unbridled Cypria! (Comp. Disselhof in his *Vortrage für das gebildete Publikum*, 3d collection, 1864, p. 112.)

(7) Luther: 'It is a Christian and a godly thing to love a maiden whom you may honourably take to wife; for it is a natural inclination which men and women have for each other. And God will not have us despise this inclination, as though it were in itself dishonourable. It is a work of God, which He has Himself wrought in the nature of man, which not only must not be despised and defamed, but must also be held in honour. For God is to be honoured in all His works, both great and small. There is no man so spiritual as not to feel such innate natural inclination and love' (*Tischreden*, Erl. ed. 61, 185).

(8) Aristotle derives ἐρᾶν (to love), according to the Greek saying, from ἰδᾶν (to see) (comp. *Eth. Nicom.* ix. 5, 3, 12, 1), i.e. he makes the love of man and woman depend, in accordance with ancient views in general, upon the gratification of sense.

(9) On the spurious poetry of love, comp. note 6. It is true of genuine love, as is expressed in Cant. viii. 6, that 'love is strong as death, and jealousy is cruel as the grave; the coals thereof are coals of fire, which hath a most vehement flame. Many waters cannot quench love, neither can the floods drown it: if a man would give all the substance of his house for love, it would utterly be contemned.' Luther: 'There is on earth no pleasanter thing than the love of woman to him who may partake of it' (*Tischreden*, Erlangen ed. 61, 212).

(10) Trendelenburg, *Naturrecht*, p. 234: 'Marriage is necessarily monogamy, because the entire personality must be surrendered to it, and this very fact excludes all other relations of a like kind. In polygamy the fidelity and confidence of man and wife do not exist.

The woman is a slave and becomes a mistress. Jealousy prevails among the wives, and hostility among the half-brothers and sisters, the children of different women. Hence, in the history of nations in a state of development, monogamy is a step in advance, a triumph of the spirit of order over individual and therefore destructive desire.' P. 236 sq., he furnishes valuable contributions to the history of the views entertained of marriage. Plato in his *Symposium* views love ideally 'as the desire for the production of the beautiful, in a beautiful body or a beautiful soul.' 'Thus does Plato grasp the sublime and spiritual element in the natural instinct. This is indeed one side, but it is as it were taken out of its natural soil, for Plato is unable either to recognise this thought in marriage, or to keep it free from a Greek unnaturalness which it is impossible and immoral to idealize. Plato's law of marriage is a misconception and a misuse of woman.' Aristotle, directing his attention to the foundation of the actual, discovered the ethic truth, concealed from the idealistic Plato, of the intrinsic destination of the opposites of male and female human nature to form a common, mutually sufficing life. 'Nor is an element of tenderness wanting when the philosopher regards the wife as one supplicating assistance and taken from her own home into another family, as one whom no injustice must approach, and especially the injustice of secondary extra-marital associations.' Among the Stoics, on the contrary, the true feeling for marriage was again lost in the superficial view entertained of it. Kant's cautious definition, that 'marriage is the union of two persons of opposite sex for the life-long mutual possession of the qualities of their respective sexes,' is based upon evasions, and only indirectly excludes polygamy. The definition of the Roman law: 'Nuptiæ sunt conjunctio maris et fœminæ consortium omnis vitæ, divini et humani juris communicatio,' is true and just, if only *omnis vitæ* is taken in the full extent of its meaning. It was Christianity 'which

filled and consecrated this relation of life with its deepest meaning.' 'The deeper comprehension of the law of marriage is established by Christianity.' 'Where the fidelity of monogamy is the custom, it reacts upon fidelity and constancy in general, and it is therefore a characteristic fact, that revolutionary efforts are generally ever directed against this element of moral stability.' 'Bed and board, *commercium et connubium*, have ever been regarded as mutually connected notions; hence all consistent socialists, *e.g.* Proudhon and Fournier, insist as strongly on community of wives as community of goods (comp. Roscher, i. 167). In most legendary history, the institutions of marriage and property are ascribed to the same individual. On community of wives and its evil results among races at a low stage of civilisation, *e.g.* in North America, the South Sea Islands, etc., comp. Roscher, i. 541 sq. Increase of population is as incompatible with community of wives, as increase of wealth is with community of goods. They who have to do with newly-born children will not doubt how easily their feeble spark of life will be extinguished without family care.' 'The Creator has undoubtedly prescribed monogamy, hence it is only in monogamous countries that we can expect domestic life, pleasant social intercourse, and free citizenship' (Roscher, i. 540). 'The respect for woman essential to true love seems quite incompatible with polygamy; the wives take the place of mistresses, and the idea of fidelity is almost foreign to the latter. The husband, too, naturally cannot trust in his wives, hence their seclusion in the harem. He too who is a tyrant in his family is but too generally a slave to his superiors. And what is to be said of the fraternal feeling between the children of different mothers?' (p. 543.)

(11) The increase of unchastity has of late been much talked of. This has been specially occasioned by the many public discussions which the moral condition of Berlin has given rise to, and the question of prosti-

tution and the efforts made against it are the order of the day. Comp. Lehmann, *die Werke der Liebe*, p. 53 sq.

(12) The repeated juxtaposition in Aristotle of the desire for food and drink and the desire for women (iii. 11, 1), or of the enjoyment of food and the enjoyment of love (vii. 4, 2), plainly shows his opinion on the subject. I cite the latter passage: 'Of the things which occasion appetite, some are necessary (constraining), others such as depend indeed on our choice, but admit of excess. I call bodily matters necessary, and understand thereby eating, drinking, the craving for the enjoyment of love, and such like bodily things,' etc. The polemic of St. Paul (1 Cor. vi. 13) shows that even in Christian churches on Greek soil, especially such a soil as Corinth, the view was still cherished which placed eating and the intercourse of the sexes on a level, and consequently regarded the latter as equally indifferent with the former in a moral point of view.

(13) Tacitus, *Germania*, 18 sq.: 'Severa matrimonia—singulis uxoribus contenti sunt—septæ pudicitia—paucissima adulteria—publicatæ pudicitie nulla venia—nemo vitia videt—numerus liberorum finire flagitium habetur—sua quemque mater uberibus alit—sera invenum venus eoque inexhausta pubertas—quanto plus propinquorum tanto gratiosior senectus.' It was quite otherwise, *e.g.*, with the Celts. With this chastity of the Germans were connected the deep seriousness and heartiness of their ancient marriage ceremony (Tac. *Germ.* 18). Such, too, was the state of things in England throughout the Middle Ages; comp. Roscher, i. 541. Though Tacitus may perhaps have coloured his picture too highly, because of the aim he had in view, it is still, after this is allowed for, much to the credit of our ancestors.

(14) On this discontent of the natural man, who is always longing for something else than what God has allotted to him, Luther repeatedly expresses himself in

words worthy of consideration, and hence he repeatedly insists that marriage should be undertaken with prayer, and that prayer should be persevered in afterwards. Comp. his marriage sermons, Works, vol. xviii. p. 269 sq.

(15) On the education of girls, comp. Wöleken, *die Bestimmung und Erziehung des Weibes*, 1865: Kühn, *die Erziehung der Mädchen*, a lecture; and especially K. von Raumer, *die Erziehung der Mädchen*, 2d ed. 1857.

(16) The question of *civil marriage* is now the order of the day. It is self-evident that a marriage is legally such even without any church rite. But the question is, first, what position the Church should occupy towards those who despise her blessing; and, secondly, what judgment we must form on the subject in the interest of the people, and of general moral opinion and practice. With respect to the first point I will quote what Luther says (vi. 460): 'It is therefore a very right and Christian rule that a blessing should be bestowed upon the newly-married pair in presence of the Church of God, and united intercession made for them, that they may enter upon the marriage state in God's name, and prosper in it. If such a blessing were to be bought, no money should be grudged to purchase it. The Church, however, gives it without money, and yet some are so boorish that they never seek it, nay, would rather do without it. Such may be let to go their own way. But they who are Christians will enter upon the state of marriage the more comfortably because of this prayer and blessing.' The Church in itself can have nothing to object in theory, if the civil commonwealth contents itself with the civil transaction, and leaves the members of the Church to obtain the Church's blessing if they wish. In practice, however, it cannot be concealed that, judging from actual results, this course of action furnishes no slight temptation to omit the practice of the church rite, if only on account of the

double trouble and expense connected with it. And this, as every judicious friend of the people will allow, would not only be a grievous injury to the Christian habits of life of the nation, but would react also with grave effect upon its view of marriage. This is shown even by Trendelenburg in his *Naturrecht*, though, in conformity with his subject, he occupies the standpoint of the State, p. 248 sq. The public declaration of intention when a marriage is concluded, is naturally under the protection of civil law, because the results of marriage belong in their wide extent to civil life. It is nevertheless a true instinct which would commit marriage, with its deep moral interests, to the guardianship of the Church, *i.e.* the ethic community based upon belief in the divine, and that the State should leave to the Church, together with the solemnization of marriage, the power of legalizing the contract. Where indeed contrary to what ought to be—but in consequence of what is—the actual state of affairs, the Church and State are at variance as to their view of the marriage law, the civil law will, as in the case of civil marriage, first make its claims good, and leave the claims of the Church, as affairs of their own, to the Church and its members.—When civil marriage originates in consequence of the disagreement between Church and State concerning the moral conditions of matrimony, it is an expedient; but even then a dignity should be maintained in its performance which would forbid its being regarded as a mere piece of legal business. With respect to the position of the Church towards those who content themselves with civil marriage, even Rothe, while insisting upon the ‘exceptional allowance of civil marriage, and at the same time claiming for it the character of a religious, and indeed a decidedly Christian (but not a church or confessional) transaction,’ confesses: ‘It is only reasonable that the Church should expect from those within her pale, that they should not desire to take such a step as that of entering the married state

otherwise than as members of the Church, and in active communion with her, and consequently with her express sanction and blessing; she can recognise none who feel no need of her prayers and blessing as her genuine members, and must hence require as the condition, not of her regarding such a marriage as valid and Christian, but of her continuing to regard the married pair as her members, that, as far as in them lies, they should conclude marriage no otherwise than by procuring its solemnization by the Church' (*Theol. Ethik*, v. 61, § 1088). In saying this, Rothe goes farther than is necessary. It is not church membership, but the full possession of church privileges, the full right of church citizenship, that should be denied to such.

(17) Riehl, *die Familie* (I quote from the 3d reprint, 1855), p. 154: 'Truly a father of a family should not lightly cast away the last remnant left him of the priestly dignity of his forefathers, viz. the office of praying before and with "the whole household." There is more honour, rank, and sovereign right in it, than in a whole collection of titles and orders. And many a poor wretch of a father has a true perception that it is so, who is yet afraid of being laughed at by his more "refined" neighbours. He is not ashamed of being little or hardly ever in his home, but very much so of being priest and master there! "Die Feigheit ist's die uns verdirbt" (It is cowardice that spoils us), as the old song says,' etc. Comp. also the able section, *Verleugnung und Bekenntniss des Hauses*, p. 233 sq.

(18) Eph. v. 28, 29; Col. iii. 19; 1 Pet. iii. 7. On the position of man and wife in the family, as mutually supplying each other's deficiencies, comp. Riehl, *die Familie*, p. 20. On the dignity and duty of the husband, Thiersch, *Ueber christliches Familienleben*, 6th ed. 1872, p. 44 sq. On the position of the father of the family, Trendelenburg, *Naturrecht*, p. 257. 'It is the

characteristic of the father of the family that the unity of the whole household should, for the sake of every member of it, be involved in his intelligent will. From this idea arise both his duties and his rights,—his duties towards the members of his household (wife, children, servants), and his rights for those duties' sake. Head and members unite in the common object of the moral welfare of the family, and find in it the measure of both their duties and rights; the head of the household the duties of protection and maintenance, the members the duties of obedience and work.'

(19) The best discussion of the passages of Scripture which treat of divorce will be found in Harless' *Die Ehescheidung, eine erneute Untersuchung der neuesten Schriftstellen*, Stuttg. 1861. Besides this may be consulted the articles (by von Hofmann) in the *Zeitschrift für Protestantismus und Kirche*, Erlangen 1859, Nos. 1 and 2, 'What Holy Scripture says of Divorce.' Luther's opinion on this question has been for some years the subject of repeated discussion. I refer on this matter especially to the articles, Luther's *Eherechtsweisheit* and *Zugeständniss und Erläuterung*, the former in the Dec. and Nov. Nos. for 1858 of the same journal, the latter in No. 3 for 1861. Thiersch, indeed, in his above-named work, p. 21 sq., appealing to Döllinger, p. 165 sq., rejects all actual divorce, and denies the right of the innocent party to contract a fresh marriage. This, however, is incompatible with the exception of our Lord, 'Except for the cause of fornication.' His indignation, however, at lax legislation concerning marriage, especially that of the Prussian common law (pp. 23 and 167), by which its sanctity and indissolubility are destroyed, is perfectly justifiable. It is true that national legislation may, like the Mosaic law, have occasion 'for hardness of heart,' i.e. because of the prevalence of immorality, to make some concessions. To this, however, must be applied what Luther says, li. 37: 'Where, however, there are

non-Christians or uncivilised false Christians, it might be well even now to keep to this law (viz. the Mosaic precept of giving a writing of divorcement), and to let them separate from their wives and take others like the heathen, lest by their discordant lives they should have two hells, one in this world, the other in the next. But let them know that by reason of such separations they are no longer Christians, but heathens, and in a state of condemnation.' Brenz, the Wurttembergian reformer, designated such a connection a 'respectable concubinage.' The main point is to keep alive the conviction of the indissolubility of marriage. On this point, comp. Trendelenburg, p. 249: 'Marriage is by its very nature designed to be indissoluble. Only when this is presupposed has it any moral force. If it could be conceived of as naturally soluble, its centre of gravity would be something else than the fact that it is a self-completing life-association.' 'Marriage is not a universally acknowledged compact, but an ordinance to which individuals are subject, and whose duration is not placed at their discretion. In this stability there is a moral power, to which the now capricious, now inordinate affections have to submit.' On adultery and its criminality, p. 252 sq. How much the strictest possible law of divorce is in favour of the wife is brought out by Riehl, *die Familie*, p. 67.

NOTES TO LECTURE VI.

(1) On this point I refer, with reiterated emphasis, to Riehl, the panegyrist of the 'united family,' and of the 'German household.' Comp. *die Familie*, p. 142 sq.; *das ganze Haus*, p. 163 sq.; *die Familie und die bürgerliche Baukunst*, etc., p. 260 sq.; *zum Wiederaufbau des Hauses*. The consciousness that the German household is our most precious national jewel, in which

lay its strength, and in which still lies its future greatness, the consciousness of our unity in domestic morals, must be again attained.' On what has been said concerning piety, comp. p. 118: 'Authority and piety are moral motive powers in the family. This is not the case in the State, where they retire to the second rank, and give place to the consciousness of law, which takes the first in their stead.' He then further carries out this distinction between the family and the State, p. 122.

(2) On the importance of custom, comp. Riehl, p. 118: 'The rule of custom begins in the family, and extends thence over civil society.' 'A custom can never be made by the caprice of an individual; it is born and grows like a popular ballad.' It is 'the historical product of a whole series of human developments. It is a vessel containing not the wisdom of an individual, but the wisdom of ages.' On religious family customs, comp. p. 154 sq., and Thiersch, *Christl. Familienleben*, p. 63 sq.

(3) On the scarcity of children in French marriages, comp. Roscher, i. 550 and 553. A decrease, however, in the numbers of families has been observed also in other countries, p. 551. The Christian apologists repeatedly reproach the heathen with killing their children either before or after birth, *e.g.* Tertull. *Apolog.* c. 9. This crime is to this very day indigenous in the heathen world; comp. Roscher, p. 538. The *patria potestas* according to Roman law included an absolute power over the life of the child (comp. Trendelenburg, *Naturrecht*, p. 260). The right of exposing newly-born children was, with respect at least to the weakly and deformed, unquestioned in the ancient world (comp. E. Schmidt, *die bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, p. 46 sq.). Plato and Aristotle, too, justify not only this, but also the procuring of abortion (Plato, *de Rep.* vol. i. p. 276; Arist. *Polit.* vii. 14; Schmidt, p. 48). All this lasted till the Christian era, and was only abolished by the influence of Christianity.

The celebrated physician Dr. Lancaster, however, reckons that in London alone are 12,000 mothers who regularly destroy their children! (*Kaiserswerther Armen- und Krankenfreund*, 1869, p. 114.)

(4) The history and doctrine of infant baptism have been very thoroughly treated by Hötling, *das Sakrament der Taufe*, etc., vol. i. 1859, p. 98 sq. Luther's sayings on baptism in general, and infant baptism in particular, have been collected by Löhe (Dr. M. L.'s *Worte v. d. heil. Taufe*, 2d ed. Nürnb. 1859). On infant baptism in particular, p. 103, Lühr's *die Wiedertäufer*, new ed. 1869, is a popular work on baptism in opposition to Anabaptist error.

(5) The descriptions given in the English Blue-book of 1865, and thence transferred to many journals and works (comp. e.g. *Kaiserswerther Armen- und Krankenfreund*, 1869, p. 111), of the state of children a few years since in English factories, are truly shocking. We read of children of five years of age who were obliged to work daily from fourteen to sixteen hours far on into the night; of boys of three years old squatting at the fire holding hot irons, many of them cooling their scorched fingers in bowls of water; of others with their hands bound up because their fingers were out of joint; nay, of mothers who pinned their children when at work with them to their aprons, that they might be able when they were sinking from weariness to shake them up again without ceasing from their own labour; and how through all this the whole of the youthful labouring class were half imbecile, crippled mentally as well as bodily. 'As soon as a child can hold a pin,' say the Commissioners, 'it is booked for misery.' The famous Ten Hours' Act of 1847 (carried out still further by the Acts of 1853 and 1856) had indeed already prescribed that children under eight should not be employed at all in factories, that those of from eight to twelve should work no longer

than five hours, from thirteen to eighteen no longer than ten. But even this is unquestionably too long. If twenty-nine per cent. of the children under thirteen years of age find employment in England, we can call this nothing but a sin against childhood. In Saxony the employment of children under fourteen amounts to only one-half per cent. There may be certain kinds of work, and external regulations may be possible, which would make the moderate employment of children admissible; but on the whole a factory is certainly one of the worst places for them. Lotze, *Mikrokosmos*, iii. 272 sq., speaks of the darker side of factory life in general, and especially of the dispiriting and joyless nature of factory work, in terms which well deserve consideration.

(6) Riehl, *die Familie*, p. 125. Thiersch, *Christl. Familienleben*, p. 79 sq., speaks very seriously of home being the right place for the education of children. On the duty of parents to educate and provide school instruction for their children, see Trendelenburg, p. 259.

(7) Herbart, *Umriss pädagogischer Vorlesungen*, 4th ed. 1841, p. 162. The firmer the rules by which a child finds himself surrounded, the easier will he find it to submit to them. Comp. Thiersch, *Christliches Familienleben*, p. 109; Riehl, p. 118: 'It is from the family that the sway of custom proceeds.'

(8) Riehl, p. 123: 'It is in the home alone that our people must re-acquire the spirit of authority and piety, in the home that they must learn how discipline and freedom go hand in hand, how the individual must sacrifice himself for a higher moral collective personality,' etc. Thiersch, p. 107: 'Obedience, and that a willing obedience, proceeding from an internal cause, viz. reverence, is not a virtue but *the* virtue of children, the sum-total of all the goodness we can demand or expect from them.'

(9) J. C. Erdmann, in his *Psychologische Briefen*, p. 309 sq., expresses himself in a manner well worthy of consideration, concerning the analogy between memory and obedience: 'To impress upon the memory is in the intellectual sphere what obedience is in the practical. We learn by appropriating what has been already thought out. In old age learning is difficult, because age is intended for something else, viz. to think for itself. If what should have been learned in youth is delayed, the subsequent difficulty of acquiring it is the well-deserved punishment. If the intellect of childhood is, according to its very notion, memory, it is self-evident that the strength of the memory is in childhood the sole standard of the energy of the intellect. With a child there is but one measure of talent, and that is memory; but one measure of morality, and that is obedience. In the days when a false pedagogy was driving obedience out of the world, by proposing always to communicate to children the reason of a command, it was also the fashion to attack memory. The reason, it was said, must be exercised instead of the memory. This made children precocious, *i.e.* stupid, because what is wisdom in age is stupidity in childhood. So, too, in practical matters, did this kind of education make children bad and immoral, because that which is subsequently a moral requirement is in childhood opposed to the idea, *i.e.* bad,' etc. It is obvious that these remarks of Erdmann, first written in 1856, are still in season with respect to the present tendency in education, especially in its attack upon the learning by heart of texts and hymns.

(10) On the matter of—corporeal—punishment, comp. Prov. x. 13, xiii. 24, xxiii. 13 sq.; Heb. xii. 5-11. Thiersch, *Christl. Familienleben*, p. 112 sq.: 'Hence those teachers do not deserve a hearing who will not allow of punishment—at least of corporeal punishment—in education. If the punishment is of a right kind, it does

not merely act on the senses, but by sensible terror and pain it arouses and sharpens the consciousness that a moral power, a just judge, an inviolable law, presides over us. It does not loosen but strengthens the moral tie by which the child is united to the father, for experience shows that strict fathers are greatly beloved,' etc. The apostle indeed warns us, Col. iii. 21: 'Fathers, provoke not your children, lest they be discouraged.'— 'One word about after anger. Scarcely is a serious punishment itself so important as the first quarter of an hour after it, and the transition to forgiveness. After a storm each seed finds the ground softened; fear and hatred of punishment, which at first were hardened against exhortation and revolted at advice, are now past, and gentle instruction penetrates and heals, as honey allays the sting of a bee, and oil alleviates wounds,' etc. *Levana oder Erziehungslehre*, by Jean Paul, i. p. 137, in Thiersch, p. 177.

(11) Wolfgang Menzel, in his *Kritik des modernen Bewusstseins*, in the chapter on educational vagaries, p. 174 sq., has some excellent remarks on this subject. At p. 184 he says: 'Suppose it should succeed, and every child should be capable of being initiated in all the arts and sciences, what a dreadful fate it would be to have all really talented, and through having none but great and highly cultivated minds, to find none to till the fields, make boots, clean the house! But what folly is it to take such capability for granted, and to regulate education accordingly, when nothing is more certain than the fact, that, according to God's wise ordainment, there will always be, so long as the world exists, mental capacities and inclinations proportioned to the indispensable labour imposed on man for his own maintenance.'

(12) Against pietistic pressure and forcing in religious education, comp. Thiersch, pp. 97 sq., 104. He speaks with great beauty on the duty of accustoming a child

to prayer, and of initiating him in Holy Scripture : ' As a child is taught to speak, so should he be taught to pray by his mother, and so soon as he can utter his first words to man, should his mother lead him to speak to God.' ' Convinced that a child's words reach the heart of God, she will reverently fulfil this maternal duty. When she is making her child say his morning and evening prayer, she is performing a no less sacred and sublime office than the minister of Christ, when, standing at the altar, he sends up to God the prayers of the Church.' ' When story-telling and the earliest instructions begin, the mother should not delay to tell the child stories from the Bible, and especially from the history of the Saviour, in that childish language which none so well understand as a mother. Who can sufficiently pity those parents who suffer themselves to be deprived of so pure a joy as giving to their child the first tidings of his Redeemer, and witnessing the first fresh deep impression made upon a childish mind by these tidings.' ' There is nothing in the world that can compare with the wealth of moral elements of education, and of deepest truths under forms most easy of apprehension, which we possess for our children in the Bible history.'

(13) Ranke, *Geschichte Deutschlands im Zeitalter der Reformation*, ii. (4th ed.) p. 313. Palmer has collected in his *Evang. Katechetik* (3d ed. 1851, p. 252) appreciative opinions on Luther's Catechism, in opposition to the depreciating and unintelligent judgment of an affected modern pedagogy. Löhe, *drei Bücher von der Kirche*, p. 123 : ' Luther's smaller Catechism is a confession of the Church, and indeed of all confessions that which is most suitable and best adapted for the people. It is a fact which no one denies, that no other catechism in the world can be *made a prayer* of but this. But it is less known that it may be called a real marvel in respect of the extraordinary fulness and great abundance

of knowledge expressed in it in so few words.' Luther says of himself in a subsequent preface to the larger Catechism: 'This, however, I will say for myself, I too am a doctor and preacher, and one as learned and experienced as any of those who have such presumption and assurance' (he is speaking of those who despised the Catechism), 'yet I still act as a child who is learning his catechism, and read and say every morning, and whenever I have time, the Ten Commandments, the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the Psalms, etc., word by word. And I am still obliged daily to read and study, and yet cannot get on as I would wish, but still remain and love to remain the child and pupil of the Catechism. And these nice fastidious fellows think with one reading to be instantly doctors above all doctors, to know everything and to need nothing more!'

(14) The literature of the school question has so inordinately increased, that it is not possible to enter into it. I shall confine myself to citing a few opinions. On the introduction of the Bible and religion into schools, Luther says in his address to the nobles of the German nation: 'Above all things Holy Scripture must be the chief and the most general reading, whether in the higher or lower schools.' The *Wurtb. ev. Consist.*, in a decree of the year 1856, declares 'that the old and sacred rights of the Bible in the schools may not be violated or curtailed, and that it is to be regarded as the central point in the religious education of the young, whether in doctrine or history, just as the reading-book is the central point of instruction in the linguistic and realistic departments.' Bluntschli, too, says: 'I declare myself against an education which ignores religion, or which is even hostile to the Confession! It would be no gain, no progress, but a step back towards barbarism. All the great acquisitions which we owe to Christianity would be abandoned.' . . . 'The school must help not merely to develope the intellect, but also to warm and ennoble

the heart. The national school should not merely turn out intelligent men, but also arouse the religious consciousness, sow the seed of faith in the hearts of children, and strengthen it to all virtuous action. If in the former matter the ultimate decision and chief care belong to the State, the Church has most to do with and can best effect the latter purpose. "As both the father and mother conduct the domestic education, so should both Church and State unite in caring for the public education of the people." (See the excellent work of Ad. Stählin, *die Schulreformfrage*, 1865, p. 85.) Schleiermacher, on the second day of the Reformation Jubilee, 1817, said: 'We cannot sufficiently thank God that in the days of a pernicious sophistry concerning divine things, and of a destructive superiority to wholesome institutions, *the connection between the Church and the school* was not also dissolved; for only thereby has a great portion of our youth attained to that early acquaintance with the word of God of which we cannot doubt the salutary influence. Where this is wanting, how much more easily is the germ of good repressed, how much more easily does youth rush into all kinds of errors! And how few return, after the disgraceful suppression of their pious feelings, to the way of life!' The votes of the preceptorial world indeed are at present on the other side. Even the Protestant Union is not liberal enough for the *Allgem. deutscher Lehrerzeitung*, which thus addresses it: 'What is the Church, now in its decay and dissolution, to us? What cultivated mind does not now think with repugnance and often with disgust of the Church? Regard us with a *noli me tangere* if you will; we can go our way without you, for our ways are different' (comp. *Allg. Ev. Kirchenzeitung*, 1871, No. 18, 'On the School Question,' p. 323). Finally, both words and feelings, as expressed and received with the greatest approbation at the two great meetings of teachers at Vienna and Hamburg, can be designated as nothing else than savage in their

hostility to the Church and clergy. With respect to the relation to the clergy, we would recall to mind a saying of that great authority in the matter of education, K. v. Raumer: 'If teachers return from their lamentable delusions, if the clergy apply themselves to a thorough educational training, it is easy to foresee that the connection between Church and school will not be dissolved, but on the contrary strengthened' (*Gesch. der Pädag.* iii. 1, p. 103). Would that these words might be fulfilled! I refer once more to the observations of Trendelenburg, as an entirely unprejudiced witness. In his *Naturrecht*, p. 476, he says: 'In the education of children, the Church, the home, the State meet.' . . . 'It is a one-sided theory of the rights of the State which favours so complete a separation of Church and State as to let the State deprive itself of a spiritual assistance.' . . . He also calls to mind (p. 479) that Luther in his sermon on the duty of keeping children at school required compulsory education, and also (p. 480) that it is a matter of history that the care for the general instruction of the people in the elements of education originated with the Church, and especially with the Evangelical Church. The work of Bishop Dupanloup on school teaching in Prussia (translated by Sickinger) regards the strength of Prussia as consisting in the Christian character of its national schools, and holds this up—as shown by the Prussian school-regulations—as a model to France. Turning from Prussia to England, he brings forward expressions of opinion by the most renowned English statesmen. 'Sir Robert Peel desires, in the name of the rights of conscience, that religion should form the universal foundation of every education, and that the religious instruction given in schools should be of a doctrinal character.' Gladstone: 'Every system which looks upon religious education as an accessory is a pernicious system.' Cousin, too, the French philosopher, says: 'Without religion schools would perhaps do more harm than good,

perhaps would only serve to introduce a barbarism of a new kind.' To what tyranny toward Christians the separation of State schools from religion and the Church leads has been shown of late years by the example of the schools in Holland (comp. on this subject Schwarz, *die religionslose Schule der Niederlande und ihre Früchte*, Berlin 1868).

(15) On slavery in the ancient world, comp. Lotze, *Mikrokosmos*, iii. 257: 'In the heroic ages, the miseries of slavery impending on the widow and orphan—as bewailed with melancholy forebodings by Hector and Andromache—were regarded as the destiny which it was but natural that the course of events should induce, and for which human wisdom was powerless to find a remedy. In the palmy days of Greece, when social institutions had long been discussed with political acuteness, the calmness with which even the most elevated minds regarded slavery, as a self-evident element of the political edifice, really arouses indignation. . . . The superabundant rhetoric and logical verbosity scarcely conceal the aristocratic selfishness which infers from the consciousness of those benefited, and from the need for some to be honourably and liberally educated, the self-obviousness of the slavery of others. The capacities of men differ; Aristotle makes the distinction of king-like souls who are capable of living nobly and worthily, and others who can neither propose to themselves reasonable tasks, nor possess the power of fulfilling them. But the moral duty of loving compassion and of educational care towards the weak is not demanded of the strong because of this distinction. The term here chosen of king-like souls imperceptibly introduces the claim of power into this view, and the weak become the property of the strong. This justification is even worse than the thing itself.' Aristotle—as is well known—calls slaves (*Polit.* i. 2, 4 sq.) animated instruments needful for life, instruments for the em-

ployment of utensils, a portion of their possessor himself, and therefore absolutely belonging to and dependent upon him. This distinction he justifies on philosophical grounds (*Polit.* i. 2, 8 sq.). Trendelenburg, *Naturrecht*, p. 173 sq.: 'Where slavery prevails, the idea of personality is not the moral characteristic of man, but an aristocratic privilege.' There history must be viewed in the light of the view of slavery taken by the ancient world. Waiz has recently shown, in a thorough investigation of the subject, that there is no *specific* distinction between different races of men in respect of their intellectual condition, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, i. 368 sq., 393; Trendelenburg, p. 177. On servants, comp. the earnest language of Thiersch, *Christliches Familienleben*, p. 141 sq.

(16) On domestic sociability, comp. Riehl, *Familie, die Familie und der gesellige Kreis*, p. 236 sq.; Thiersch, p. 151 sq. The question of social intercourse itself will find its place subsequently (lect. x. note 10).

(17) On the history of Christian works of mercy, comp. lect. x. note 6. On the question of communism, lect. ix. note 8.

NOTES TO LECTURE VII.

(1) On the State as a product of history, comp. *e.g.* Constantin Franz, *Vorschule zur Physiologie der Staaten*, Berlin 1857—a work designated by Trendelenburg in his *Naturrecht*, p. 363, as one of great observation—pp. 61, 63: 'The State is not a mere process, but the result of a process, that is to say, that the process by which it is developed must sooner or later attain to this conclusion.' P. 118 sq.: 'States, with all they are or possess, are found within the pale of history.' States do not

spring up according to general and necessary forms, like natural organisms, but arise through a complication of facts, which forms the basis of their individuality, etc. Hence it is a mistake to say, as *e.g.* in Wagener's *Staats- und Gesellschaftslexicon*, under the article 'Staat' (vol. xix. 1865, p. 578): 'Man and the State are inseparable; there can be no development of mankind except in the State.' Aristotle already shows that, 'according to the system of nature, States must be conceived of before men. . . . Man is a ζῷον πολιτικόν.' Hence the question concerning the origin of the State coincides with that concerning the origin of mankind. 'The State is primordial,' says Dahlmann; 'the primitive family is the primitive State, and every family independently viewed is a State. For even in the first few men of the first family, the notions of custom, justice, and order were aroused. This condition of order passed from the family to those artificial political institutions from which the State proceeded. Consequently, the State is an expression for the moral order of the world, a thing originally given, and not historically developed,' etc. All this is erroneous, or is at least stated in a manner open to misconstruction. It is the ancient view, which absolutely identified men with their national or political existence, and made the commencement of the State coeval with the beginning of mankind, and which consequently failed to admit the independent rights either of personality and its relation to God, *i.e.* religion, or of the family, in respect of the State. Holy Scripture and the view based thereon teach us to distinguish between the beginning of mankind and the family, and that of nations and states, and exhibit the latter as a fresh stage in the historical development of mankind.

(2) That the State does not arise absolutely from the family, as is made to appear in the passages quoted from Wagener in note 1, and even by Dahlmann, is admitted by Constantin Franz, p. 18: 'Consequently the

State must not be regarded as a kind of extended family ; for widely as a family may spread and ramify through a series of generations, it is yet essential to the principle of a family that all its members should have sprung from that one unity, the family ; the citizens of the State, on the contrary, do not originate from the State, but precede it. Hence the application of the analogy of the family principle to the State is not very suitable. Nor can it be shown that "any State was ever developed from a family, while the contrary is admitted of all historical States." So, too, p. 63. Hence it follows, p. 37, that 'supreme power can never be possessed as private property.' It was, as is well known, the doctrine of Haller, in his *Restauration der Staatswissenschaften*, 6 vols. 1845, that the sovereign power bore the character of private property, in opposition to the revolutionary tenet, that it was the result of a political compact. But public power, because it is public, cannot have the nature of a private right, and this is not the correct way of restoring the inviolability and sacredness of the magistracy. Comp. Stahl's refutation in his *Rechtsphilosophie* (2d ed. p. 553 sq.).

(3) The view of a compact already rests upon the doctrine of Hugo Grotius, a statement and criticism of which may be compared in Stahl's *Rechtsphilosophie*, p. 158. It was subsequently further modified by Rousseau (comp. *Contrat social ou principes du droit publique*, 1762), and attained a wide-spread acceptance. On Rousseau, comp. Stahl, p. 294 sq. Rousseau's problem was to combine man's inalienable right to liberty with his connection with the State and the obligations resulting therefrom. He found its solution in the complete renunciation of all his rights by each member of the community in favour of the whole—the general will thus originating is sovereign. This theory presupposes a natural condition and equality of man at variance with all experience. The compact, whether

historically or philosophically considered, is not the original source of justice. Only possible under the protection of the State, it is, both in this democratic theory and in Hobbes' absolutist theory, made to precede and to lay the foundation of the State' (Trendelenburg, *Naturrecht*, p. 14). Against the view which makes the State originate in voluntary agreement, comp. Const. Franz, p. 52 sq., where it is shown that the result of such an attempt to construct a commonwealth simply from the free choice of men might perhaps be a French revolution, but not a State.

(4) Const. Franz, p. 55, shows that the State can no more be derived from pure force than from free agreement. 'Slavery is based upon pure force, but slaves, wherever they are found, form no integral portion of the State; they are not subjects, but are esteemed as mere property. Despotism could not have founded the earliest States, for they exhibit a character of internal calmness and stability' (p. 62). It is now certain that the primitive States could not have originated either in voluntary agreement or the despotism of a ruler, but that they were the result of an intrinsic necessity. Such an intrinsic necessity did not, however, consist in the natural growth of the body politic out of the family; as this could only give rise to a patriarchal combination of tribes, which in themselves neither are, nor can become true states without the addition of another element.' So also does Trendelenburg, p. 800, oppose the two theories of usurpation and compact. Gregory VII. (Hildebrand) expressed in very strong terms the view, that sovereign power originated in force and ungodly usurpation, and at the instigation of the devil: 'Quis nesciat, reges et duces ab iis habuisse principium, qui Deum ignorantes, superbia, rapinis, perfidia, homicidiis, postremo universis pæne sceleribus mundi principe diabolo videlicet agitante super pares, scilicet homines, dominari cæca cupiditate et intolerabili præsumptione affectaverunt' (Greg. lib. viii.

'Epist. ad Herimannum episc. Metensem a 1081,' in Gieseler's *Church History*, vol. iii. p. 4, Clark's translation). Jesuit professors, on the contrary, as Bellarmin and Mariana, advocate the compact theory and the sovereignty of the people. From this they deduce the lawfulness of tyrannicide, etc. Comp. Stahl, *Rechtsphilosophie* (2d ed.), p. 292.

(5) When Const. Franz reduces the divine element in the foundation of the State to mere providence (p. 31), this is neither satisfactory nor in harmony with the famous passage, Rom. xiii. 1. Cicero well remarks, *Somnium Scipionis*, c. 3: 'Nihil est illi principi Deo, qui omnem hunc mundum regit, quod quidem in terris fiat, acceptius, quam concilia cœtusque hominum jure sociati quæ civitates appellantur.' Comp. Rothe, *Theol. Ethik*, ii. 2d ed. p. 460. It is a fundamental idea of Trendelenburg's *Naturrecht* that justice has its roots in morality, and that the morality appeals to religion (p. 51). Thus the State is finally rooted in the sphere of religion, and invested with the authority of the divine will. How decidedly Luther advocated the divine foundation of the State, and consequently of government, is well known. His whole moral view is based upon the doctrine of the 'three divine institutions,' the family, the State, and the Church (Works, *e.g.*, 4, 394, Jen. i. 524b: 'Tres enim hierarchias ordinavit Deus contra diabolum, scilicet œconomiam, politiam, ecclesiam,' etc.). It is to the Reformation that we really owe this perception, which never previously existed in this form, though its germ was found among the Hussites (comp. Richter, *Kirchenrecht*, p. 157, note 12: 'Et hæ tres partes debent esse unum corpus ecclesiæ'). Luther made this perception the foundation of his ethics, and caused it to become common property in the popular view of Christianity (comp. *Luther's Ethik*, p. 87 sq.), and from him this doctrine was transmitted to the subsequent instructors of our Church. It must indeed be admitted

that the historical development must be combined with the divine foundation, and that we are indebted to the historical school of jurists for having insisted on the historical element. Comp. on this subject, Stahl, p. 564 sq.: 'Law is one aspect in the sum total of a nation's life, inseparably connected with its other aspects and activities, such as language, custom, art. Hence like these it originates, not from choice and reflection, but in an inherent feeling and instinct, a felt necessity.' The deeper truth which is at the bottom of this is 'the recognition of an active divine administration in history. Hence arises reverence for what exists, acquiescence when a change takes place, and a regard to a higher Power from whom what is necessary and best is expected. Piety, viewed in the light of its inward motives, is a solicitous attendance on history, a preservation of every peculiar institution, a respect for all that has happened without our assistance' (p. 578 sq.). 'In saying this it (the historical school) is decidedly opposed to revolution' (p. 580). It differs, however, from all counter-revolutionary authors—Maistre, Haller—inasmuch as it by no means undertakes to make a final settlement of the form and fashion of the world according to definite and past institutions. It cannot be sufficiently insisted on, that a true feeling for history will not regard it as including only the past; but will recognise also the undisclosed development involved therein, and that a true sense of religion will not arbitrarily limit the divine interposition to earlier formations, as though these were an effort which it could not surpass, but will accept with submission new and future forms, as being equally attributable thereto' (p. 581).

(6) Wagener, *Staats- und Gesellschaftslexicon*, p. 579. The possibility of a State, and indeed the natural basis of any commonwealth, involves the two elements, people and land. Const. Franz, p. 60: 'The dispersion of mankind preceded the foundation of States, and there

can be no doubt that differently gifted and respectively higher and lower nations arose—a fact not only testified to by the Bible, but obvious at the present day in the differences existing between the various races of mankind.' In his further delineation Franz proceeds from the scriptural account of the dispersion (Gen. xi.), and recognises it as the true key to the understanding of that primitive occurrence, of which we are without any other historical knowledge. 'It would be presumptuous to attempt to set up any definite view of that marvellous event, the dispersion, of which we have no historical information, while everything testifies that it was not effected by a gradual estrangement from a common primitive type, but must have taken place by extraordinary occurrences, and, as we have said, in the form of a catastrophe.' 'In consequence of its national basis, the State is the constituted nationality' (p. 77). So too Trendelenburg: 'The nation is the bearer of the State, the State the completion of the nation' (pp. 282, 284). On what is further said in the text on national distinctions, comp. lect. ii. note 12. Also L. Diefenbach, *Vorschule der Völkerkunde aus der Bildungsgeschichte*, 1864; Wagener, *Staats- und Gesellschaftslexicon*, vol. xxi. art. 'Völkerstämme.'

(7) C. Franz, in his above-cited work, aptly shows that the formation of States is not a mere product of nationality, but is occasioned by definite historical events, wants, etc. 'It is not the State itself, but only the elementary organizations which precede the formation of States, that arise from nationality.' The tie of nationality is the reason, so to speak, of only a bringing together of men, while a superiority and subordination, upon which public authority is based, are essential to every political association. The institution of this public authority is conditioned by overruling circumstances, as well as by the nature of the object in view, and is not derived from nationality, which, absolutely considered,

involves no object. Hence nations may go on vegetating for centuries, without advancing to the formation of a State, because no common object establishes its claims among them. When, however, some common object comes forward, they suddenly make their appearance upon the stage of history, as *e.g.* the Germans at the period of their incursions upon the Roman Empire, with which the formation of the German State begins. 'Hence nations are to be regarded as merely the substratum and material of the political organization, and it is in this circumstance that their importance to the State consists.' 'When, however, a commonwealth is formed, and developes itself through several centuries within a nationality, political institutions and tendencies are at last so overgrown by the national character, that the nationality henceforth appears to be the producing and determining power.' The political constitution being, as has been shown, conditioned by the historical relations of a people and country, there is no universal pattern for constitutions, nor any possibility of transferring them from one nation to another. Hence Franz justly ridicules those who regard the peculiar English constitution as the universal model, 'while, on the contrary, every State should seek the pattern of its constitution solely in its own people.' He consequently opposes all such mechanical legislation, p. 157 sq. 'If, then, as is evident, it is their objects which make States and nations great, and even determine their very existence, what folly should it appear to us to attempt to heal a sickly period by mechanical legislation, and to expect the revival of a State from the re-modelling of its constitution.' Trendelenburg, p. 276, blames the Hegelian philosophy, because it would develop a perfect constitution in a purely logical and philosophical manner. 'The constitution which is proportioned to the origin of the State, the history of the people, the peculiarity of their manners, the degree of their cultivation, the political circumstances of the

neighbouring States, in short the corresponding constitution, is always the perfect one.'

(8) Const. Rössler, in his *System der Staatslehre*, i. 1857, p. 538 sq., pours just contempt upon the one-sided principle of nationality, and the fanaticism for nationalities of all possible sorts, which is its consequence. 'Such fanaticism was entertained by Humanism in 1848 for Poles, Czechs, Slaves, Danes, etc., to the prejudice of Germans. It is a folly which has at all times been dreamt of, that the political divisions of the world should be co-extensive with the different languages. Languages shift indiscriminately, and there are numerous races speaking the same tongue who could not possibly form one political nationality,' etc. Comp. Const. Franz' above-cited work, pp. 82, 87 sq., and 92, 96 sq. 'Since the unity of a State does not arise from unity of nationality, but is often quite distinct therefrom, these two principles enter upon a process,' etc. 'Again, since the limits of States exceed the limits of nationalities, and everywhere include fragments of different nations, an intertwining of nationalities takes place, whereby the spirit of exclusiveness, inherent in each, is broken, international intercourse promoted, and the idea of a universal citizenship of mankind throughout the world introduced.'

(9) The definition of the State given in the text is in accordance with those usually given by political science: e.g. Gerber, *Grundzüge eines Systems des deutschen Staatsrechts*, 2d ed. 1869, p. 1: 'In the State a nation attains legal order in its joint life.' It is the form of law for the joint life of a people. Kant proceeds too much upon the formal notion of the rights of the individual when (*Metaphys. Anfangsgründe des Rechts*, § 45) he defines the State as the union of a multitude of men under certain legal enactments. So too is the political science of modern Liberalism, as represented, e.g., by

Rotteck and Welcker's *Staatslexicon*, unable to assign any other concrete matter to the State than the interest of the individual. 'That the joint life exists only to promote the aims of individuals, and not the reverse of this proposition, is a fact; hence no one must be used as the means, or indeed offered as a sacrifice for the idea of the whole' (comp. *Staatslexicon*, new ed. 1845; Welcker under 'Polizei,' x. p. 694). In opposition to this, Hegel (*Rechtsphilosophie*, 1821) sees in the State the realization of the objective spirit, but then understands it too broadly. 'The State is the reality of the political idea—the reality of concrete liberty.' This view has also been greatly extended, governing, *e.g.*, even the notions of Rothe, and involving in his case the most significant and objectionable results. Comp. the next note. A brief historical sketch of the notion of the State is given by Trendelenburg, *Naturrecht*, p. 291 sq.

(10) The erroneous extension by Hegel of the idea of the State, mentioned in note 9, reappears in the various phases of modern opinion: *e.g.* when Wagener, in the *Staats- und Gesellschaftslexicon*, calls the State 'the form or manifestation of all earthly existence;' or Rössler, as above, p. 23, declares it to be 'the realization of the common capital of mankind, or human association in an absolute sense;' or, p. 1, 'the comprehension of all moral functions in a joint aim,' as though the State were the kingdom of God. He is afterwards only consistent when he says that the State is not merely the bearer, but also the source of all justice. This view is justly, and not 'sophistically,' as Rössler says, opposed by Stahl; for it leads to a deification of the State, a revival of the erroneous opinion of the ancient world, which indeed knew of nothing higher, while Christianity teaches us that above and beyond the State is the Church, and above both the kingdom of God. Comp. Const. Franz, *Das neue Deutschland*, 1871, p. 353: 'What, then, let me

ask, is the deification of the State, and the subordination of both justice and morality to political objects? It is an ancient, and therefore also a heathen principle, while the German principle is, that justice is *above* political power.' Again: 'It is an especially German, and at the same time a Christian principle, that the Holy of Holies has its place in the conscience.' P. 360: 'The worship of the idea of the State and the aims of the State.'

(11) Wagener's *Staatslexicon*, vol. xiii. art. 'Menschenrecht,' p. 265 sq., points out how Christianity, by asserting human personality, introduces the recognition of the original rights involved in the very nature of man,—a recognition which is then vindicated and carried out in the way of historical development, and in connection with general culture; also that the political science of natural right, and especially that of Rousseau, puts certain abstract theories of the supposed equal political rights of individuals in the place of the moral rights involved in the personality of man. Hence arose the 'Declarations of Right,' given in the French republican constitutions of Sept. 3, 1791, and June 24, 1797, and containing the results of all the reasoning about 'the way in which and the means by which the constant inherent and inalienable rights of men as such, and as citizens of a State, are to obtain recognition.' Their contents are, however, so incompatible with all political order, that they were limited even by the constitution of Aug. 22, 1795, while that of Dec. 15, 1800, expunged these declarations as superfluous. For the laws of the State, when they are just and wise, are themselves the recognition of these rights of man, under the conditions of the existence of society of which the individual is a member. If, however, the laws are unjust, or the government tyrannical, such a declaration of rights is of no avail. The first of man's original rights is his life, and therefore protection of life and limb. With this

is connected his right to education. The second original right is equality, as based upon human personality, *i.e.* equality in the eyes of the law, with the maintenance, however, of such fundamental distinctions as are involved in the organism of human society. Another right is liberty, as also proved by the nature of human personality, *viz.* by its intrinsic self-determination,—a liberty to be restricted, however, by the limits supposed by human society. The last primitive right of man is protection in the rights he has obtained, *i.e.* the recognition of the person in the result of his acts,—a recognition to be restricted, however, by the general administration of justice, *i.e.* by an admission of the rights of others. Comp. on this subject the above-cited treatise of Wagener.

(12) Dahlmann, *Politik*, vol. i. 2d ed. 1847, p. 6: 'The bad State makes use of force only, swallows up families by the power of its law, attributes to itself a supreme right over property, sets its seal upon investigation, and insists upon all kinds of exceptions to every rule. The good State, on the contrary, far from interfering with the rights of the individual, takes them under the protection of public justice, and imposes upon property and persons such restrictions only as are demanded by the public good. By this decided step, of allowing the rights of the individual, it reconciles the independence of families with the obligations of government,' etc. On socialism and communism, and their attempted organization of all mankind, and all their activities, comp. the interesting and instructive article on 'Socialism' in Wagener's *Staatslexicon*, vol. xix. pp. 297-325.

(13) Guizot, in particular, has undertaken to show that, in contrast with the ancient system of government, in which the Roman emperor was also Pontifex Maximus, religion an affair of the State, and freedom of conscience consequently absent, the separation of the spiritual and temporal powers, by reason of Christ's saying,

'Render unto Cæsar,' etc., is now the basis upon which Christian governments are founded, and the prerequisite of freedom of conscience. See his work, *L'Eglise et la Société Chrétienne*, 1861, and his *Méditations sur la Religion Chrétienne* (Médit. 1, 'Le christianisme et la liberté,' e.g. p. 9); also his *Histoire de la Civilisation en Europe*, p. 54: 'La séparation du spirituel et du temporel a donc été la source de la liberté de conscience la plus rigoureuse et la plus étendue. Le grand principe de cette liberté était déposé dans le berceau de la civilisation européenne, et c'est l'église chrétienne qui l'y a introduit et maintenue.' Comp. also the confessions of our Church in the 28th art. of the Augs. Conf.

(14) *The separation of State and Church* has been regarded in Liberal circles as the height of political wisdom, and as the infallible remedy for all the difficulties that have arisen from the relations of these two powers. In the German Diet of 1872, Schulze-Delitzsch, on the occasion of a debate, May 16, on the Jesuits and other kindred orders, moved the following amendment to the law: 'Finally, to prepare common measures with the combined governments to bring about the complete separation of State and Church, and of Church and school, and thus to enter upon the only path for abolishing for ever all religious complications in the province of the State.' This is nothing else than abstract doctrinairism, which supposes that difficulties are to be got rid of by declaring that it will have nothing to do with them. Gneist, who brought in the report, also acknowledges this by speaking of the '*ignis fatuus*' of the so-called free Church in the free State.' 'That most unfortunate of all phrases, The free Church in the free State, brought things to such a pass in the model State of Belgium, that the number of male and female Jesuits increased more in a few years than it did during the palmy days of Spanish and Austrian rule,' etc. And yet Belgium has always been accounted the

model State according to the pattern laid down by Liberalism. 'That most difficult act, the actual dissolution of partnership between Church and State,' continues Gneist, 'cannot be smoothed down into the simple expression, "separation of the Church from the State." To demand this is to take the matter too easily. In the present day we, who by the experiences of the last few years have surpassed this stand-point, ought to be spared so perplexing and barren an expression, and I must beg you to dismiss all expectations founded upon it.' The more intelligent, moreover, had no need of the experiences of the last few years to enable them to perceive that it was impossible to carry this Liberal doctrine into practice. Dahlmann in his *Politik*, section 'Religion and the Church in the State,' p. 341, already wrote—and it is not superfluous to call to mind these long since uttered words of so acknowledged an authority: 'High as the State is, power does not belong to it alone; it is pervaded by a certain constitution of affairs which it must accept if it would make it of relative service. Especially is religion superior to the State, and the question is, what position is the Church to occupy with respect thereto? Not only Hobbes, but also Spinoza, cuts the knot, and Justus Lipsius, who in Jena acted the Protestant, in Leyden the Reformed, and in Lyons the Catholic, followed the example of the Chinese, whose religion must always be that of the emperor. The *esprits forts* of the French Revolution were satisfied with teaching that religion had no place at all in civil enactments, but was entirely the concern of the individual, and a matter wholly indifferent to the State; and in the autumn of 1793 it was decreed by the National Convention that God and religion were to be out of question in the instruction of youth. We will not here ask whether the State, which derives its support from public custom, can assume an indifference to religion, which sanctifies custom by referring it to its original source,' etc. And p. 343: 'Can that of which

Socrates was incapable, with respect to a very degenerate worship, be—I will not say desirable, but—on the whole possible to the State at the present day with respect to Christianity, viz. to ignore it? All higher cultivation, and especially all progress in the more conscious cultivation of the State, has been developed in modern Europe by means of, and together with, Christianity. The past Christian ages have given our existence limbs which we cannot renounce, even if we desire to do so. When the French at the Revolution rejected, together with the computation of time common to all Christians, its division into weeks, which Christianity had transmitted to us from Judaism, they proclaimed such a desire; but to attain this supposed elevation they must have renounced also the necessary oneness of marriage, the non-exposure of children, the deeper principle of penal justice, the love of one's neighbour beyond the State, in fact, the foundations of their entire civilisation. For our own part we do not at all want either to miss the church-tower from the landscape, or to try to separate ourselves from all that Christianity is to us through our ancestors.' P. 367: 'Can and ought the State to practise absolute toleration? They who start from philosophy will, when they encounter this question, answer it in the affirmative, and perhaps adduce the case of the United States of North America to prove that their opinion is capable of being carried out. They, however, who are observers of history and of life, will, while wishing to give an affirmative, decide upon a negative reply, regard the case of America as not to the point, and meantime strive the more earnestly to set limits to the agency of the State.' P. 349: 'Oaths and marriage, magistracy and property, even the observance of certain days make religion the concern of the State. *The State must not be governed by the Church, but neither must it desire to govern to the prejudice of religion.*' Const. Rössler, too, in his above-named work, though starting from premises which we certainly do not share,

says, p. 214: 'The State—as the constituted totality of moral functions (?)—can never be religionless. Shallowness alone can subscribe to the proposition that the State must be atheistic, by which is meant indifferent. It is in the nature of things that the State cannot behave with indifference towards religion. The State is always following some religious principle, however cast in the background, however unrecognised such connection may be; the State may be atheistic, at least it can try to be so, but then it is not indifferent.' Trendelenburg, p. 348 sq., expresses himself excellently on the intrinsically necessary relation of the State to religion, and therefore to the Church ('The Church as a condition of the very existence of the State'); and p. 352, on the co-operation of the two: 'It is universally perceived how difficult it is to attain to union, and discover the limits of justice in the relation of churches to each other and the State, due consideration being had to their respective individuality. But the Church, if judicious, and the State, if wise, will before they separate, or are only kept together by force, leave no means untried to find a point of union in their intrinsic aim, and to agree upon their mutual rights.' Const. Franz, in his *Vor-schule zur Physiologie der Staaten*, p. 153, carries out the notion that 'religion must on principle be excluded from the aims of the State.' For if it is true religion it will be 'secularized and adulterated by the State.' As a matter of history, however, all States have been overgrown with religious aims; and this applies even to North America. P. 161: 'Though, however, the State must set before itself no religious aims, yet religion has nevertheless a very great influence on the attainment of the aims of the State, and even forms their indispensable guarantee, because the disposition whence arise obedience to the law and devotion to public affairs is itself maintained by religion. Philosophers may deceive themselves in this matter, but it will not escape the candid observer that the moral consciousness of

nations is indeed and in truth everywhere rooted in religion.' P. 159: 'But, however States may be intertwined with religion, the latter always has its own sanctuary, within which the power of the State neither may nor can penetrate.' 'God can and will suffer none to rule over the soul but Himself,' says Luther in his treatise, *On the Secular Authority*, and how far we are bound to obey it, 1523 (Erlangen ed. vol. xxii. p. 82). The article 'Liberalism and Ultramontanism,' in the *Allg. evangél.-luth. Kirchenzeitung*, 1871, No. 47, shows how 'the theory of the absolute indifference of the State towards religion, or of the godless State, on the part of a spurious Liberalism, called forth the opposite extreme of the supremacy of the Church over the State, on the part of Ultramontanism.' Fabri, in his *Staat und Kirche*, 1872, p. 27 sq., addresses to modern Liberals certain very just and weighty remarks against the unfortunate amalgamation of the party of political progress with irreligious tendencies. I append from Tocqueville's work on American democracy a saying which has obtained fresh application: 'Les incrédules de l'Europe poursuivent les chrétiens comme des ennemis politiques plutôt que comme des adversaires religieux; ils haïssent la foi comme l'opinion d'un parti plus que comme une croyance erronée, et c'est moins le représentant de Dieu qu'ils repoussent dans le prêtre que l'ami du pouvoir. En Europe le christianisme a permis, qu'on l'unit intimément aux puissances de la terre.' The sentence in the text on the ease of putting such a separation on paper, etc., is in accordance with Fabri's *Staat und Kirche*, p. 124.

(15) Stahl's treatise on the Christian State, 1847 and 1858, asserts that 'but one objection can be made to the Christian State, and that is by denying Christianity itself;' and then consistently carries out this assertion by saying, e.g. p. 20, that the State of a Christian people stands in direct relation to the Christian religion. An article

on the Christian State (by Von Scheurl), in the *Erlangen Zeitschrift für Protestantismus*, 1858, on the other hand, tends to show that the legislation of the State, even in the matters of marriage and national education, is not directly determined by Christianity as such, but by the Christian customs of the people, *i.e.* the national Christianity in so far as this is the common possession of its different churches. Otherwise the State would have to practise theology, and to ascertain independently from the Bible what is the Christian doctrine concerning marriage. The treatise concludes as follows: 'We are no less seriously concerned than Stahl that our German State should not be unchristianized. But we can only conceive of the true christianization of the State as produced by the Christianity of the people. We do not esteem it desirable, nor even, strictly speaking, possible, that the enactments of a State should be directly based upon Christianity. For we have no revealed Christian system of Government, and find in the records of the Christian revelation only precepts concerning the conduct of the individual towards the State, and in this respect no new revelation at all. It is true that the Christian faith will and must inwardly renew and transform the national life, and therefore that the State of a Christian nation will and must be of an essentially different composition from that of a non-Christian nation. The State as such, however, can by no means be Christian, not, that is to say, Christian in such a sense as not to be national. The State, whether of a Christian or a heathen people, must ever be the expression of its definite nationality in its public affairs. By nationality, however, we of course by no means understand the transitory and vacillating humour of the masses, whether at the present or any other period, but the permanent characteristics of a nation as an intelligent individuality, in our conception of which we take account not only of its separate contemporaneous members, but also of its successive generations, as together con-

stituting a certain kind of personal unity. The Christian revelation relates directly to that kingdom only which is not of this world, and which is not destined to receive into itself the kingdoms of this world, the States as such. To this extent we assert that the Christian State properly so called is out of question; for it would coincide with the Church (and with the kingdom of God). But as for State legislation in conformity with the Christian character, and with the prosperity of Germany, and contributing to their permanence, may the Lord ever bestow such upon us; and may every German Christian who has the power and opportunity, regard it as a sacred duty to do his utmost to maintain it.'

(16) The expressions of Christ in the Sermon on the Mount, especially those on oaths, on suffering wrong, etc. (Matt. v. 33, etc.), have—as is well known—when regarded as external precepts, been frequently exposed both to the misconception of believers and the misinterpretation of unbelievers; and yet Christ's refusal to arrange a dispute about an inheritance (Luke xii. 14) might suffice to show us that the Lord Jesus would have nothing to do with the external secular ordinances of civil life, but desired that His words should be the rule in the inner world of the heart. It was in consequence of such misconception that the ancient Church often hesitated as to its position with respect to oaths, judicature, trade, military service, etc. The Romish Church made the words of Christ and of the gospel in general into a law, but for the sake of rendering external, secular, and political existence possible, confined this law to the perfect, properly so called. The Anabaptists fell into the same erroneous and legal views. Luther speaks ably and with triumphant lucidity on this subject in his exposition of Matt. v., vi., and vii. (1532, Erlangen ed. vol. xliii.)

(17) The importance of St. Paul's Epistle to Philemon

consists in its bringing before us this truth, the proving of which is the theme of the whole of C. Schmidt's frequently mentioned work on *Civil Society in the Old Roman World, and its Transformation by Christianity*.

(18) Von Schweizer, *Zeitgeist und Christenthum*, 1861, p. 196. Comp. *Lectures on Fundamental Truths*, p. 339.

(19) Compare Schmidt's above-named work, p. 246.

(20) I would call to remembrance the serious words of Bismarck in the German Diet, on the occasion of the debate on capital punishment.

NOTES TO LECTURE VIII.

(1) On the dignity of the judicial office, comp. Trendelenburg, *Naturrecht*, pp. 387 and 397; Aristotle, *Eth. Nicom.* v. 7, ὁ γὰρ δικαστῆς βούλεται εἶναι ὅσον δίκαιον ἐμψυχον: the judge is to be, as it were, animate justice.

(2) On punishment, see Trendelenburg, p. 103; its authorization in the moral community, p. 104. The deterring theory is that external conception of punishment occasioned by the separation of justice from the moral principle, p. 105. The notion of punishment has, under Hegel's influence, been corrected and completed from the moral and objective side. According to this, a transaction contrary to law is null, and in punishment the State makes a manifestation of its nullity. Hence it is the negation of a negation. P. 106: 'Since an act of injustice, which invades the power of justice, when once done cannot be undone, it is by punishment that the power of justice is, ideally at least, reinstated, and it is by means of such violence that its universal recognition is maintained.' Stahl's expres-

sions in the 'philosophical foundation' of his *Rechtsphilosophie*, ii. 1, 3, 1854, arise from his profound view of the subject. P. 105: 'It is the eternal law of righteousness, as every candid consciousness bears testimony, that punishment should inevitably follow evil.' P. 167: 'By the punishment of the evil-doer it is testified in a practical manner that moral order is supreme.' 'Punishment is therefore inflicted for righteousness' sake. Punishment may have no merely future purpose (as that such transgressions should not in future be committed), and may be no merely effectual mechanical means; but the act which has been perpetrated, of itself and absolutely, requires punishment on moral grounds.' This is the specific and universal meaning of the term, and when the penalty which the transgressor suffers in punishment is inflicted for any other purpose—such as prevention, protection, etc., it ought at least to be no longer called punishment. Trendelenburg, p. 120: 'In the corrective point of view the Church stretches out a helping hand to the State.'

(3) The right of capital punishment is expressly acknowledged in Holy Scripture. On the passage in Gen. ix. 5, 6, whose literal translation is: 'Your blood will I require according to your souls, at the hand of every beast will I require it, and at the hand of man, at the hand of every one's brother will I require the life of man. Who sheds man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed, for in the image of God made He man,' comp. Delitzsch's *Commentary on Genesis*, 4th ed. 1872, p. 227: 'Murder is the most extreme violation of the brotherly relation of mankind, and is to be punished accordingly. The penal power attributable to God alone is here committed to the hands of man.' 'We have here the first traces of the institution of a government as the executive of the divine law and the representative of God.' And indeed it is, in the first place, the human race itself which is invested with the attri-

butes of authority, and opposed as a Holy Vehme to the act of blood. When St. Paul, Rom. xiii. 4, designates the magistrate as the bearer of the sword, he unquestionably uses the sword as the symbol of the 'jus gladii, i.e. necis (Ulpian, qui universas provincias regent jus gladii habent).' He is speaking, moreover, not of heathen magistrates only, but of magistrates in general, and of what results from the idea of government. It is, moreover, obvious that the sword cannot be the great insignia of penal justice to the exclusion of capital punishment, but that it is chosen with express reference to the latter. As Luther says: 'It is not in vain, that is, not *sine usu*, not as a mere bauble, that he bears the sword.' Comp. Tholuck's *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, 5th ed. 1865. On capital punishment, Stahl, *Fundamente einer christliche Philosophie*, p. 150, says: 'There is an absolute transgression against the most sacred possession, which civil order must, according to God's command, protect; and hence there is also an absolute punishment, viz. the execution of the transgressor.' *Philosophie des Rechts*, part ii. 2, p. 540: 'A legislation which does not inflict death, but only imprisonment, for murder, would not maintain in its full sacredness the law which protects life, and hence, far from being a humane, would on the contrary, by its disregard of human life, be an *unjust* legislation.' Kant also requires capital punishment: 'There is no *homogeneousness* between ever so sad a life and death' (*Rechtslehre*, vol. v. p. 168). Hegel, *Philosophie des Rechts*, p. 345: 'Since life is the whole compass of being, punishment for taking this away cannot consist in the loss of that which is of a non-equivalent value, but only in deprivation of life.' Compare also the justification of capital punishment by Marheinecke, *Theol. Moral*, pp. 336-345; Nitzsch, *System der christlichen Lehre*, p. 334; Rothe, *Theol. Ethik*, v. 278 sq.; Wuttke, *Handbuch der christlichen Sittenlehre*, ii. 565, etc. The question of capital punishment has recently, as is well known, been made the subject of

repeated discussions, and the aversion to it is one very widely diffused. An enlightened juristic vote in its favour is given by J. E. Kuntze, *Ueber die Todesstrafe*, 1868. Comp. also *die Frage v. d. Todesstrafe, Versuch einer höheren Darst.* etc. 1869; Pfotenhauer, *die Todesstrafe akadem. Vorträge*, 1863; Fürer, *die Todesstrafe, ein Versuch zu ihrer Rechtfertigung*, a lecture delivered at the Gnadau Conference, 1869, with concluding remarks by President V. Gerlach, 1869; Kemmler, *die Berechtigung der Todesstrafe*, 1868. On the other side see Mehring, *Prälat. die Frage v. d. Todesstrafe*, 1868. The antipathy to and attack upon capital punishment have chiefly originated in a misunderstood humanity. Trendelenburg, p. 124: 'It is false humanity to promote crime by lax punishments in the interest of the criminal.' Capital punishment may be greatly restricted, indeed for the most part be checked, but when it is abolished by law, a right to life which he no longer possesses is conceded to the criminal, and those notions of justice which relate to its due proportionality become perplexed.

(3) *Aug. Konf.* 16: 'Of magistracy and secular government it is taught that all authorities, regular governments and laws, are ordained and instituted of God.' Rulers are in the Old Testament called Elohim (gods) as the representatives of God. The divine institution is, however, designated by our Church not as direct, but as indirect. As heaven and earth, sun, moon, and stars, are God's ordinances, and upheld by Him, so also are all polities.' *Apol.* 8, art. 156, ed. Rech. How lively a consciousness of the divine authority of even heathen governments prevailed in the ancient Church is shown by several expressions of Tertullian: 'Noster est magis Cæsar ut a Deo nostro constitutus quam vester.' *Aug. de Civ. Dei*, 5, 21: 'Qui dedit imperium Constantino christiano, ipse etiam apostatæ Juliano.' (Tholuck, *Com. on Romans*, ch. xiii. 1.)

For what Luther thought of the divine institution of government, comp. *Luther's Ethik*, p. 101: 'Let the government be what it may, it is not of man, or it would not be safe for an hour; if God did not uphold it by His power, my Lord Omnes would utterly destroy it. Because, therefore, it is the power and ordinance of God, we must look upon it as though we saw God. Wherever He casts it, His honour must follow' (Erlangen ed. xxxiv. 217). This must be said for the comfort of governors and for the fear of subjects (xxxvi. 189). 'After the gospel or spiritual office, there is on earth no better jewel, no greater treasure, no richer alms, no more excellent institution, no better possession, than a government which does justice and upholds right' (xxxix. 241, and elsewhere). Christ, indeed, sanctioned government, but did not institute it (v. 272, xxxix. 233); it is divine, but not, properly speaking, Christian. 'For the emperor was at that time (viz. of Christ) a heathen, and knew nothing of Christ, and his government was founded on merely human wisdom, and guided, conducted, and maintained thereby; yet Christ says, that because he is emperor he is to be regarded and obeyed as such' (v. 272). Government belongs to the kingdom of creation, not to that of the gospel, and is not therefore founded and justified first of all by the latter (against the Papal doctrine). For such a kingdom already existed, founded from the beginning of the world, and subjected to the reason of man by the word of God, as He says, Gen. i. 28, 'Have dominion over the fish of the sea,' etc. This is the ancient rule with which the secular authority has to do, and for which it needs not the Holy Spirit, and concerning which not much is to be taught even in Christendom. 'The counsel and assistance of lawyers is what is needed in this respect' (xi. 326). Comp. also Harless, *Christl. Ethik*, 6th ed. 1864, p. 547 sq. (translated in Clark's Foreign Theological Library); Rothe, *Theol. Ethik*, 2d ed. vol. ii. 1867, p. 460 sq.

(5) Harless' above-cited work, p. 652 sq.: 'When kings and those in authority no longer rule "by the grace of God," and subjects no longer obey "in the name of God," then even the best form of government is eaten away by a spirit of self-deception; and the ruler who says "I am the State" is soon followed by the other and equally false extreme, "the will of the sovereign people." A people, on the other hand, is well advised when rulers and subjects are reminded by justice and law that the maintenance of order is designed to secure to the members of the commonwealth the possibility of together fulfilling their common office, in the spirit of the love of Christ, and where that office, being regarded as of God's appointment, reminds all as much of God's judgment (comp. *e.g.* Ps. lxxxii.), as of those gifts of grace without which even natural fitness for an earthly office cannot enable a man to discharge its duties with a blessing,' etc. The doctrine of the sovereignty of the people had been promulgated previous to Rousseau and the writers of the Revolution by the Jesuits. This was done, *e.g.*, in the beginning of the seventeenth century by Mariana, who in some respects goes even beyond the French Revolution. He permits insurrection not merely when it is resolved on in an assembly of the people, but when such an assembly is not possible (*si publici conventus facultas erit sublata*), each individual is called upon to kill tyrants; for the desire of citizens to destroy tyranny and to punish the crimes of rulers does not cease with their loss of the power of assembling, etc. Only this may not be done by means of poison, partly because execution by poisoning is not a punishment customary in Christendom, partly because others than the tyrant are endangered thereby. The assassination of Henry III. by a monk is especially extolled (Mariana, *de Rege et Regis Institutione*, i. 6, 7). Stahl, *Geschichte der Rechtsphilosophie*, 2d ed. p. 293.

(6) Comp. Luther, 'On Secular Rulers, and how far

we owe them Obedience,' 1523, *Ethik Luthers*, p. 107, etc. Luther most earnestly deprecates sedition (xxii. 261, xxiii. 61, liv. 139). 'For sedition is worse than murder' (iii. 219). 'However tyrannical rulers may be, though they must themselves answer to God for their tyranny, this gives their subjects no right to use force against them. It is true that rulers are bound to maintain justice (xxii. 265), and when they put power before justice, must put up with being reproached by words (xlii. 18); but we have no right to go farther, and to resist by force the injustice which we should on the contrary suffer' (xxxviii. 435, and elsewhere). What is further said in the text on the increased affinity with revolutionary views existing in many non-German Reformed circles, rests upon personal observations, and is confirmed by history.

(7) On how sedition is reprobated by Luther, comp. note 6. On this point Trendelenburg well says, in his *Naturrecht*, p. 492: 'In a legitimate State, revolution, if we compare what takes place within a State to that which happens to man in general, is a rebellion of the desires against the will. In every revolution there is always an error in the background, on the side of either the people or the government, and sometimes of both. Every revolution errs against the fundamental idea of the State, for in each the part usurps authority over the whole, and right yields to might. The State being the condition for the realization of all justice, it is absolutely inviolable; and if it is to protect right, it must itself be protected by law. Every revolution involves the disorder of the State. Though it may seem at first a forcible uprising only against a part, it really is an uprising against the whole. No one has it in his power to hinder the war against a part from becoming a war of the parts against each other, and a war against the whole. Revolution endangers the feeling of respect for rulers and the stability of law, and hence cuts at the

roots of the nation's moral ideas. It interrupts the continuous development, and cuts asunder the roots of law which find their strength in history,' etc. On that counterpart of revolution—a morbid reaction—I quote the able expressions of Stahl (*die gegenwartigen Parteien in Staat und Kirche*, 2d ed. 1868, p. 334 sq.). After showing that there is a reaction which is salutary and necessary, viz. the restoration of true principles, good institutions, etc., he continues: 'But there is also a morbid reaction. It consists in misconceiving and keeping aloof from the tasks actually incumbent upon the times, which revolution had but misunderstood. . . . Merely to put down revolution is of itself no healthy reaction. But a reaction is decidedly morbid when it attacks wholesome institutions together with revolution; when it reacts not only against the diseased matter, but against the developing healthy germ; when it seeks not only to extirpate the malady, but to paralyse and destroy the members infected with it. Revolution, besides the evil which it is in itself, involves also the opposite evil of such obstructive and destructive reaction.'

(8) On the question of *legitimacy*, comp. Stahl, *die gegenwartigen Parteien*, p. 302: 'It is an error to suppose that the principle of legitimacy involves *slavish unconditional obedience*. That subjects should themselves employ force, practise active resistance, rebel against their rulers, is certainly contrary to it.' On the other hand, however, on the principles of legitimacy, and by the concurrence of the whole Christian Church, when rulers overstep the limits of divine or human enactments, *passive resistance*—i.e. the refusal of obedience unless under the application of force—is beyond all doubt allowed, nay, commanded. 'It is an error to suppose that the principle of legitimacy is an unbending logical dogma, which *ignores*, in favour of the absolute inalienability of dynastic rights, *all historical events, and*

opposes all historical necessities, and therefore sets itself above history. The legitimate claims of a dynasty originate in time, and may also terminate in time; they attain maturity, they become superannuated; and the same Divine Providence which founded has also the right and power to destroy kingship. The idea of legitimacy is just this, that man (the people) should recognise God's providence in history, as a law above himself, and should therefore certainly not attempt himself to lay down a law to Providence.' Similarly does Harless express himself in his *Christl. Ethik*, p. 552, when discussing the conduct of the Christian with respect to changes in the existing order of things. I refer to him more especially, because he states more decidedly than I have done in the text the conditions under which the new government is to be regarded as the actual government. 'That government has no right to recognition, on the ground of the Christian conscience, which opposes the general moral objects of human society, and their special realization according to the national peculiarities of a people' (p. 554). But how is such a state of affairs to be recognised, and according to what principle is it to be judged of? I believe we must fall back upon the point mentioned in the text as one easily perceptible, viz. that the new authorities have already entered upon the administration of the laws of the State. With respect, however, to the resistance which may be offered to lawlessness, he says, p. 554: 'The position of those who were appointed on the part of the community (by public acts), to advocate and administer the rights of a people to the maintenance of their national calling, is one thing; the position of those whose business it is, as simple members of a nation, to contribute to the preservation of the rights of a national society, by conforming their personal actions to national enactments, is another. The former *must*, in conformity with their office, oppose every power destructive of the objects of human and national society; the latter *may* do so, but

are not officially called upon by the interests of society thus to act,' etc. To escape by flight and exile from the duty of protest, and refusal of an oath of allegiance, can only be justified or appear innocent where there is from the first a certainty that every attempt to maintain justice will be rendered vain by force before it is carried into execution.

(9) Comp. Ruckert's touching lay :

' Aus der Jugendzeit, aus der Jugendzeit
Klingt ein Lied mir immerdar ;
O wie liegt so weit, o wie liegt so weit,
Was mein einst war !

' Was die Schwalbe sang, was die Schwalbe sang
Die den Herbst und Frühling bringt ;
Ob das Dorf entlang, ob das Dorf entlang,
Das jetzt noch klingt.

' O du Heimatflur, o du Heimatflur
Lass zu deinem sel'gen Raum,
Mich noch einmal nur, mich noch einmal nur,
Entfliehn im Traum ! '

Rothe, *Theol. Ethik*, 2d ed. 1867, ii. 432: 'The soil, i.e. to speak generally, the sum total of the material elements which constitute the sphere of its external existence, being the casual principle of a nation's individuality, the chief and original object of patriotism is this very soil on which the nation has grown.' Rothe shows further on how patriotism then 'takes a higher flight.' Comp. note 10.

(10) Rothe, *Theol. Ethik*: 'But as soon as an individual, in his attachment to his nation, becomes also conscious of an attachment to its political constitution, his patriotism takes a higher flight, and becomes a love to the political institutions of his home' (5, 392). Schleiermacher, *Christl. Sitte*, p. 257: 'He is a bad citizen who does not actively interfere, when the objects of the State cannot be attained without his assistance.' Fichte, too, admits in his addresses to the German nation (Works, vii.

299 sq.), that when what is highest and most difficult in politics has to be effected, morality must be completed and strengthened by religion.

(11) Comp.* e.g. the following strophes from the *Heliand*. Mary, after receiving the message of the Angel, says :

“ ‘Mein Herz zweifelt nicht
an Wort und Weise.’ So erfuhr ich dass das Weib empfang
gottesbotschaft gern und willig,
mit lichtem Sinn und mit lauterer Treue,
mit guttem Glauben.’¹

Of Mary at the manger it is said, v. 383 :—

‘Nicht war ihr Herz in Zweifel,
das Gemuth der Jungfrau.’²

Of the wicked Jews, on the contrary, v. 2350 :—

‘Und so manches grosse
Zeichen zeigte er ihnen dass sie nicht zweifeln sollten,
sondern lauterer an seine Lehre glaubten.’³

V. 2491 :—

‘So frommt die Treue
und ist gut für jeden, dass kein Goldes Hort
gleicht solchem Glauben.’⁴

V. 2903 :—

‘An des Wassers Gestade
sammelten sich die Gesellen Christi die er sich selbst erkoren
die Zwölfe in guter Treue : sie Kannten Zweifel nicht.’⁵

And so in many other passages. Comp. also Vilmar, *Deutsche Alterthümer im altsächs. Heliand* (Gymnasial-programm, Marburg), p. 24 sq.

¹ ‘My heart doubts neither the word nor the means.’ I thus perceived that the woman received God’s message willingly and heartily, with sincere fidelity and true faith.

² Her heart was in no doubt, the mind of the Virgin.

³ And He showed them so many signs that they ought not to have doubted, but simply to have believed His doctrine.

⁴ This faithfulness profits, and is good for all, so that no treasure of gold equals such faith.

⁵ The companions of Christ whom He had Himself chosen, the twelve, assembled on the shore in good faith ; they knew no doubt.

(12) On the advent of infidelity from Italy at the period of the Renaissance, comp. *Lectures on Fundamental Truths*, pp. 8 and 335 sq. The influence of France, especially of Voltaire and French freethinking, is well known. Nor is it less so that the German patriots of the era of liberation—especially Stein and Arndt—advocated by word and deed, and insisted upon not merely general, but Christian piety, as a condition of the restoration of Germany, Comp. *Lectures on Fundamental Truths*, p. 123 sq.

(13) Roscher, i. 508 : ‘In behalf of the human feeling for liberty, it may boldly be affirmed that no religious and morally good people ever perished so long as it preserved these best possessions.’ Tocqueville : ‘A people that would be free and strong must believe, and a people which will not believe must be a subject people.’

(14) Cicero’s contributions to international legislation amount to legal forms to be observed at the proclamation and during the waging of war, *de Offic.* i. 11. His boastful words on the old times of Rome (at the beginning of ii. 8), in which Rome’s position towards the nations ‘might be more correctly called a protectorate of the world than a supremacy over it,’ have a tinge of panegyric and purpose. On the influence of Christianity, and consequently on the importance of the Papacy, in the Middle Ages, with respect to the rights of nations, comp. vol. xxi. pp. 518-521, in Wagener’s *Staats- und Gesellschaftslexicon* ; Rothe, v. p. 341 sq. Schleiermacher, *Christl. Sitte*, p. 491 : ‘It is also a result of the growing power of true Christian consciousness, that States endeavour to institute and ensure a peaceable intercourse with each other, and that indeed no longer from a selfish point of view, but purely out of love to the entire body of nations. And this result, where it exists, is the highest attainment of policy, and the most brilliant triumph of the Christian spirit; for nothing

more powerful than the selfishness of nations can be opposed to Christianity.'

(15) On the moral importance of trade, comp. Rothe, v. 247 sq.: 'As on the one hand credit, being the condition of its vitality, moral worth, and especially that national and public morality which begets confidence, is its indispensable basis; so too on the other is trade an instrument of supreme importance for the diffusion and propagation of those powers which carry on the moral process among mankind.' Stahl, ii. 2, p. 58: 'Commerce, as the ruler of material intercourse, carries intellectual intercourse upon his back.' Trendelenburg, p. 504: 'Commerce has, from the beginning of the world's history, opened one nation to another, and implanted and cherished in all the thought that they need each other.' P. 329: 'Thus commerce becomes an ethical instrument, and that not only of one nation, but of mankind.' P. 333: 'When commerce, in its great enterprises, boldly traverses the ocean, etc., it strips off its mere self-seeking, and the merchant learns to entertain grand designs affecting the whole world.'

(16) The ancient Church often hesitated concerning the lawfulness of waging war. On Luther's teaching, comp. *Luther's Ethik*, p. 109: 'It forbids us to use the sword, but when rulers require us to draw it in war, we are bound promptly and confidently to wield it; it is then no longer our hand that strikes, for we no longer do it ourselves, but our rulers do it by means of our arm. We then act not as Christians, but as subjects,' etc. (xliii. 128, 137). It is this thought which Luther carried out when he found occasion to write a separate treatise on the question, 'Whether soldiers can be in a state of salvation,' 1526. In this he makes the distinction between the person and his office the foundation of the entire discussion. It is quite another question, whether war is itself lawful. Here it is self-evident that everything turns first on its being not a matter of

choice but of necessity (xxii. 270 sq., xxiii. 54), and then upon its being entered upon not with arrogant self-confidence, but in dependence on God (xxii. 227). Trendelenburg, p. 420 : ' War between two nations inflames their mutual passions, and a bloody battle unchains in the ordinary man the wild beast within him which was restrained by culture, and makes him a savage, like the tame lion after he has tasted blood.' P. 526 : ' War is the self-help of nations. And as in a State, when the maintenance of justice has become impossible, this maintenance is again left to the individual, so among the different states, when the power of deciding and reconciling is absent, self-help becomes lawful. The rightfulness of a war depends upon the consciousness of a moral necessity. This consciousness is indeed at first only that of a party, and not a judicial sentence; but if the consciousness becomes the moral faith of the nation, this is both a pledge of the lawfulness of the cause, and a source of strength which cannot be equalled.' Harless, *Christl. Ethik*, p. 489 sq. The characteristic of a lawful war is that it is necessary in the interest of justice. ' Its justification is to be found in those international duties which flow from the special callings appointed by God to the several nations in their mutual relations, and whose violation a regularly constituted association of nations has a right to avenge. The Christian who recognises his earthly calling as an individual member of a nation, neither can nor will draw back from the duty of avenging breaches of international law. Nay, knowing that in this respect he is not merely in the service of an earthly master, but even as a soldier is serving his God, to whom he owes life and body, for the purpose of executing His justice, it is in the Christian soldier that we find the full spirit of sincere self-surrender to the execution of God's justice and righteousness on earth.' The glorification of war as a means of exciting the varied powers of life—a glorification frequently heard of late—apart from the

divine calling thereto above alluded to, cannot be morally justified.

(17) On the agency of Christian love in war, comp. Lehmann, *die Werke der Liebe*, 1870; on the work of deaconesses, pp. 144, 225, note 11, where the supplements to the *flieg. Blätter* of the *rauhes Haus*, 1864 and 1866, Nos. 8 and 9, are referred to. *Allg. ev.-luth. Kirchenzeitung*, 1870, on the Samaritan-service in war, Nos. 41 and 43. Raundorff, *Unter dem rothen Kreuz*, Leipzig, 1867. (The dark picture here drawn of the hyenas of the battle-field, in contrast to the works of Christian love, is very terrible.) Henri Dunaut, *die Barmherzigkeit auf dem Schlachtfelde, eine Erinnerung an Solferino*, translated by Wagner, 1864. *Discussions of the International Conference*, Berlin, 1869. Hahn, *die deutschen Frauenvereine unter dem rothen Kreuz*, 1870. Brinkmann, *die freiwillige Krankenpflege im Kriege*, 1867. Uhlhorn, *die Arbeit der Diakonissen im letzten Kriege*, a lecture, 1867. Marie Simon, *meine Erfahrungen auf dem Gebiete der freiwilligen Krankenpflege*, 1872. Scheper's *Bilder und Eindrücke aus einer achtwöchentlichen Dienstzeit als freiwilliger Feldprediger*, 1871. Diestelkamp, *Freuden und Leiden eines geistl. freiwilligen Krankenpflegers*, 1871. Hofmann, *Erinnerungen an den deutsch-französ. Feldzug*, 1870-71. Kadelbach, *Bilder und Erinnerungen*, etc., 1871. Also the information given in the different journals on this subject, e.g. *Bausteine*, *hannov. Sonntagsblatt*, *Armen- und Krankenfreunde*, by Disselhoff, etc.

(18) On the moral task of diplomacy, comp. Trendelenburg, p. 542 sq.

(19) Trendelenburg, p. 545: 'We will not ask whether men will ever be able to dispense with war. We do not ask it, because the time is far off. Nevertheless, constant peace has from of old been the desire of the

wiser sort, who hope for it when man becomes good. The prophet Isaiah (ii. 2 sq.) tells of the last days, when the nations shall make their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into sickles. But they are not to come till the mountain, on which is the Lord's house, is higher than all mountains, and till all walk in the light of the Lord. The Stoic Zeno imagines an age in which the nations will live like one flock upon a common pasture, and under common laws; and a Stoic poet sings hopefully even of a Roman era: 'Tunc genus humanum positis sibi consulat armis inque vicem gens omnis amet.' Kant describes it as a condition of constant peace that politics should be moral (new edit. 1796, p. 96). 'Constant peace is to proceed from morality; and law, in so far as it is itself moral, will help to bring it about and maintain it.' But morality points back to religion, *i.e.* to Christianity. And of this, the first and last word is, 'the kingdom of God.'

NOTES TO LECTURE IX.

(1) Comp. A. von Harless, *das Verhältniss des Christenthums zu Kultur und Lebensfragen*, Erlangen, 1863; Conrady, *Kultur und Christenthum*, a lecture, 1868; Disselhoff, *Christenthum und Kultur*, in the nine Apologetic Lectures published by the Committee of the Society for the Inner Mission in Bremen, 1869. Conrady lays down a definition of culture which is too formal, and not quite to the point. 'By culture,' he says, 'we understand the whole range of the efforts of the human mind in the actual or supposed development of the powers and talents latent therein and referable thereto, together with the summary of all those mental acquisitions which find their expression in the literature of the age, in art, and in politics.' Here culture is not sufficiently separated from education, with which indeed Conrady rather identifies it (p. 5). This is scarcely

correct. I have endeavoured in the text (comp. the beginning of lect. x.) to state briefly and exactly the relation between the two. Harless, guided by motives which he states, confines himself to the discussion of poetry, literature, and politics, in their relation to Christianity. He likewise directs his chief attention only to art and science. Disselhoff designates free spiritual personality, marriage, the family, the state, and art and science, within these provinces, as the chief manifestations of culture. In discussing these matters, he displays extensive reading, especially in poetic literature. I have endeavoured in the text to furnish a complete sketch of the various departments and agencies of culture, upon the ground of the old and popular division of the different classes.

(2) Plato in *The State*, on the ground of his psychological division of man into reason (*νοῦς*, in the head), courage (*θυμός*, in the breast), and sensuous desires (*ἐπιθυμία*, in the belly), already regarded the State as compounded of three classes,—of the ruling, the fighting, and the earning, *i.e.* of the educated, governing, and labouring classes. With this division the cardinal virtues agree. The virtue of the first class is wisdom, that of the second valour, that of the third prudence, while justice keeps them all in order. The Indian castes are also founded upon this division, which is in them carried out to its extreme. Comp. Wuttke, *Handbuch der christl. Sittenlehre*, vol. ii. sec. 308 (p. 520 sq.).

(3) On the influence of settlement and agriculture with regard to culture, comp. Lotze, *Mikrokosmos*, ii. 411 sq. On the condition of the ancient Aryan nations, comp. J. Röutsch, *Ueber Indo-germanen und Semitenenthum, eine volkerpsychologische Studie*, 1872, p. 26 sq. From what has been said, it appears that the life of the primitive Indo-Germanic peoples was chiefly, but not exclusively, a pastoral one. We have not to think, in their

case, of a nomadic life like that, *e.g.*, of the predatory tribes of Scythians, Turcomans, and Mongols, but of a wandering with their herds, occasionally combined, when a longer sojourn was made, with the cultivation of the soil. Here, then, where we first meet with the nations of the Indo-Germanic group, we already find among them the germs which, when developed, laid the foundation of their subsequent greatness in the world's history, viz. a determined inclination for a settled life, combined with the impulse to spread themselves,—a feeling for what is called culture and civilisation, combined with military courage and warlike inclinations. Proof of this is adduced from language, viz. from the circumstance that in all the Indo-Germanic tongues there are a number of words designating things which betray at least a start towards civilised life: house (*duma*, *domus*), plough, barley (*ξεία*, *γαρα*). That the rearing of cattle formed the chief employment is perceived from the fact, that among all the Indo-Germans the collective idea is found (*paçu*, *πωῦ*, *pecu*, *faihu*). Bullocks, cows, and oxen, horse, sheep, and swine were tamed by the Indo-Germans. 'The flock includes the dog, already become the friend of man, while the cat seems not to have been as yet domesticated, on which account the mouse, "the thief," still had a good time,' etc.

(4) Handicraft was regarded as ἀνελεύθερον (unworthy of a free man) by the ancient world. Plato, *de Rep.* i. 347; Aristot. *Polit.* iii. 3, 2, viii.: 'All common labour and trading in the life of a citizen' are incompatible with true political virtue and prosperity. 'For such a life is ignoble.' vi. 27: 'None of the employments carried on by the multitude of artisans, dealers, and hirelings requires or excites any moral power.—*Rhet.* i. 9, 27: μεδεμίαν ἐργάζεσθαι βάνουσον τέχνην, ελεuthéron γὰρ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν. We also find in Cicero a like contempt for manual labour and labourers: 'An quidquam stultius, quam quos singulos sicut operarios

barbarosque contemnis, eos aliquid putare esse universos,' *Tusc.* v. 42; *de Offic.* i. 42: 'Base and ignoble is also the business of the day-labourer, of whom the labour—not the skill—is remunerated, for in their case the wage for which they bind themselves to the work of a slave is ready money. We cannot also but regard as low the employment of the retail dealers, who buy wares from wholesale dealers to sell them directly, for they can gain nothing but by duly deceiving their customers; and there is nothing really more disgraceful than deceit. Artisans, too, practise a mean employment, for the workshop implies nothing noble.' Comp. E. Schmidt, *Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, etc. p. 56, etc. Lotze (*Mikrokosmos*, iii. 257 sq.) strongly condemns Aristotle on this point. On handicraft among the Jews, comp. the copious and interesting proofs in Delitzsch, *Handwerkerleben zur Zeit Jesu*, Erlangen 1868. The relation between Christianity and labour is expressed in Eph. iv. 28; 1 Thess. iv. 11; 2 Thess. iii. 10-12. On the esteem in which labour was held in the primitive Church, comp. Schmidt, p. 191. On the sound views of the guilds of the Middle Ages, comp. Lotze, iii. 263 sq.

(5) Aristot. *Pol.* i. 3, 23: 'The activity of trade is exposed to just disapprobation, because its foundations are unnatural, and rest upon mutual overreaching.' Cicero approves only of wholesale, and condemns retail dealing (see note 4). Scruples were also felt in the primitive Church on the question of trade (comp. Lactant. *Institt.* v. 17, 12 sq.) Comp. also lect. viii. note 15.

(6) Lotze, iii. 269 sq., speaks doubtfully of the results of machinery, and of the great division of labour thereby introduced. On the division of labour as the foundation of all human culture, and on its uses, comp. Roscher, *System der Volkswirtschaft*, i. 9th ed. 1871, p. 110 sq., while the dark side of a highly-developed division of labour is brought forward, p. 119 sq. Some of Roscher's opinions on this question are here cited: 'Where, in-

deed, the one-sidedness effected by the division of labour goes so far as to deteriorate the personality of the workman, then the *human loss* of the nation is greater than its material gain.' Schleiermacher rightly pronounces all purely mechanical employment of a man, which makes him an animated instrument (a slave!), immoral. 'The proportion in which any special calling is moral depends on the measure in which it harmonizes with the general calling of mankind. The whole man is of more importance than the sum of his performances and enjoyments (Luke ix. 25). Hence nothing is more pernicious than a premature addiction to some one-sided employment, often resorted to from poverty, before the foundations of a general education have been laid' (p. 121). 'The best corrective for the one-sidedness resulting from an extreme division of labour consists in the extension and the varied employment of leisure, both which are indeed facilitated by that higher culture which is combined with the division of labour' (p. 122).

(7) The labour question is a chief element of the social question, on whose successful solution the future of our civil society depends. Dr. Engel, director of the Royal Statistical Office of Berlin, says, in the *Städtisches Jahrbuch* of Berlin for 1868: 'The wholesale industry system now prevailing, and specially advocated in large towns, is characterized as follows by the most enlightened statesmen, and those best acquainted with actual life. There is, notwithstanding all the humane endeavours on the part of *individual* employers, and the heroic exertions after frugal self-help on that of *many* workmen, a consumption of men in favour of capital—a consumption which, by wearing out the vital strength of individuals, by enfeebling whole generations, by breaking up families, by letting men run morally wild, and by its destruction of all alacrity in labour, *endangers in the highest degree the state of civilised society.*' After the successful termination of an external war, which now

lies behind us, this internal conflict, gathering its forces, hangs menacingly over us. Modern times have put powerful weapons into the hands of the so-called working classes,—universal suffrage, corporate rights, and liberty of coalition. To these are added, as motive powers, the undeniably many causes of distress, and also the increased requirements of life, and the desires and passions of men. Capital has become the basis of production; this is a fact which we cannot alter, from which we cannot retrograde, with which we cannot dispense. Capital may either be regarded as exclusively an individual possession, as by Liberalism, whose principle is one-sided individualism, or required as a common possession, as by Communism, whose exclusive principle is community of property. The former principle necessarily involves the reaction of the latter. For mere individualism leads to the oppression of the weak by the strong; so that, in spite of legal liberty and equality, there exists a monopoly of money power, accompanied by a dangerous proletariat. A mere policy of non-intervention, which is the principle of Liberal legislation, is of no avail. For a wrong state of things will not make itself a right one, but must be made such in the way of legislation or social enactment. The decisive element, however, lies in moral remedies. In the *Edinburgh Review* for July 1850, art. ‘Church and State Education,’ we read: ‘The truth is, that the evils under which the labouring classes suffer are essentially moral evils, and that their cure is not to be effected except by the operation of moral causes. If the wages of labour were doubled to-morrow—other things remaining the same—these evils would not be diminished, but rather increased. We do not mean that there are not many labourers whose material well-being is impossible on their present earnings; but we assert that the chief source of the misery of the *class* of labourers is in their demoralization; and that so long as this remains, whatever measures may be taken to better their con-

dition, by increasing their wages or cheapening their food, they will defeat them by their vices and their improvidence.'

Benjamin Franklin, addressing the working classes, exclaims: 'Hearken not to any one who tells you that you can grow rich in any other way than by industry and economy; hearken not, he is a poisoner' (Hettinger, *Apologie des Christenthums*, ii. 3, 2d edit. 1869, p. 256). I spoke from this point of view, on the social office and importance of the Inner Mission, at the annual meeting of the Association for Inner Missions, held at Leipsic in 1871 (see the second Report of this Association, Leips. 1871). Schäffle, the famous and able social economist, says (*deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift*, 1864, p. 358): 'The social questions of the present day may indeed be *re-garded* by the political economist exclusively in their economical aspect, but they can never be *solved* in all their bearings without the co-operation of all the moral potencies of society.' Very interesting is the information given, in *The Working Classes of England in their Social and Political Relations*, by Ludlow and Lloyd Jones, translated by J. v. Holzendorff, Berlin 1868, p. 189, concerning the conference with workmen held in the London Coffee-House, Jan. 21, 1869, and the opinions there expressed on the religious question among the workmen. 'We may rest assured,' said the mover of one resolution in concluding his speech, 'that the gospel has lost nothing of its power over the masses since the days when it was said of its first Teacher that "the common people heard Him gladly."' It is well known that V. A. Huber, in particular, has taken a great interest in contributing to such a solution of the labour question. His observations, ideas, and counsels are to be found more especially in his journal *Concordia*, a contribution to the solution of the labour question, Leips 1861 sq. At great church meetings this question has repeatedly been made the subject of comprehensive reports and thorough discussion. At the fourteenth

German Evangelical Church Diet, held at Kiel, 1867, Prof. Nasse of Bonn treated this question in an exhaustive manner, and Comm. R. J. Quistorp of Stettin, and Sarasin of Basle, contributed valuable remarks (see *die Verhandlungen*, etc., Berlin 1867, p. 134 sq.). The copious and important lectures delivered by Wichern and Prof. Wagner at the October meeting at Berlin, 1871 (see *die Verhandlungen*, etc., Berlin 1871, p. 91 sq.) are well known. The lecture *Der Kern der Arbeiterfrage*, given at the Johanneum in Hamburg, 1872, by Comm. R. J. Quistorp (Stettin 1872), produced a great impression upon the parties in question. 'There are many,' it is said, p. 15, 'who admit indeed that a mere rise of wages, a mere increase of income, will not suffice permanently to raise the condition of the working classes, and to reconcile them to their condition. They think that the something else that is wanting is better education, more cultivation of the understanding, more intelligence, more knowledge,—in short, to use the dying words of Goethe, "more light." I say, on the contrary, that highly as I appreciate the value of a more solid education of the working classes, it is not only more light that is wanted, but, above all, more love. Everything does not depend only upon enlightening the understanding, but also upon warming the heart. It is in the fact that the love of many has waxed cold, and that a blind and inordinate selfishness which alienates man from man has taken its place, that I behold the main root of the terrible discord which has attacked society and threatens its dissolution!' 'More love, however, can only arise from drawing more deeply from the Source of all love, from a renovation and revival of the Christian consciousness.' 'It is not the lower classes, not those who have no property, that must make a beginning, but *ourselves*; for it was from us, the higher classes, that that false direction of heart and mind, whose ultimate results we encounter in the religious and social doctrines of revolutionary fanatics, proceeded and

penetrated to the lower classes.' 'When we employers learn to tread this path, and to tread it with right feelings, especially towards our work-people, then, but not till then, will the labour question be solved in the right manner' (p. 23). I earnestly recommend this lecture to my readers.

(8) The widest diffusion of socialistic and communistic ideas took place, according to Roscher, i. 152, among the ancients in the age of the decadence of Hellenism, and in that of the degeneracy of the Roman republic; among the moderns, at the era of the Reformation, and again at the present time. That Platonic socialism (Plato, *de Rep.* v.) was no mere individual fancy is best shown by the controversy directed against it by Aristophanes in his *Ecclesiazusen*. Comp. also Arist. *Polit.* ii. 2. 'The speeches of the Gracchi, and, in a far ruder fashion, the conspiracy of Catiline, remind us of the catchwords of modern socialism (see Plut. *T. Gracchus*, 9, and Sallust, *Cat.* 20, 23, 37-39).' 'A social revolution of the most fearful kind, by which a great part of all private property passed into the hands of those who hitherto had had no possessions (the soldiers), and knew not how to administer it, happened twice during the Roman republic, viz. under Sylla and the second Triumvirate' (p. 153). 'In the two centuries whose central point is the Reformation, the transition from the husbandry of mediæval peasants to modern high cultivation could not in the first instance but press severely on the lower classes. A like effect was produced by the depreciation of the precious metals. The abolition, too, of so many monasteries, which caused a great increase of poverty, was scarcely compensated by the numerous new poor laws which played so great a part in Spain, England, etc., during the sixteenth century.' In Luther's days, it was almost as usual as it was in 1848 to speak of the great corruption of trade, the systematic fraud everywhere prevailing, etc. Münzer's principle was '*Omnia simul communia!*'

'The community of goods and wives, that of the libertines (Calvin, *Instructio adv. Libertinos*, c. 20), English communists of the Reformation age.' The most important systematic works of the period are Sir Thomas More's *Utopia* (1516), and Campanella's *Civitas Solis* (1620). More expressly declares that 'all the States of the time were but conspiracies of the rich to promote their private interests, and to plunder the poor under the mask of the common good' (p. 154). 'Almost all socialists have succeeded better in the critical than in the positive part of their work.' 'On the conspiracy of Babœuf (executed 1796), who desired complete equality and community of labour, enjoyment, and education, the doing away with great cities, etc., comp. Buonarrotti, *La Conjuration de Babœuf*, 1821. This work powerfully contributed to the revival of communistic ideas after the July Revolution. Among the works of modern communists, which are especially distinguished from the ancient by their industrial colouring, Cabet's *Voyage en Icarie*, ii. 1840, is prominent. He declares the doing away with religion, the family, and town life open questions, and desires that the prevalence of community of goods should be brought about by the peaceful means of persuasion' (p. 155). Comp. the very able history of the socialist system in Marle's *Weltökonomie*, i. 2, 435 sq. Schäffle's work, *Kapitalismus und Socialismus*, 1870, is a significant attempt to acknowledge what is true and to oppose what is unjust in socialism. On community of goods, Roscher, p. 167, says: 'Let us disregard for the present the terrible and culture-destroying revolution by which community of goods must be preceded, and ask what will be its results. Among either brutes or angels it might exist without doing harm. And also among men united by genuine love. All exemplary family life is a kind of community of goods. In larger associations such love is indeed only to be found combined with great religious enthusiasm, which is never of long duration, and of which Acts ii. 44 sq., iv. 33 sq., v. 1-11,

offers the most remarkable and best example.' Besides, this community of goods of the primitive Christians at Jerusalem was 'only a community of use, not of possession (Acts iv. 32); it was moreover entirely a voluntary act of love (v. 4), not a duty, and still less a right which the poorer might claim' (p. 158). Where these prerequisites are absent, *i.e.* in ordinary times, the most prejudicial results will ensue. Where there are now 1000 rich and 100,000 proletariates, there would be in the next generation no rich and perhaps 200,000 proletariates. Poverty would be universal. For the sake of a period of transition very agreeable to the multitude, but very brief, all those better possessions of life which surpass the eating of potatoes, the drinking of brandy, and the begetting of children, would have been wrecked; for equality of education, as advocated by the communists, would in practice amount to an utter absence of any higher scientific cultivation at all. Far more envy really lurks in communism than is believed.

(9) In the ancient world there was in intellectual as well as in political life an aristocratic element. As only the narrow circle of citizens, properly so called, was capable of liberty and virtue, so too but a narrow circle was capable of education. 'Odi profanum vulgus et arceo.' With Christianity, a wealth of new and sublime ideas entered the world, and became the common possession of all members of the Christian Church. Comp. *Lectures on Fundamental Truths*, lect. i. p. 5 sq. Hence Origen says: 'The philosophers are physicians who heal only the great and rich; Plato, who must, however, by no means be depreciated, is read only by men of science and education. Christ and His apostles, impelled by love to man, sought to gain Greeks and barbarians, wise and simple, learned and unlearned. And because their teaching was intended for all men, it was not to be like the highly-seasoned food, which could be enjoyed only by the luxurious and dainty' (Stirm,

Apologie, etc. p. 209). Guizot, appealing to Montesquieu, specially shows how by this means it became the parent of civilisation. Comp. *Lectures on Fundamental Truths*, lecture ix. note 18. Jouffroy, *Mélanges philos.* p. 424 (quoted by Hettinger, ii. 3, p. 136): ‘The Church asks the young Christian whence he came? he knows it—whither he is going? he knows it—how he is to attain his end? he knows it. She asks this poor child, who never in all his life thought about such matters, why he is here, and what will become of him after death? he gives a sublime answer. She asks how the world came into existence, and why God made it, and the plants and animals upon it? How the earth was peopled, how diversity of language, how suffering originated? he knows all. The origin of the world, the origin of our race, the destiny of man in this life and the next, the relation of man to God and to his fellow-men, his rights over creation,—nothing is strange to him. And when he comes to maturity, he knows the principles of natural rights, of national rights; for all these follow as a matter of course from the instruction he has received. Truly it is a great religion which is thus able to give an answer to every question that man asks. If Christianity is in the first place a matter of faith, yet it is also true that “faith seeks its ideas;” it impels to knowledge as well as to confession. “Fides præcedit intellectum,” “Credo ut intelligam,” are old-fashioned maxims of the Church and of theology. None of the ancient religions had a theology, *i.e.* a religious science, but only a mythology; and science—in philosophy—led to a dissolution of religion. Christianity alone has a theology, and has it by an inward necessity, as being the religion of the word, and addressed to the thoughts and will of human personality. Thus Christianity produced theology, and theology bears the other sciences in her bosom, until they set out on their independent paths. They are still, however, united to her, both by a common moral and scientific interest in truth, and by their use of the same

scientific method and instruments. But apart from the special cultivation of the sciences, only consider the educational importance of preaching! Christianity is the commencement of civilisation and education to the uncivilised nations, even by the very fact that it is to them the commencement of literature. For it brings them the Holy Scriptures, and with them the beginning of all further education.' Comp. Stirn, *Apol.* p. 210; Nitzsch, *die Wirkung des evangelischen Christenthums auf kulturlose Völker*, Berlin 1852.

(10) On the relation of the modern ideas of liberty of conscience and humanity to Christianity, comp. Hündeshagen, *Beiträge zur Kirchenverfassungsgeschichte und Kirchenpolitik*, etc. 1864, p. 474 sq. The doctrines and demands laid down by the age of Illuminism 'belong, in their better and primitive form, to Christianity; in many the Christian feature may still be discerned, even in their degenerate state. May not indeed the whole humanitarian agitation, the fanaticism for the rights of man, the dignity of man, philanthropy, human well-being, etc., be regarded as a reaction on the part of that moral view of the world which, though fundamentally combined in Christianity with the religious view, has nevertheless failed in so many points to attain its just dues in actual realization, repressed as it has been, and as good as stifled in several particulars, by the one-sided preponderance of the religious view? Unsupported by the State, inadequately cherished by the Church, certain elements of the Christian world of thought, instead of developing themselves within the Church, and through its medium in Christianized mankind, have strayed into the extra-Christian, nay, the anti-Christian domain, have wandered about like lost and orphaned children, and have, in this their neglected state, not only degenerated in many respects, but have also lost the knowledge of their parentage, and at last taken up a hostile position towards the mother who bore them.

The ideas of liberty of faith, mutual toleration in religious matters, also the ideas of liberty and rights in social life, of pure manhood and human dignity, and lastly, that apparatus of social notions for whose realization a struggle was begun in 1789, which to this very day stirs the passions of Christian nations in both hemispheres—what, after all, are these but such homeless descendants of Christianity, ruined and run wild in their homelessness, who, never certain concerning their own nature, have in their self-ignorance entered into the service of the natural man, and have, in their insubordinate state, been misused and spurred on riotously to resist reasonable human enactments, to oppose sacred and divine ordinances, nay, to outrage the Holy God Himself? To these let us add the idea of progress, unknown to the heathen world—which despaired of the future (comp. *Lect. on Fundamental Truths*, lect. viii. p. 238)—but essential to Christianity, as being involved both in the idea and the fact of the history of salvation, and in the doctrine of the Trinity, and consequently ruling the history of the Church and its doctrine (comp. the saying of Vincent Lerins in his famous *Commonitorium*: ‘profectus non permutatio’). Also the separation of the two powers, the spiritual and secular, upon which, in contrast to the ancient view that religion was of the State, is based the whole stability of Christian social order and liberty of conscience. Especially is an inward relation to science peculiar to Protestantism. The Reformation proceeded from a university (Wittenberg), and found there its home; ‘nor did the Swiss doctrine flourish till it had found its university (Geneva),’ Dahlmann, *Politik*, p. 311. On the universities as exhibiting and effecting the union of the various sciences, comp. the able section in the above work, p. 30 sq.; also Ph. Fischer, *Spekul. Ethik*, 1851, p. 407.

(11) The relation of art to science may be thus expressed: art carries out the general to the individual,

science leads back the individual to the general. Good remarks on art will be found in Ph. Fischer's *Spekul. Ethik* (p. 263 sq.). The mind, 'that born idealist,' exhibits in art the idea of its entire life in the most direct form. The principle of art is the imagination pervaded by the idea, its aim the carrying out of the idea to reality, a carrying out which is free, and yet at the same time in conformity with laws (p. 263). Its æsthetic development being one of the necessary stages and spheres of the mind, 'art is not merely the gift of individuals, but a popular world-wide gift—a view which Herder and Goethe, who owed it to Herder, vindicated in behalf of science also' (p. 264). From my lecture *On the Development of Religious Painting*, Leips. 1863, p. 3: 'The pictorial arts proceeded from architecture. This is the oldest of the arts, and originally included the rest. It was but gradually that sculpture and painting separated themselves from architecture, and pursued each its independent path. Architecture impresses the thoughts of the mind upon stone, but they still struggle with the supremacy of matter, and therefore of technics. In sculpture, matter has become entirely the form which pervades it with spirit. The variously affected individual life, however, of mind and heart can only be represented by the art of light and colouring. Sound, that direct expression of the inward emotion, penetrates still more deeply into the life of the soul. But the art of language, poetry, stands highest of all. To architecture belong the oldest monuments of man's artistic efforts; sculpture is the art of the ancients, painting of the Christian era. Music has in recent times been specially cultivated and developed, while poetry, the faithful companion of mankind, is of all time.' On the relation of sculpture to painting, Schelling says, in his discourse of 1807, *On the Relation of the Plastic Arts to Nature*: 'The perfect plastic artist will indeed, as Winckelmann says, not take more matter for his work than he needs for the accomplish-

ment of the purposes of his mind; nor, on the other hand, put more power into the soul than is expressed in the matter: for his art consists in expressing the spiritual in a manner wholly corporeal. Hence sculpture can attain its true climax only in those natures whose idea involves that they are at all times in reality all that they are in idea or in soul, *i.e.* in divine natures. Painting, on the contrary, represents by light and colour, and therefore by a non-corporeal, and to a certain extent spiritual, medium. Nor does it by any means give its images for the objects themselves, but expressly intends that they should be regarded as pictures. Hence, even for this reason, it does not lay so much stress upon the material as sculpture does, and seems, on this account, capable of giving a clear preponderance to the spiritual,' Schelling, *Philos. der Kunst*, Works, i. 5, p. 576. 'Architecture is necessarily fashioned according to arithmetical, or, as being music in space, according to geometrical proportions. It is music in space—music, as it were, petrified' (Rothe, *Theol. Ethik*, ii. 314). My lecture on *Religious Painting*, p. 4: 'Art is the product of an inward craving, which the Creator Himself has implanted in the human mind. Hence it is primordial, and we are justified in saying that poetry is older than prose, painting than writing. Man has an irrepressible craving to give to the thoughts of his mind, by means of sensible matter, that beautiful expression which may awaken noble sentiments and emotions. This impulse is indigenous in his inmost soul, even in those lowest depths where religion also finds its home. In this inner world, art and religion are near neighbours, and hence it is natural that when they come forth into the sphere of the phenomenal, they should appear side by side, and willingly enter into mutual alliance.' Kahnis, *Kunst und Kirche* (three lectures, Leipsic 1865), p. 56. It is the highest vocation of art 'to be a priestess, offering to the nations the mysteries of a higher world in the form of the beautiful.'

(12) On the connection of the enjoyment of art with labour, comp. Martensen, *Grundriss des Systems der Moralphilosophie*, 1845, p. 92: 'They who only dream away life in æsthetic enjoyment, who would delight in the enchanting appearance of the ideal, in the image of liberty, but withdraw from the serious reality of work, have apprehended the meaning neither of art nor of life.' Comp. Ph. Fischer, *Spekul. Ethik*, p. 272, on 'the moral importance of art as refining and ennobling the mind.' That beauty is founded in God, and in the eternal harmony of the divine power, was, as is well known, a fundamental idea of Plato (comp. Hettinger, *die Kunst im Christenthum, Festrede*, etc., 1867, p. 4 sq.), and has frequently been repeated since his days. Comp. also Winckelmann, *Gesch. der Kunst*, 1776, p. 260; Hettinger's above-named work, p. 5. 'Supreme beauty is in God. The idea of beauty becomes more perfect, the more certainly it can be conceived in harmony with the Supreme Being.'

(13) On the difference between the Christian and the ancient ideal, comp. Hegel's *Asthetik*, edited by Hotho, 2d edit. 1842, vol. ii. p. 70 sq. The classical ideal is both as to form and subject the human, with the rejection of all that is unfitting and incidental. But 'with all their mental sublimity, an atmosphere and odour of sadness has always been perceived by the intelligent, even when charmed by their perfect beauty, in ancient works of art representing the gods' (p. 77). 'It is this very sadness which decides their fate, by pointing to something higher than themselves' (p. 101). The classical is the adequate and beautiful manifestation of mind in its external and sensible form—a union accomplished in the element of the external, and therefore appropriately existing in sensible reality. The true notion of mind is not, however, yet attained; on the contrary, it presses back from this reconciliation with the corporeal to its reconcilia-

tion with itself. Thus arises the contrast of subjectivity as existing in itself and the outward appearance. This self-perception of the mind is the principle of romantic (Christian) art. Classical beauty is therefore no longer the highest ideal. For mind now knows that its truth does not consist in merging itself in corporeity; on the contrary, it becomes certain of its truth by bringing itself back from the external to its own inwardness, and assuming that external reality is not its adequate existence. Hence beauty becomes mental beauty (better, the beauty of the soul), p. 121 sq. 'By surmounting the finite, the natural, the transitory, it enters the realm of truth and satisfaction. This process is conflict, grief, death, sorrow for the transitory,' p. 125. 'Not till the Middle Ages is the real necessity for the infinite pain of this sacrifice of the most specific subjectivity, or suffering and death, etc., perceived. It cannot be said that death in its essential import was comprehended by the Greeks,' p. 127. 'Grecian beauty exhibits the internal qualities of the mental individuality as wholly moulded into its bodily form, acts, and surroundings, as wholly expressed, and content to live in the external. To romantic beauty, on the contrary, it is absolutely necessary that the soul, though manifested in the external, should at the same time show that from this corporeity it returns to itself, and lives in itself. Hence the corporeal can at this stage express the inwardness of the mind only so far as it manifests that the soul has its congruent reality not in this actual existence but in itself. On this account beauty is no longer the idealization of the objective form, but the inward condition of the soul in itself; it becomes a *beauty of inwardness*,' p. 138. Comp. my lecture on *Religious Painting*, p. 6. 'Our Lord's mode of instruction by parables is the starting-point of Christian art. It contains the germ of the new principle, that the sensible is a parable of the super-sensible. The principle of ancient art is: the sensible is the manifestation of the super-sensible; the highest perfection of

the sensible form is also the fitting expression of the super-sensible; the eternal intrinsic value comes forth in the ideal earthly form. The Christian notion, on the contrary, is that the eternal, the divine, has over and above even the most ideal form a surpassing value, which the sensible manifestation may indeed enable us to form a notion of, but is incompetent fully to express. Through the covering of the earthly we look into a world of eternity, of which this world is not a manifestation, but only a parable.' This is shown, especially with respect to the representation of grief in ancient and Christian art, by a comparison of the Laocoon and Niobe with the crucified Saviour and the *Mater Dolorosa*, in my lecture *On the Representation of Grief in Art*, Leips. 1864. The article of Prof. Krüger (Göttingen) on the Liturgy and Church Music, in Kliefoth and Dieckhoff's *Theologische Zeitschrift*, 1863, p. 169 sq., also contains good and apposite remarks on the difference between heathen and Christian art—the æsthetic root of the former, the ethic root of the latter. Martensen, *Grun-driss*, etc. p. 92: 'In Romanism and heathenism, art and religion are confounded, and the fantastic light thus produced gives rise to the forms of mythology and superstition. In Protestantism, art first keeps within its proper limits, and only when thus duly distinguished from religion can it be reconciled therewith and justified by theology.'

(14) The Christian principle of art, and the great advance which art, in all its departments, owes to Christianity, are treated on, in frequent accordance with Hegel, by Ph. Fischer, *Spekul. Ethik*, in a copious and comprehensive section, pp. 274-374. I adduce a few passages: 'If the ideal of art is the union of the finite and the infinite, of the idea and reality, of the universal and the individual, it is obvious that the absolute truth of the Christian view is the cause of the beauty and sublimity of romantic art; and that sacred art, by its union of the

æsthetic with the moral ideal, presents the truest and most objective glorification of reality' (p. 278). 'The God-man, who exhibits by His person and history no particular relative personification of the Divine, but both the absolute self-manifestation of God and the archetype of mankind, is the absolute ideal of art, which, in conceiving and depicting Him, devotes itself to the representation of what is Highest and Holiest' (p. 279). This is then carried out with respect to the several arts, and first to Architecture. 'The inseparableness of art from worship and its sanctuaries, this blending of its agency with faith, applies to the symbolism of *architecture* in a higher sense than to ancient architecture' (p. 297). While the Romance round-arched style expresses the 'satisfaction of the mind by the visible Church which represents heaven upon earth, the popular genius of the German Christian nations, rising from the created to the Divine Father and Redeemer of the world, expresses the most ardent longing for the celestial state itself, of which the Church on earth is an image, and for which its sacred temples and worship are a preparation' (p. 296). On *Sculpture and Painting*: 'Sculpture devotes itself chiefly to the representation of the sublime repose and harmony of the self-contained and self-sufficing gods or men of antiquity' (p. 308). 'Not till after the light of that spiritual kingdom of faith, love, and hope had risen upon mankind, by means of the Divine Logos, was painting capable of expressing, by the symbolism of colour, that most ideal manifestation of life, the inward ideality of the mind' (p. 309). On these arts, comp. the already often-mentioned lectures, *On the Development of Religious Painting*, Leips. 1863; *On Church Art*, 2d edit. 1864; *On the Representation of Grief in Art*, 1864. *Music*, 'an essentially romantic art, which did not, till the promulgation of the religion of faith, hope, and love, solemnize her true spiritualization and her transfiguration into a symbol of hidden mysteries, is even more nearly connected than are sculpture and painting

with Christianity' (Fischer, p. 329). 'The high, the truly moral destiny of music is to render sensible the harmonious emotions and images of a mind stirred by the revelation of God and of His kingdom, by a poetry of sound as deeply felt as it is artistic' (p. 332). 'Music is the echo of the inward harmony of a genius which manifests therein its religious life and its feeling for nature' (p. 333). 'It follows, from its very nature, that the most direct power of moving the feelings is at its command.' 'The reason why the moral, and especially the religious effect of music is to be so highly estimated is, that its sacred power ennobles and spiritualizes the feelings (*Gemüth*), and through them the whole man, and devotes and disposes him, so to speak, to the most ardent reverence and lively perception of God and of His manifestations.' 'But for the same reason this poetry of sound—*abusus optimi pessimus*—is capable of expressing, with fearful power, the most terrible passions and the most uncontrolled feelings, and of dragging its hearer into the vortex of excessive sensuous excitement' (p. 334). On music, comp. Thibaut's treatise, *Ueber Reinheit der Tonkunst*, 4th enlarged edit., with preface by K. Bahr, which itself marks an epoch; also Krüger, in his above-named work, and others. The very sanctuaries of Christianity—those vast halls—were specially adapted for music and song, while the Grecian temples merely served the purpose of containing the images of the gods and the sacred vessels, but offered no space for the soul-stirring sounds of speech and song. Heathenism was symbolical, but dumb; the gospel opened both heart and mouth. For in the former there were only dumb idols, in the latter a revelation, *i.e.* a God who speaks. So early as the New Testament we read of Christian songs (psalms, odes, hymns, 1 Cor. xiv. 26; Eph. v. 19; Col. iii. 16), while the Revelation of St. John gives, in the praises of heaven, an image of the praises of earth (v. 9, xiv. 3). Pliny's letter, quoted in note 9 to lecture iv., shows that hymns were sung in the Christian assemblies

to Jesus Christ, and the cultivation of music and song in the Christian Church, from that time onwards, is well known. Down to the times of Sebastian Bach sacred art towers far above secular in music—Bach himself being its greatest representative, and ruling in its sanctuary like a priest. From his days to those of Mozart the effort was to bring secular up to the level of sacred art; from Mozart onwards the secular element became the ruling power, and the elder sister the vassal of the younger. Of late, however, the treasures of ancient music, and especially Bach's, have again been brought to light and appreciated (comp. Krüger, *Gott. Gel. Aug.* 1863, ii. p. 988). Finally, with respect to *Poetry*, we refer, in epic poetry, to the *Heliand*, Dante, and Klopstock's *Messiah*; in lyric, to the wealth of religious popular poetry, or poetry with at least a religious tendency, produced in the Middle Ages, and to the treasures of Protestant hymnody; in dramatic, above all, to Shakespeare. Comp. lect. i. note 4.

(15) Luther praises not only the arts and languages in general, but the fine arts, especially music, in particular (vol. iii. 280, 282, 283, 284 sq., lii. 298, lvi. 297). 'Also that it is not my opinion that all the arts are to be destroyed and to perish by means of the gospel, as some super-spiritualists give out, but I should like to see all the arts, and especially music, employed in the service of Him who made and who gave them.' In a like spirit (lvi. 295) he wrote the song of 'Frau Musiker, 'as a preface to all good song-books:'

'Hie kann nicht sein ein böser Muth,
 Wo da singen Gesellen gut;
 Hie bleibt kein Zorn, Zank Hass noch Neid,
 Weichen muss alles Herzeleid;
 Geiz Sorg' und was sonst hart anleit,
 Fährt hin mit aller Traurigkeit.
 Auch ist ein jeder dess wohl frei

Dass solcher Freud kein Sünde sei,
Sondern auch Gott viel bäss gefällt;
Denn alle Freud der ganzen Welt
Dem Teufel sie sein Werk zerstört,' etc.¹

And lx. 60 : 'The devil is a sad spirit, and makes folks sad, hence he cannot bear cheerfulness; and therefore gets as far off from music as possible, and never stays where men are singing, especially spiritual songs' (lxii. 111, 307, 311).

(16) Ph. Fischer, p. 272 and elsewhere, lays stress upon the fact that Christianity has, in the gospel history, given to art its most sublime subject. Whether this gospel history ought, however, to be made the subject of dramatic representation is questionable, and the Oberammergauer Passion-play alone cannot furnish the answer. For this is intended to be less a purely artistic performance than the fulfilment of a religious duty in that spirit of simplicity which beholds the secular and religious spheres in far more immediate union than is the case when they are viewed from the standpoint of reflection occupied at other stages of secular and Christian development. Emilie Ringseis, in the preface to *Sebastian*, a martyrdom tragedy in five acts, Freiburg 1868, 'desires that sacred subjects should be represented on the stage, just as a crucifix is placed in the corner of the inn room (as is the case in Roman Catholic districts), notwithstanding the noise and confusion of an inn,' etc. The existence of the theatre is a fact, and it can neither be reasoned away nor preached down. Some, however, will make no use of this excellent weapon, from indignation at its great power in the enemy's hand, or from fear lest its unskilful use should

¹ Ill-humour cannot be here where companions sing pleasantly together : neither anger, contention, hatred, nor envy stay here, and all heart-sorrow must depart ; covetousness, anxiety, and whatever else disposes to harshness, begone, with all sadness. Every one, too, may be sure that such joy is no sin, but that it pleases God far better than all other joy in the whole world. It destroys the work of the devil, etc.

bring injury to their own leader. It is the old story of burying the talent because God is a hard master. This is moreover the Romish stand-point, which, on the one hand, requires asceticism, and exalts the saints above the sphere of what is human and natural, and on the other makes no real distinction between spiritual and natural, sacred and profane, the Church and the world, divine worship and the theatre, but intermingles one with the other, and offers this misty mixture of devotion and sensuous enjoyment. The Reformation view is based upon the decided discrimination of the two provinces. The contrast between the two views is, in the matter of the drama, exhibited in Calderon and Shakespeare. In the former, sacred subjects are represented, in the latter, actual human life, but in the light of Christianity, the delineation being really based upon the moral spirit of Christianity. On the representation of sacred subjects on the stage, comp Hase, *das geistliche Schauspiel, geschichtl. und sachl.* Leips. 1858, e.g. p. 318: 'It is impossible to be edified by hearing the same song in the theatre on one day which on another we sing in church.' On the question of dramatic entertainments, see Hagenbach's *Kirche und Schauspiel, Eine Kulturgeschichtliche Zeitfrage*, in Gelzer's *Monatsbl.* 1862, 5; Rothe, 5, 141 sq. 'In fact, the mistrust of play-going, so long rooted in Christianity, has ever, where it has not arisen from a dislike to art on principle, been inspired by the existing state of the stage, and has, when rightly understood, always applied to this and not to theatrical representations in the abstract. In this limited sense it has always, from the first Christian centuries to the present day, had good reason for continuing. Such a confession is indeed a very humbling one to Christendom, the condition of the stage being a true barometer of the condition of morality in general. Still, humbling as the confession may be, we cannot but own, when we consider the present state of our stage, that it stands on a very low moral level, and that, when

regarded from a Christain stand-point, it naturally raises a prejudice against theatrical representations in general. Such a conclusion is forced upon us whether we turn our attention to the dramas, with their scenic apparatus, now presented upon our stages, or to the actors themselves, or, finally, to the theatrical public properly so called.' Karl Frenzel, *Neue Studien*, Berlin 1868: 'The public that supports the stage with its money has a certain claim' that this stage should not be regarded, as by Schiller, as a moral institution, but as an institution devoted to amusement.

(17) Compare the quotations from Hegel, note 13, and my lecture on the representation of grief.

(18) Harless, in his article 'Christenthum und Dichtkunst' (*Erlanger Zeitschrift*, June 1860, reprinted in the work, *Das Verhältniss des Christenthums zu Kultur und Lebensfragen der Gegenwart*, 1873), written on the occasion of the Schiller festival, enters into the superiority of the gift and the work to the artist. I cannot refrain from quoting various passages, which will certainly please all my readers: 'Speech in the abstract is a wondrous mystery, the depth of which it would be difficult for thought to exhaust. A child of paradisaic birth, now cast out into a strange land, it wears a garment covered with the dust of earth, and is yet winged with celestial pinions.' 'They whom we call the rulers of language are themselves ruled by that same spirit which, by its unconscious formative agency, created language.' 'It is not the material in the abstract, not to mention the rule and standard according to which we mould and carve, but the unfettered genius of speech itself, transmitted to us by its own free agency, that is the parent of poetic thoughts perfect in form, for this genius of speech is one with the genius of poetry, nay, speech is, by its very origin, itself poetry' (p. 10 sq.). What is called simplicity, directness, artlessness, is the highest art, and

the chief ornament of true poetry ; and poetic language gives to the soul that laver of purification in which it washes off the sweat of thought *about* things, and learns, as it were, playfully to dive *into* the very essence of the things' (p. 11). 'For this very cause, however, regard to the individual poet will, in our judgment and appreciation of poetical productions, be kept very much in the background. It is only in place when the question is to account for the deficiencies, imperfections, and moral blemishes of a poem. As for that, however, which is great, beautiful, and sublime in a poem, the poet himself best knows that it was given him, that it arose within him, he knows not how, that he could not have created it by all the energy of his self-conscious will,' etc. (p. 13). 'Because these things are so, it is absurd and preposterous to try to estimate the worth of the poetic gift and its results according to our opinion of the author's moral personality. I may in this respect think very meanly of the poet, without being prevented on that account from very highly estimating his gift and his work' (p. 14). 'We must not judge by his matter whether a poet is alienated from Christianity or not' (p. 19). 'Truth is the highest law, whether for the poet or the Christian. He who has a feeling for it desires to say no more and to speak no otherwise at any moment than he really feels, and has a horror of words which give out, like a poster, that here is a Christian singing, speaking, or making poetry!' 'The office of poetry is misunderstood when it is regarded merely as a means for the promotion of Christianity' (p. 20). 'What Christianity would be to the world, cannot be understood without understanding the world. Wouldst thou look, then, into the world's heart, contemplate the monuments of art, and turn over the pages of poetry. There it is that she opens her heart, there that she gives vent to her most sacred sorrow and most silent longings ; there are found the echoes of the joy with which the morning stars praised God, and the groaning of the creature longing for the liberty of the

sons of God; an uncomprehended home-sickness for a lost glory, and a hopeful anticipation of a fresh sun-rising; the voice of a widow bewailing her desolation, and the call of the bride seeking her unknown bridegroom' (p. 21). 'Genuine poetry is akin to prophecy; she is the prophetess and revealer of the voices and thoughts concealed and locked up in nature and history, so far as this human nature can in her light conceive or know them. We are all like the people of Israel while wandering in the wilderness. The Christian eye sees by faith the land of promise, but body and soul are still surrounded by the sand and sun-burning of the desert. Before us marches One who came from heaven to be the true bread of life; but the divine mercy does not leave us even now without other manna, which falls like dew upon the wilderness, and strengthens both soul and body with earthly food. This is the gift of art, a gift bestowed by God, and in the power of none to bestow upon himself. And to those who do not for its sake neglect the rest of the Sabbath, it may also be granted that, strengthened and refreshed by the power of art, they may leave the plains of Moab and ascend the mountain, whence their eyes may behold in the distant twilight the Canaan they long for. Well for those whom art leads to such heights! But let him to whom it becomes a voice alluring him back to the wilderness, learn to renounce it, no matter whether he finds those to whom it is committed averse to Christianity or not. For all things are yours, but ye are Christ's. All things are lawful unto me, but all things are not expedient; all things are lawful for me, but I will not be brought under the power of any' (p. 20 sq.). I would here also commend to notice Hamann's *Æsthetica in nuce* (in his *Kreuzzügen des Philologen*, Hamann's Works, edited by Fred. Rothe, 1821, ii. 255 sq.), in which the rays spread over his other works are, as it were, collected into a focus. God is the supreme Author. All our authorship should be an image of the Divine. Hence it begins:

‘Neither lyre nor pencil, but a winnowing fan for my muse, to purge the floor of sacred literature!’ and it concludes with these words: ‘Let us now hearken to the summary of His most recent æsthetics, which is also the oldest, “Fear God, and give glory to Him, for the hour of His judgment is come,”’ etc. Compare also Disselhoff’s *Wegweiser zu J. C. Hamann*, 1817, p. 215 sq. Rothe, v. 135, 136 sq., discusses the purity, chastity, and Christianity of art. Good remarks will be found in W. Arnold’s *Kultur und Rechtsleben*, 1865, p. 39 sq., on the moral or immoral spirit of a people, as reflected in the character of its national art.

NOTES TO LECTURE X.

(1) On the definition of the notion of education, comp. Harless, *das Verhältniss des Christenthums*, etc. (3d article, ‘Christianity and the Literature of General Education,’ 1862): ‘The universality of this lively interest in all that pertains to human knowledge and power is the token of genuine education’ (p. 32). ‘Genuine education, as the intellectual and ethical virtue of a kindly interest in whatever may stir man to, or become the theme of, his intellectual struggles after the comprehension and dominion of the powers and forces which condition his being, surpasses all single branches of knowledge and all particular acquirements’ (p. 33). ‘Where this universal sensorium is cultivated and maintained, there is education’ (p. 37). ‘Kant, in his *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, pt. i. appendix, defines humanity as, on the one hand, the feeling of general interest, on the other, the power of cordially and generally communicating this feeling.’

(2) On the feature of sadness in the Greek delineation of life, comp. lect. ix. note 13; *Darstellung des*

Schmerzes, p. 5; *Lectures on Fundamental Truths*, pp. 183 and 394 (lect. vii. note 9). On the discords of reality as expressed in poetry, etc., and their reconciliation by Christianity, comp. Harless' above-named work (1st treatise, 'Christianity and Poetry'), p. 21, and (2d treatise, 'Christianity and Literature') p. 50 sq.

(3) The description of the 'great-souled man' is in Aristotle's *Eth. Nicom.* iv. 3; comp. lect. iii. note 11. On isolated opinions and movements, lect. ii. note 13. Individual manifestations of natural human benevolence are enumerated by Chastel in his *Histor. Studien über den Einfluss der christl. Barmherzigkeit in den ersten 6 Jahrh. der Kirche*, translated from the French by Wichern, 1854, p. 1 sq. (note, p. 210), and acknowledged also by Augustine (Ep. clv. *ad Macedon.* c. 14). How much self-interest was mingled in the commendation of benevolence by Aristotle and Cicero, is pointed out by Chastel, pp. 6 and 7, and appendix, p. 211.

(4) Aristot. *Eth. Nicom.* vii. 7, 4, 5, viii. 14, 5, ix. 1, 7; *Magn. Mor.* ii. 11.

(5) Cicero, indeed, insists that benevolence ('beneficentia, benignitas, vel liberalitas') must prevail as well as justice, *de Off.* i. 7, 20; still justice even abbreviated of love is the supreme virtue (comp. *e.g.* in the above), 'ut ne cui quis noceat nisi lacessitus injuria'—also the permission of revenge. It is true that he also lays stress on the idea of human association: 'non nobis solum nati sumus—homines hominum causa esse generatos, ut ipsi inter se alius alii prodesse possent,' i. 7, 22; the first thing always is, in a stoical fashion, 'universi generis humani societas,' i. 16, 50. But the bond of human association is only 'ratio et oratio;' the proper moral bond and all deeper foundation are absent. He is unacquainted with love properly so called, and knows only of a rendering of assistance which costs nothing, 'danti

non molesta,' i. 16, 51. Benevolence is to be regulated by the deserts of others, i. 14, 42; 'ut in beneficentia delectus esset dignitatis,' i. 14, 45, xv. 46. Hence the feeling of mercy is absent, and the ruling principle is still the ancient spirit of self-righteousness; benevolence itself being regarded from the point of view afforded by justice. He requires that we should do good to our friends, i. 14, 43; our love is to be in proportion to the love we receive from others, i. 14, 47,—in opposition to which, comp. Matt. v. 40 sq. On the benevolent efforts made under the influence of the new spirit in the times of the Roman emperors, comp. Chastel, p. 67 sq.; E. Schmidt, *die bürgerl. Gesellschaft*, etc. p. 361 sq.

(6) On the history of Christian mercy, comp. the two above-named works of Chastel and Schmidt. For an acquaintance with the works of mercy of the present time, comp. Lehmann's repeatedly quoted work, *die Werke der Liebe*, 1870, which gives an able sketch of the whole department of the Inner Mission; Natzinger's *Geschichte der kirchlichen Armenpflege*, 1868, is a good and comprehensive account from the Roman Catholic stand-point.

(7) On the section on friendship, comp. especially the lecture of Curtius, 'On the importance of friendship in ancient times with respect to morality, science, and politics' (in Gelzer's *Monatsblatt*, July 1863), on which it was chiefly founded; also from a humanistic stand-point, Märklin's *Gymnasium - Programm*, Heilbronn 1842, on the position and importance of friendship in ancient and modern times. Among the ancients the subject was most copiously handled by Aristotle, *Eth. Nicom.* viii. and xi., and Cicero, *Laelius sive dialogus de amicitia*. In antiquity, the importance of marriage is eclipsed by the importance of friendship. It is admitted that the specifically ancient crime of so-called pederasty was, even among the best, connected with the exaggera-

tion of friendship. This was not a merely intellectual, but also a sensual affection.

(8) On the reproach cast from of old upon Christianity, that it did not adequately appreciate friendship, comp. Rothe, iv. 68 sq., where, however, the refutation is not historically carried out. The most genuine and fervent expressions perhaps ever uttered concerning Christian friendship will be found in the charming little work, *Philemon, or Christian Friendship*, dedicated to the scattered confessors of the Lord, by F. Delitzsch, 2d edit. 1868, which is founded on the compositions of the sisters Klettenberg and C. F. von Mosers, both known by means of Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahren*.

(9) In the middle of the last century, friendship was cultivated to an excessive degree, and became a veritable passion, especially in the literary circle of Halle-Halberstadt, of which Gleim was the centre. In the seventeenth century, in the cases of Opitz and Flemming, it was a masculine, in the eighteenth a sentimental attachment. That friendship cannot be durable between those of opposite religious opinions is exemplified by the cessation of the friendship which existed between Heine and Spitta in their student days.

(10) The subject of sociability is treated of by Schleiermacher, *Entwurf eines Systems der Sittenlehre*, edited by Schweizer, 1835, p. 307 sq., and thoroughly discussed by Rothe upon the basis of Schleiermacher's remarks.

(11) On the dangers of sociability, comp. Rothe, v. 178 sq.; on its genuine and spurious Christianization, p. 182 sq.

(12) On falsehood in general, and falsehoods of courtesy in particular, comp. Rothe, iv. 349 sq.

(13) On play, comp. Rothe, v. 197 sq.

(14) On the need of Christianity in the present age, comp. e.g. Const. Rössler, *System der Staatslehre*, p. 521 sq. 'Against the enormous temptations furnished by the immense dominion obtained by man over matter in the nineteenth century, and by the contradiction between the grand resources at the command of the whole, and the limited privileges of each individual,—against these temptations nothing can avail but powerful principles.' In thus speaking, the *Kreuz-Zeitung* is quite in the right. If the immeasurable acquisitions which the mind of man has both theoretically and practically attained are not to be a curse, are not to plunge him into feebleness, degeneration, and barbarism, he must take a firmer stand than he has ever yet done on that eternal foundation which can bear him up free and triumphant above all earthly powers, and especially above the secret power of the earthly. Its own dominion over things earthly is the greatest danger to the mind. It is superior to this when it surrenders itself to the absolute power. Never was religion more necessary to any age than to ours, which has to choose between a noble use of precious possessions, and a shameful shipwreck through self-decay. They who would deprive mankind of Christianity, that absolute anchor of the mind in an extra-mundane basis, are but miserable fools. How fatal is a breach with religion is shown by social democracy. It is worth while calling attention to the words of the Berlin *Sozial-Demokrat* of March 12, 1865: 'They who take heaven from the people must give them earth. . . . When the priesthood bowed the neck of mankind, it gave to the suffering son of man the kindly hope of another and a better world. In all the misfortunes of life, in sorrow, need, and sickness, a sweet hope was still left to a believing mind. But what is now the case? There are still poverty and privation, sorrow, need, and sickness. These are artificially enhanced and heaped up upon one class, while the pleasures and good things of the world combine to enrich the other. . . . What, then, have

the favoured of human society to offer to those millions, through whose sickness, increased by poverty and care, they enjoy the pleasures of earth? We tolerate no halfness and no expedients; we desire the full results, the whole truth. Ye wretched Pharisees of free churches, of liberal citizenship, who have deprived the people of the consolations of faith, and yet will not remove from them the iron yoke of your iron machines, where then is your logic? The logic of history is sterner than yours: the people have done with heaven—they are justified in claiming earth.'

(15) The legend of Prometheus has of late been repeatedly alluded to in this sense; comp. Martensen, *die christl. Ethik*, 1871, p. 76 sq., and the names there mentioned.

(16) This conviction was expressed in *Lectures on Fundamental Truths*, p. 173, and therefore in 1864: 'Hence I repeat it, the combination of religion with modern progress is the vital question of the day for Europe, and especially for Germany.' Even the date might show how unworthy of regard is the discovery made by one of the collaborateurs of the *Protest. Kirchenzeitung* of the Protestant Union (1872, No. 12), that it shows a leaning towards the Protestant Union, because the latter has inscribed the reconciliation of Christianity with culture upon its flag. But apart from the consideration, that while much is talked very little is done in this respect by the Association in question, it also understands this reconciliation in an entirely opposite manner. For it would determine what is Christian by the standard of this culture, *i.e.* of the notions of the age, while I regard Christianity as an independent and self-determined quantity, and speak of an alliance between the two independent powers, Christianity and culture.

(17) On progress without Christianity, etc., Wolfgang

Menzel speaks in his vehement but true and striking manner (*Kritik des modernen Zeitbewusstseins*, p. 245): 'There is an almost universal prejudice that mere humanity and morality will suffice without the Church. It is thought right to be horrified at all that is specifically Christian in Protestantism. . . . Many are just intelligent enough to perceive that the Church is still necessary for the common people, if they are not to get quite untractable, and that it is only the educated classes who are justified in emancipating themselves from its authority. Others, however, will never give up the hope of being able, by means of popular instruction, to screw the common people up to the level of the educated public. Such a disposition does good service to the destructive tendencies, and has hitherto, beyond all other agencies, contributed in times of repose to the promotion of revolution. With the avowed or secret consent of the educated public, unbelief has been increasingly diffused among the lower strata of society by means of the press, especially by worthless local papers. The number of those who no longer believe in anything is increasing enormously among the people. The efforts in a contrary direction of those who believe are suspected. If the Church acts independently, and without the consent of the State, a most fearful hierarchy is thought to be gaining ground. If the Church is supported by the State, the whole Philisterhood pitches its voice in the democratic key, and raises an outcry about reaction and violence done to conscience. The Philisterhood does not know what it is about, for it does not really desire revolution, while yet it is playing into its hand. It is like the wretched hedge-sparrow, constantly trembling at the gigantic cuckoo changeling in its nest, and yet with foolish affection continuing to nourish it and foster its growth. . . . How we can get on without God, and without the Church, will be seen when the last volcanic upheavals of revolution shall begin under the feet of the self-supported Philistines.'

Martensen (*Christliche Ethik*, p. 279) speaks in grave terms on the severance of principles which is being effected by the progress of culture: 'Humanity and liberty are said to be the watchword of the age; and this, *rightly understood*, expresses a demand sanctioned by Christianity itself. For the development of human freedom and of culture is rooted in the original destiny of the human race, and therefore in the divine plan for its education. This must not, however, constitute the final purpose, the highest end, but must be only one of the conditions, one of the means for the attainment of something far higher. In presence of all the emancipation now attained, and the grand development of natural powers now exhibited, the gospel never ceases to testify: 'If the Son shall make you free, then are ye free indeed.' In presence of the colossal wealth of culture, a treasure ever accumulating from age to age, the gospel of Christ unceasingly declares: 'Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.' Yes, it is a component element of genuine humanity, and of the human race itself, to thirst after God. . . . We stand before the most profound of all the contrasts which the history of our race has exhibited. For while, on the one hand, man is ever attaining more liberty and independence, and more firmly establishing and extending his dominion over the earth; and while, on the other, the gospel is unceasingly accompanying his path with the very same demands with which it first made its appearance in history, the great EITHER—OR is being the more emphatically pressed upon the choice of mankind: either in loving submission to let the kingdom of man be transfigured into the kingdom of God, or in selfish arrogance to try to set up that kingdom without and apart from the kingdom of God. . . . And when the great question of historical *progress* is raised, we are constrained to say, that the tension between these opposites increases ever more and more. . . . Hence the prayer, 'Thy kingdom come,' includes within it the true

view of all mental progress ; for in it we pray not only that the kingdom of God, but also that the true and genuine kingdom of humanity in its union with that of God, may come. . . . Emancipation, by the alliance of culture and civilisation, which are in our days regarded by many as the true tasks of history, and with which they hope to see at last the dawn of a golden age, does not absolutely constitute that progress which is all-decisive. The progress upon which all finally turns is the increase of the mutual relation between the actually existing kingdom of God, and the human race emancipated for liberty, education, and civilisation. And the ultimate purpose of all history, and therefore that which must be the object of all our efforts, is the *union* of the kingdom of mankind and the kingdom of God,—a union which involves the completion of the work of redemption and emancipation, by which latter term indeed we understand that genuine and holy emancipation from the powers of nature, and from all the unauthorized powers of the world, which is recognised by Christianity itself.'

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
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